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1. Large-Scale Mines 
and Local-Level Politics
COLIN FILER AND PIERRE-YVES LE MEUR1
Two Political Economies
Papua New Guinea (PNG) and New Caledonia (NC) have two key 
things in common. First, they both belong to the geopolitical region 
known as Melanesia, which was originally defined (by Europeans) in 
terms of the racial, linguistic and cultural characteristics of its indigenous 
population. Second, they have comparable levels of economic dependence 
on the extraction and export of mineral resources. In the past decade, 
the extractive industry sector has accounted for roughly 80 per cent of the 
value of PNG’s exports and more than 90 per cent of the value of NC’s 
exports. In most other respects, these two places are profoundly different.
PNG achieved its independence from Australia in 1975; NC is still 
technically part of France. Under the terms of the Nouméa Agreement 
of 1998, NC ceased to be an ‘overseas territory’ and became a ‘special 
collectivity’, and a referendum on full independence must be held by the 
end of 2018. Despite the current difference in political status, we shall 
refer to both of them as ‘countries’.
1  We thank Claire Levacher and Jean-Michel Sourisseau for their comments on a draft of this 
introductory chapter, but we take full responsibility for any mistakes remaining in this final version.
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PNG is much bigger than NC. In 2014, NC had a resident population 
of 268,767. The estimated population of PNG in that year was 30 times 
larger. The population of NC is roughly the same as the population of the 
Autonomous Region of Bougainville, whose government could hold its 
own referendum on full independence from PNG at the same time as the 
NC referendum.
PNG is also much poorer than NC. PNG’s gross national income per 
capita is less than US$2,500; the equivalent figure for NC is 15 times 
that amount. The distribution of cash incomes is highly unequal in both 
countries, but even poor people in NC would count as reasonably wealthy 
people in PNG. If cash incomes are left out of the equation, and human 
development is measured only by the standard health and education 
indicators in the United Nations Human Development Index, currently 
only 15 countries are worse off than PNG out of the 187 independent 
countries included in the rankings (UNDP and GoPNG 2014: 3).
The vast majority of people in PNG are descendants of the population 
that existed when the country was first subjected to European colonial 
administration in the nineteenth century, although the very small 
proportion of European or Asian descent wields a disproportionate 
influence over the country’s business activities. NC is more like Tasmania, 
in the sense that it was first established as a penal colony and then as 
a  settler colony, but a much larger proportion of the indigenous 
population survived this process of colonisation. Indigenous (Kanak) 
people now account for less than half of the resident population of NC, 
but still outnumber those of metropolitan French descent. The balance 
of the population in NC consists mainly of people who originate from 
Southeast Asia or other French Pacific territories.
Between 75 and 80  per cent of the population of PNG still live in 
traditional rural village communities, while the rest are distributed 
between large and small urban centres, peri-urban settlements and ‘rural 
non-villages’ such as oil palm estates and resettlement schemes. More 
than 60 per cent of the NC population live in urban areas, mostly in and 
around the capital of Nouméa. Indigenous people constitute the majority 
of NC’s rural population.
Given these similarities and differences, we can now pose the questions 
addressed in this volume as follows: is the relationship between large-
scale mines and local-level politics in PNG and NC quite similar, either 
because of the way that the mining industry nowadays deals with local 
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communities, or else because of the way that Melanesian communities 
deal with the mining industry? Or is the relationship quite different 
because of all the other differences between the two countries? To refine 
these questions, we need to briefly consider the way in which the mining 
industry is organised and regulated in these two countries, and the way in 
which the division of each country between political and administrative 
units, or their differing degrees of political independence, is related to the 
definition of a mine-affected area or a set of mine-affected communities. 
We may then proceed to develop a single conceptual framework through 
which to compare the relationship between large-scale mines and local-
level politics in different political and institutional settings.
Large-Scale Mining Operations
A large-scale mining operation is here defined, for the sake of argument, 
as one that produces mineral commodities with an average value of more 
than US$100 million a year for a period of at least ten years. Although 
the title of this volume features the concept of a ‘large-scale mine’, we do 
not think of a ‘mine’ as a place where mineral resources are extracted from 
the ground, but rather as a group of excavation and processing activities 
that are integrated into a single whole by means of a network of corporate 
relationships between the producers. In PNG, each large-scale mining 
operation occupies and constitutes a distinctive territorial enclave within the 
country’s borders, with one place of excavation, one processing plant and 
one route by which the product leaves the country. In NC, the situation is 
somewhat different because one of its three processing plants derives its raw 
material from a number of distinct excavation sites located in different parts 
of the country. Furthermore, some of this raw material is actually exported 
to a fourth processing plant located overseas that is predominantly owned 
by a company based in NC, so it is ownership and control of one or more 
refineries that constitutes the core of each large-scale mining operation.
In calculating the contribution of extractive industry to PNG’s exports, 
we have included a petroleum project that has been exporting oil on this 
scale since 1992, and this has recently been supplemented by a liquid 
natural gas project whose contribution to the value of PNG’s exports will 
be much greater. However, for the purpose of the present volume, we have 
excluded oil and gas projects from our definition of a ‘mining operation’: 
first because the mining and petroleum industries are subject to different 
forms of regulation in PNG; and second because NC does not yet have an 
operational petroleum industry with which to make a comparison.
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PNG has hosted seven large-scale mining projects in the period since 
independence, five of which are still in operation.2 The Panguna gold and 
copper mine operated from 1972 to 1989, when it was forcibly closed by 
civil unrest on the island of Bougainville. The Misima gold mine (in Milne 
Bay Province) operated from 1986 to 2004. The Ok Tedi gold and copper 
mine (in Western Province) began production in 1984; the Porgera gold 
mine (in Enga Province) in 1992; the Lihir gold mine (in New Ireland 
Province) in 1997; the Hidden Valley gold mine (in Morobe Province) 
in 2009; and the Ramu nickel and cobalt mine (in Madang Province) in 
2013. The Ok Tedi, Porgera and Hidden Valley mines are all scheduled 
to close within the next decade. A large-scale seabed mining project has 
been approved for development but is not yet operational. Four other 
prospective large-scale mining projects (in Milne Bay, Morobe, Madang 
and West Sepik provinces) are currently undergoing feasibility studies, 
and the Autonomous Bougainville Government has plans to reopen the 
Panguna mine if it can mobilise popular support for this to happen.
The large-scale mining industry in NC produces only one commodity, 
nickel, which means that the country’s economy is especially vulnerable to 
fluctuations in its price. The main island (Grand Terre) accounts for roughly 
9 per cent of global nickel production, and still contains between 10 and 
30 per cent of the world’s known reserves of this mineral, despite the fact 
that it has been mined since 1873. Since the 1930s, NC’s mining landscape 
has been dominated by a company called Société Le Nickel (SLN), which 
was founded in 1880 and controlled by the Rothschild Bank from 1888 
to 1974. Following a bailout by the French Government, it came under 
the control of a newly established French company called Eramet in 1985. 
The core of this operation is the Doniambo processing plant in Nouméa, 
which derives its raw material from four different mine sites. In recent 
years, the SLN complex has been joined by two other large-scale mining 
and processing operations—the Koniambo project in North Province and 
the Goro project in South Province.3
2  It has also hosted a number of medium-scale projects with lower production values, most 
of which have operated for only a few years.
3  The nickel mining industry in NC also contains a number of small- and medium-scale mining 
companies, known as petits mineurs, which are not controlled by one of the three big operators, and 
which tend to move in and out of the supply chain, or raise and lower the volume of their output, 
with fluctuations in the nickel price (Freyss 1995). These companies have been the focus of recent 
political debate about the grant of permits for the export of nickel ore to be refined in China.
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The PNG Government reserves the right to purchase anything up 
to 30 per  cent of the equity in any mining project for which it grants 
a development licence, but has generally ended up with a smaller stake or 
no stake at all. The balance of the shares in all large-scale mining projects 
has normally been held by foreign investors, including the companies that 
operate them, but the Ok Tedi project is now an exception to this rule 
because the former operator (BHP Billiton) decided that it was a liability 
rather than an asset. When the government has purchased a  stake in a 
large-scale mining project, all or part of it has commonly been held in 
trust for the provincial government, local-level government or landowning 
community that hosts the project. These other entities are allowed to 
choose whether they wish the national government to exercise this option 
on their behalf.
The PNG Government currently holds a 5 per cent stake in the Porgera 
project, which is operated by the Canadian company Barrick Gold, 
and this stake is held in trust for the Enga Provincial Government and 
the local landowners. A comparable stake in the Lihir project, which is 
operated by the Australian company Newcrest, was acquired and then sold 
by the local landowners. The government did not exercise the option to 
purchase shares in either the Hidden Valley project, which is also operated 
by Newcrest, or in the Ramu project, which is operated by the China 
Metallurgical Group Corporation. BHP Billiton bequeathed its shares in 
the Ok Tedi project to a charitable trust known as the PNG Sustainable 
Development Program, but this entity was nationalised in 2013, so this 
project is now wholly owned by the government.
State participation in NC’s three large-scale nickel mining operations is 
organised through the three provinces.4 Together they own 34 per cent of 
the SLN complex and 5 per cent of the Goro project, which is operated 
by the Brazilian company Vale. The Koniambo project has a very different 
complexion because it is the result of a political initiative that was part 
of the process of ‘negotiated decolonisation’ initiated by the Nouméa 
Agreement in 1998. This project is operated by the Swiss company 
Glencore (formerly Xstrata), but 51 per cent of the equity is controlled 
by the Kanak-dominated North Province through its majority of shares 
4  While each province has its own elected assembly and its own administration, the word 
‘government’ (gouvernement) is not applied to this level of political organisation. Although such 
entities would be recognised as ‘provincial governments’ in PNG, we shall here follow the French 
practice of assigning political agency to ‘provinces’ and ‘provincial authorities’.
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in a company called Société Minière du Sud Pacifique (SMSP), which was 
formerly part of the SLN complex. SMSP also holds a 51 per cent stake 
in a nickel refinery in South Korea, and is planning a similar investment 
in a second refinery in China. The Korean refinery derives some of its 
raw material from excavation sites owned and operated by SMSP, so the 
SMSP complex currently consists of two refineries and their suppliers.
Development Agreements
The development of a large-scale mining project in PNG is framed by three 
different types of agreement that are normally negotiated in the following 
order. First, there is a compensation agreement between the holder of 
an exploration licence and the customary owners of the land covered by 
that licence. Since 97 per cent of the land in PNG is generally held to be 
customary land, there is no such thing as an exploration licence without 
customary landowners. Second, there is a development agreement (or 
mining development contract) between the national government and the 
project proponent based on feasibility studies that the proponent provides 
to the government. This type of agreement is linked to the production of 
an environmental impact statement that must also be approved by the 
national government. Third, there is a benefit-sharing agreement between 
the national government, the provincial and local-level government (or 
governments) hosting the project and the customary owners of the land 
required for development purposes, which is negotiated through an 
institution known as the development forum. The project proponent is 
also represented in the negotiation of this third type of agreement, but a 
development licence is not normally granted until it has been finalised. 
The first two types of agreement have been features of PNG’s mineral 
policy framework since independence in 1975; the third type was added 
in 1988 in response to political pressure from provincial governments and 
local community representatives (Filer 2008; Filer and Imbun 2009).
In PNG, development agreements have normally required that national 
participation be specified in training and localisation plans and business 
development plans whose implementation is then reported to the national 
government at regular intervals. These plans are subject to the ‘preferred 
area policy’, which has come to inform the negotiation of benefit-sharing 
agreements. The origins of the preferred area policy can be traced back to 
a pair of decisions made by the newly independent national government 
in 1976. The first decision was to repatriate a sum equivalent to the whole 
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of the royalty collected by the national government, in its capacity as the 
legal owner of subsurface mineral resources, to the province from which 
those resources were extracted. This decision was made in response to 
threats of secession from the province that hosted the Panguna mine, 
but it would have general application under the new system of provincial 
government that was put in place at the same time. The second decision 
was to oblige the future developer of the Ok Tedi mine to give preference 
in training, employment and business development to the people of the 
area most directly affected by the mining operation. This decision was 
not initially meant to have general application, nor did it apply to the 
Panguna mine. It was justified by the observation that the people living 
around the Ok Tedi mine were exceptionally poor and therefore deserved 
this form of affirmative action (Filer 2005; Filer and Imbun 2009).
Considerations of poverty and equity have long since disappeared from 
PNG’s preferred area policy. The allocation of royalties and the allocation 
of entitlements to training, employment and business development 
opportunities are now included in the range of benefits that are subject to 
benefit-sharing agreements through the development forum. In effect, the 
preferred area policy creates concentric rings of entitlement to a range of 
benefit streams that are subject to such agreements, including entitlements 
to training, employment and business development opportunities. The 
innermost ring is occupied by the customary owners of the land covered 
by development licences, the next by ‘project area people’ (however these 
might be defined), the next by the people or government of the host 
province, and the outermost ring by the population or government of the 
nation as a whole (Filer 2005). In the period since the development forum 
was invented in 1988, there has been a steady increase in the proportion 
of government revenues from each new resource project that is captured 
by organisations or individuals in the three inner circles of entitlement. 
Since 1993, the economic privilege bestowed on preferred areas has been 
compounded by a tax credit scheme for developers who supply social and 
economic infrastructure to local communities (Filer 2008).
There is no direct equivalent of the development forum in NC. Instead, 
there is a recent history of agreements between mining companies and 
indigenous communities or organisations, a separate history of agreements 
between mining companies and provinces or municipalities, and some 
instances of tripartite agreements between company, state and community 
representatives (Le Meur and Mennesson 2012). There is no clear division 
between ‘compensation agreements’ and ‘benefit-sharing agreements’, 
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and most agreements do not conform to the ideal type of a ‘community 
development agreement’ (O’Faircheallaigh 2013). If compensation and 
development agreements in PNG have come to be framed by national 
government laws and policies, the situation in NC is better described 
as one in which policies derive from the accumulation of agreements 
(Le Meur, Horowitz et al. 2013).
The recent history of development agreements and policies in NC’s 
mining sector cannot be understood in isolation from the politics of 
decolonisation. This was already evident when the Front de Libération 
Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS) identified the Koniambo project 
as the main vehicle for the redistribution of economic power that was 
envisaged by the Matignon-Oudinot Agreements of 1988. Before 
the Nouméa Agreement was signed in 1998, the FLNKS insisted on 
a separate agreement, known as the Bercy Agreement, which established 
the feasibility of the Koniambo project by means of an ‘exchange’ of ore 
bodies between SLN and SMSP.5 In 2002, the government agency in 
charge of land reform identified the ‘areas of influence’ of the clans with 
customary land rights around the future Koniambo project plant site at 
Vavouto. The result of this inquiry was an agreement under customary 
law that was designed to settle a dispute that had already caused the plant 
site to be relocated (Horowitz 2002), but also aimed to forestall any future 
disputes about the distribution of mining revenues, especially in the form 
of business opportunities for local enterprises. In this second respect, it 
seems to have set the precedent for a similar agreement made between 
Kanak leaders and SLN in 2004. Since 2007, SLN has been party to 
tripartite agreements that also involve the provincial and municipal 
authorities and thus enhance their regulatory powers over the mining 
industry. However, the provincial and municipal authorities were not 
party to the ‘Pact for the Sustainable Development of the Great South’ 
that Vale made with the representatives of local customary authorities 
and indigenous organisations in 2008, and which is widely regarded 
as another significant landmark in the mineral policy domain. Instead, 
Vale signed a  separate ‘Convention for Biodiversity Conservation’ with 
South Province in 2009. This might be regarded as a sort of compensation 
5  The Bercy Agreement was signed by representatives of the metropolitan and territorial governments 
as well as the companies involved in the transaction. The role of the French Government was critical in 
ensuring that this agreement survived the economic conditions that SLN sought to impose on it.
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agreement but, unlike compensation agreements in PNG, it was not an 
agreement made with the holders of customary land rights in the area 
affected by the Goro project.
Although questions of land tenure are linked to the participation of Kanak 
community leaders in development agreements with mining companies, 
they are not simply articulated in terms of an ‘ideology of landownership’ 
(Filer 1997), mainly because mining projects have been developed on 
public land. However, there has been a general shift from demands for the 
recognition of customary land rights to demands for the recognition of 
a broader range of indigenous political rights, which include the right to 
make this type of agreement without making land claims (Le Meur 2010). 
In this respect, the situation of Kanak communities in NC resembles that 
of Aboriginal communities in Australia more than it resembles that of 
the ‘customary landowners’ who dominate PNG’s political system. But 
as customary institutions have become increasingly central to economic 
arrangements within (and beyond) NC’s mining sector, they have acquired 
greater complexity and have been subject to greater regulation. This is 
why development agreements with local or indigenous communities are 
not just compensation agreements or benefit-sharing agreements, but also 
political agreements. And while the development forum could in some 
ways be seen as the central institution in PNG’s current mineral policy 
framework, development agreements in NC’s mining sector have not 
played the same pivotal role in the formulation of mineral policy.
Local-Level Politics
There is no simple answer to the question of what actually constitutes the 
‘local’ level at which large-scale mining operations become the subject 
of local-level politics. There is no necessary correspondence between 
the boundaries of a mine-affected area and those of a set of political 
or administrative units, even if each mine-affected area is conceived as 
a unique geographical space surrounding a large-scale mine. The question 
of what actually constitutes a mine-affected area is itself a political 
question, especially if people’s inclusion in such an area entitles them to 
special consideration in the payment of compensation or the distribution 
of project-related benefits. Project operators have an obvious interest 
in limiting the size of such an area in order to treat broader social and 
environmental impacts as externalities for which they cannot be held 
accountable. On the other hand, there may be some circumstances in 
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which the boundaries of the area affected by one project overlap those 
of the area affected by another project, and it is also possible to represent 
the areas affected by several different projects as part of a larger region 
which experiences the cumulative social and environmental impacts of 
all of them. As we have seen, the presence of three large-scale projects 
or complexes in NC’s nickel mining industry does not mean that there 
are only three geographical areas that count as areas affected by their 
operation.
Since the population and the land mass of NC are both smaller than 
those of the average province in PNG, the gap between the practice of 
politics at different levels of political organisation is also bound to be 
much smaller, especially when it concerns the costs and benefits of 
three large-scale mining projects that make such a big difference to the 
national economy.6 But the internal political divisions of the country are 
not without their own significance. South Province contains 75 per cent 
of the total population, as well as two of the three nickel refineries; 
North Province contains 18 per cent of the population, one refinery and 
several different mine sites;7 while Loyalty Islands Province contains the 
remaining 7 per cent of the population and no mining operations at all. 
The whole country is divided into 33 municipalities or communes, in 
the normal French manner, but the indigenous Kanak population is also 
divided between eight ‘customary areas’, each of which has two elected 
representatives in the country’s Customary Senate, and 57 traditional 
‘districts’, each of which has a ‘big chief ’.8 These political spaces can be 
distinguished from each other by the form and extent of their engagement 
with the politics of the large-scale mining industry.
Given that Kanaks account for roughly three-quarters of the population 
of North Province, but only one-quarter of the population of South 
Province, it is understandable that the large-scale mining industry has 
become the focus of a specific form of local-level politics that is part of the 
process of ‘negotiated decolonisation’ initiated by the Nouméa Agreement. 
6  The same point would apply to the Autonomous Region of Bougainville if it were to become 
an independent country.
7  The SLN refinery (at Doniambo) draws its raw material from several different mine sites. Only 
one of these (Thio) is in South Province, while the others are in North Province.
8  When a municipality contains more than one traditional district, the name of the municipality 
may be the same as the name of one of its component districts. All but one of the 33 municipalities 
belong to one of the three provinces, and all but one of the 57 districts belong to one of the eight 
customary areas.
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Development of the Koniambo project in North Province is seen as a way 
of ‘rebalancing’ the distribution of economic power between the north 
and the south in order to compensate for the colonial marginalisation 
of the indigenous population by enabling them to develop their own 
economic policies and public investment strategies. On the other hand, 
the development of the Goro project in South Province has offered new 
scope for political parties opposed to independence to argue that further 
decolonisation could discourage foreign investment,9 while Kanak people 
living in the area affected by this project have mobilised a discourse of 
indigenous rights that looks like a ‘weapon of the weak’ (Scott 1985) in 
a context where they have not had the same amount of bargaining power.
Since the French Government’s contribution to public expenditure in 
NC accounts for 15 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product, the 
trade-off between this ‘administrative rent’ and revenues from the mining 
industry has become a key issue in both national and local-level politics. 
From an economic point of view, the administrative rent compensates 
for shortfalls in mineral revenues during periods when nickel prices are 
abnormally low. From a political point of view, there is a complex game 
in which both sides try to demonstrate their superiority in managing the 
trade-off. The loyalist parties claim that the NC Government’s ability 
to manage the mining industry is an indirect function of the subsidies 
it continues to receive from the metropolitan government, since these 
contribute to the country’s high standard of living. On the other side, 
the pro-independence parties claim that a Kanak-dominated province 
has shown a superior capacity to manage the mining industry in ways 
that reduce the need for metropolitan subsidies and hence pave the way 
for economic, as well as political, independence. The pro-independence 
parties also advocate a form of state capitalism in opposition to the 
economic liberalism that is generally favoured by the loyalist parties, and 
that in turn entails a difference in their understanding of the relationship 
between local-level politics and economic policy.
As befits a much larger country, PNG has four tiers or levels of political 
organisation. The second tier consists of the National Capital District, 
20 provinces and one autonomous region (Bougainville) that used to be 
a province. Each of these 22 entities has its own elected representative 
in the national parliament and 21 of these representatives are known as 
9  The anti-independence bloc contains divergent views about the desirable level of public 
participation in the SLN complex.
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governors.10 At the next level down, there are 89 ‘open electorates’, also 
with their own elected representatives in the national parliament, three of 
which are subdivisions of the national capital, while the rest are known 
as districts in their own right. The fourth tier comprises 332 local-level 
governments, each with its own directly elected president who participates 
in decisions made at the district and provincial levels, but not at the 
national level. Twenty-nine of these local governments represent towns, 
most of which are provincial capitals, while the rest represent rural areas.11
Since most of PNG’s provinces do not host a large-scale mining project, 
nor any of the facilities associated with the export of oil and gas, there 
is an ongoing political debate about the way that national revenues 
from the extractive industry sector should be distributed between the 
minority of project-hosting provinces and districts and the majority that 
cannot currently claim ownership of such a project. The point at issue 
here is the so-called ‘derivation principle’, which says that a national 
government should transfer some of the revenue it derives from any 
economic activity to the lower levels of government responsible for the 
area where the activity occurs so that these lower levels of government 
will have an incentive to support this activity. This is a national issue, 
not a  local one, and is only indirectly connected to the distribution of 
revenues from foreign aid. Foreign aid now accounts for only 3 per cent 
of PNG’s gross domestic product, and its distribution across the country 
could not possibly compensate for the effects of the preferred area policy, 
even if policymakers thought this would be a good idea.
In the context of the mining industry in PNG, local-level politics seems to 
have a quite distinctive focus on the negotiation and implementation of 
promises to provide compensation and benefit packages to the customary 
owners of land in mine-affected areas, but also on the distribution of the 
contents of these packages among the people who are entitled to a share of 
them. The size of the enclaves that are demarcated for this purpose varies 
from one project to another, but the boundaries may also change during 
the course of the project cycle. At one extreme is the Lihir group of islands, 
which is comparable in size and population to Loyalty Islands Province in 
NC, but accounts for just one of the ten local government areas in PNG’s 
10  The Autonomous Bougainville Government has an elected president whose office is distinct 
from that of the regional member of the national parliament, so the latter is not known as the 
governor of the autonomous region.
11  There are no local governments in the National Capital District, but there is an ‘assembly’ that 
represents the district’s indigenous population.
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New Ireland Province. At the other extreme is the area now recognised 
as the one affected by the Ok Tedi mine, which has grown to include all 
or part of ten out of the 14 local government areas in Western Province, 
and whose physical extent is greater than the whole of NC’s land mass. 
The larger the scale of a mine-affected area, the greater the scope for it to 
be internally divided into separate geographical zones, each of which may 
then become the site of a distinct set of political activities related to the 
mining project that affects it.
A mining enclave or mine-affected area cannot be neatly demarcated by 
lines on a map in the same way that a mine site or plant site is bounded 
and guarded by fences, gates and signposts. It is also constituted in an 
institutional and ideological sense, by means of its connections with 
different political and administrative levels and spaces. These connections 
can be made of legal rules or administrative norms, the distribution 
of shareholdings in different companies, networks of patronage or 
clientelism, or the positions assigned to the practice or promise of mining 
in different political imaginations (Le Meur, Ballard et al. 2013). The 
multidimensional nature of the mining enclave or mine-affected area 
therefore means that local-level politics is not simply politics conducted 
within a particular physical space, or even at one level of political 
organisation.
Stakeholders, Actors and Characters
Politics is not like football. The people who ‘play politics’ around the 
mining industry, at any level of political organisation, are not themselves 
organised into teams that simply pass a ball of power between them until 
they score a goal against the other side. World Bank functionaries may 
like to represent themselves as referees in this sort of contest (Szablowski 
2007), but sporting metaphors cannot do justice to the social and 
economic context in which different groups of political actors take to 
a political field, nor to the way in which their relationships develop once 
they get there.
The Triangular Model
During the 1990s, the politics of the large-scale mining industry came 
to be regarded, in several quarters, as a triangular contest between the 
representatives of mining companies, government agencies and local 
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communities (Ballard and Banks 2003). In the case of developing 
countries, this triangular model of political relationships could be seen 
as a substitute for the previous binary or bipolar model in which the 
representatives of national governments contested the terms of large-
scale resource development with the representatives of multinational 
corporations (Girvan 1976; Bosson and Varon 1977; Cobbe 1979; Faber 
and Brown 1980; O’Faircheallaigh 1984). But in the case of capitalist 
countries, the new triangle replaced an older triangle in which local 
communities were represented as communities of mineworkers engaged in 
a class struggle with their employers, while governments were represented 
as umpires in the contest or more often as supporters of the ruling class 
(Dennis et al. 1969; Burawoy 1972; Bulmer 1975; Gordon 1977; Nash 
1979; Williams 1981; Robinson 1986; Moodie with Ndatshe 1994; Finn 
1998). So what had really changed if there were still three parties to the 
contest?
The end of the Cold War is only one part of the answer to this question. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the mining industry underwent a process 
of modernisation that had several different aspects, each of which had 
its own political repercussions. The process did not begin and end in the 
space of 20 years in every single part of the global mineral economy, but 
it went far enough to change the political complexion of the industry 
in those regions and countries where new mining projects were being 
developed.
The new mines were typically open-cut (or open-cast) mines in which 
huge machines were applied to the excavation of very large holes in the 
ground, and the material excavated from these holes was then subjected 
to a complex sequence of mechanical and chemical operations in order to 
separate specific mineral commodities from much larger volumes of waste 
material. The mechanisation and partial automation of different aspects 
of the process of extraction was accompanied by an increase in the capital 
cost of constructing new mines at any particular scale, which added to the 
cost and complexity of feasibility studies undertaken in advance of mine 
construction, and made mining companies more dependent on capital 
markets to finance the cost of construction. But an increase in the rate 
of extraction or ‘throughput’ also had the effect of shortening the overall 
period of time that it would take to exhaust an ore body of any particular 
size, and thus gave rise to a form of planned obsolescence in which the 
lifetime of a new mine had to be calculated before it could be financed 
and constructed.
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Since many of the new mines were developed in regions remote from 
existing centres of population and industry, where the costs of exploration 
were correspondingly high, mining companies sought ways to reduce 
or avoid the additional cost of building and operating a new township 
to accommodate their workforce, mindful of the fact that such a town 
might serve no useful purpose at the end of an operation abbreviated 
by the increased scale and rate of extraction. As the cost of air transport 
fell relative to the other costs of exploration, construction and operation, 
mining companies developed a preference for what came to be known 
as a ‘fly-in/fly-out’ form of employment, in which most of the workers 
are flown from their point of recruitment to the mine site at intervals of 
less than one month, work on the mine for several days at a stretch while 
sleeping in dormitories, and are then flown out for ‘field breaks’ in their 
normal places of residence (Jackson 1987; Brealey et al. 1988; Storey and 
Shrimpton 1988; Houghton 1993; Storey 2001; Markey 2010).
This last feature of the process of modernisation is clearly evident in 
PNG, where the Ok Tedi project was the last one to incorporate plans 
for a conventional mining town when construction started in 1982. It is 
much less evident in NC, where the ‘fly-in/fly-out’ form of employment 
has only been characteristic of the construction phase of the Koniambo 
and Goro projects.12 Most of the workers employed in the operation of 
the nickel mining industry are local residents who commute to work on 
a daily basis.13 This can readily be explained by the number of production 
sites scattered around a very small country, and by the quality of the road 
transport network, which is much better than that encountered in any 
province of PNG. In this respect, the large-scale mining industry in PNG 
seems rather more ‘modern’ than its counterpart in NC for the somewhat 
paradoxical reason that PNG is a less developed country. Furthermore, 
the SLN complex, in contrast to the Koniambo and Goro projects, has 
a rather ‘traditional’ mode of operation because it has been operating for 
such a long time.
Regardless of these differences, we still need to consider the political 
repercussions of this process of modernisation in those places where one 
or more of its features have been in evidence.
12  About 7,000 workers were employed in the construction of each of these projects. Most were 
recruited from Asian countries (Philippines, China, South Korea and Thailand) under special (and 
some would say unfair) labour regulations.
13  The Koniambo and Goro construction camps are still partially occupied by local workers who 
work and sleep on site for four or five days at a time and then have two or three days at home.
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Since the modernisation of the mining industry was accompanied by the 
globalisation of all sorts of capital, the new generation of mining projects 
entailed a surge in development agreements between foreign mining 
companies and national governments claiming ownership of the mineral 
resources that were the targets of their investment (Bridge 2004). In the 
negotiation of these agreements, national government representatives 
generally tried to maximise the national share of the rents or benefits 
without creating too much of a dent in the surplus left over for distribution 
to foreign shareholders and thus making other countries more attractive 
as investment targets (Daniels et al. 2010).
At the same time, the growth in the scale and rate of extraction made the 
new generation of mining projects a sitting target for a new generation of 
environmental activists, and thus put additional pressure on government 
and company representatives to negotiate a second trade-off between 
the distribution of economic benefits and environmental costs (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998). The institutionalisation of environmental impact 
assessment was one aspect of this second form of negotiation (Paehlke and 
Torgerson 1990; Petts 1999), but this did not happen overnight, so the 
new generation of mining projects caused a great deal of environmental 
damage (and political conflict) before they were subjected to more effective 
forms of environmental regulation.
In those countries where national governments began to attach 
environmental conditions to development agreements with foreign 
mining companies, the prior process of environmental impact assessment 
sometimes involved a parallel process of social impact assessment 
and a form of consultation with the representatives of mine-affected 
communities (Little and Krannich 1988; Howitt 1989; Joyce and 
MacFarlane 2001). When these communities were identified as groups of 
people who would suffer most of the negative impacts of a new mining 
project, efforts could be made to compensate them for the damage, or 
even to provide them with a special share of the national economic benefit 
derived from the project. But considerations of environmental justice were 
rarely sufficient to grant the representatives of such communities a seat at 
the high table of project negotiations unless they could also be represented 
as indigenous communities with a special attachment to the land and other 
things that would be damaged or destroyed (Geisler et al. 1982; Hobart 
1984; Howard 1988; Chase 1990; O’Faircheallaigh 1991, 2002; Howitt 
2001; Downing et al. 2002). The third point in the new triangle was 
thus assembled from a combination of demands for environmental justice 
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and for recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples (Horowitz 2011). 
However, it is worth noting that Kanak political parties have been wary 
of the idea that Kanaks belong to separate ‘indigenous communities’, 
whether or not they be mine-affected communities, in case this weakens 
the political case for national independence.
It should now be clear that this type of community bears little 
resemblance to the traditional community of mineworkers. It is true that 
the compensation and benefit package delivered to members of a mine-
affected community might include a provision for them to be granted 
special access to employment on the mining project, but this would not 
establish much in the way of a common interest with members of the 
workforce recruited from other places, especially if those other workers 
were long-distance commuters who had their own families or communities 
somewhere else. In effect, mine-affected communities had now come to 
be defined as communities united by the social relations of compensation, 
not by the social relations of employment, even if jobs are still understood 
to be part and parcel of a compensation package.
This does not mean that the political repercussions of the process of 
modernisation were self-evident to all the relevant actors at each stage 
in this process. By 1990, some actors in the mineral policy process were 
starting to think along these lines because of their engagement with the 
interests and concerns of mine-affected communities. But there had to be 
moments of political crisis before the new model of political relationships 
could be firmly established as a feature of that process at all levels of 
political organisation. One such moment was the ‘community rebellion’ 
that forced the closure of the Panguna copper mine in 1989.
The Lessons of Panguna
The construction, operation and closure of the Panguna copper mine on 
the island of Bougainville, in the period from 1967 to 1989, provides 
a clear illustration of the process of modernisation and its political 
repercussions. But, in this case, the illustration also served to inform 
the new model of stakeholder politics that was applied to the large-scale 
mining industry at a global scale.
The Panguna mine exemplified the technical innovations that were typical 
of the new generation of open-cut mining projects. However, because 
it was commissioned at the very start of the process of modernisation, 
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no environmental conditions were attached to the licences granted by 
the Australian colonial administration, so the mine was designed to 
discharge its waste material directly into the Jaba River. The construction 
of this most modern mine was also accompanied by the construction of 
a modern mining town to accommodate the families of a workforce with 
multiple technical skills. Long-distance commuting was not yet thought 
to be an economic option for the employment of this type of workforce.
In the short period of time between self-government in 1973 and full 
independence from Australia in 1975, representatives of the new nation-
state renegotiated the Bougainville Copper Agreement that it inherited 
from the colonial administration and, in so doing, made PNG look like 
a very smart young Third World country (O’Faircheallaigh 1984). But 
the resulting increase in the national share of the incomes generated by 
the new mining project was just one aspect of a longer policy process that 
also established a set of rules to govern the distribution of these incomes 
between different groups of national stakeholders. These groups included 
national members of the mining workforce, the customary owners of land 
leased to the mining company and the people of Bougainville (or North 
Solomons) Province.14 Representatives of the national government and the 
mining company thought that this process had been completed by 1980.
The outbreak of the Bougainville rebellion in 1989 was the start of an 
entirely new policy process that was not confined by national borders. 
It was the first in a sequence of ‘bad events’ that eventually forced the 
captains of the global mining industry to articulate new standards of 
corporate social responsibility (MMSD 2002; Filer et al. 2008). But 
the lessons of the rebellion were not easy to learn, since it was not 
clear whether and how it might have been caused by the negligence of 
Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL). Some observers blamed the Australian 
colonial administration for approving the development of the mine 
without regard for what Bougainvilleans wanted. Others blamed the 
national government for failing to share enough of the benefits of the 
renegotiated mining agreement with the provincial government or local 
landowners. Since the first phase of the rebellion was organised by a local 
landowner association, much attention was paid to the grievances that its 
14  The name ‘North Solomons’ was adopted by the local advocates of secession when PNG became 
independent in 1975, and was recognised by the PNG Government when the North Solomons 
Provincial Government was established in 1976. The previous name, ‘Bougainville’, has been restored 
as part of the peace process that has led to the grant of regional autonomy.
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leaders held against the mine itself. Were they upset about the influx of 
outsiders taking jobs or doing business with the mine; about the damage 
being caused to their own land or physical environment; or about the 
inability of their own social institutions to cope with a rapid process of 
social, economic and environmental change?
The reason that these questions are so hard to answer, even with the 
benefit of hindsight, is that the rebellion was not a single ‘event’ with 
a discrete set of causes. It was a local and provincial political process 
with deep historical roots that continued to evolve for years after it had 
triggered a set of national and global policy responses within the mining 
sector. If  all the local and provincial actors who were involved in this 
process at one time or another had shared a common set of interests and 
motivations, then the process would not have lasted for as long as it did 
(Regan 2003).
So what lessons were to be drawn from the events that forced the closure 
of the mine if the allocation of responsibility or blame is still contestable? 
The first lesson was that a disaffected mine-affected community had the 
power to close down a large-scale mining project if government forces 
were too weak to stop this from happening. The second was that a mining 
company could not always rely on a Third World government to police 
and enforce the compensation and benefit-sharing agreements under 
which it operated. From which followed a third lesson, that mining 
companies operating in fragile or chaotic political environments had to 
develop new strategies to manage relationships between all three groups 
of stakeholders in the triangle.
There may have been a fourth lesson, but it was not quite so obvious to 
external observers. It could be drawn from the fact that Francis Ona, the 
rebel leader, emerged from the ranks of BCL’s own workforce. He and 
some of his fellow mineworkers were not only members of the landowner 
association that demanded huge amounts of monetary compensation 
from the company in 1988; they were also responsible for escalating 
acts of sabotage against the infrastructure of the mine that culminated 
in the outbreak of armed conflict at the end of that year (Filer 1992). 
In this respect, the first phase of the rebellion was an ‘inside job’. In the 
second phase, the company was forced to close the mine because it could 
not guarantee the safety of its workforce; however, by that time, the 
rebellious landowners in the workforce were already on the other side of 
the fence. Nearly all of the workers who lost their jobs in 1989, including 
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many Bougainvilleans, left Bougainville to look for work elsewhere. 
The rebellion did not serve their economic interests at all, but nor was it 
inspired by rational economic calculations on the part of the rebels, and 
that is one reason why the government and the company were unable to 
contain it. So the lesson would be that recruitment of more workers from 
a mine-affected community is not necessarily sufficient to compensate 
for the negative impact of a mining project on their society and their 
environment.
The Fourth Corner
The most obvious lessons of Panguna helped to inform the efforts of the 
World Bank to persuade mining companies and national governments 
to form a new kind of ‘public–private partnership’ to deal with the 
social and environmental impacts of large-scale mining projects on local 
communities. To this end, the bank’s own mining department sponsored 
a series of regional ‘mining and community’ conferences, one of which 
was held in PNG in 1998. The bank’s interest in this matter was not the 
direct result of its previous engagement with the mining sector in PNG or 
in other developing countries, but was part of a wider effort to show how 
much it cared about ‘sustainable development’. In this respect, the bank 
was responding to public criticism of the social and environmental impacts 
of a sequence of major infrastructure projects that it had funded during 
the 1980s (Rich 1994; Wade 1997; Fox and Brown 1998; Clark et al. 
2003). It was now in the business of sharing the lessons of that experience 
with an audience of investors and regulators whose complacency had been 
shaken by a set of scandals and disasters in their own backyards.
The paradox in the World Bank’s embrace of the triangular model of 
stakeholder relationships is that the bank’s own stake does not clearly 
belong in any of the three corners. And the bank is not alone. A range of 
other stakeholders from outside the triangle got mixed up in the politics 
of the large-scale mining industry during the course of the 1990s. Ballard 
and Banks (2003: 304) describe this as a ‘fourth estate’ comprising ‘a wide 
variety of NGOs, financial intermediaries, lawyers, business partners, and 
consultants’. So why not simply replace the triangle with a rectangle, call 
the fourth corner ‘society’, and let the World Bank be part of it?
There seem to be two main reasons why academic observers have hesitated 
to take this step. The first is the risk of confusion between ‘society’ and 
‘civil society’. If we think of civil society in the old-fashioned way, as the 
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set of institutions or organisations that do not belong to the state or 
the church, then mining companies could be part of it, and so could 
landowner associations, perhaps even the World Bank. But when people 
now talk about the relationship between civil society and the mining 
industry, or civil society and the World Bank, this is clearly not the usage 
that they have in mind. In their usage, ‘civil society’ simply refers to 
a group of critics or enemies of whatever institutions or organisations are 
on the other end of the relationship. In its most inclusive form, the phrase 
has thus come to stand for all those stakeholders who are opposed to the 
power of capital in all its manifestations and therefore do not wish to be 
seen as ‘stakeholders’ at all.15
Those self-proclaimed members of ‘civil society’ who make it their 
business to attack the mining industry or the World Bank may claim that 
what they are doing is itself an essential feature of ‘neoliberal capitalism’ 
(Kirsch 2014). This may well be the case, but it does not mean that civil 
society, in this narrow sense, is the entity from which the targets of their 
attack have now decided to seek what they call their ‘social licence to 
operate’. Some captains of the mining industry discovered their need for 
such a licence at the same time that some World Bank officials began to 
sponsor ‘mining and community’ conferences. But there is an important 
sense in which the World Bank and other financial institutions were 
more significant members of the ‘society’ from which this licence was 
being sought than were the members of mine-affected communities or 
the members of ‘civil society’ who acted as the allies or advocates of those 
same communities.16 It is not necessary to believe that mining companies 
deserve a social licence to operate in order to appreciate that there is a large 
group of actors in the global mineral policy process whose values and 
opinions are now just as critical to the operation of the mining industry 
as those of national government or local community representatives 
(Dashwood 2013; Owen and Kemp 2013).17
15  Which is not to deny that the World Bank may have its own reasons for not wishing to be seen 
as a ‘stakeholder’.
16  Some scholars would regard the World Bank’s new-found enthusiasm for ‘community 
development’ as a straightforward manifestation of neoliberal governmentality (Rose 1999; Li 2007). 
We have taken a somewhat different position.
17  Recent literature on this subject has stressed the significance of local community support in 
corporate constructions of the ‘social licence’ (Parsons et al. 2014). Our argument would be that what 
matters here is the demonstration of community support to a wider social audience, since there is 
little point in demonstrating its existence to the very people from whom it has been acquired.
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The second reason why academic observers have hesitated to adopt 
‘society’ as the name of the ‘fourth estate’ is that it may be taken to imply 
that this is a group of actors or characters with a set of common interests 
that contrast with those of the other three groups. Each of the other three 
groups contains a set of organisations of the same general type, whose 
interests are represented in the way that they are organised. The fourth 
corner is not occupied by organisations of the same type, unless they are 
all assigned to the residual category of ‘non-governmental organisations’, 
so their interests may be as diverse as those of all the organisations in the 
first three corners. From the windows of the World Bank, it looks as if 
the global mining sector consists of a number of national governments, 
each with an agency dedicated to the regulation of the mining industry, 
a  greater number of mining companies large and small, and an even 
greater number of mine-affected communities, one for each of the 
mines that affect them. But there is no equivalent plurality of ‘societies’, 
because national (or subnational) societies are not the authorities from 
which mining companies seek to obtain their ‘social licence’.18 This is 
probably why the World Bank prefers to represent ‘civil society’ as a fuzzy 
set of actors who could be acting at any level of political organisation 
(Barma et al. 2012).
But even at the local level of political organisation that is invoked by the 
title of this volume, there is no large-scale mining project that involves 
just one company, one government agency or even one mine-affected 
community. Instead, there is a corporate space, a government space and 
a community space, each of which is liable to be occupied by a number 
of organisations or agencies in different relationships with each other, 
some of which count as political relationships, and within each of these 
organisations or agencies there are more political relationships. The ‘social 
space’ may be a residual space, but it is hardly any different in this regard, 
unless we assume or discover that all the people who enter it only do so 
as allies or supporters of people who occupy one of the other three spaces, 
in which case the fourth space virtually disappears.
The basic problem here is to justify the claim that the space occupied 
by the politics of the large-scale mining industry, at any level of political 
organisation, has any specific shape at all. If politics goes on inside each 
of the organisations that occupy this space, as well as between them, 
18  For example, no such licence can be obtained from the ‘societies’ of PNG, NC, France, Melanesia.
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then it is surely possible for groups of political actors to be assembled in 
many different ways in relationship to many different issues. In that case, 
why should the number of such groups not vary from place to place and 
time to time? Our argument would be that a rectangular representation 
of stakeholder relationships in the large-scale mining industry is not in 
itself an essential and permanent feature of ‘neoliberal capitalism’, but is 
just a way of representing the conventional wisdom that currently reflects 
a specific process of economic and technological change at multiple levels 
of political organisation. That said, we still need to think of more specific 
ways to represent what political actors actually do with their political 
relationships, and how these activities vary from one mine site to another.
The Problem of Collective Agency
In their recent studies of local-level politics at two mine sites in PNG 
and Indonesia, Alex Golub and Marina Welker both pose the problem of 
collective agency by asking how individual actors get to ‘enact a mining 
company’ or ‘personate a mine’ (Golub 2014; Welker 2014). Both clearly 
recognise that the internal constitution of a mining company is not 
sufficient to explain the political behaviour of its employees, either in 
their dealings with each other or in political relationships with external 
actors who are enacting, impersonating or representing government 
agencies, landowner associations or tribal communities. All such 
collective entities, organised or otherwise, are subject to an ongoing social 
process of construction, deconstruction and reconstruction, from within 
and without.
Both authors also recognise that the boundaries of such entities are not 
always clearly demarcated, in the sense that some actors are able to represent 
both sides of the relationship between two such entities in two different 
corners of our rectangular model. One obvious and common example 
of such a ‘conflict of interest’ would be the community affairs manager 
recruited by a mining company from the community whose affairs he is 
supposed to manage. Francis Ona is another case in point. He was not 
a community affairs manager. Indeed, he elected to work night shifts so 
that he could spend part of the day harassing the occupants of BCL’s 
Village Relations Office. Some might say that he was only a political actor 
in his capacity as secretary of the Panguna Landowners Association, but 
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that would miss the point. BCL kept him on the payroll precisely because 
of his leadership role in the mine-affected community, but this just gave 
him more power to disrupt the company’s operations.
Golub and Welker both see their case studies as applications of actor-
network theory (Callon and Latour 1981; Latour 2004), but they also 
echo the agent-based or actor-oriented form of political anthropology 
that was exemplified in the work of scholars like Turner (1957), Epstein 
(1958), Barth (1959) and Bailey (1969). Turner’s conception of political 
process as social drama is especially pertinent here because it entails 
a  clear distinction between actors and the roles or characters or masks 
that they adopt. In this way, we avoid the semantic confusion implicit 
in the concept of a ‘state actor’ or a ‘company actor’. The ‘stakeholders’ 
who inhabit the four corners of our rectangular model are not groups of 
actors; they are groups of roles or characters that constitute the structure 
of a political domain. Actors move between these positions at intervals 
that can vary from an hour to a decade and, in so doing, can function 
as brokers or gatekeepers at numerous points of intersection between 
the four corners (Boissevain 1974; Long 1989; Bierschenk et al. 2000). 
The frequency of such movement in the domain occupied by the large-
scale mining industry has accelerated with the process of modernisation 
and globalisation. And that is one reason why the political process or 
drama in which the actors are engaged has accelerated the transformation 
of the political structure that is the stage on which they act. This is how 
the politics of the large-scale mining industry are subject to the process 
known as ‘structuration’ (Giddens 1979). The Bougainville rebellion was 
a perfect illustration of it.
From this point of view, we should be wary of the idea that local-level 
politics is simply part of the impact that large-scale mining projects have 
on people living in mine-affected areas. It may be true that the presence 
of a mining project intensifies relations of competition and conflict 
between the members of one or more local communities, and causes 
new kinds of argument about who counts as a community member or 
representative. But one of the lessons of Panguna is that this sort of impact 
need not reduce the capacity of such people to make life difficult for other 
stakeholders or transform the political structure of the industry at a level 
beyond that of the locality in which they are situated.
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The destabilisation of this political structure adds a new significance 
to the point made many years ago, that local-level politics, as opposed 
to ‘purely local’ politics, is by definition a form of politics in which some 
of the actors also act at other levels of political organisation (Swartz 1968). 
As actors in the world of mining politics have changed their characters or 
hats with ever greater frequency, so has there been a growth in the number 
of such actors who play different parts at different levels of political 
organisation, in what Kirsch (2014) calls the ‘politics of scale’. This is 
largely a function of rapid change in the technology of communication, 
not in the technology or organisation of the mining industry. But it does 
have the effect of reinforcing the position of the ‘mine-affected community’ 
as the key point of reference in the definition of what counts as ‘local-level 
politics’, even when representatives of that community engage in political 
relationships with other stakeholders outside the area where the mine site 
or the plant site is located (Bebbington 2013).
Politics and Power
If we have so far made an argument about the way that political relationships 
around the large-scale mining industry have been transformed by a process 
of economic and technological change, we still need to say more about 
what actually constitutes political activity within this set of relationships. 
We have suggested that politics necessarily involves conflict, and seems 
to involve the exercise of power, but we have not clearly stated what the 
conflict is about, except to say that it often features demands for greater 
local control over large-scale mining projects, and the only thing we have 
said about power is that some of it ‘belongs’ to mine-affected communities.
Two Big Issues
The main reason why the political structure of the large-scale mining 
industry has a well-defined shape, even while it has been destabilised, is 
that stakeholders are not contesting an indeterminate number of political 
issues. There are only two big issues at stake here. The first involves 
the distribution of the economic, social and environmental costs and 
benefits of a large-scale mining project. The second involves the problem 
of representation, impersonation or structuration.
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The distributional issue encompasses the social relations of compensation, 
since that is the way that it typically appears to people representing the 
interests of a mine-affected community. It does not encompass workplace 
relations or the social relations of production, except insofar as the wages 
paid by mining companies or their contractors count as part of the larger 
package of costs and benefits that is being contested. The modernisation of 
the industry has split the wage-earners between two groups. On one hand 
there are those, like Francis Ona, who move back and forth between the 
community and the company, and can become political actors in one or 
both of these spaces. On the other hand, there are those who do not count 
as members of a mine-affected community, and therefore cannot claim 
to represent it. The terms and conditions of employment at a modern 
mine site are rarely such as to unite workers in both camps in a political 
contest with company managers, unless we allow that a ‘modern’ mining 
operation can have lasted long enough to unite them.
The prominence of the distributional issue as a political issue explains why 
the process of environmental (and socioeconomic) impact assessment 
is necessarily a political process, even if it is carried out in a technical 
or superficial manner (O’Faircheallaigh 1992). In most countries, this 
process is a legal hurdle that a mining company has to jump over in order 
to extract a development licence from a national government, and in 
many countries, the government has little capacity to hold a company 
to account for the impact of its operations once the licence has been 
granted.19 However, there are other institutions that have been created 
to accommodate the distributional contest at different levels of political 
organisation, and some of them remain active throughout the mining 
project cycle.
The representational issue is really just one aspect of the distributional issue, 
since it revolves around the question of how individuals get themselves or 
each other into roles in which they can participate in the contest over the 
distribution of costs and benefits as the representatives of whole groups of 
other people. For reasons already explained, this issue takes on a life of its 
own because of the frequency with which political actors move between 
representative roles, and the consequent appearance of multiple ‘conflicts 
19  NC’s new mining code (issued in 2009) constitutes an attempt to overcome this limitation by 
demanding that mining companies produce long-term action plans covering the entire process of mine 
closure and its aftermath, but the PNG Government has been making similar demands for more than 
three decades while still losing the capacity to hold companies to account for their implementation.
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of interest’. The representational issue often raises questions of authority or 
legitimacy, but these questions are best addressed in an empirical analysis 
of the political process rather than by means of abstract definitions of 
such concepts. An empirical approach can reveal the extent to which 
distribution and representation are mutually constitutive issues.20
Occupants of the fourth (social) corner in our rectangular model of 
stakeholder politics do not normally get involved in the distributional 
issue as people claiming a share of project benefits for themselves. They 
may obtain such benefits from people who occupy one of the other three 
corners, may represent those people in a contest over this issue, and may 
claim ‘credit’ from this engagement that can be invested in other fields 
of action. But they may also enter the political process as purveyors of 
ideas about things like environmental justice or the rights of indigenous 
people without making any such claim or commitment. World Bank 
functionaries see their roles this way, even if some members of ‘civil 
society’ would prefer to place them squarely in the company corner. 
The presence of this fourth group of stakeholders therefore adds to the 
complexity of the representational issue.
Political Actors and Roles
Given the complexity of the representational issue, it is no easy matter to 
determine who counts as a political actor and what counts as a political role. 
Many political actors are not keen to be known as such, and are therefore 
quite happy to go along with the old-fashioned idea that a political role is 
equivalent to a public office, and all such roles must therefore be part of 
the state. Even public servants will say that they are not political actors if 
they have not been elected to the offices they hold; they merely serve the 
public interest by acting on the orders of elected politicians.
Elected politicians in PNG turn this argument on its head by constantly 
accusing each other of ‘playing politics’, which is surely what they are 
supposed to do, and then making the same accusation against all sorts of 
other people as well, while those people make the same accusation against 
each other. The net result, as in many other countries, is that ‘politics’ 
appears to be an extremely widespread but very unpopular sort of activity. 
In PNG this virtual paradox is carried to extreme lengths because of the 
20  This is the way that Lund (2002) has previously dealt with the relationship between property 
and authority, albeit in another context.
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sheer numbers of people who compete to be elected as members of the 
national parliament or as presidents of local councils (May et al. 2013; 
Schwarz 2013). A member of parliament has every reason to fear that 
lots of people in his constituency, including local councillors and public 
servants, are ‘playing politics’, because dozens of them could be planning 
to stand against him (or very occasionally her) at the next national election.
This form of political competition is no more intense in the minority of 
electorates that host large-scale mining projects than it is in the majority 
that do not. However, there is another form of political competition that is 
especially prevalent within mine-affected communities, both in PNG and 
in NC, which is the competition to hold office in landowner associations 
or so-called landowner companies (which are known in NC as sociétés 
par actions simplifiées—‘simplified joint-stock companies’). The existence 
of such entities is authorised by the state, but they are obviously meant 
to represent the interests of people who belong to the local community. 
These roles are political because they are an integral part of the social 
relations of compensation. The proliferation of such roles in the vicinity 
of large-scale mining projects reflects the level of popular concern with the 
distribution of project-related costs and benefits (Bainton and Macintyre 
2013; Grochain 2013; Golub 2014).
This intensification of local-level politics also entails the reconfiguration 
of  customary leadership in response to the demands of ‘development’ 
or the demands of legislation. This underscores the capacity of actors 
to create new roles for themselves, instead of simply acting within the 
confines of a political structure that is already given as a fact of life. 
But it also tends to obscure the distinction between public and private 
domains of political action, because ‘state actors’ and ‘company actors’ get 
tangled up in a contest in which ‘community representatives’ dominate 
the distributional issue by sheer weight of numbers, and everyone accuses 
everyone else of attempting to manipulate the distribution of project-
related costs and benefits to their own personal advantage (Filer 1998; 
Bainton 2009). The boundaries between ‘politics’ and ‘economics’ are 
also blurred as political orientations encompass the activities of local 
entrepreneurs (Le Meur et al. 2012; Grochain 2013).
A focus on the distributional and representational issues does have one 
analytical advantage, for it enables us to ignore forms of political behaviour 
that are disconnected from these issues. The practice of office politics is no 
less real than the occupation of political office, but some of the political 
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relationships that are internal to the organisations that occupy each of 
the four corners in our rectangular model do not have any bearing on the 
contest at the centre of the square. The contest creates a number of roles 
for people representing the state, the company, or even ‘society’, and that 
number also tends to expand as the contest intensifies. But here again, it is 
not possible to deduce the content of their political relationships from the 
way in which these roles are constructed.
Metaphors of Power
It is hardly possible to comprehend the content of political relationships 
without reference to the concept of power. There is a school of thought 
that actually defines politics as the pursuit and exercise of a certain type 
of personal or interpersonal power, which is the power that some people 
exercise over other people. Personal power is thus contrasted with the 
impersonal power that people may exercise over things or that things may 
exercise over people. In this school of thought, person A is understood to 
exercise power over person B if A can get B to do what A wants B to do. 
This statement of their mutual relationship may be qualified in various 
ways by reference to the intentions or desires of the two parties, or by 
reference to what actually gets done, or to the ways and means by which 
compliance is secured (Lukes 2005; Searle 2009). Max Weber is seen as 
the founder of this school of thought within the discipline of sociology, 
when he defined power as the probability of individuals getting what they 
want in the face of resistance from other individuals. But this was also 
Machiavelli’s way of understanding politics.
Machiavelli’s version of methodological individualism was a self-conscious 
departure from the Aristotelian tradition in which politics is understood 
as the collective pursuit of specific moral goals by the citizens who are 
members of a political community. Insofar as this activity involves the 
exercise of power, it is the power to determine what we would nowadays 
describe as the public interest, which is a form of impersonal power 
that people exercise over things. Furthermore, it is a form of power that 
people exercise by virtue of their occupation of specific positions or roles 
in a political system that might or might not be a nation-state (Easton 
1990). We do not have to subscribe to functionalist forms of social 
theory to see the potential value of this alternative conception of political 
practice, especially when we are dealing with a situation in which many 
of the actors appear to prefer the Machiavellian version of politics as an 
interpersonal power game.
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Since we have defined the game in question as a contest over the 
distribution of costs and benefits,21 it is all too easy to assume that power 
is a form of currency that people use to purchase a bigger share of the 
benefits, or to bear a smaller share of the costs, either for themselves or 
for the groups or entities they are supposed to represent. If the outcome 
of the contest, which is the actual distribution of costs and benefits at 
some particular moment in time, is then calculated according to a single 
standard of measurement, like money, then we might be tempted to think 
that we have measured the balance of power between competing economic 
interests. But all we should have done is to represent political relationships 
as if they were market relationships between actors who possess the same 
kinds of assets, the same kinds of values, and the same kinds of goals.
This is clearly not the case. Just because we have defined our political field 
as a contest, this does not mean that all the political relationships in this 
field are relationships of competition or conflict that entail the exercise of 
just one kind of power. The different actors involved in this contest may 
have all sorts of different ideas about the definition of economic, social 
and environmental costs and benefits, just as they may have different ideas 
about what is public and what is private, what is right and what is wrong, 
who has the power to do what, or who has power over whom.
Participation, Exclusion, Domination
Steven Lukes (2005) took issue with the Aristotelian school of thought, 
as represented in the work of Talcott Parsons and Hannah Arendt, on the 
grounds that it simply fails to accommodate what people mean when they 
talk about ‘power games’ or ‘power struggles’ as an integral part of any 
political process. He also tried to avoid the methodological individualism 
that is commonly associated with an emphasis on interpersonal power as 
the primary form of political power. Lukes reckons that the exercise of 
authority or influence by political office-holders does not even count as 
an exercise of political power if there is no conflict between the interests 
of different actors in a political relationship. On the other hand, he does 
not assume that political power can only be exercised by individual actors, 
nor  that its exercise must always be intentional, so it cannot simply be 
defined as the capacity of individuals to realise their own interests at the 
expense of other people.
21  Benefits may include political positions or roles, which again links the distributional issue to the 
representation issue.
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Lukes conceives the exercise of political power as something that can take 
place in three dimensions. The first dimension is the one identified in 
the work of political scientists like Robert Dahl (1961), who pioneered 
the  study of urban American power games in the 1950s. In their 
‘pluralistic’ conception of local-level politics, power was indeed defined 
as the capacity of individual actors to influence decisions on issues 
that were political because they were controversial, and different actors 
in the political process therefore had different preferences. The second 
dimension is the one identified in the work of Bachrach and Baratz 
(1970), who observed that power can also be used by the participants in 
any political process to exclude some issues and actors from that process, 
thus constraining the definition of what counts as a legitimate subject 
of political debate and whose preferences can make a difference to the 
outcome. Lukes himself adds the third dimension, in which the power 
exercised by groups or organisations is not reducible to that exercised 
by their individual members, and the exercise of power can take place 
without the appearance of political conflict or debate if it is exercised in 
a way that prevents people from acting in their own interests.
In the first (1974) edition of his book, Lukes was clearly thinking about 
this third form of power as the sort of power that is exercised in the political 
relationship between social classes. One of the first attempts to apply the 
three-dimensional conception of political power to the analysis of local-
level politics is of interest here because it was applied to the relationship 
between capital and labour in what we would call a traditional mining 
region in the United States (Gaventa 1980). However, the focus on class 
can be misleading in two ways: first, because it encourages the reduction 
of all political preferences to economic interests; and second, because it 
suggests that the first two forms of interpersonal power are much less 
important than the third one. In that case, it is easy to suppose that the 
one key question to be addressed in any study of local-level politics is 
the question of when, where and how the subordinate party in a binary 
relationship is able to escape the trap of false consciousness and resist the 
power of the dominant party (Scott 1990).
Even if we put the traditional form of class struggle to one side, and 
reframe the question of power as a question about the distribution of 
economic, social and environmental costs and benefits from large-scale 
mining projects, we may still be tempted to adopt a one-dimensional 
conception of the political relationship between mining companies 
and mine-affected communities as a bipolar relationship of persistent 
Large-Scale Mines and Local-Level Politics
32
domination and occasional resistance in which all other stakeholders are 
simply allied with one side or the other (Kirsch 2014). Yet Lukes himself 
now concedes that the third type of political power is not always exercised 
in a zero-sum game between two groups of people with one type of interest 
in the result (Lukes 2005: 109).
Nor is there any reason to assume that the parties to relationships of 
domination and dependency, acquiescence or resistance, must occupy 
different corners in our rectangular model. Such relationships may just as 
well be found inside a company, a state or a community. The exercise of 
interpersonal power through relationships of participation and exclusion 
may likewise involve actors and roles that belong to one corner or to 
several corners at any particular moment. The common exclusion of 
women from the politics of the large-scale mining industry is an obvious 
case in point (Eftimie et al. 2009).
If there is no objective or authoritative basis for deciding where people’s 
real interests lie, it is obviously more difficult to distinguish different forms 
of interpersonal power in terms of people’s capacity to either advance 
their own interests or prevent other people from doing so. Political actors 
make use of a wide range of material and symbolic resources to secure the 
support, compliance or silence of other actors in any political process, and 
we might just as well distinguish different forms of interpersonal power 
by reference to these different forms of ‘political capital’.
To take but one example, representatives of communities downstream of 
the Ok Tedi mine in PNG were able to secure the support of numerous 
‘civil society’ actors in pursuit of their compensation claims against BHP 
because of the nature and extent of the environmental damage that they 
were complaining about. The political capital assembled in this way 
was then deployed against the mining company in the form of a well-
publicised law suit that cost the company its ‘social licence’ to operate 
the mine, as well as a substantial compensation package, but did not put 
an end to the environmental damage. The community representatives 
who gained a partial victory in that legal contest then tried and failed 
to convert that form of political capital into votes from other people in 
the mine-affected area when they stood for election to PNG’s national 
parliament (Banks and Ballard 1997; Kirsch 2014). In this instance, we 
could say that they had three different degrees of success in the exercise 
of three different forms of interpersonal power, but these are just three 
of many possible forms.
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The Powers of Things
In most of the vernacular languages of Melanesia, the word that most 
closely approximates the concept of ‘power’ is the one that signifies a type 
of dangerous supernatural force that is beyond human control. There is 
nothing political about this sort of idea, except perhaps in those cases 
where it is associated with the status of a chief, and thus approximates 
the well-known Polynesian idea of mana, but even then, it represents 
a supernatural form of traditional authority that cannot be manipulated 
by its notional owner. In some respects, it is no more political than the 
power that comes out of a modern power station. Foucault’s concept of 
‘biopower’ has similar properties, for it is too pervasive and irresistible to 
be part of anyone’s power games or power struggles, and may only seem to 
be political if politics is either identified with the practice of government 
or conceived as the domination of all individual subjects by a singular and 
mysterious social (or even supernatural) force (Brown 2006; Searle 2009). 
So how can the power of things over people get more political than this?
In the present context, one obvious candidate is the power of the mine. 
Golub (2014) writes about the Porgera gold mine as one of several 
‘leviathans’ that are more or less successfully assembled and ‘personated’ by 
the individual actors who contest the distribution of its costs and benefits. 
It is not clear whether this construction of the mine as a person distinct 
from the mining company or its representatives is just a way of paying 
homage to actor-network theory (Callon and Latour 1981), by showing 
how individuals assemble social groups, or whether it reflects the way that 
people in the mine-affected community actually talk. Anthropologists 
are certainly not the only people who indulge in this form of reification, 
by talking about a mine as if it were a person.
There is one obvious way in which a large-scale open-cut mine can seem 
to exercise a degree of impersonal power over its own workforce that goes 
beyond the executive or supervisory powers of its own managers. The 
regimentation of the process of production and consumption within 
a modern mining compound creates a sort of ‘total institution’ in which 
every individual is subject to the same form of discipline or self-discipline, 
commonly construed in terms of health and safety, regardless of their 
status in the occupational hierarchy. Yet this is only an approximation 
of the power of surveillance exercised in Foucault’s world of extreme 
discipline: insofar as it works, it takes the politics out of the organisation. 
The impersonal power of the mine gets to seem a lot more political 
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when conceived as the power to transform or ‘overflow’ the physical 
environment (Letté 2009), since this transformation is one of the main 
bones of contention in the social relations of compensation, as distinct 
from the social relations of supervision or surveillance. It makes sense for 
all political actors contesting the distributional issue to represent the mine 
as a powerful agent in its own right, since none of them need then accept 
a personal responsibility for what it does to its environment, but what it 
does is what they have to deal with in their own political relationships. 
And once the power of the mine ‘overflows’ the boundaries of the mining 
enclave in the form of a violent reaction, then politics presents a second 
type of limit to governmentality (Li 2007).
Golub would argue that the power of the mine, in this sense, is not 
something that it acquires as a result of its design, or as a feat of mechanical 
engineering, but as a work of fiction that, like other ‘leviathans’, has 
emerged out of local people’s engagement or ‘entanglement’ with ‘wider 
networks of power and knowledge’ (Golub 2014: 83). But he goes 
on to argue that the mine has acquired more power in the local-level 
political process through which it has been constituted or ‘personated’ 
than the government that supposedly regulates that process. In other 
words, the balance of impersonal power between the four corners in our 
rectangular model is decidedly tipped against the state.
It is a commonplace of political science and political philosophy that 
the power of the state is greater than the sum of the personal powers 
attached to roles or positions in the state apparatus, in a sense that is 
not true of companies or communities. This assumption is commonly 
associated with ideas about the rule of law or the legitimate use of force. 
France is just the sort of nation-state that is (or was) assumed to wield 
this sort of power, but the PNG state looks more like a naked emperor or 
paper tiger, especially in the vicinity of large-scale mining projects. Hence 
the observation made by one community leader involved in negotiating 
the development of the Lihir gold mine, that ‘the State is only a concept’ 
(Filer 1995: 68). Some social scientists have made similar observations 
about the ‘state as such’ (Abrams 1988; Alonso 1994), but even if the 
state is only a product of some political imagination, some states may have 
more imaginary power than others.
If the PNG state is unusually ‘weak’, this does not mean that politicians 
or public servants have less capacity to use their offices as sources of 
interpersonal power, even when dealing with mining companies or mine-
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affected communities. If anything, that sort of power is enhanced when 
it is not constrained by the rule of law (Dinnen 2001). The weakness of 
the state must therefore be understood as a function of the incapacity of 
‘state actors’ to act in concert with each other, or as a function of their 
capacity to move between positions in different corners of the political 
rectangle (Clements et al. 2007). Golub has a neat example of this type of 
mobility in the shape of the Porgera district administrator, whose power 
was a function of his capacity to represent the mine and the mine-affected 
community, as well as the state, and sometimes to wear all three of these 
hats or masks at the same time (Golub 2014: 51).
The Power of Ideology
An ideology is a third sort of ‘thing’, aside from a mining project or 
a  nation-state, that may exercise power over the people involved in 
a political process by making them think and talk about a political issue 
in a way that contains a certain sort of bias. The concept of ideology has 
some of the same drawbacks as the concept of economic interest, since 
ideologies and interests alike have commonly been seen as the properties 
of social classes.
If we seek to understand a political process that does not seem to contain 
any obvious element of class struggle, there may be no reason to think 
that participants in this process are weighed down with any ideological 
baggage beyond an understanding of their interests as individuals or as 
the occupants of specific political roles. The world of Melanesian politics 
may look like a world without ideology when no distinction can be drawn 
between the policies of different political parties beyond the self-interest 
of their leaders (Rich et al. 2006), or when (as in the case of NC) the main 
point of distinction is the question of how public participation in large-
scale mining projects relates to the prospect of national independence. 
However, those anthropologists who regard all political relationships as 
variations on a single theme of domination and resistance will say that 
the ‘end of ideology’ just means the triumph of a single ideology at all 
levels of political organisation, regardless of any regional variations in 
‘political culture’. This is of course the ideology that most of them call 
neoliberalism, and many associate (a bit hastily) with Foucault’s concept 
of governmentality (Ferguson and Gupta 2002).
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Golub (2014) argues that models of ‘pervasive governmentality’ fail 
to explain the practice of politics in Porgera precisely because they 
overestimate the power of the state. But by the same account, a mining 
company that cannot dominate a mine-affected community, even when it 
takes on some of the functions of government, can hardly be the vehicle 
that makes everyone in sight subscribe to a neoliberal ideology when they 
contest the issues of distribution and representation. This does not mean 
that ideology has no place in the contest; it only means that the power of 
ideology is exercised in the construction of political identities and roles, 
not in the pursuit of class interests.
For example, one of the key things that establishes the identity and 
the rights of mine-affected communities in PNG is an ‘ideology of 
landownership’ which asserts that every automatic (or indigenous) citizen 
counts as a ‘customary landowner’ by virtue of his or her membership in 
one of the multitude of clans that each own one portion of the country’s 
total land area. The emergence of this ideology as a form of national 
identity reflects the social relations of compensation in a resource-
dependent economy, and is therefore closely linked to the form of local-
level politics in which ‘clans’ have been constituted or reconstituted as 
collective claimants to ‘compensation’ from large-scale resource projects 
(Filer 1997). This is what distinguishes the ideology of landownership 
from ideologies of indigenous or ethnic identity. Golub (2014) obscures 
this point when he says that members of the mine-affected community 
in Porgera have come to construe themselves as ‘Ipili’, that is to say, 
as members of a partially invented tribal community. Community leaders 
are more likely to represent themselves as ‘landowners’ when dealing with 
other stakeholders in their political contest, and in so doing they take 
advantage of the fact that most of these other stakeholders subscribe to the 
ideology of landownership.
The ideology of landownership may perhaps be conceived as a form of 
popular resistance to the power of neoliberal governmentality, but there 
is no reason to assume that it constitutes the only form of national or 
subnational identity that has an impact on the type of political process 
that we are considering here (Keesing 1992). In NC, the ideology 
of landownership is constrained by specific legal provisions for the 
restoration and redistribution of collective customary land rights under 
policy reforms initiated in 1978. Where big mining projects are at stake, 
and it is hard to convert indigenous land claims into formal land rights, 
Kanak people alternate between the assertion of indigenous rights and 
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a more inclusive appeal to municipal community interests. At the same 
time, these tensions raise questions about corporate boundaries and local 
citizenship, since mining companies are expected to meet the obligations 
that arise from being accommodated as a stranger of a special kind within 
the local community (Le Meur, Ballard et al. 2013; Le Meur 2015). 
In the PNG case, Golub (2014) notes that Porgeran community leaders 
could represent themselves or their followers as subsistence farmers or 
indigenous people in their efforts to secure more compensation from 
the mining company. Political contests over the distribution of project-
related costs and benefits also seem to encourage such leaders to represent 
themselves as ‘chiefs’, even in places (like Porgera) where anthropologists 
would say that no such roles existed in traditional society.
In one sense, this is simply further evidence of the capacity of political 
actors in such places to invent new roles that carry the impression of 
additional personal power. But in another sense it could be argued that 
an ideology of chieftainship has developed alongside the ideologies of 
landownership, subsistence affluence or indigenous rights, each with 
the power to create a different form of cultural identity fit for the same 
political purpose (Rodman 1987). The ideology of chieftainship asserts 
that people only ‘play politics’ because foreign forces have corrupted 
a  traditional social system in which chiefs exercised the only legitimate 
form of personal power, so being or becoming a chief in a local political 
contest is another way to diminish the power of political roles that do not 
have this aura of traditional authority (White and Lindstrom 1997). This 
ploy does not work quite so well in NC, because the roles of great and 
small chiefs have been officially recognised in the colonial rendition of 
‘customary authority’ since the early years of colonial rule. Nevertheless, 
the Customary Senate does represent the more recent emergence of 
neotraditional authority at a higher level of political organisation, and that 
is where the global discourse of indigenous rights tends to be mobilised.
Ideologies of this kind may be understood as forms of nationalism insofar 
as they construct the idea of ‘the nation’ in specific ways (as a nation 
of customary landowners, subsistence farmers, indigenous people or 
traditional chiefs), but they do not resemble the nationalisms of European 
history because they do not treat state institutions (including modern legal 
codes) as legitimate expressions of this cultural identity (Appadurai 1990; 
Foster 2002). They therefore have the effect of creating what Ferguson 
(2005) calls an ‘ungovernable space’, and in the Melanesian political 
landscape few spaces are less governable than those which surround 
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a large-scale mining project (Allen 2013). The regimentation of life within 
a mining compound therefore stands in stark contrast with the unruliness 
that prevails on the other side of the fence (Golub 2014). In Bourdieu’s 
(1977) terminology, such ideologies can even be counted as forms of 
symbolic violence against any organisation that threatens the boundary 
of a neotraditional community.
There is no reason to assume that such ideologies have some sort of 
monopoly over the terms in which people debate the distribution of costs 
and benefits from large-scale mines in Melanesia. It is also possible to 
detect a very different ideology, or set of ideologies, in which the mine itself 
becomes a symbol of modernity because of its power to deliver what most 
stakeholders, including local community members, call ‘development’. 
If all actors in a local or national political process agree on a single definition 
of development, and if it can be shown that this is a ‘neoliberal’ definition, 
there seems to be much less scope for any construction of ‘culture’ to 
be more than a passing form of ‘neopopulist’ resistance to the one great 
power that runs the world. But a closer inspection of what people do 
mean by ‘development’ in this particular debate suggests that there is no 
such general agreement, just as there is no general agreement about the 
definition and measurement of costs and benefits (Martin 2013). The key 
point is that ‘landowners’ may subscribe to an ideology of development in 
the same way that ‘developers’ subscribe to an ideology of landownership, 
not because they agree about the best way to calculate the distribution 
of costs and benefits, but simply because they want something from 
the other side. Furthermore, the notion of ‘development’—especially of 
‘sustainable development’—may be deployed as a semantic vehicle to align 
divergent corporate and community interests in the form of a specific 
local agreement, as in the case of the Goro project (Horowitz 2012).
Politics and Policy
If the practice of local-level politics in the vicinity of large-scale mines is 
now to be understood in terms of the relationship between interpersonal 
and impersonal forms of power, how are we to understand the relationship 
between the political process that runs alongside the mining project 
cycle at each major production site and the policy process that creates or 
transforms the political institutions or ‘spaces’ in which the distributional 
and representational issues are negotiated? If a policy process is understood 
to be one type of political process, we might suppose that it is set apart 
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from other types by virtue of the fact that policies are made by governments 
and are therefore made at a level of political organisation above the level 
at which the game of local-level politics is played. However, what we have 
already said about the power of the state should alert us to the possibility 
that things are not quite so simple.
To begin with, governments do not have a monopoly on the production 
of policies. Mining companies have policies too; so does the World Bank, 
and so do many non-governmental or community-based organisations. 
Indeed, organisations established to represent the interests of ‘local people’ 
in the negotiation of benefit-sharing agreements are liable to manufacture 
policies and programs precisely in order to demonstrate their moral 
superiority over the other parties to the negotiation. A notable example 
of such activity is the long sequence of policy pronouncements made 
by the Lihir Mining Area Landowners Association since its formation 
in 1989, which have certainly seemed like acts of symbolic violence to 
representatives of the mining company at which they are mainly directed 
(Filer 1995; Bainton 2010). Beyond the proliferation of actors involved in 
policy production, agreements themselves can also become the building 
blocks of policies that change the terms in which the distributional and 
representational issues are resolved in subsequent agreements (Le Meur, 
Horowitz et al. 2013; O’Faircheallaigh 2013).
The proliferation of actors and negotiation spaces invariably takes place in 
a specific political and historical context. In NC, the production of mineral 
policy is inseparable from the politics of decolonisation, as was already 
evident when the Bercy Agreement became a precondition for negotiation 
of the Nouméa Agreement in 1998. The Bercy Agreement was not only 
the result of strong political action by the Kanak and Socialist National 
Liberation Front; it also served to illustrate the disjuncture between the 
French metropolitan state and NC’s different levels of political organisation 
in negotiation of both the representational and distributional issues in the 
mining sector. While the process of ‘negotiated decolonisation’ creates an 
active role for the metropolitan state, both as an umpire and a stakeholder 
in the negotiation of mineral policy, it also fosters state-making processes 
within NC, where provincial and local agencies are riddled with moving 
political fault lines.
That sequence of events contrasts with current bilateral negotiations 
between local Kanak communities and mining companies about the 
grant of free, prior and informed consent for renewed exploration of the 
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so-called ‘forgotten coast’, which is the eastern coast of South Province. 
In this instance, a two-year moratorium has been imposed at the behest 
of customary authorities at both local and national levels, supported 
by indigenous organisations and the pro-independence mayors of the 
two local municipalities (Thio and Yaté). This moratorium has created 
space for the conduct of environmental baseline studies and the design 
of a sustainable development strategy for the area. The negotiation now 
involves customary, municipal and provincial authorities, and could 
become a sort of showcase for South Province, which favours autonomy 
for NC but is opposed to outright independence.
In PNG, the capacity of the national government to complete its own 
policy pronouncements on the questions of distribution and representation 
in the mining sector has almost evaporated over the past 15 years, despite 
(or possibly because of ) the ‘technical assistance’ it has secured from 
the World Bank. The policy process has continued, numerous foreign 
consultants have been engaged to move it forwards or backwards, but 
no new institutions have emerged as a result. A mineral policy process is 
most likely to produce a new political institution or settlement when it 
is undertaken in response to a crisis in the political relationships around 
a single large-scale mining project. As we have seen, the Bougainville 
rebellion was the first in a series of such crises that led some of the world’s 
biggest mining companies to the conclusion that they had lost their 
‘social licence to operate’, and hence to the creation of the institution 
known as the Global Mining Initiative, followed by the Mining, Minerals 
and Sustainable Development Project, followed by the establishment 
of the International Council on Mining and Metals (Danielson 2006; 
Dashwood 2013).
Some observers think that the Bougainville crisis also inspired PNG 
government officials to invent the institution known as the development 
forum (Golub 2014: 102), but this is not so. The development forum was 
invented in 1988 in response to demands by provincial premiers and local 
community leaders for a bigger share of the benefits to be derived from 
the Porgera gold mine and a stronger voice in the negotiation of a benefit-
sharing agreement (Filer 2008). Once this agreement was finalised in 
1989, the prime minister tried to persuade Francis Ona and his followers 
to negotiate the same sort of agreement, but to no avail. The conflict on 
Bougainville was eventually resolved by a peace process that was a different 
sort of policy process, since it bore no direct relationship to political debate 
about the costs and benefits of the mine that was now closed (Regan 
2010). But once that policy process had led to the establishment of the 
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Autonomous Bougainville Government in 2005, a more specific policy 
process was instituted to invest this new government with the power 
to determine the conditions under which the Panguna mine might be 
reopened or any other mining project might be authorised (Regan 2014).
Although government officials can reasonably claim credit for inventing 
the development forum in the first place, this institution did not simply 
become the more or less governable space in which national and provincial 
government representatives would henceforth negotiate benefit-sharing 
agreements with the representatives of landowning communities. 
Each new forum created an opportunity for the participants to turn 
a political contest into another policy process by making demands that 
were inconsistent with existing laws and policies. In the Lihir case, for 
example, the community leaders demanded a share in the ownership of 
the mine that was greater than the share the government was prepared 
to purchase on their behalf. They were only persuaded to moderate their 
demand when the prime minister undertook to raise the rate at which 
royalties were levied on all large-scale mining projects, and hence to raise 
the income that the landowners and their community government would 
receive from their agreed share of the royalties levied on the Lihir mine 
(Filer 2008).
From such examples it should be evident that a policy process is not best 
conceived as a process in which one collection of stakeholders operating 
at a higher level of political organisation determines the rules by which 
another group of stakeholders operating at a lower level of organisation will 
sort out their political differences. A political contest over the distribution 
of costs and benefits derived from one large-scale mining project can turn 
into a policy process by changing the rules that apply to the same sort 
of negotiation in other locations (Le Meur, Horowitz and Mennesson 
2013). And if governments do not have a monopoly on the production 
of policies, the transformation of a political process into a policy process 
can involve the occupants of any number of the four corners in our 
rectangular model of stakeholder relationships at any particular moment 
in time. The transformation may therefore involve a form of escalation, 
in which the number of actors and roles involved in the process grows 
larger as an issue gets to be contested in new locations or at larger scales, 
on different or bigger stages.
When a political process does turn into a policy process, there is no need 
to assume any change in the way that power is exercised over the outcome. 
The interpersonal powers of participation, exclusion and domination may 
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still be deployed, but the first two are likely to be more significant with 
an increase in the number of actors and roles involved in the process, 
since it is less likely that all of them will belong to one of two camps 
and that one camp will score a decisive victory over the other. When the 
design of political institutions is at stake, impersonal forms of political 
power are liable to be exercised or resisted with greater intensity, as 
more of the actors engage in acts of physical or symbolic violence. But 
whatever happens along the way, the outcome of a policy process will 
almost invariably change the balance of both personal and impersonal 
power between the different elements in the political landscape, since any 
political institution contains its own distinctive forms of social inequality. 
Changes in the balance of power that result from the transformation of 
political institutions must then be distinguished from those that result 
from what Kirsch (2014) calls the ‘politics of time’, in which the capacity 
of different actors to influence the distribution of costs and benefits from 
a large-scale mining project diminishes in different degrees as the project 
moves from the point of being designed to the point of being finally 
closed.
Case Studies
The papers collected in this volume were not originally meant to address 
a single theoretical question. Most of them are derived from a conference 
that dealt with the broader topic of ‘mining and mineral policy in the 
Pacific region’. We have taken the relationship between large-scale 
mining projects and local-level politics in two specific jurisdictions—the 
independent nation of PNG and the French territory of NC—to be one 
specific aspect of this broader topic. The authors of conference papers 
relating to this more specific topic were therefore invited to submit chapters 
to the present volume, while some additional papers were commissioned 
in order to make the collection more complete. This introduction has 
been written in response to their submissions, so the ideas that it contains 
have not necessarily informed any of the other contributions. In this 
final section of our introduction, we summarise the key messages of each 
chapter in the light of our conceptual framework.
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New Caledonia
Jean-Michel Sourisseau and his colleagues examine the institutional 
innovations adopted by a set of local actors, claiming at once a customary 
and entrepreneurial legitimacy, to deal with, and profit from, the structural 
effects of the Koniambo project in North Province. They show how these 
different actors got involved, directly or indirectly, in construction of the 
nickel processing plant, and compare this practical experience of project 
management with the expectations, hopes and fears expressed by the same 
actors before the start of the construction process. Their main focus is 
on the distribution of employment, the structure of the local economy, 
and the relationship between economic development and social cohesion. 
They highlight the appearance of an active learning process on the part 
of these actors, albeit one that requires a certain level of institutional 
support to reduce the risk of increasing economic inequality and social 
disintegration in the project-affected area.
Matthias Kowasch examines the Koniambo project from a different 
standpoint, by looking at the spatial distribution of the social, economic 
and environmental changes experienced by local communities—especially 
Kanak communities—since the project’s inception. Three elements are 
central for the interpretation of these dramatic changes. First, he shows 
that these communities have been active drivers of these changes and see 
the Koniambo project as ‘theirs’, even though the provincial authorities 
have played a decisive role in its implementation. Furthermore, he shows 
how the creation of a ‘simplified shareholding company’ has played 
a critical role in mediating the participation of Kanak communities in the 
distribution of project benefits by managing the distribution of contracts 
to local entrepreneurs. Finally, he warns that these positive aspects of the 
relationship between the project developers, the provincial authorities 
and local communities should not lead us to underestimate the negative 
impacts of the project in the form of escalating land disputes, rising 
inequalities, economic exclusion or social disruption.
Christine Demmer explores the origins and consequences of the political 
conflict that resulted in the closure of the Boakaine mine (in North 
Province) in 2002, after ten years of operation by the Société Minière 
du Sud Pacifique, and the recent political debate about the possibility of 
reopening it. Through this case study, the author raises questions about 
the identity and authority of the different Kanak actors competing over 
the management and distribution of mineral revenues in the municipality 
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and district of Canala.22 At stake here is a localised notion of sovereignty 
in which the struggle for political and economic independence has also 
been a struggle for control of the ‘modern’ municipality and ‘customary’ 
district in which the mine is located and a struggle for the recognition 
of indigenous land rights and traditional chiefly authority. While this 
study reveals the persistence of the segmentary logic of ‘traditional’ Kanak 
society in the practice of contemporary politics, it also shows how Kanak 
demands for participation in the modern mining industry connect with 
the practice of politics at different levels of political organisation.
Pierre-Yves Le Meur examines another case of political conflict around 
Thio, one of NC’s oldest mining locations, in 1996. A two-week blockade 
of the two main mines and the wharf by local Kanak residents resulted 
in a new agreement between the operating company (Société Le Nickel), 
the local customary authorities, the municipality and the province. This 
was a wide-ranging agreement that could be described as an ‘impact–
benefit agreement’ because it covered a mixture of social, economic 
and environmental issues, including customary land rights, access to 
employment and the prospect of opening a new mine under Kanak 
ownership and control. The reconfiguration of the local political arena that 
was prompted by the eruption and resolution of this conflict is analysed 
from the different local perspectives represented in the substance of the 
agreement, but also placed in the broader historical context established by 
the Matignon-Oudinot Agreements of 1988 and the Nouméa Agreement 
that was signed ten years later. In this broader perspective, the conflict of 
1996 can now be seen as the starting point or harbinger of a major shift in 
the political complexion of NC’s mining industry, from both a discursive 
or ideological point of view and in terms of the relationships between 
different political actors and their roles.
Claire Levacher provides another side to this story of political change, 
and a contrast to the story of the Koniambo project, in her account of 
the way that discourses of environmental justice, indigenous rights and 
sustainable development were mobilised by Kanak representatives in their 
negotiation of the ‘Pact for the Sustainable Development of the Great 
South’ that was made with the developers of the Goro project in 2008, 
ten years after the Nouméa Agreement. This agreement was not based on 
indigenous land claims, but it did coincide with an election that brought 
22  Canala is the name of the municipality and one of the two districts that it contains.
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the municipality of Yaté, where the project is located, under the control 
of an indigenous political association known as Rhéébu Nùù (‘Eye of 
the Country’). While negotiation of the agreement revealed significant 
differences in the conceptions of natural and cultural heritage espoused 
by the members of indigenous and environmental groups, the subsequent 
alliance between the mining company and indigenous political leaders has 
been forged at the expense of both a radical environmental ideology and 
the local influence of the provincial authorities.
Papua New Guinea
Glenn Banks and his colleagues ask why and how mining companies 
in PNG have delivered community development programs to mine-
affected communities. They observe that company motivations vary 
along a continuum that ranges from contractual obligations to corporate 
philanthropy, with considerations of social responsibility and social 
licence somewhere in the middle. But regardless of the motivations, 
they see all such programs as ways of countering the ‘unruliness’ of local-
level politics at the same time as they are meant to mitigate negative 
social impacts, and in this sense they are inherently conservative forms 
of intervention. Although such programs can make mining companies 
look like aid agencies, the resemblance is only superficial, because mining 
companies rarely even pretend to engage local communities in the design 
and implementation of different projects, while their lack of interest 
in the monitoring and evaluation of development outcomes reflects 
a fundamental lack of accountability to any public audience.
Colin Filer and Phillipa Jenkins make similar points in their discussion 
of the way in which the distributional issue has been negotiated between 
the stakeholders in the Ok Tedi mining project, but they also focus on the 
question of how the distribution of power, as well as the distribution of 
costs and benefits, between the different stakeholders has been modified 
through the lengthy political and policy process associated with the 
timing of mine closure. While the Ok Tedi mine is rightly renowned for 
the extent of the environmental damage it has caused, less attention has 
been paid to the scale and complexity of the institutional superstructure 
that has evolved out of a sequence of compensation and benefit-sharing 
agreements between community representatives and other stakeholders. 
While the authors question the direction of the causal relationship between 
the transformation of the mining company into a ‘proxy state’ and the 
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apparent weakness of political institutions in the mine-affected area, there 
is no doubt that the political life of this particular mine represents an 
extreme form of the contradiction between resource dependency and 
sustainable development at a number of spatial and temporal scales.
John Burton and Joyce Onguglo question the extent to which mining 
companies in PNG have earned their social licence to operate by means 
of compliance with the various international standards of good practice 
to which they have made a public commitment. They also discuss the 
reluctance of some of these companies to acknowledge that mine-affected 
communities in PNG are also indigenous communities, whose rights 
and interests therefore demand special consideration. In some respects, 
this reluctance may be seen as another type of corporate response to the 
‘unruliness’ of these communities, especially those whose leaders look 
more like warlords than landlords. The PNG Government is also taken 
to task, not only for its tolerance of corporate hypocrisy, but also because 
it espouses progressive social policies which it then fails to apply to the 
benefit-sharing agreements for which the companies are not directly 
responsible.
Susan Hemer approaches the gender equity issue from a rather different 
angle, by questioning the effectiveness of the different strategies adopted 
by the representatives of two women’s associations in their efforts to secure 
a bigger share of the benefits, or a smaller share of the costs, associated with 
the development of the Lihir gold mine. While a few of these women have 
been able to air their grievances on a national, or even an international, 
stage, and thus secure some kind of support from stakeholders outside 
their own community, this has notably failed to enhance their status or 
authority within the male-dominated political life of the mine-affected 
community. Insofar as male and female members of this community 
remain committed to a defence of their own ‘customary’ values against the 
impact of a large-scale mining project, there seems to be very little scope 
for local women to be ‘empowered’ in ways that would be recognised and 
endorsed by members of a national or international audience, since they 
can only gain ‘respect’ for doing things that only women do.
Nick Bainton deals with another form of inequality and marginality in 
the Lihir community by asking how the leaders of that community can 
simultaneously patronise and demonise the migrants from other parts of 
PNG who are not directly employed by the mining company yet still 
seek to benefit from the economic opportunities that it offers. In some 
47
1. Large-Scale Mines and Local-Level Politics
respects, the growth of this population of strangers underscores the 
distinction between the two inner circles of entitlement prescribed by the 
preferred area policy, since they have settled on land in close proximity to 
the leases held by the mining company, and the customary owners of this 
land are also first in line to receive royalty and compensation payments 
in respect of these leases. Individual members of the ‘local political elite’ 
have recruited individual migrants as their clients, either as tenants or 
employees, but each individual patron has more to fear from the clients of 
other landowners than he can hope to gain from the support of his own 
clientele, so the growth of migrant numbers has induced a widespread 
sense of ‘civic insecurity’ that now verges on a ‘climate of fear’. So long as 
the migrants all have patrons, the local-level government cannot respond to 
calls for their wholesale eviction, so these calls are redirected to the mining 
company, accompanied by the tacit threat of violent conflict between the 
insiders and the outsiders, which could escalate to the point at which it 
endangers the company’s social licence. The same problem is far more 
acute at Porgera, where the migrant population has long outnumbered the 
population of traditional landowners, but the recent history of violence at 
Porgera has only served to heighten the sense of insecurity at Lihir.
Anthony Regan concludes the discussion of large-scale mines and local-
level politics in PNG by revisiting the sequence of events that led to the 
forced closure of the Panguna copper mine in 1989 and put Bougainville 
squarely at the centre of a new global debate about the social and 
political impact of large-scale mining operations on local or indigenous 
communities. No one is better qualified for this task, since the author 
has communicated directly and extensively with all of the main actors 
in that social drama, as well as compiling a voluminous record of all the 
documentary evidence relating to their actions at the time. From this 
evidence, he argues that closure of the mine was not the primary aim of 
most of these actors, but he also argues that there were many different 
groups of actors, with different interests and goals, who played some part 
in a process that none of them was able to control. The point of this 
argument is to challenge the conventional portrait of the process as one 
that was inspired by the grievances of a single group of ‘young landowners’ 
from the mine lease areas, led by Francis Ona, who simply wanted to 
expel the mining company from their territory. The question addressed 
here is not just a matter of historical interest, since the constellation 
of political forces that existed on Bougainville in the 1980s was not all 
that different from the one that still exists within the jurisdiction of the 
Autonomous Bougainville Government. And that is why Bougainvilleans 
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still hold a wide range of views on the question of whether the Panguna 
mine should be reopened, or whether another large-scale mine should be 
developed in the region and, if so, under what conditions.
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2. From Anticipation to Practice: 
Social and Economic Management 
of a Nickel Plant’s Establishment 
in New Caledonia’s North Province
JEAN-MICHEL SOURISSEAU, SONIA GROCHAIN AND DAVID POITHILY
Introduction
New Caledonia has gone through major changes over the last 40 years. 
From an economic point of view, four different periods can be identified 
(Couharde et al. 2016):
• the ‘strictly assisted economy’ system from 1975 to 1989, characterised 
by excess savings in relation to investment and an outflow of savings 
abroad;
• a strong ‘rebalancing process’ from 1989 to 2005, with gross savings 
being redirected towards funding projects in New Caledonia;
• an ‘industrialisation process’ from 2005 to 2013, with foreign direct 
investment inflows financing the national economy; and
• since 2013, the shaky start of a ‘mining and metallurgical economy’.
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This pathway to development remains structured around management 
of the dependency on mining and government revenues, though 
different options are still open. Depending on the ideological stance, this 
development trajectory either guarantees that the country and its mineral 
reserves remain within the realm of the French Republic, or else it can act 
as a lever for economic, and eventually political, emancipation.
Development choices cannot be separated from political debates. The rise 
of the independence movement in the 1970s, the polarisation of the 
political arena between loyalist and pro-independence camps, the violent 
upheavals of the 1980s, known as les événements (‘the events’), the return 
to civil peace with the Matignon-Oudinot Agreements of 1988, and, 
finally, the period of ‘negotiated decolonisation’ following the Nouméa 
Agreement of 1998—all these marked turning points in structural policy 
for this former French colony. Since 1988, the country has been divided 
into three provinces that have significant powers. Federalism resulted in 
the implementation of different economic projects and policies in the 
pro-independence North Province and Islands Province and in the loyalist 
South Province.
Ultimately these phases in the political process did not profoundly alter the 
logic of dependency contained in the economic model, which has proven 
to be compatible with political emancipation,1 but structural changes are 
now under way that could eventually challenge the foundations of this 
model of dependency. One of these changes—which was initiated by the 
pro-independence movement in the 1990s—was implemented in the 
mid-2000s, and should be consolidated in the next decade, is local-level 
harnessing of mineral revenues as a way to progressively supplant French 
government transfers.2
This chapter proposes to assess the nature of these changes from the 
perspective of a pro-independence local authority, North Province,3 
focusing on the Koniambo nickel processing plant in which the province 
is the majority shareholder (Figure  2.1). Having clarified the origins, 
1  The dependency is self-sustaining, in particular through high salary levels supported by 
indexation in the administration, which drive consumption prices and justify the permanence of the 
payments (Freyss 1995). Moreover, it has enabled sustained growth since the late 1980s.
2  Today, after 25 years of a stronger economic autonomy, such a strategy is increasingly taken up 
by all of the key political and technical actors.
3  As mentioned in Chapter 1, people in New Caledonia do not refer to this entity as a ‘provincial 
government’, although it shares many characteristics with what are legally recognised as provincial 
governments in Papua New Guinea.
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trajectory and challenges of this project, we examine the way in which 
different actors ensured the economic and social management of the 
plant’s construction phase in 2010, and compare their practical experience 
of the project with the expectations, hopes and fears expressed by the 
same actors five years earlier. We focus on the topics of employment, 
the structure of the local economic fabric, and the relationship between 
economic development and social cohesion. At the end of the chapter, we 
update the key indicators to give a glimpse into the current state of the 
province’s development strategy since the smelter became operational in 
2013. However, we mainly aim to understand the very specific period of 
the preparation and management of the plant’s construction, as a strategic 
phase in the wider unfolding of a national ‘nickel doctrine’ based on the 
public appropriation of New Caledonia’s natural resources to achieve 
the goal of decolonisation.
Figure 2.1 North Province, New Caledonia.
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University (based on information from Direction des 
Infrastructures, de la Topographie et des Transports Terrestres, North Province, and Direction 
des Systèmes d’Information/Service Information et Méthodes, Thierry Rousseau).
This analytical perspective is necessarily partial, since it concerns only 
North Province, and does not cover all of the national-level changes 
underway. It can only consider the initial dynamics of a long-term metal 
production cycle and development process. It does not tackle the height of 
the construction phase in 2012 and 2013, when there was a massive influx 
of foreign workers (Blaise et al. 2016: 137; also Chapter 3, this volume). 
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However, the chapter does enable the contextualisation of questions 
about the management of mineral revenues by stressing the specificity 
of previous expectations, which are important to an understanding of 
prevailing realities and local political stakes. It also enables us to restore 
the public authorities to the centre of debates about the management 
strategies applied to mining projects, despite the fact that state actors are 
often presented as secondary actors, whose role is confined to facilitating 
or regulating the dialogue between ‘companies’ and ‘communities’.4
The Usine du Nord Project and its Ambitions
From the second half of the 1990s, New Caledonian development 
policies were structured around the enabling of instruments for economic 
independence, and eventually its political counterpart. The specialisation 
in mining and metal production was maintained (Néaoutyine 2006), but 
so was the collection of administrative rent through French Government 
payments—at least temporarily. Like the political consensus that 
accompanied it, the latter was perceived by some as evidence of a solid tie 
with France, and by others as a form of repayment of the colonial debt 
(Sourisseau et al. 2010). Division of the proceeds from the exploitation of 
mineral resources was one of the key elements in the negotiation of civil 
peace. In addition to the purchase in 1990 of the Société Minière du Sud 
Pacifique (SMSP) by the holding company, Société de Financement et 
d’Investissement de la Province Nord (SOFINOR), which is owned and 
controlled by North Province, a préalable minier (‘mining prerequisite’) to 
the Nouméa Agreement guaranteed that the pro-independence movement 
would have some control over metal production (Grochain and Poithily 
2011; David and Sourisseau 2016).
This issue is important. While the assisted economy model meant that the 
service sector was still the main contributor to New Caledonia’s wealth, 
the country has actually been dependent on its mineral resources and 
their strategic nature since it was colonised. Depending on global market 
conditions, the contribution made by nickel mining and processing to the 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP) has varied from 3 per cent (at the 
historical low of 1998) to 18 per cent (in 2007, an exceptional year for the 
4  It is interesting to note that the concepts of ‘companies’ and ‘communities’ are rarely clarified; 
these terms refer to heterogeneous entities that merit better definition as a result of local case studies 
(see Chapter 1, this volume).
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sector). The nickel and non-market sectors combined account for 50 per 
cent of the growth in added value between 1998 and 2007 (CEROM 
2008). Moreover, in the aftermath of the political agreements, thanks to 
the industrial revolution initiated with the planned operation of three new 
large-scale smelters, each processing over 50,000 tons of nickel a year, and 
the expansion in the capacity of the existing Doniambo plant, it was thought 
possible that nickel’s share of GDP would increase to more than 25 per cent 
(GoNC 2009). Hence, the already significant knock-on effects of the sector 
were set to become even more extensive. In this context, controlling the 
income from mining and metal processing was at the heart of the debate 
surrounding the country’s future legal and political status. At stake was the 
nature of its future development: exogenous or endogenous; part of France 
or more or less autonomous.
In fact, the development of new nickel smelters had long since come to 
symbolise this choice. The construction of the processing plant in South 
Province would appear to have been relatively conventional, with a clear 
division between the private sector entity responsible for the operation—
in this case, the Brazilian company Vale5—and the local authorities, who 
were involved mainly through monitoring the operator’s compliance with 
government regulations and imposing taxes to harness a portion of the 
value produced,6 while making allowance for compensation or fees to be 
paid to local communities. Since the plant was launched in the mid-2000s, 
the logic has shifted towards compensation of the resident clans and the 
management of environmental concerns.7 In response to the difficulties 
encountered at the beginning of the project, another public stakeholder 
emerged in the form of local Kanak associations known as ‘local groups 
with special rights’, groupements de droit particulier local (GDPLs), 
which collectively purchased a stake in the project’s subcontracting 
businesses (Bouard et al. 2016). However, this move was confined to 
one local community (Yaté), which had less than 2,000 inhabitants, 
and ultimately became a sort of enclave (see Chapter 6, this volume). 
5  Vale had got involved in the Goro project through its purchase of the Canadian company 
INCO.
6  Only 5 per cent of the equity in the Usine du Sud (Southern Plant) is held by the state, through 
the Société de Participation Minière du Sud Calédonien, which was established in 2005. This entity 
is owned by all three provinces but, in accordance with the logic of ‘rebalancing’, the distribution of 
dividends favours the North and Islands provinces.
7  A sustainable development pact was concluded between Vale’s subsidiary Goronickel and the 
customary authorities of Yaté.
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While the administration of South Province certainly intervened in such 
processes, it did so as a facilitator in a process of negotiation focused on 
the company–community relationship.
Construction of the Usine du Nord (Northern Plant), which was based on 
the Bercy Agreement, was more clearly rooted in the political bifurcation 
of the 1980s, and had the task of lending concrete expression to the spatial 
and economic rebalancing at the root of the political consensus. In 1998, 
SMSP formed an alliance with the Canadian company Falconbridge 
to launch the feasibility studies before Falconbridge was bought by the 
Anglo-Swiss company Xstrata (now Glencore) in 2006.8 Xstrata officially 
confirmed its commitment to the project in October 2007, on much 
the same conditions as those negotiated with Falconbridge. Under this 
arrangement, confirmed by Glencore, SMSP holds 51  per cent of the 
capital in the joint venture, Koniambo Nickel SAS (KNS),9 which was 
established to implement the project.
The project includes a pyro-metallurgical plant, a power station, a deep 
water port, an automatic conveyor and various other structures. Costing 
a total of almost US$5 billion, its construction (like that of the Southern 
Plant) constituted a major project in global terms. Its completion in 2013 
required the employment of a large workforce, which peaked at over 6,000 
employees. Around 1,000 jobs are involved in the operation of the plant, 
which is expected to last for at least 30 years. According to estimates from 
2004, the plant was expected to generate 1,700 indirect jobs and attract 
some 8,000 people to the municipalities near the plant—Voh, Koné and 
Pouembout (VKP) (North Province 2004; Syndex 2005). At the level of 
the province and its 45,000 inhabitants, the project embodies the hope 
of unprecedented economic and social momentum, and therefore justifies 
the creation of new public infrastructure.
The balanced social management of the expected impacts of the Koniambo 
project would appear, therefore, to be a prerequisite for its success. 
The public control of the project aims to boost leadership of the economic 
development of North Province by the Kanak people and, in some 
respects, to demonstrate the country’s ability to manage its independence 
8  As a result of various acquisitions and mergers, the New Caledonian nickel landscape is now 
characterised by the presence of three foreign multinationals—Glencore (Switzerland), Vale (Brazil) 
and Eramet (France), the latter being the majority shareholder of Société Le Nickel.
9  A société par actions simplifiée (SAS) is a ‘simplified’ company in which the shares are typically 
held by a number of other companies or associations.
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(Néaoutyine 2006). Henceforth, public policy will use the mine and the 
plant as resources at the service of a territorial strategy. It is intended to 
reinject the profits into the diversification of the local economy with a view 
to anticipating shocks in the metals market, preparing for the ‘post-nickel’ 
period, and providing protection against a ‘Dutch disease’ scenario.10
From Anticipation to Practice: Questions 
and Methods
The Usine du Nord project is a high-stakes project from both an economic 
and political perspective. The possible pitfalls and risks of failure were 
known to be significant, even at the early stage. Numerous questions 
existed before the start of the project—and still exist—regarding the 
public policies and the social and economic structures likely to make the 
mine and the smelter not merely an economic enterprise, but a real lever 
for emancipation, rebalancing and the common destiny of the province.
Hence, the question arises as to whether public action was able to respond 
to the challenges posed by the planning and launch of the project’s 
construction site in the period from 2005 to 2010. How have the issues 
identified in 2005 been confirmed, invalidated or reformulated in 2010 in 
light of the experience gained? Which generic lessons can we draw from the 
management of the beginning of construction in terms of local capacities 
for intervening or being involved in the process? And which methods or 
methodological approaches are best suited to answering these questions?
Our hypothesis is that the majority of the fears clearly voiced in 2005 
were not realised and that, overall, expectations were satisfied both in 
2010 and since then, at least in the VKP area near the plant and at the 
political centre of the province. We hope to show that, whatever the end 
of the story may be in future decades, this situation was not only the 
result of favourable circumstances and sustained economic development 
throughout the entire country during the period in question, but that it 
was also the outcome of innovations and adaptations—both individual 
and collective, public and private—made by the local actors.
10  ‘Dutch disease’ refers to the negative consequences arising from large increases in a country’s 
income. Primarily associated with a natural resource discovery, it can result from an increase in foreign 
aid or a substantial increase in natural resource prices—anything that changes the structure of the 
national economy in favour of one export-specific sector. The consequences are a stronger national 
currency and lower international competitiveness in other parts of the economy.
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Our analysis is based mainly on two studies conducted by the Institut 
Agronomique Néo-Calédonien (IAC) in 2005 and 2010.11 The first, 
which was based on investigations carried out in late 2005 and involved 
almost 250 people throughout North Province, clarifies the nature 
of the expectations, fears and concerns anticipated by locally elected 
representatives, economic operators, customary chiefs, representatives of 
local non-profit and cultural organisations and provincial public servants 
(Sourisseau et al. 2006). The second is one of the studies produced within 
the framework of the centre set up by the IAC to monitor the economic 
and social dynamics of the Koniambo project. It is based on approximately 
100 interviews conducted with businessmen from the VKP area who 
were awarded subcontracts for construction of the plant, and on the 
analysis of some of the forms of public shareholding set up for the project 
(Grochain and Poithily 2011). The practices observed in this second study 
are compared with the forecasts produced in 2005. The comparison is 
underpinned by the detailed and comprehensive statistical series produced 
by the Institut de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, the Institut 
pour le Développement des Compétences en Nouvelle-Calédonie and 
the provincial Direction des Systèmes d’Information.12 This evidence has 
been combined with data from an assessment by the IAC of the financial 
support distributed by the provincial authorities under their development 
code, and data from an evaluation produced by the provincial engineering 
office (Emergences) on the development of customary lands in the directly 
affected municipalities of Koné and Pouembout (North Province 2008).
Our analysis is focused on three topics that emerged as particularly 
important in the early stages of the negotiation process and for the actors 
interviewed in 2005, and which are well documented by the studies 
conducted in 2010. The three topics are:
1. employment, particularly youth employment;
2. the structuring of a local economic fabric through harnessing a portion 
of the income from mining and metal production, particularly in 
light of concerns about competition between local companies and 
companies from South Province or from overseas; and
11  These two studies offer the opportunity for a comparison, but also explain the period chosen 
for this purpose, even if it would have been relevant to have surveys completed at the very end of the 
construction phase in 2013.
12  The same sources are used for the update at the end of the chapter.
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3. social cohesion, and especially the relationships between customary 
life and economic development.
It should be noted that our analysis is limited in two respects. First, we 
propose to recount merely a small part of this experience. The story has 
already started, so it is not a question of returning to the genesis of the 
project and the conflicts that emerged from the ‘mining prerequisite’ of 
1998, which have already been extensively documented (Bencivengo 
1999; Grochain 2010; Le Meur and Mennesson 2011; David and 
Sourisseau 2016). And the story is far from over: the period covered by 
this chapter is primarily the period between 2005, when an irrevocable 
commitment was made to building the project, and the start of the actual 
construction phase in 2010. The second limitation is the choice of three 
particular issues as the focal points for providing answers to a more general 
set of questions about the development process. In other words, we aim 
to illuminate a general topic through the adoption of admittedly partial 
approaches.
The Analytical Context
From an analytical point of view, based on the stated ambitions of the 
project, an investigation of its impacts on provincial development involves 
questioning the role of the provincial authorities—considered as a branch 
of the state—in the management of mining and metal production 
activities. At the same time, the province acts as a sort of guarantor in the 
management of the social impacts of a sectoral development project as 
part of a broader development program, beyond the traditional models of 
confrontation or negotiation between a company and local communities, 
whether or not the latter have the support of public authorities or external 
associations.
In focusing on the public authority, we are attempting to complement the 
analytical framework developed by Geert van Vliet (1998) to understand 
mining project cycles and the strategies of their operators (see Figure 2.2). 
In this framework, the inception of a mining (or petroleum) project 
is characterised by a strong tendency on the part of the developers to 
compensate local communities because they are at the beginning of 
the process and must provide some reassurance, particularly as they 
have a significant economic stake in the project being accepted. At this 
juncture, the local people themselves have poor negotiation capacities and 
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are generally reassured by the compensation on offer. Once the project has 
started, the companies will have replaced the original negotiating team 
with new managers who are subject to the new demands of construction 
and operation, with a rapid decline in their disposition to negotiate. 
Meanwhile, local people gain both experience and expertise, and can 
better identify the impacts of the project, so their ability to negotiate 
grows rapidly, often with support from non-governmental organisations. 
This creates a risky situation, but the windows of opportunity remain 
open, and the negotiations significantly shape the subsequent stages in 
the project cycle. At the end of the cycle, especially if a company is not 
planning to extend its activities in the area, it is much less willing to 
negotiate because the workforce involved is dedicated to the closure of the 
operation. By contrast, the negotiating capacity of the local population is 
at its highest level because the negative impacts of the operation are now 
well known. This phase of the project cycle has the highest level of risk 
and conflict.
Figure 2.2 The politics of the large-scale mining project cycle.
Source: van Vliet (1998).
Numerous amendments and qualifications can be added to this model in 
terms of the slope of the curves and the time scales. Having noted that 
the model is silent on the role of the state and its ability to modify the 
curves through proactive policies, it is possible to make four additional 
comments here.
First, the willingness of companies to pay communities at the beginning of 
the cycle is somewhat questionable. This applies in particular to Chinese 
companies operating in Africa, or in Papua New Guinea, and surely in 
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many other places, but it could also be the result of new corporate strategies 
that do not adhere to international standards, but instead involve specific 
adaptations to particular national contexts.
Second, very severe conflicts are occasionally observed at the beginning 
of the project cycle, not necessarily between the company and the local 
communities, but within the communities themselves (see Filer 2006). The 
question of benefit distribution can generate such tensions if the country 
or territory does not have a sufficiently clear normative framework, or the 
framework is not generally agreed upon, or there is limited ability and 
willingness to implement it. In our case study, we suggest that this type of 
tension was prevented by the fact that a normative framework was already 
in place at the start of development process.
Third, the recent rise of discourses of citizen control, and the adjustment 
of  corporate social and environmental responsibility standards, has 
increased the willingness of companies to pay compensation at the 
beginning of the production phase,13 or even towards the end of the 
project cycle.14 This tendency has been reinforced by the provision of 
multilateral assistance for the management of environmental impacts in 
particular.
Finally, the model does not consider the cumulative experience 
of populations and companies with a long historical experience of mining 
operations in a particular area, as is the case in New Caledonia. In our 
case study, we suggest that, from the outset, the negotiating ability of the 
local people was greater than is indicated in Figure 2.2. Despite the level 
of control exercised by the former developer Falconbridge,15 the project’s 
‘clearing’ or approval period from 2000 to 2006 was also a decisive 
period for the structuring of development policies and public policy in 
general (Sourisseau et al. 2010; Bouard 2011). This would have enabled 
the provision of a normative framework that effectively modified the 
conditions of the dialogue with the company. We support this hypothesis 
regarding the inflection of the curve with the representation of the 
province as a shareholder in the project. Beyond the financial aspects, we 
13  The previously mentioned Grand Sud Pact relating to the Goro project is an illustration of this 
phenomenon in New Caledonia.
14  A particularly explicit Caledonian example is an agreement reached in Thio in 1996 (Le Meur 
and Mennesson 2011; see also Chapter 5, this volume).
15  Criticism was expressed to the effect that the voice of SMSP was not sufficiently heard at the 
information and negotiation meetings (Sourisseau et al. 2006).
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establish that the experience acquired through SMSP from 1990, and its 
concrete participation in the financial and technical investment in the 
plant, influenced the form of local representation in the project.
The amended conceptual framework hence moves to formalise the lessons 
learned from the transition from expectation to practice in terms of the 
management of a project’s effects at the beginning of a new industrial cycle.
From Expectation to Practice, 2005–10
The points of view expressed in 2005 bear witness to a quasi-unanimous 
commitment to the Koniambo project on the part of the local actors. 
The Usine du Nord was deemed indispensable in giving meaning to the 
economic rebalancing of the territory and, more broadly, to the general 
thrust of the political agreements of 1988 and 1998. It also emerges that 
development of the plant could not, and should not, be considered in 
isolation; it must be connected with broader sectoral policies and with 
territorial dynamics as a whole. However, commitment was coupled with 
enormous focus, which was often expressed as vigilance in relation to the 
potential negative effects of economic development. Hence the actors 
appeared to be concerned but also clear: they felt that they were both the 
potential beneficiaries of the positive impacts of the future plant but were 
also exposed to its inevitable negative impacts, especially those related to 
a risky ‘submission’ to the laws of global markets. They also stressed that 
‘progress from word to deed’ only strengthened the need for vigilance, 
and that the risk of distrust must not be discounted. In 2005, a common 
basis existed for the representation of the issues and challenges associated 
with the Usine du Nord. However, as emerges from a more detailed 
examination, there were different—and sometimes even contradictory—
expectations and fears expressed by different actors.
Disruptions took place around the plant site in 2010, but to a lesser 
extent than had been expected. The provincial demographic balance was 
jeopardised by the attractiveness of the site. The loss of 1,500 inhabitants 
from the east coast highlighted the risk of the emergence of an east–west 
imbalance in the course of north–south ‘rebalancing’. At the same time, 
construction of the plant was delayed, and the population of the VKP area 
‘only’ grew by 2,000 inhabitants (GoNC 2010)—far fewer than the 5,000 
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predicted by the development plans in 2004.16 This was a more gradual 
demographic transition than the ‘tsunami’ referred to by several of our 
informants in 2005.
Overall, it appears that the progress promised in terms of access to health 
care and education in 2005 was confirmed and reinforced, and the 
standard of living of local households continued to increase (CEROM 
2011). This trend has since been confirmed by the 2014 population 
census (GoNC 2015).
With the exception of 2008, a year characterised by a general slowdown 
in New Caledonia, the number of job seekers throughout North 
Province declined after 2002 and, in 2010, the outlook in this regard 
was reassuring (GoNC 2011). Assessment of the effects of the provincial 
Code of Development (CODEV) showed that provincial action had been 
sustained and diversified, and had yielded convincing results, even from 
the point of view of people in receipt of government aid. For instance, in 
2010, more than two-thirds of the 1,100 projects funded since 2003 were 
still active; for each 1,000 francs of government subsidy, another 1,500 
francs were added through the activity being subsidised, and 56 per cent 
of the CODEV beneficiaries declared in 2010 that their daily life was 
better thanks to the project funding (Gaillard et al. 2011). Although 
this assessment confirms that economic activity followed demographic 
trends, and that the west had benefited more from the development 
process, this imbalance was not always perceived negatively, and the 
returns from the acquired skills and transfers to the community in the 
east were beginning to take effect.17 The reorganisation of the Department 
of Economic Development and the Environment in 2010 was indicative 
of the additional resources provided for environmental management and 
the increased specialisation of administrative services within the province. 
In line with the hopes expressed by interviewees in 2005, the elected 
representatives and their advisers also insisted on the need to continue 
their strategy of linking structural projects, with strong government 
participation, to development of the local area. The  interviewees felt 
empowered by an encouraging assessment of 20 years of decentralisation 
16  This prediction did not include the foreign construction workers, 5,000 of whom were present 
in 2011–12, but who mostly stayed inside the construction site. The target of 5,000 local inhabitants 
was actually achieved in 2014 (GoNC 2015).
17  The expansion of development services within the provincial administration has continued since 
then (North Province 2015).
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or ‘provincialisation’ and the credibility thus acquired by the provincial 
authorities, and were generally positive about the progress of the 
Koniambo project.
However, the public unanimity in favour of the plant appeared less 
convincing in 2009, particularly because of the visible impact of site 
clearance on the landscape and the inconvenience caused to some of 
the local people. Its usefulness in terms of provincial development and 
its necessity in terms of the north–south rebalancing process were not 
in question, but vigilance was being maintained and even heightened.
The Local Employment Issue
What the Local Actors were Saying in 2005
In 2005, the locally elected representatives from the VKP area were 
generally confident about the positive impacts the plant would have for 
their communities. In their concern ‘to be ready on time’, however, they 
deplored the timidity of private initiatives: ‘The paradox is that we have 
high expectations and, at the same time, face a real waiting game’. Outside 
the VKP area, the elected representatives were hoping for ‘some direct 
employment’, but were not counting on it too much because they thought 
the logic of ‘local employment’ would to work to their disadvantage. 
Instead they believed that they would have a role to play in the supply of 
food (agricultural produce and fish), and in the areas of leisure, weekend 
tourism and services.
In particular, the elected representatives highlighted the risk 
of  ‘disappointment among young people’ due to the limited number 
of direct and indirect jobs that would actually be created, the lack of 
qualifications that could make many young people ‘difficult to employ’, 
and the very narrow conception of ‘local’ employment. Some mayors, who 
were generally optimistic in other respects, did not rule out the possibility 
of such frustrations leading to the formation of ‘social movements’.
The risk of an increase in territorial imbalances between the east and west 
coasts was recognised, particularly by elected representatives from the east 
coast. They thought the risks were both economic and demographic, with 
a decrease in the value of grants received by the communities in decline, 
and some feared that marginalisation would lead to social destabilisation: 
‘The young people from the east coast are restless and they feel forgotten’. 
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The elected representatives from the VKP area were more optimistic and 
believed that ‘it is a mistake to think that the east coast will not benefit 
from the effects of the plant’.
For the customary authorities, the creation of jobs, particularly for young 
people, was almost always associated with strong fears: ‘There will be fewer 
jobs than the young people are expecting’. They also feared the resulting 
frustration, and insisted on the need for both training and a provincial 
focus: ‘The mine is not only for Voh, but for the North Province’.
The representatives of economic organisations were also worried by the 
narrow conception of ‘local’ employment: ‘The politicians invented 
specific local characteristics and now they no longer know how to manage 
them’; ‘Before the “events” the people were very available, now each 
one thinks about his tribe, his community, his organisation’. The risk of 
disappointment on the part of the young people was repeatedly evoked.
Ultimately, the question regarding the jobs that were supposed to be 
created by the project was sensitive, and a potential source of ‘slippage’. 
All of the local actors pointed out that special efforts had to be made in 
terms of providing training for the labour force so that the Koniambo 
project and other development activities would promote the social 
advancement of disadvantaged people. Accordingly, a greater recognition 
of other sources of potential employment appeared to be necessary. 
In addition to the industrial project, interviewees felt that provincial 
economic development should be based on the other projects supported 
by SOFINOR (in aquaculture, fishing or tourism), on the structuring of 
a private sector market, and on the social economy sector, which had been 
considered for a long time to be the main supplier of self-employment 
and a form of protection against job insecurity.
What the Research Said in 2010
The employment statistics produced by the Institut pour le Développement 
des Compétences en Nouvelle-Calédonie showed that the fears expressed 
in 2005 had only partly materialised. The figures for job offers (Figure 2.3) 
show the dynamism of the provincial labour market. In 2010, 60 per cent 
of job offers related to the construction site in the municipality of Voh, 
but, over the preceding three years, there were more than 1,200 job offers 
each year relating to work outside the plant site. When compared with 
the number of applications, this prompted the conclusion that there was 
a situation of near full employment.
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Figure 2.3 Employment offers and applications in North Province, 
2000–10.
Source: Institut pour le Développement des Compétences en Nouvelle-Calédonie.
Seventy-seven per cent of the New Caledonian employees working on 
the Koniambo project itself were natives of North Province; 45 per cent 
of the local employees were natives of the VKP area, 6 per cent were from 
other parts of the west coast and 21 per cent were from the east coast. 
Moreover, 77  per cent of the local employees were Kanaks. Concerns 
previously expressed about the employment of young people on the 
Koniambo project had been assuaged, since they constituted a substantial 
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majority of the project’s employees: 70  per cent were under thirty-six 
years of age, and 45  per cent of these were under thirty-one. On the 
other hand, the position of female employees on the Koniambo project, 
as in the mining and metal production sector more generally, remained 
fairly marginal. They accounted for less than 30 per cent of the project’s 
employees, at a time when women accounted for 37 per cent of the total 
formal workforce in New Caledonia. Hence, the employee profile most 
commonly found at the Vavouto construction site was that of a young, 
male, Kanak worker who was a native of North Province (Grochain 2010).
With regard to the position of young people in the North Province job 
market as a whole, we found that the number of applicants under twenty-
six years of age fell from 597 in 2005 to 487 in 2009, but rose again to 
582 in 2010. In the end, the proportion of applicants in this age group 
remained at 31.5 per cent and, like the other age groups, they seem to 
have benefited from the development of the mining project. Here again, 
women accounted for nearly two thirds of the unemployment rate. Their 
representation among the job applicants increased from 58 to 62 per cent, 
and they benefited least from the new developments. The proportion of 
permanent contracts among the job offers rose from 5 to 12  per cent 
between 2005 and 2010, but it peaked at 28 per cent in 2008, before the 
peak of applications for work on the construction site. Likewise, the share 
of full-time job offers increased from 77 to 93 per cent between 2005 
and 2010. It may therefore be concluded that a trend for longer-term 
contracts already existed, and this invalidated some of the fears expressed 
in 2005. However, employment was still very unevenly distributed, with 
more than 85 per cent of the total job offers being made in the VKP area.
The population census figures indicate that the employment rate among 
people over fourteen years of age rose from 49 to 53 per cent in North 
Province as a whole, and from 57 to 67 per cent in the VKP area, between 
2004 and 2009. Women in particular benefited from this trend, as their 
rate of employment rose from 35 to 45 per cent, but men from the VKP 
area still ended up with the highest rate of employment (78 per cent).
A closer look at the employment of people originating from different 
tribes enables further clarification of the figures (North Province 2008). 
Direct surveys of all households from the tribes of Koné and Pouembout 
show that the number of wage-earners among the working population 
increased by 178 per cent in 12 years: in 1996, 361 out of 1,180 working 
people were wage-earners, the others being self-employed in the domestic 
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economy; in 2008, there were 1,005 wage-earners out of a total working 
population of 1,867, which represents 1.7 salaried employees per 
dwelling. Among the salaried employees in 2007, almost three-quarters 
had permanent jobs, which guarantees a certain financial stability for the 
families in the tribes. In 2008, the tribes that benefited most from the 
slight improvement were those close to Koné: Noelly, Baco, Tiaoué and 
Koniambo accounted for two thirds of the salaried employees. We also 
noted considerable variability in the representation of the different tribes 
in different economic sectors, but an overall balance between the four 
major sectors that accounted for 75 per cent of the jobs: administration, 
food and agriculture, ‘other services’, and ‘other trades or industries’. 
So the mine and construction of the smelter did not (yet) constitute the 
dominant sector in the process of job creation.
Within this already positive situation, local businessmen in the 
subcontracting sector developed strategies to create jobs for their families 
and social networks. In the businesses themselves, associations of family 
members were common, and the head of the family typically became 
the managing director. The company’s dividends were generally evenly 
distributed, but family members without shares in the company could 
also be expected to contribute to its operation (Grochain and Poithily 
2011). The companies were recruiting first and foremost from their family 
circles, but if the family could not meet the requirements, they looked for 
trustworthy people in their wider circle of acquaintances. With regard to 
access to jobs created directly by the construction project, these family 
and social networks were also mobilised to pass on information and thus 
facilitate the process of local recruitment.18
Finally, efforts to support local companies operating outside the mining 
sector were being sustained at the provincial level. From 2004 to 2010, 
implementation of the CODEV program alone created almost 750 
jobs, the vast majority of which were intended for local workers, and 
half of which would be (low-paid) forms of self-employment (Gaillard 
et al. 2011).
In the period following the preparation and start of the project construction 
phase, the logics of proximity and provincial assistance enabled the local 
population to seize the job opportunities offered by the ‘mechanical’ 
18  This type of information was also distributed through more formal channels by bodies like the 
Bureau des Entreprises du Nord, SAS Vavouto, and others.
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growth in economic activity. With the exception of concerns about an 
increase in the intraprovincial east–west imbalance, and the relatively 
poor integration of women into the labour market, the fears expressed in 
2005 had generally not been realised by 2010.
The Business Development Issue
What the Local Actors were Saying in 2005
All the economic operators encountered in 2005 were in favour of any big 
project that could generate more business activity. A considerable number 
of them were of the view that ‘the mine lights the fuse’. Specifically, the 
most experienced and well-resourced economic operators thought that 
‘the long-term prospects are good’, even though ‘there are a lot of short-term 
uncertainties’ concerning the activities that would actually be promoted 
by the new local economy and the ability of local companies to respond 
to the new opportunities. The small companies and traders appeared to 
be more worried and uncertain because of previous announcements that 
turned out to be false.
The question of access to landed property was of concern for a number 
of economic operators who took a positive view of the development 
of new activity zones, especially on customary land, but were worried 
about possible delays in establishing new activities, and were undeniably 
suspicious of the prospects of actually investing in customary land.
However, it was the threat of competition from the businesses of South 
Province that generated most concern, particularly in the construction 
phase: ‘We must not allow the markets related to the plant to get away 
from us’. Three explanations were presented: (1) the tendering system was 
deemed to be disadvantageous to the companies from the north; (2) the 
elected representatives were perceived as only wanting to deal with ‘reliable 
contractors’; and (3) there was thought to be a lack of relevant skills in 
some prospective areas of work. The creation of groups of companies for 
specific tenders was mentioned as a (partial) response to these challenges.
The existing support mechanisms for investment on a significant scale, 
such as the Institut Calédonien de Participation or the grant of tax 
exemptions, were considered ‘effective and uncomplicated’ by those 
who could benefit from them, even if they had limited knowledge of 
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their operation. CODEV was subject to differing opinions, but was 
also generally considered to be an ‘asset’ that ‘could be improved on’. 
A large number of economic operators in the VKP area expected to 
receive information and support from the Cellule Koniambo, an entity 
established by the provincial authorities to support the development of 
businesses related to the Koniambo project. Nevertheless, the provincial 
economic development and employment situation prompted calls for the 
strengthening of socio-economic initiatives, which were considered ‘very 
significant in number but still not very well coordinated’. The view was 
that more should be done to encourage the diversification of business 
activities so that individuals could really exercise more choice in this field.
Informants agreed that it was necessary to promote the establishment and 
maintenance of links between the various mechanisms and institutions 
so as to improve their impacts and benefits. People expressed particular 
preference for the facilitation and promotion of small business activities, 
the provision of a personalised advisory service for businesses, a local 
process for facilitating the emergence and intensive support of individual 
and collective initiatives, and the establishment of some collective services 
such as a sorting centre.
What the Research Said in 2010
Between 1995 and 2010, the number of companies in North Province 
increased by more than 4,100. Nearly two-thirds of these companies were 
operating in the service sector, while 28 per cent were in the construction 
sector and 8 per cent in the manufacturing sector. The figures for business 
start-ups are more significant. In 2010, more than 600 businesses were 
created in North Province, compared with fewer than 300 in 1995 and 
340 in 2005. Taking into account the disappearance of some enterprises, 
there was a net increase of 120 businesses in the constructions sector and 
375 in the service sector over the whole period (Figure 2.4).
The emergence of the VKP urban centre largely explains the increase in 
the number of start-ups after 2005, and especially in 2010. Thirty-eight 
per cent of the businesses were created within the VKP area, and over 
40  per cent of these start-ups were in the construction sector. On the 
east coast, the proportion of business start-ups decreased slightly between 
1995 and 2008 (from 35 to 30 per cent), and towards the end of the 
period in question, more than 70 per cent of these start-ups were in the 
tertiary (service) sector. Moreover, it was possible to observe an increase 
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in the proportion of start-ups in the tertiary sector in all parts of the 
province after 1995, except in the municipalities bordering the new plant 
site. Similarly, the manufacturing sector accounted for nearly 10 per cent 
of the business start-ups on the west coast, compared with only 5 per cent 
on the east coast.
Figure 2.4 Net annual average of semi-annual business start-ups, 
1995–2010.
Note: Numbers are negative for some sectors in some years because the number of new 
businesses created was smaller than the number of existing businesses that closed. 
Source: Institut de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, Direction des Systèmes 
d’Information/Service Information et Méthodes.
Overall, the trends in business creation and development followed those 
observed in the labour market. Since the early 2000s, it has been possible 
to observe the initial effects of provincialisation, followed by a noteworthy 
acceleration with the commencement of work at the Vavouto construction 
site. In 2010, almost 450 new businesses were established with their 
headquarters in the VKP area.
In the subcontracting sector, the total value of locally issued on-site 
orders and contracts from 1998 to 2009 was XPF58 billion, of which 
XPF38 billion was concentrated in the period from mid-2005 to mid-
2009 (Grochain and Poithily 2011). Close to 90 businesses were created 
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over this latter period with the help of the Cellule Koniambo. Seventy 
per cent of these businesses were headquartered in North Province and 
operating on the Vavouto site, and provincial policy measures enabled 
locally owned businesses to capture 60 per cent of the XPF38 billion spent 
locally through on-site contracts and orders between mid-2005 and mid-
2009. Public works accounted for 57 per cent of the value of these spin-
offs (22 per cent in earthworks and 35 per cent in construction), followed 
by transport (23 per cent), marine activities (8 per cent), environmental 
management (4  per cent) and miscellaneous government contracts 
(8 per cent). Finally, it should be noted that the new entrepreneurs, both 
Caledonian and Kanak, often came from modest social backgrounds. 
These figures indicate that competition from the south did not seriously 
disadvantage the entrepreneurs of the north, but that was mainly because 
of provincial policy measures taken to counter that risk.
A few examples will serve to illustrate this point.19 Although some local 
businesses were already involved when work first commenced at the 
Vavouto site, major contracts—especially for earthworks—were awarded 
to businesses from outside the area. In keeping with the fears previously 
expressed by local economic operators, businesses in the VKP area were 
not well structured, were poorly prepared to meet the demand, and thus 
had trouble asserting themselves against the outsiders. They tried to stress 
the need for local employment and the political values of ‘rebalancing’ and 
‘common destiny’ at the expense of market relationships that favoured 
large companies with prior experience of working with Hatch Technip, 
which was the joint venture company selected by Falconbridge (in 2006) 
to oversee the whole construction process.20 In 2008, the Bureau des 
Entreprises du Nord (BEN) was established by local entrepreneurs to 
push for greater local participation, especially in relation to the earthworks 
contract awarded to the multinational company Vinci. From the outset, 
BEN united northern business organisations with partnerships, known as 
sociétés civile de participation (SCPs), which represented the local Kanak 
clans. However, the federal structure of this organisation did not meet 
the requirements of KNS, and that is why SAS Vavouto was established 
in late 2008. This new corporate entity was able to raise finance on its 
own account and take responsibility for issuing subcontracts on behalf of 
KNS, often by dividing them between local companies that were members 
19  See Poithily (2010) for more detailed description and analysis of these case studies.
20  This major contract included design, procurement and project management services.
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of BEN while underwriting their capacity to meet the contractual 
requirements. In return, SAS Vavouto received a commission calculated as 
a percentage of the value of each contract and redistributed the dividends 
to its shareholders, which were the main clans of the VKP area grouped 
into SCP partnerships. Although the new company did not secure all of 
the contracts that it wanted, it did secure enough—including some of the 
earthworks contracts—to make a significant contribution to the growth 
in spin-offs for local businesses.
The provincial authorities supported the establishment of another joint 
venture, the Société Webuihoone Maritime SAS (SOWEMAR), in 
which a subsidiary of SMSP owns 49 per cent of the shares, while the 
rest are divided between two clan-based companies from the VKP area. 
SOWEMAR secured a contract to operate the tugboats that tow the bigger 
ships entering the port of Vavouto, and this enabled the participating 
clans to create a long-term and potentially profitable activity in the area. 
It was not expected that local residents would so quickly capture a share 
of the market in activities aside from those that have conventionally been 
assigned to them, like caretaking, cleaning and ‘site enhancement’.
The French Government also played an important role through the 
provision of tax relief. Unlike provincial tax exemptions associated with 
new projects, which have been criticised by developers for being too small 
and by contractors for being too slow, national tax relief on vehicle prices 
facilitated the creation of new businesses in the area.
In light of these examples, it would seem that a variety of local 
entrepreneurs got more than they had previously hoped to get from the 
economic development triggered by the project. The strategies adopted, in 
particular the collective dynamics generated around public shareholdings 
and embedding of contractual decisions in local social networks, generally 
proved effective. However, it must be stressed that most of the businesses 
created were very small in size (80 per cent had no salaried employees), 
and that provincial economic activity was still highly dependent on the 
public or semi-public sector as the leading supplier of salaried jobs and 
provider of financial support for the vast majority of private initiatives. 
This situation, which the provincial political executive hoped would be 
a temporary one, demonstrates the inexperience and financial frailty of 
a network of businesses, the majority of which had only recently been 
established.
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The Social Cohesion Issue
What the Local Actors were Saying in 2005
In 2005, there was a general belief that big projects would accelerate 
and amplify the changes in local communities, which had already 
been weakened by the rapid changes taking place, because they would 
aggravate social inequalities. The role of the customary chiefs in economic 
development, the institutionalisation of the relationships between the 
political office holders and customary chiefs, and the need to ensure 
‘historical continuity’ were at the centre of the questions being raised. 
The need to respect the rights of the clans was highlighted by some 
customary chiefs, but warnings against opportunistic conduct were also 
being expressed. The customary chiefs in the tribes closest to the proposed 
project expressed the greatest fears about the social changes to come: 
‘People are going to earn money but let’s be careful to use the money for 
our well-being and not to our disadvantage’. The customary authorities 
were preoccupied with preserving a way of life even though ‘life is going 
to change’, particularly as many of them stated that they did not ‘know 
what is really going to happen’.
On a slightly different note, the people’s elected representatives were 
aware that the project would accelerate changes in the local society and 
thought it was essential ‘to prepare to control them’. The influx of people 
and the growth of economic activities and revenues were considered as 
positive drivers of a ‘co-mingling’ between villages and tribes as long 
as  they were controlled. Hence, the ‘preservation of a tribal space’ that 
was not excluded from development, but could benefit from it through 
the adoption of new practices appropriate for customary land, appeared 
to some of the mayors to be an important way of exercising such control. 
For a small minority of the mayors, outside the VKP area, the risk of ‘bad 
development’ was one that could not be ignored, and they thought it was 
necessary to remain vigilant against ‘the wrong kind of development’ that 
results in a poor distribution of the wealth that is generated.
More broadly, questions remained about the choice of a ‘dehumanised’ 
form of economic development, ‘favouring individualism’. These identity-
based issues reflected the fears of a ‘loss of peaceful life in the north’ and 
the risks of growing social ruptures. This sentiment was accompanied, 
however, by clarity in relation to the differences between European and 
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Kanak conceptions of development, and the need for corresponding 
differences in strategy and policy. Finally, there was concern about one 
demographic aspect of the construction process: ‘Many foreign workers 
will come; they will be single and that can cause many problems’.
What the Research Said in 2010
There are no statistics that provide objective information about the link 
between development and social cohesion. To assess the differences 
between expectations and practical experience, we relied on three main 
sources:
• the CODEV evaluation carried out by the IAC, specifically its 
assessment of the project’s impact on the social integration of 
households;
• a study of the customary life of the Koné and Pouembout tribes 
(North Province 2008); and
• a more general study of the solidarity networks in local communities 
(Grochain and Poithily 2011).
The CODEV evaluation was concerned with the distribution of 
XPF3.4 billion in support of 3,362 economic projects in North Province. 
The program was also intended to respect and develop the local Kanak 
culture, and was therefore not exclusively focused on the production of 
marketable goods, but was also meant to contribute to an improvement 
in the social life of the beneficiaries. A noticeable improvement in 
relationships with the local population was found to have been achieved. 
Having received assistance, individual CODEV beneficiaries felt that 
their activities were being recognised and, as a result, they were better 
integrated into professional networks. For their part, the groups and 
associations supported by the program were found to enjoy a better social 
environment as a result of 57 per cent of the projects. For these two types 
of CODEV beneficiaries, the projects appeared to play an important role 
in the acquisition of a certain socio-professional recognition. Moreover, 
54 per cent of the projects were found to have improved social relationships 
within tribes, while 46 per cent had this effect within villages. At the same 
time, however, problems involving jealousy appeared in 28 per cent of the 
projects that had some social impact (and may have played some role in 
the 9 per cent that were simply aborted). Overall, less than one-third of 
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the projects were perceived by the beneficiaries as having had a significant 
impact on their social environment, and many of them were assessed 
more in terms of how they improved individual living conditions. On the 
other hand, the beneficiaries perceived a decline in the negative impact 
of projects on the social environment, which suggests the emergence of 
a basic trend towards a greater social acceptance of market integration.
The study of the Koné and Pouembout tribes emphasised the rarity of 
wealth creation in late 2008, and thus corroborated the fears of a growing 
imbalance in the distribution of benefits from the new project (North 
Province 2008). The assets of the tribes were found to reside in the social 
economy, which was often organised around women and the conduct of 
very small-scale productive activities. The consultancy report was based 
on an inventory of 48 businesses originating from within the two tribes, 
which had a combined population of 3,000 residents. Ninety-two per cent 
of these were fragile micro-businesses that generated 130 jobs between 
them and focused on activities (such as transport) that were related to 
the proximity of the plant site. At the same time, the study noted a trend 
towards a reduction in food-producing activities with the emergence 
of wage-earning opportunities, the small proportion (only 15 per cent) 
of  micro-businesses that were producing food on customary land, and 
the disappearance of several livestock farms. The analysis confirmed the 
risk of social and customary deconstruction and an exodus of villagers to 
the urban centres. To this scenario was added local people’s pessimism 
regarding the possible impacts of economic development on social 
relationships, such as the emptying of Kanak villages during the week, the 
substitution of wage employment for mutual aid, the rise of individualism, 
a decline in traditional authority, uncertain entrepreneurial capacities, the 
disappearance of vernacular languages, scholastic failure, family problems, 
and competition or conflict generated by the flow of regular cash incomes. 
Nevertheless, the report concluded with a note of optimism in relation to 
‘the measured and not very alarmist formulation of the problems’ and the 
‘current revitalisation of the councils of clan chiefs who share and act in 
the context of the customary area’ (North Province 2008: 130).
In their analysis of the strategies of the local subcontracting companies, 
Grochain and Poithily (2011) also reported on new forms of valuation of 
customary life and relationships. On one hand, these strategies enabled 
the placement of customary life, as reconstituted on the basis of inter-
generational relationships and the social changes already under way, at 
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the core of entrepreneurial practices; on the other hand, they also resulted 
in new forms of conflict. It was easier to secure contracts because of the 
developer’s acknowledgment of local people’s customary connections to 
the land, but this in itself was far from being sufficient as a basis for the 
development of a business strategy. Ideally, the business operators should 
become entrepreneurs while retaining certain fundamental customary 
elements in their working arrangements and, as previously mentioned, the 
GDPLs were understood to be bodies that could bridge the gap between 
the customary and capitalist organisation of work.
The formation of the SCPs, which brought together the clans of the VKP 
area, was a further illustration of this point. This type of partnership or 
association, which had already been tested in the context of the Goro 
project in South Province, was meant to be a way of enabling the customary 
authorities to be recognised and represented within the project. What was 
also involved here was an acceptance of the decision by the provincial 
authorities and KNS not to pay royalties to the customary authorities, but 
instead to initiate a kind of apprenticeship in business development. The 
GDPL, the basic organisational unit governed according to customary 
law, was modified so that it could participate in the SCP, an economic 
structure managed in accordance with common law that could then 
invest in other companies. With the support of KNS and the provincial 
authorities, and following around 100 meetings, the intention was to 
assemble the various clans in a customary form of capitalism that would 
offer the best solution for them. In the end, one SCP united the GDPLs 
(and hence the clans) from the coastal zone with their allies from the 
plains, another united the GDPLs from the Koniambo Massif, and a third 
united the GDPLs of the tribes of Baco and Poindah bordering the massif. 
The SCPs functioned as screening devices that took responsibility for 
economic issues on behalf of the customary authorities they represented, 
for example by investing in businesses, or collecting and redistributing 
the dividends arising from their investments. As we have seen, there was 
also an overarching structure, SAS Vavouto, which grouped the SCPs 
with other shareholders for the purpose of facilitating relationships with 
KNS, and hence formed a second ‘screen’ between the project and the 
customary authorities.
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Figure 2.5 Popular participation in SAS Vavouto.
Source: Authors’ diagram.
Thus the principle at work here did not involve the multiplication 
of  bilateral relationships between an industrial enterprise and a set of 
isolated local clans, which might have been the standard practice in 
the logic of an enclave development, but was scarcely feasible within 
the local context and territorial ambition of this particular project. 
The intention was to recognise customary claims through innovative 
financial instruments, which meant a rethinking of the political 
relationships within and between the clans. Within this alternative form 
of organisation, customary relationships continued to facilitate access to 
markets. Based on their preferential position, particularly in relation to 
access to information, through their GDPLs and SCPs, the clans actually 
established a system for exchanging contracts and jobs that was partly free 
from the logic of economic effectiveness and partly bound to a customary 
base (Poithily 2010). At the same time, this relational structuring enabled 
the project’s developers to deal with one entity, Vavouto SAS, which was 
consistent with its management principle of not spreading contracts too 
thinly between the service providers.
The system that was put in place appeared to operate well enough, and 
enabled the shielding of local businesses from excessive competition and 
the linking of customary authorities from the VKP area by contributing 
to their reorganisation. However, it did not prevent conflicts, which 
remained frequent even if controlled in their intensity, nor territorial 
imbalances, which could ultimately become extremely risky. Furthermore, 
its endurance was not guaranteed because of the weakness of many of the 
resulting businesses.
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With respect to indirect impacts, the integration of the Kanak people 
into an economic development program for customary land remained 
a source of ambivalence because of the combination of some successful 
projects with some internal conflicts. Without turning very violent, the 
latter have had the effect of ‘judicialising’ the customary world through 
the recognition of the clan as a legal entity and the capacity of clan leaders 
to instigate legal proceedings.
The Situation in 2016
The empirical study documented in this chapter was completed in 2010, 
so it is now instructive to consider what has transpired since then. So far 
as local employment is concerned, the figures show the expected decline 
in the availability of jobs following the end of the project’s construction 
phase, but a relatively stable number of job offers in the operational phase, 
at a level three times higher than it was before 2005 (Figure 2.6). This is 
a sign of dynamism in the labour market, largely driven by the efforts to 
‘rebalance’ the supply of infrastructure in North Province, supported by 
an overall ‘densification’ of the provincial service sector. The demand for 
formal employment in North Province has stabilised at around 1,500 job 
applications per annum in recent years, comparable to the trend in New 
Caledonia as a whole (GoNC 2016).
The Koniambo smelter employed 999 workers at the end of 2015 
(KNS 2016). However, it is worth noting that the local labour market 
was destabilised in 2016, firstly because of technical problems with the 
furnaces in 2015, and then because of a fall in the nickel price in 2016.21 
This instability demonstrated the extent to which the local economy 
was sensitive to the functioning of the smelter. Expatriate positions were 
the first to be cut, which led to a 15 per cent drop in real estate prices 
and had a negative impact on economic activity at large. A new wave 
of redundancies affecting local workers was avoided thanks to the trade 
union pressure, the reassertion of Glencore’s commitments in North 
Province and slightly better prospects for metal prices.
21  Nickel prices have been highly unstable on the London Metal Exchange over the last ten years. 
They fell from US$55,000/tonne in 2007 to US$10,000/tonne in 2009, rose to US$25,000 in 2010, 
dropped again to US$11,000 by the end of 2016, but are now rising again.
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Figure 2.6 Employment offers and applications in North Province, 
2000–16.
Source: Institut pour le Développement des Compétences en Nouvelle-Calédonie.
In the matter of business development, there was an understandable peak 
during the height of the construction phase, and one that was not confined 
to business activity within the construction sector itself, and business 
creation outside the construction sector has retained its dynamism in 
the operational phase (see Figure  2.7). The total value of contracts 
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relating to the construction and operation of the smelter amounted 
to XPF367 billion by the end of 2015, and businesses based in North 
Province captured 49  per cent of this value (KNS 2016). The volume 
of subcontracting activities has understandably decreased, and enterprises 
have had to close or else reorient their activities, which generated some 
awkward situations for individual entrepreneurs. However, the departure 
of enterprises from South Province that were temporarily based in North 
Province has limited the impact of the post-construction ‘demobilisation’ 
on the truly local businesses.
Figure 2.7 Net annual average of semi-annual business start-ups, 
1995–2016.
Note: Numbers are negative for some sectors in some years because the number of new 
businesses created was smaller than the number of existing businesses that closed.
Source: Institut de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, Direction des Systèmes 
d’Information/Service Information et Méthodes.
It is hard to say whether local entrepreneurs have learned to operate 
more sustainably as a result of measures implemented before the start 
of the construction phase. Although the provincial dynamics no longer 
depend on the direct and indirect impacts of the construction process 
itself, they are still strongly supported (and subsidised) by the provincial 
authorities. The Nord Avenir Group was split off from the province’s 
holding company, SOFINOR, as the holder of assets outside the mining 
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and metallurgical sector, in order to promote economic diversification, 
and now holds shares in more than 80 firms in both North and South 
provinces. However, it is still dependent on public funding, which could 
be seen as a sign of frailty.
With respect to the question of social cohesion, the structures designed 
to bridge the gap between customary and capitalist forms of organisation 
are still in place (Apithy et al. 2016), but the dynamics at work do not 
provide clear answers to the concerns formulated in 2005 about the nature 
and ‘quality’ of the development triggered by the project. It appears that 
adjustments are being made on a day-to-day basis, but have still been 
dictated by the rhythms of the nickel economy, even after the smelter 
started operating in 2014. The slowdown in the rate of economic growth 
(IEOM 2016) has not had much effect on the local communities so far, 
and recent studies suggest that individual members of local tribes have 
been able to adjust to economic fluctuations through short- or longer-
term occupational or geographical mobility (Pestana et al. 2016). These 
capacities have been enhanced by the level of infrastructural development 
achieved in the last three decades. However, there is still much uncertainty 
about the medium- and long-term social impacts that will be experienced 
through the remainder of the mining project cycle and hence about the 
opportunities offered by the new industrial regime.
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this chapter partially validates the hypotheses 
contained in the model of negotiations through the mining project cycle 
(Figure 2.2), but it also seems necessary to add some new elements into 
the framework in light of the relatively short period of time that elapsed 
between the decision to build the smelter and the completion of the 
construction phase.
First, it seems essential to incorporate the presence of the province, both as 
the face of the state and as a key actor involved in supporting the project 
and managing its impacts. Our observations show that its action weighs 
on the normative framework at the start of the project, with the dual 
effect of maintaining the company’s willingness to pay at a high level and 
noticeably increasing the negotiating capacity of the local communities. 
Moreover, far from concentrating its political actions on the one industrial 
project, the province has broadened of the concept of redistribution and 
93
2. From Anticipation to Practice
limited social tensions through the implementation of CODEV, through 
the operation of financial entities like SOFINOR and Nord Avenir, and 
through the other levers at its disposal, which remain both numerous 
and well resourced. To understand the effects of the project on a small 
territory, it would seem essential to shift the focus of the analysis to 
the capacity of the state (or in this case the province) to connect other 
dimensions of development to the production of minerals or metals.
Second, it seems that the political dimensions of the project brought 
about a combination of provincial action with the developer’s engineering 
efforts and with knowledge of the likely impacts of the project on local 
populations. These conditions contributed to the control of conflict at the 
beginning of the project cycle. Not only were the rules already generally 
in place, but the support of the local authorities, occasionally backed 
up by the developers, created conditions favourable to the emergence 
of organisational innovations and mechanisms for redistribution of the 
benefits. The high level of prior awareness of the risks, as demonstrated by 
the clarity of the anxieties expressed in 2005, is also indicative of a learning 
process that altered the shape of the curve representing the negotiating 
capacity of the local actors.
The model cannot, however, account for the different levels of conflict 
that are likely to extend through the local communities. While the 
project’s construction phase ran quite smoothly, minor conflicts have 
occurred during the operational phase, which highlight the fact that active 
power relations are at play, and which could lead to more acute tensions 
in future. It would appear to be necessary to approach the project cycle 
in its entirety while being attentive to the discreet changes that emerge 
in the initial phase and whose effects might only become apparent in 
a subsequent phase of the cycle.
As we have seen, the weakness of the local economic fabric also presents 
a major risk. Its disintegration could quickly undermine the durability 
of the redistribution mechanisms, the assumption of responsibility and 
the lessons learned through the public shareholding institutions, and the 
subsequent ability to contain social conflicts.
Generally speaking, due to the far-reaching economic development that 
has been in train through the construction and operational phases of the 
project, it is difficult to assess the sources of future tension that may be 
related to the radical social dynamics at work. We have seen that innovations 
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and proactive policies do not necessarily provide convincing answers or 
reduce the level of uncertainty about the profound nature of the changes 
taking place. What may be involved here, again, are the hardly discernible 
seeds of conflicts to come.
Ultimately, our analysis argues in favour of the ongoing monitoring of 
changes triggered by the production of minerals and metals throughout 
the mining project cycle. More comprehensive monitoring would 
eventually enable the formulation of more detailed recommendations that 
could in turn enable better anticipation and prevention of conflicts and 
improvement in the management of social impacts. It would also make 
sense to develop the analytical framework applied here by improving the 
integration of the state’s capacity for action, focusing on the connections 
between industrial and broader local development, and taking the 
heterogeneous nature of local communities into account.
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3. Social and Environmental 
Transformations in the 
Neighbourhood of a Nickel Mining 




The irony of ‘poverty in the midst of plenty’ can be applied to many 
developing and emerging countries rich in mineral resources. The resource 
curse thesis ‘correlates natural resource abundance to evidence of slow or 
declining economic growth’ (Langton and Mazel 2012: 24; see also Auty 
1993; Sachs and Warner 1995; Freudenburg and Wilson 2002; Bebbington 
et al. 2009). Raw materials such as copper, nickel, gold and uranium are 
found and widely exploited in regions inhabited by indigenous peoples 
who live far from the centres of political power. In most cases, the mining 
sector offers few economic benefits for the indigenous peoples, even if 
mine operators promise to provide opportunities for social, educational 
and economic development. In their study of the Pilbara region in 
Western Australia, Taylor and Scambary (2005:  28) note: ‘While the 
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regional labour market has grown in both size and complexity, indigenous 
participation has remained relatively marginal’. The relationship between 
mining companies and indigenous communities is largely based on 
an unequal relationship of power. Even if multinational companies 
have become increasingly aware of the importance of corporate social 
responsibility, indigenous communities are in most cases characterised by 
weakness in the face of these companies. Taking examples from Papua 
New Guinea, Colin Filer postulates a process of ‘social disintegration’ 
within such indigenous communities (Banks 1996: 233).
The French overseas territory of New Caledonia possesses around 
25 per cent of worldwide nickel deposits, and mining products represent 
around 95 per cent of its total exports. Economic development and the 
nickel industry depend on each other. Historically, indigenous Kanak 
people were excluded from the mining industry in New Caledonia, while 
the land was forcibly occupied for farming and other economic activities. 
Discriminatory regulations were abolished after World War II, and Kanak 
people progressively became French citizens. They also got jobs in the 
mining sector, especially as truck drivers or cleaners. The only nickel 
smelter at that time was the Doniambo plant in Nouméa, which was 
operated by the French company Société Le Nickel (SLN). This situation 
changed in the 1990s. The demands of the independence movement for 
economic development and political emancipation from France resulted 
in the Koniambo project in North Province.
Figure 3.1 The Koniambo project construction site, September 2012.
Source: Photo by Matthias Kowasch.
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North Province, which is governed by the Kanak independence umbrella 
party Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (Kanak and 
Socialist National Liberation Front), became the majority shareholder 
in the project. A majority shareholding means more decision-making 
power and more influence over the strategy of the mining company or 
its shareholders. But involvement in the nickel sector will not preclude 
societal transformations occurring within the Kanak communities living 
in the neighbourhood of the project. On the contrary, employment, 
business creation and shareholding lead to social upheaval.
After describing the emergence and background of the Koniambo 
project in northern New Caledonia, this chapter focuses on societal and 
environmental transformations within the indigenous communities in 
the neighbourhood of the project. In 2003, Leah Horowitz completed 
a PhD thesis about the relationship between the Koniambo project and 
the closest Kanak village, Oundjo, which is only 2 kilometres from the 
work site (Horowitz 2003a). Drawing upon this ethnographic study 
and the papers of other authors working on societal transformations in 
neighbouring Kanak communities (Emergences 2009a, 2009b; Poithily 
2010; Grochain and Poithily 2011; Le Meur et al. 2012; North Province 
2013), this chapter is based on more than two years of fieldwork and 
various research projects conducted at the Institut de Recherche pour le 
Développement (IRD) between 2007 and 2012.1 The present chapter sets 
out the involvement of neighbouring Kanak communities in the Koniambo 
project, through employment, business creation and subcontracting, and 
describes conflicts linked to the construction of the nickel smelter. Social 
and environmental transformations within the communities are analysed 
in a theoretical framework outlined in the next section.
Method and Theoretical Framework
Fieldwork in post-colonial settings is subject to special rules and presents 
very particular challenges to the researcher. The French overseas territory 
of New Caledonia is a country, inscribed since 1986 on the United 
1  I would like to thank the IRD branch in Nouméa, especially the research groups UMR Espace-DEV 
and UMR GRED for logistical support, welcome and encouragement during my PhD and subsequent 
research projects. In the framework of different research programs (GERSA, Mining Governance), 
financial grants helped me to conduct the surveys. I received warm welcomes from families in the four 
villages where I worked. I would like to particularly thank my family in Baco, where I lived for a year.
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Nations (UN) list of ‘non-self-governing territories’ (see article 73 of the 
UN Charter). The long history of relations between the indigenous Kanak 
independence movement and the UN has been described by Christine 
Demmer (2007) and Stéphanie Graff (2012). The civil war in the 1980s, 
the independence movement and the process of decolonisation have to be 
considered by researchers who undertake ethnographic studies in Kanak 
communities. The theft of intellectual property represents a danger that 
the researcher also has to consider when doing fieldwork. According to 
Paul Robbins (2006: 313), research in the global South can be a post-
colonial and expropriating act. When I started fieldwork in the Kanak 
village of Baco, clan elders mentioned that it is important to share the 
results of research studies with the communities themselves. Kanak 
communities often welcome European researchers who are interested 
in obtaining information about clan histories, sacred places, and local 
people’s perceptions and ideas—in short, ‘intellectual property’.
My fieldwork in northern New Caledonia was part of a PhD thesis in 
human geography (2006–10), other research projects and a consultancy 
undertaken for the authorities of North Province in 2012. A quantitative 
survey of 239 people in four Kanak villages (Netchaot, Baco, Oundjo 
and Gatope) was carried out from 2008 to 2010 (see Figure 3.2). Young 
volunteers from the villages were recruited as interviewers for the study. 
The quantitative approach was complemented by semi-structured 
interviews with businessmen, customary authorities and politicians. I 
collaborated with customary authorities to map sacred places and clan 
housing in order to visualise territorial perceptions in the vicinity of the 
mining project. We pointed out the places with a global positioning 
system or on a paper map before exporting the data to a  geographical 
information system. The challenge was to develop a method of spatial 
analysis to map the heritage values attributed to places by Kanak people 
and to make this new information available for regional planning 
programs. A real partnership means having enough space for views to 
be expressed by both the researcher and the customary representative. 
Both play the parts of ‘learner’ and ‘teacher’ at the same time (Kowasch 
2014: 261). Collaboration with customary authorities and representatives 
is consistent with the conclusion of the political ecologist Piers Blaikie 
(2012: 237), who suggests that ‘the notion of a politicised organigram is 
sometimes useful to understand what “really goes on” in a relevant part 
of an administration’ (2012: 37). And the regular presentation of research 
results in Kanak villages underlines the point that researchers can ‘give 
something back’ to local populations (Kowasch 2014: 262).
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Figure 3.2 Location of the studied Kanak villages in northern 
New Caledonia.
Source: Author’s map, based on information supplied by the Direction des Infrastructures, de la 
Topographie et des Transports Terrestres.
The question then is whether the researcher has to be integrated into 
the indigenous village for a longer period and actively participate in 
community life. According to Blaikie (2012), social engagement can 
be useful, and withdrawal into an ivory tower does not permit a deeper 
understanding of peoples’ perceptions and opinions. My research results 
are based on integration into community life in the village of Baco over 
a period of six years.
The environment has not only a utilitarian value for Kanak societies but 
also a cultural heritage value. Research on environmental economics in 
other countries has attempted to place a monetary value on ecosystems 
(e.g. Constanza et al. 1997; David et al. 2007). Figure 3.3 shows a simple 
model to demonstrate the transformation of environmental values.
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Figure 3.3 Environmental value model.
Source: Author’s chart, based on personal communication from Gilbert David and Jean-Brice 
Herrenschmidt (2010).
Heritage values are transcribed mainly in topographical locations that 
represent an essential cultural reservoir. Winslow (1995: 14) notes that 
each clan name is a set of place names—the name of the place where the 
ancestor of the clan appeared and all other places that the clan occupied 
in its history. Ancestors are pervasive, and their presence is felt in the 
passage of a butterfly, in the falling rain or in the swirls of river water. 
The appropriation of space in a particular place results from naming and 
recognising the site in one’s own language. The real ‘owners’ of a place are 
its founders. The specificity of the clan is primarily its history: the place 
and the circumstances of its appearance, the journey it undertook and the 
recognised symbolism of place. The social identity and legitimacy of any 
clan is then presented as a route or as a series of places where the group 
lived (Naepels 2006:  50). But Kanak property is subject to perpetual 
updating (Naepels 1998; Le Meur 2010; Kowasch 2012a), because the 
itinerary of the clan can change, and also because land can be given away. 
The founding group is therefore not the only one able to claim land rights. 
Pursuant to a ‘host dynamic’, the newcomer receives from the founder 
some ground where he can live and grow crops. It is important to note 
that the transfer of land represents not the transfer of ownership, but 
the superposition of different legitimacies: the property is not unique, 
but rather consists of competing titles. The founder maintains a special 
relationship to the land. The newcomer in turn can argue that he resided 
there, made exchanges with the founder and worked there, but he cannot 
in any way challenge the fact of having received the land of another.
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The ‘traditional’ Melanesian model contains a strong cultural discourse 
linking places to a myth and/or to a specific history. To these cultural 
heritage values, which include cultural practices like fishing or subsistence 
farming, are added economic practices, which are required for people 
to live and reproduce. In the transitional or ecological model, the 
discourse seeks to balance the importance of practical values and cultural 
heritage, describing a changing pattern of Melanesian lifestyle in the 
cash economy, or otherwise describing the evolution from a free-market 
economy to a  sustainable development model, introducing a notion of 
balance between the use of the environment and its capacity to retain its 
heritage features. According to the classical Western economic model, the 
socioeconomic value of an environment is often reduced to its practical 
value—the economic goods and services that the environment provides. 
The  conservation model in turn removes the question of practice 
by promoting the protection of natural areas perceived as part of  a 
common heritage. Only the cultural heritage value exists in this model 
(see Figure 3.3).
Fishing and subsistence farming have heritage value as cultural practices, 
because they are used to establish or renew social relationships with 
other clans and to transmit cultural knowledge to younger generations 
in the context of customary ceremonies, as when fish are exchanged in 
a customary wedding ceremony. New incomes from people’s involvement 
in the mining sector not only lead to social transformations within Kanak 
communities, as when farming products can be replaced by products from 
the supermarket, but mining projects also result in changes to landscape 
and territory. Fishing, hunting and farming are practised in what Tolia-
Kelly (2006) calls ‘territories of belonging’. The exploitation of mineral 
resources creates conflicts and negotiations over such territories.
Given that cultural heritage sites are also located on mine sites in New 
Caledonia, and on the customary land where the social and economic 
facilities required for a metallurgical plant are constructed, would it be 
true to say that the territories of belonging are currently being transformed 
by the traditional landowners themselves? Who are the actors in these 
development projects and what conflicts within the Kanak communities 
result from the projects? The territorial and social transformations linked 
to the Koniambo project will be analysed in the rest of this chapter. What 
are the implications of what Amin (2002: 397) would call this ‘politics 
of place’?
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A Short History of the Koniambo Project
The Koniambo project has a strong symbolic value for the Kanak 
independence party that governs North Province. Shareholders in the 
project include the local company Société Minière du Sud Pacifique 
(SMSP), which owns 51 per cent of the shares and is owned by North 
Province, and the Swiss group Glencore, which holds 49  per cent. 
The  Koniambo nickel smelter has an annual production capacity of 
60,000 tonnes of ferronickel. The first pouring of nickel metal was in 
April 2013, and the plant was fully commissioned in November 2014. 
However, it failed to operate at full capacity due to technical problems 
and incidents.
Even before the Koniambo project went into production, North Province 
was reinvesting its revenues from SMSP nickel mines elsewhere in the 
country in wider economic development, such as tourism, aquaculture 
and urbanisation, along with construction of social or cultural facilities. 
In this case, the nickel sector is a kind of ‘instrument’ for economic and 
political independence, and not just for making profits (Winslow 1995; 
Pitoiset and Wéry 2008; Le Meur and Mennesson 2011; Kowasch 2012a). 
Investors sometimes mention ‘two Koniambo projects’: on one hand, the 
construction of the processing plant and development of the mine; on the 
other hand, the economic development of the Voh, Koné and Pouembout 
(VKP) municipalities where the Koniambo project is located.
By taking the initiative in the 1990s to build a nickel smelter in North 
Province, SMSP sought an industrial partner who could provide the 
relevant expertise and co-financing (Néaoutyine 2006; Pitoiset and Wéry 
2008). The provincial authorities and SMSP initially established a joint 
venture with the Canadian company Falconbridge.
SMSP contacted and negotiated with Falconbridge and then convinced 
the French Government—with assistance of political pressure from 
independence party leaders—to help it obtain the Koniambo Massif from 
a French mining company (Horowitz 2004: 290).
SMSP/Falconbridge won the Koniambo Massif in exchange for 
surrendering the licence to mine another nickel deposit (Poum), in 
the far north of New Caledonia, to SLN. The deal was fixed in the 
Bercy Agreement in 1998, signed by SMSP/Falconbridge, the French 
Government and the French company Eramet, which is SLN’s parent 
company (Pitoiset and Wéry 2008). In 2006, Falconbridge was taken 
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over by the Swiss mining company Xstrata, which thus became the 
new partner of SMSP (Pitoiset and Wéry 2008; see also Chapter 2, this 
volume). Xstrata has mainly financed construction of the processing plant 
on Vavouto Peninsula and exploitation of the nickel deposit, while SMSP 
holds the mining tenements in the Koniambo Massif and has support 
from local Kanak communities, even though nickel mining has caused 
widespread environmental pollution in the country for nearly 150 years. 
With the recent development of the Koniambo and Goro nickel projects 
(see Chapter 6, this volume), New Caledonia is expected to triple its 
nickel production and become the second-largest nickel producer in the 
world. In October 2012, around 6,000 workers from different countries 
were working (and mostly living) on the Koniambo construction site. 
Chinese and Filipino workers, who assembled the components of the 
nickel smelter and the power plant, travel the world doing such work. 
Direct employment on the project accounted for between 800 and 1,000 
jobs once it came into production.
SMSP already possesses nickel mines in Ouaco and Poya, on the west 
coast, and Nakety and Kouaoua, on the east coast of Grande Terre, the 
main island of New Caledonia, all located in North Province. Since 1995, 
SMSP had become the largest ore exporting company in New Caledonia 
because SLN, which produces more than 50 per cent of the ores, feeds 
the majority of its output into its Doniambo processing plant in Nouméa. 
The primary goal of SMSP was always to become a ‘metallurgist’ and to 
transform nickel ores into metal. This milestone was achieved in 2008 
with the start-up of a processing plant in Gwangyang in South Korea. 
The nickel smelter is operated by Société du Nickel de Nouvelle-Calédonie 
et Corée (SNNC), a joint venture between SMSP, holding 51 per cent 
of the shares, and its Korean partner POSCO, holding 49 per cent. SMSP 
and POSCO created a second joint venture, which is simply called Nickel 
Mining Company (in English), to exploit all of SMSP’s nickel deposits 
in New Caledonia apart from the Koniambo deposit. The revenues from 
the smelter in Gwangyang were used to co-finance construction of the 
Koniambo plant. In both cases, the 51/49 per cent model of ownership is 
remarkable because it has been rolled out to an overseas investor. It is little 
known globally that an indigenous mining company holds 51 per cent 
of the shares in a project that is operating in South Korea (with POSCO), 
as well as another joint venture planned in China, with the Chinese nickel 
producer Jinchuan. Processing plants are integral to both deals.
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The Koniambo project is located in a rural area where the infrastructure 
required for the new nickel smelter was initially lacking. In 2004, North 
Province set out to provide a broader development of the VKP area, which 
only had 8,211 inhabitants at the time (Kowasch 2012c; North Province 
2013). In the five years until the next census (in 2009), the local population 
grew by an average of 18 per cent each year. The resident population of the 
provincial capital, Koné, where many of the new facilities were built, grew 
from 5,199 in 2009 to 7,340 in 2014 (GoNC 2016: 31). To welcome the 
new arrivals, the main priority of the public authorities was to provide 
a greater supply of rental housing. Anne Pitoiset and Claudine Wéry 
described the transformation in their biography Mystère Dang:
The villagers discover traffic, real estate speculation, rental housing 
development and the massive arrival of new peoples. The money flows and 
no question, this time, people don’t want to be dispossessed … For the 
first time, the nickel boom leaves Nouméa and its effects are felt in Kanak 
country. (Pitoiset and Wéry 2008: 106)
In New Caledonia, it is common to talk of the ‘bush’ beyond Nouméa 
in  order to highlight the demographic and economic primacy of the 
capital located in South Province, 270 kilometres south of Koné. Some 
40 per cent of New Caledonia’s population live in Nouméa, and the capital 
accounts for roughly 75  per cent of formal employment. The  spatial 
imbalance of the territory, inherited from the colonial period, has 
continued to widen. A policy of ‘territorial rebalancing’ was started with 
the Matignon Agreements of 1988. Horowitz (2004: 307–8) noted how:
Many people hope that the [Koniambo] project will entail an economic 
readjustment or ‘rebalancing’ (rééquilibrage) as promised in the Matignon 
and Nouméa Accords, allowing the Northern Province to be placed on 
more equal footing with the Southern Province.
The development of the VKP area is an example of this policy (Néaoutyine 
2006). The provincial authorities wanted to turn the growing VKP area 
into a real urban centre, an Oceanic city to rival Nouméa. New rental 
housing, shops and industrial areas mushroomed (see Figures 3.4 
and 3.5). One problem has been that the settlements and socioeconomic 
facilities, such as shops and schools, in the area are scattered in different 
locations. Access to facilities such as supermarkets requires the use of a car. 
Public transport does not really exist; there are only some shuttle buses 
operated by individual businessmen that link the Kanak villages to the 
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three towns (Voh, Koné and Pouembout). The process of socioeconomic 
development was initially concentrated on private and state land, but the 
public authorities have since made efforts to integrate Kanak clans and 
their customary land into the process (North Province 2013).
Figure 3.4 First stone of the new cultural centre in Koné, 2008.
Source: Photo by Matthias Kowasch.
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Figure 3.5 Rental housing on customary land, Baco, 2011.
Source: Photo by Matthias Kowasch.
With the construction of the nickel smelter in North Province, and 
a wider development of the VKP area, the independence movement has 
also wanted to show that Kanak people are capable of handling a major 
global mining project, and that the Koniambo project can indeed lead 
to more economic and financial independence from France. The Kanak 
independence leader Jean-Marie Tjibaou explained:
The future of self-determination and the promotion of dignity require 
that we are not beggars. For this, it is necessary that the country helps 
people organising themselves to produce wealth, making them financially 
independent. (Pitoiset and Wéry 2008: 161)
The businessman D. Xamène from Oundjo, who has a subcontracting 
company involved in earthworks and equipment transport, expressed the 
political dimension of the project as follows:
One day we will have our independence, we will have our factory … It is the 
wish of all Kanak peoples. This is a political struggle. (Kowasch 2010: 374)
Nevertheless, the focus on the mining industry is a bold move, because 
the general economic development strategy depends on nickel prices in 
the world market.
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Employment, Business Creation 
and Subcontracting
The study conducted in the four Kanak villages in the neighbourhood 
of the new nickel smelter showed that many of the residents of these 
communities supported the Koniambo project: 60 per cent of the 239 
interviewed people were in favour or rather in favour of the project; 
only 13 per cent were against or rather against. Kanak people generally 
perceive the Koniambo project to be ‘their project’, one that is meant to 
generate employment and services, economic development and political 
emancipation. Their hopes largely hinge on the prospect of employment 
(198 responses). Broader economic development of the VKP area ranks 
second in the number of responses (87) (Kowasch 2010: 373). The mining 
sector is mainly considered as a big employer, not as an instrument for 
development more broadly. The interviewees showed an interest in working 
either for the mining operator Koniambo Nickel SAS (KNS) or for one 
of its subcontracting companies. Among the 239 interviewees, aged from 
sixteen to seventy years, 73 (31 per cent) wanted to be employed by KNS 
and 26 (11 per cent) were already working for the mining company or for 
a subcontractor (Kowasch 2010: 454). Young people under thirty years of 
age especially expressed a great willingness to work in the mining industry. 
Most of the interviewees wanted to be truck drivers or cleaners, which is 
consistent with the job opportunities that actually exist for many people 
in the neighbouring villages. Being a truck driver or cleaner is popular 
because parents, grandparents and friends already have experience in these 
professions, and these jobs also allow people to stay in their home village. 
The customary and family relationships that are central to one’s identity 
are easier to maintain if one can stay in the village. Furthermore, most of 
the interviewees who were motivated to work in the mining sector did 
not have the qualifications to apply for higher-paid positions. In many 
cases, it was cheaper for companies to employ Asian workers than to hire 
local workers, partly because foreign workers are exempt from many of 
the strict regulations that apply to local working conditions. For example, 
Chinese workers who were employed by the China Machinery Industry 
Construction Group could work 60 hours per week, and unofficially 
often worked even longer hours, and still earn the New Caledonian 
minimum salary, which is around US$1,400 per month. As pointed out 
in Chapter 2 (this volume), local communities feared the massive influx of 
foreign workers because so many were single men. KNS did make an effort 
to employ local people, so in late 2012, at the peak of the construction 
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phase, over 60 per cent of the workers on the Vavouto construction site 
were locals. Furthermore, 77 per cent of the local employees, excluding 
the expatriates, were natives of North Province, 77 per cent were Kanak, 
and the most common employee profile was that of the young male 
Kanak who was a native of North Province (see Chapter 2, this volume). 
This helps to explain why so many of my own interviewees were interested 
in working for KNS.
The education level of interviewees in the villages of Netchaot, Baco, 
Oundjo and Gatope who indicated that they were interested in working 
on the Koniambo project is shown in Figure 3.6. The majority of young 
Kanak people between sixteen and twenty-nine years old (55 per cent of 
the interviewees) had been to secondary school, but had not obtained 
a higher school certificate. Often, they continued with specialised training 
for jobs like that of technician or truck driver. Only 22  per cent had 
obtained a higher school certificate, and a small minority (5.5 per cent) 
had spent a minimum of two years on a university degree.
Figure 3.6 Education level of the peoples in the four villages motivated 
to work in the Koniambo project.
Source: Kowasch (2010: 457).
These results are consistent with those from a study conducted by the 
provincial Observatoire de la Santé et des Actions Sociales. That study 
found that just 4 per cent of young Kanaks in North Province obtained 
a higher school certificate, which permits one to enter university, as against 
10  per cent in non-Kanak communities (North Province 2008:  26). 
Among interviewees aged between thirty and forty-five years, no one had 
completed a university degree. The majority (72 per cent) had finished 
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their education at the end of primary school (36 per cent) or secondary 
school (36 per cent). In keeping with the colonial history of the country, 
no one between the ages of forty-six and sixty-five years in the four 
studied villages held either a higher school certificate or university degree. 
This study also showed that young Kanaks had lower annual wages than 
their European fellow citizens with the same skills: ‘We have to note that 
the young Kanaks who work have an income less than half than all other 
communities: US$8,677 against US$19,500’ (ibid.: 18). The study also 
took the example of businessmen and noted that non-Kanaks earned 
three times more than Kanaks (US$30,136 against US$10,665).
In their working document, Le Meur et  al. (2012: 16–20) explain 
that Kanak business development started late, but accelerated with the 
construction of two new nickel smelters in the north and south of New 
Caledonia. During the first nickel boom (1967–71), the creation of small 
and medium enterprises did not involve the Kanak population, but was 
dominated by new immigrants (ibid.: 16). In 1993, Isabelle Leblic (1993: 
240–51) reported a growing demand for subcontracting in the mining 
sector in North Province. Kanak subcontracting in the mining sector 
finally accelerated with the construction of the Goro and Koniambo 
smelters at the beginning of the new millennium.
In North Province, there were more than 550 registered companies by 
2008, compared with 340 in 2005 and less than 300 in 1995 (North 
Province 2013:  35). Even if not all newly established companies were 
subcontractors in the Koniambo project, the increase in business activity 
was still a consequence of the development of the nickel sector. From 
1998 to 2009, nearly 90 subcontracting companies were founded to 
service the Koniambo project, most of them with the support of KNS 
(Le  Meur et  al. 2012). Examples of subcontractors created with such 
support are Société des Travaux du Massif Koniambo (STMK) and Société 
Webuihoone Maritime SAS (SOWEMAR) (ibid.: 45).2 The main activity 
of SOWEMAR was maritime transport, which included the renting of 
two tug boats in order to bring container ships from the lagoon entrance 
to the port of Vavouto (Kowasch 2012a, 2012b). It was also responsible 
for security around the plant site, and had a role to play in the marine 
emergency plans of KNS, such as intervening in the event of accidental 
pollution.
2  Shares in SOWEMAR were split between a clan company from Gatope (46 per cent), a collection 
of coastal clans (5 per cent), and SOFINOR, an SMSP subsidiary (49 per cent) (see Chapter 2, this 
volume; also Kowasch 2010).
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KNS also assisted in the foundation of SAS Vavouto, which is a federation 
of various local companies and businessmen (see Chapter 2, this volume). 
It was founded in 2008 as the interface between local subcontractors 
and the mining company. The goal of SAS Vavouto was to seek, manage 
and distribute contracts by dividing them into several subcontracts for 
its members. Indeed, in accordance with its development strategy, North 
Province does not allow royalty payments to Kanak communities but 
instead supports their direct participation in the Koniambo project by 
means of business contracts and employment. Not all local subcontractors 
are members of SAS Vavouto but, as of August 2012,3 the company 
had federated 126 mostly local (often indigenous) enterprises (personal 
communication, SAS Vavouto, August 2012). Voh, where the smelter was 
built, had the highest concentration of subcontractors—54 enterprises 
(see Figure 3.7).
Figure 3.7 Subcontracting companies belonging to SAS Vavouto 
in August 2012.
Source: Author’s map, based on information supplied by the Bureau des Entreprises du Nord.
3  Around 6,000 people were working on the Vavouto construction site at the peak of the 
construction phase.
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Of the 126 enterprises belonging to SAS Vavouto at the time, nine 
were from Oundjo, eight from Gatope, two from Baco, and one from 
Netchaot. The further the village from the nickel smelter site, the 
fewer the number of SAS Vavouto members. People living closer to the 
construction site felt more involved and were better informed about 
job and business creation opportunities. Furthermore, KNS gave more 
support to business creation in the neighbourhood of the project, which 
meant that business creation and local employment were both higher in 
the neighbouring villages of Oundjo and Gatope than in Netchaot, which 
is more than 30 kilometres from Vavouto Peninsula.
Most Kanak subcontractors were involved in three types of business: 
earthworks and the transportation of material and personnel. The business 
types of all small enterprises located in Baco and Oundjo were identified 
in the revision of the regional planning and development program for the 
VKPP area (VKP and the commune of Poya) in 2012 (North Province 
2013). The types of business operating in Baco are shown in Figure 3.8 
(though not all of them were subcontractors in the Koniambo project).
Figure 3.8 Number of enterprises per working area in Baco, 
August 2012.
Sources: Kowasch (2010), North Province (2013).
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Customary Land Claims, Sacred Places 
and Economic Projects
During French colonisation, the indigenous Kanaks were driven into 
reservations, just like the indigenous populations of North America. 
The reservations occupied about 10 per cent of Grande Terre. Land reform 
in New Caledonia started in 1978 with a view to buying land from settlers 
and returning it to the Kanak clans. Kanak clans create local associations 
in order to claim and receive these estates. In 2010, the results seemed to 
be satisfactory to the Agence de Développement Rural et d’Aménagement 
Foncier (ADRAF), because a balance of landownership had been achieved: 
customary land and European private estates both occupied 295,300 
hectares (Kowasch 2012a: 206). Some 63 per cent of the surface area was 
classified as state land, while 1 per cent remained subject to negotiation 
by ADRAF. As a result, Kanak clans theoretically have the opportunity to 
establish economic projects on their land. ADRAF attributes estates to local 
associations licensed to do business. These associations are known as ‘local 
groups with special rights’, groupements de droit particulier local (GDPLs), 
rather like Aboriginal corporations in Australia. But, until now, much of 
the redistributed land has been left fallow because the primary motivation 
of the clans is usually not economic (Doumenge 2003). The allocations are 
generally based on clan histories and identity values. The anthropologist 
Michel Naepels (2006: 50) notes that the ‘social identity and legitimacy of 
any group is an itinerary, a series of places where the group passed’. From 
the Kanak viewpoint, the legitimacy of land claims results from the places 
where the clan has lived during its history. The ‘first occupants’ have given 
a name in their language to those places. But the land can be given to 
another clan for farming or house building, so different legitimacies can 
overlap. The legitimacy of land claims becomes negotiable, characterised 
as a ‘game of power and influence’ (Le Meur 2010: 109). Moreover, the 
displacement of clans during colonisation now makes it difficult to say 
who the ‘first occupant’ was.
This historical context has led to land conflicts that restrain potential 
investment. Another handicap for investors is the fact that customary 
land is inalienable and non-transferable, so investors sign a ‘customary 
deed’ with the traditional landowners, which gives them some security 
of tenure, but which can theoretically be removed at any time. In the 
absence of a legal framework, the Kanak-dominated North Province 
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supports and provides economic projects on customary land. That is why 
the initiative for projects on customary land generally comes from the 
public authorities, not from Kanak clans. Project implementation rests in 
the hands of state actors, so the involvement of customary representatives 
can be described as ‘guided participation’ in socioeconomic development.
As already mentioned, the provincial authorities have encouraged 
neighbouring Kanak communities to participate in the Koniambo 
project. The VKP area, including its customary land, should be turned 
into an urban centre, so the public authorities have made efforts to 
integrate Kanak clans and their customary land into the process of urban 
development. It is the larger tracts of customary land that are more likely 
to be the target for potential economic projects. In South Province, in the 
neighbourhood of the Goro nickel project, customary land is confined to 
a narrow coastal zone, and development of this land for new sociocultural 
facilities or industrial parks is almost precluded. In the north, the 
proportion of customary land is significantly higher. Around 50 per cent 
of the district of Koné, 28 per cent of Voh, and 12 per cent of Pouembout 
is classified as ‘customary land’ (ADRAF 2012: 5) (see Figure 3.9). Land 
reform has resulted in the doubling of the amount of customary land 
in the district of Koné over a period of 25 years, from 9,820 hectares in 
1978 to 18,720 hectares in 2004 (ADRAF 2004: 6). When we compare 
the four villages of Gatope, Oundjo, Baco and Netchaot, the situation 
of Baco, whose territory is cut lengthwise by the north–south Territorial 
Road No. 1 and also by the road connecting the east and west coasts, is 
particularly interesting (North Province 2013: 43). The customary estate 
of Baco covers a total area of 4,264 hectares—229 hectares in the tribal 
reservation and 4,035 hectares transferred to customary ownership. In the 
village of Baco, the clans are grouped into four ‘broader clans’: Baco, 
Poavidapthia, Poaxu and Wabealo. Each of these broader clans has its 
own local association (GDPL) to manage its customary land. Thanks to 
its geographical location between the towns of Pouembout and Koné, in 
front of the parliament house of North Province, Baco is ideally positioned 
for development projects.
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Figure 3.9 Size of customary lands of the villages of Netchaot, Baco, 
Oundjo and Gatope.
Source: Author’s map, based on information supplied by the Direction des Infrastructures, 
de la Topographie et des Transports Terrestres and the Agence de Développement Rural et 
d’Aménagement Foncier.
One example is the development project on the customary land of the 
Baco GDPL (517  hectares). The provincial authorities approached the 
customary representatives in order to create sociocultural and economic 
facilities such as rental housing, a commercial centre, a bank, a cinema, 
an art school, a Lapita (pottery) museum, a bus terminal and an area for 
shops and industrial services on a total area of 48 hectares. Construction 
started in August 2010 and the first 15 houses were occupied in 2012. 
The Baco association then embarked on a second economic project: the 
establishment of a 17-hectare industrial park. This time, the project was 
supported by the council of elders representing all the clans living in Baco 
because the park was to be built on the village’s customary reservation, 
next to Koné-Tiwaka, the connecting road between the east and west 
coast of New Caledonia. The first stone for the new industrial park, that 
would host only non-polluting industries and crafts, was laid in February 
2009. The goal of both projects was to develop local employment and to 
benefit from the broader development of the VKP area. Baco has often 
been described as a ‘flagship project’ for development on customary land 
in New Caledonia.
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Other Kanak villages do not have the same advantages. Netchaot has 
spacious estates, but the village is more than 30  kilometres from the 
construction site and around 15 kilometres from the provincial capital at 
Koné. Gatope’s customary land is close to the nickel smelter but is limited 
in extent—286 hectares in the tribal reservation and only 32 hectares that 
has been added by redistribution—but this latter area did become the 
site of newly built rental housing. Oundjo has a large area of customary 
land that is located between the town of Koné and the nickel smelter. 
Originally, the mining operator SMSP wanted to build its processing 
plant on Pinjen Peninsula (1,610 hectares), which is owned by the clans 
living in Oundjo. In 1999, SMSP organised a meeting in Oundjo to 
officially ask for permission to do this.
The peninsula had several advantages for this purpose. It was located 
near the town of Koné, it had good road access, because Territorial Road 
No.  1 passes just behind the peninsula, and it was also accessible by 
boat at different points. In addition, the terrain was flat, which would 
make it easier to construct the smelter, and since it was located between 
two entrances to a single lagoon, container ships could enter the lagoon 
through one passage and leave through the other.
However, the clans did not agree on the proposal, which led to the so-
called ‘Pinjen conflict’ (Horowitz 2003a, 2003b; Kowasch 2010, 2012a, 
2012b). While some of the clans argued in favour of the financial benefits 
of land leasing, others were opposed because the peninsula contains sacred 
places, where ancestors reside, and was used for hunting and crab fishing. 
In addition, Pinjen had become a symbol of Kanak struggles for land and 
cultural recognition, having been transferred to the clans in the 1980s 
after several claims and contests, so those opposing the new development 
proposal did not want to ‘lose’ this land for a second time. In the end, 
the majority of the clans voted against leasing the land to SMSP, so the 
company bought a site further north, on Vavouto Peninsula.
Meanwhile, the conflict between the clans in Oundjo continued, but we 
have to note that this was not just a ‘mining conflict’. Pinjen Peninsula 
has a long history of settlement, colonisation and expulsion (Kowasch 
2012b: 205). Several families from clans now living in Oundjo, Gatope 
and Népou4 passed through Pinjen at one time in their clan itinerary. 
The legitimacy of land claims in Pinjen is still a subject of struggle, even 
4  A Kanak village in the commune of Poya, in the south of Pouembout.
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if ADRAF attributed the peninsula to an association including all the 
clans from Oundjo in 1989. The suggestion that every current ‘mining 
conflict’ is not only about resources and benefits, because it has a longer 
history, fits well with the observations of the geographer Glenn Banks, 
who argued that:
conflicts are never finally ‘resolved’ … current conflicts are likely to form 
the background to future conflicts, even when it appears that the parties 
have ‘settled’ their differences (Banks 2008: 26).
Development projects on customary land are generally implemented 
outside of local people’s actual living space. A majority of the Kanak 
people do not want the urban transformation of the VKP area to affect 
their own villages. The maintenance of traditions and community values 
is very important. As the businessman D. Xamène explained, Kanak 
people know that their lifestyles will change under Western influence, 
but this does not mean that all Kanak people will support the change 
(Kowasch 2010: 460). At the same time, it is important to note the lack 
of space available for development projects inside the Kanak villages. 
The tribal reservations are the bitter fruit of colonial land dispossession 
and displacement. From the end of the nineteenth to the mid-twentieth 
century, they represented a restricted space for the Kanak population. 
Land reform involved a strategy of demographic de-concentration, and 
the ‘reconquest’ of land in favour of Kanak clans. In the current logic 
of negotiated decolonisation, development projects on customary land 
outside the villages represent a reappropriation of this land.
Conflicts and Social Transformations
The extent of local people’s approval of the Koniambo project seems 
to decrease with their proximity to the site of the new nickel smelter 
(Figure 3.10). In Oundjo, only 2 kilometres from Vavouto, 28 per cent 
of the interviewees were against or rather against the project. In Gatope 
(12 kilometres away), 24 per cent gave these responses; in Baco (around 
15  kilometres away), the figure was 12  per cent; and in Netchaot 
(30 kilometres away) it was 2 per cent.
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Figure 3.10 Difference in perceptions of the four neighbouring Kanak 
villages vis-à-vis the Koniambo project (per cent per village).
Source: Kowasch (2010: 367).
Gatope and Oundjo are the two villages that have experienced the greatest 
environmental impacts. These included the destruction of the mangroves 
where crabs were hunted. Foreign construction workers who spent their 
free time on the beach at Gatope or on the coast near Oundjo made 
disruptive noises and left waste behind. Furthermore, the Chinese and 
Filipinos did not speak French, so could not communicate with local 
people, while the latter did not seem very interested in meeting the foreign 
workers in any case. Residents of Gatope helped to dig the access channel 
from the port of Vavouto to the open sea, while fishermen from Oundjo 
saw the container ships arriving and leaving every day. Furthermore, the 
territorial road bisects the village of Oundjo, and the trucks transporting 
equipment to the building site damaged the road and made it dangerous 
for children to cross.
The participation of local Kanak people in the Koniambo project has 
also depended on the level of social cohesion and solidarity within the 
clan and the village. As we have seen, development projects on customary 
land represent one way to benefit from the project. The establishment 
of sociocultural and economic facilities on customary land is not just 
a matter of interest to the individual businessman, but also to the clan 
or even the whole village. This ‘collective business participation’ requires 
group consensus. Where there has been disagreement, the project has not 
moved forward. There are several examples of projects that were put on 
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hold, including a large rental housing project in the village of Koniambo 
and the establishment of facilities on the customary land of the Wabealo 
GDPL in Baco.
When they use the natural environment, or reclaimed land, to participate 
in the economic development of the VKP area, Kanak communities 
transform the value of the land itself. Sacred places lose their value when 
replaced by a rental housing project. Mineral extraction can destroy sacred 
places with strong cultural heritage value. The values of other sacred places 
increase, because clans want to preserve them for traditional activities or 
to respect the ancestors and or maintain their identity value. Traditional 
landowners want to benefit from mining activities when they make 
customary land available to foreign and local companies. To be members 
of the ‘contact clan’ for public authorities or the mining company is 
a kind of recognition of their status as ‘landowners’. As we have already 
seen, customary land is characterised by the superposition of different 
legitimacies: the property is not unique or exclusive, but rather consists 
of competing titles and claims. Every development on customary land 
entails a remodelling of the territory, which often leads to land disputes 
(Kowasch 2012a). But the expansion of a group’s prestige and influence 
can be realised only in consensual manner, not just through remodelling 
its territory (Herrenschmidt 2003:  322). Progress that is disconnected 
from the land, such as employment in the nickel sector, will not lead 
to a  change of identity or a growing influence for the clan. It is the 
recognition of a clan at a certain place that can change the perception of 
what causes territorial remodelling. Land claims are part of this game of 
influence and power.
Nevertheless, the growth of mining benefits, participation and material 
wealth in the VKP area are not enough to establish harmony and peace. 
Horowitz (2004: 309–10) emphasises this aspect:
History has shown, for New Caledonia as for elsewhere in Melanesia, 
that the generation of economic benefits is not a sufficient condition 
for harmony, either within the nation at large or within small-scale 
communities.
Everywhere in the area, the distribution of benefits and contracts has 
become a source of conflict. Since not everyone can have a contract 
or a job, socioeconomic disparities within the clans and communities 
neighbouring the project have increased as the mining revenues have 
filtered down. New inequalities are visible within these communities as 
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the ‘new wealthy’ invest in consumer items, including cars and electronic 
goods. This imbalance has generated conflicts and jealousies because some 
Kanaks have become businessmen and have accumulated personal wealth. 
The problem is not always a lack of benefits to other clan members, but 
rather that people are not following traditional norms in terms of the 
distribution of such benefits. In Oundjo and Gatope, for example, social 
conflicts contributed to an increase in the number of purely individual 
businesses, and thus to ‘favouring individualism’ (see Chapter 2, this 
volume). Growing disparities within Kanak communities reflect the theory 
of fragmented development (Scholz 2002), in which social and regional 
disparities widen with the decline of social consensus and solidarity in 
the context of globalisation and societal fragmentation. The president of 
the council of elders in Oundjo spoke in July 2009 about development 
and business creation in his village, saying: ‘Today, I say: If you want to 
do something, just do it! But keep it to yourself ’ (Kowasch 2010: 344). 
Greater individualism increasingly erodes traditional community life. The 
Pinjen conflict is still present in Oundjo, and the clans who were in favour 
of construction of the smelter on Pinjen Peninsula still seem to be more 
involved in the project. Most initiatives to create businesses are taken 
individually, just like the decision to apply for a job, not only in Oundjo 
but also in other Kanak villages. Development projects on customary 
land, however, are still based on collective decision making and support.
In comparison to Oundjo and Gatope, Netchaot is further from the mining 
site and more remote. The council of elders that meets regularly is dynamic 
and engaged. The customary district of Baco/Poindah, where the villages 
of Baco and Netchaot are located, founded a subcontracting company in 
order to derive a collective benefit from the Koniambo project. However, 
some development projects, such as the construction of rental housing 
for construction or mining workers, could not be implemented because 
Netchaot is too remote. Traditions and customary ceremonies have been 
preserved, with over 100 toponymic places in the village territory proving 
the vitality of its traditions, and the Kanak languages Paicï and Cemuhi 
still being spoken in the village.
The participation of Kanak people in the Koniambo project can be 
qualified as ‘fractional’ because traditional activities, including fishing, 
hunting and subsistence farming, are still practised. Ninety-two per cent 
of interviewees in the four villages who were employed had businesses were 
still engaged in subsistence farming of crops like yam, taro, mango, papaya 
and banana. Fifty-seven per cent fished in the rivers and 48 per cent went 
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hunting. There are no rivers in the coastal villages of Gatope and Oundjo, 
where most of the residents instead fish at sea. According to large surveys 
conducted by the Institut Agronomique Neo-Calédonien (Guyard et al. 
2013), ‘multi-activity’ is a characteristic of all residents in the studied 
villages, but employees and businessmen naturally have less time to 
work on farming, fishing and hunting. Sometimes they even have to buy 
yams for customary ceremonies. The disjunction between traditional 
activities and salaried employment reflects the transformation of Kanak 
communities in the neighbourhood of the mining project and can be 
a source of conflict, because the planting of yams has an identity value.
A similar situation in Papua New Guinea was described by Benedict Imbun 
(2011: 51–5), who wrote of the ambivalent attitude of communities near 
the Porgera gold mine confronted with salaried employment, business 
creation and wealth accumulation. Their ambivalence resulted from the 
juxtaposition of the status of traditional ‘landowner’ with the social class 
status generated by the mining industry. In this instance, they developed 
an anti-risk strategy by combining business creation with employment.
The disjunction between traditional activities and employment concerns 
not only farming, fishing, hunting and customary ceremonies; it also 
affects daily activities such as the care of children and older people. There 
are not enough nurseries and retirement homes in the VKP area, and this 
has constituted a new challenge for the local communities.
Conclusion
Historically, indigenous Kanak peoples were largely excluded from 
employment in the mining industry in New Caledonia. Mining 
employment has been the principal aspiration of Kanak people from the 
villages neighbouring the Koniambo project. The surveys showed that 
the majority of the Kanak communities support a project they consider 
to be ‘their project’, that will provide local employment but also bring 
broader development. For the political authorities of North Province, 
the mining industry is an instrument for economic independence and 
political emancipation. The public authorities are struggling to push the 
urbanisation of the VKP area where the four studied villages are located. 
Furthermore, the provincial authorities and SMSP have begun applying 
a 51/49  per cent shareholding split with multinational companies in 
other countries, an arrangement that is unique to New Caledonia and 
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uncommon for indigenous mining companies worldwide. Their aim 
is to be ‘masters of the exploitation of mineral resources’ so as to take 
responsibility for wider economic development.
Meanwhile, we have to distinguish between the perceptions of mining 
among Kanak village people and Kanak political leaders, even if the latter 
also live in the villages. Sometimes, members of the provincial assembly 
are at the same time customary chiefs or members of the local council of 
elders, but in each role they have to defend other interests. Nevertheless, 
the public authorities have encourage the tribal populations to participate 
in the development process, whether through employment or through 
the establishment of rental housing or other sociocultural and economic 
facilities on customary. The construction of such facilities brings 
more financial benefits for the next generation because the traditional 
landowners must first amortise their bank loans. Collective participation 
in such ventures also depends on consensus, social cohesion and solidarity 
within the clan and the village.
But development and new socioeconomic disparities coexist. Not 
everybody can work in the mining sector, and not every businessman 
can get a contract. The struggle for contracts and employment in the 
mining sector is very strong, as local subcontractors have to compete 
with international companies and more experienced businessmen from 
Nouméa. Individual business creation has grown in the neighbourhood 
of the Koniambo project, while collective participation is often hindered 
by internal discord and problems with the distribution of benefits. When 
individual businessmen are obliged to manage ‘collective enterprises’, 
this can result in favouritism because they occupy several positions. 
Employment and business creation require specific professional skills and 
qualifications. The improvement of educational opportunities remains 
a challenge for North Province. Kanak people who moved to Nouméa 
several years ago have returned to the villages in order to benefit from the 
nickel boom in the north. Most of the conflicts in the villages concern the 
distribution of mining benefits, land claims and legitimacy. The unequal 
distribution of benefits can create jealousy within the communities and 
lead to intra- and inter-clan conflicts. Customary ‘ownership’ of estates 
leads to a flow of financial benefits, so that land claims increase when 
public authorities or private businessmen are planning economic projects 
on these estates. However, this chapter has also shown how the conflict 
over Pinjen Peninsula has its own history deriving from colonisation, 
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displacement and customary struggles between families. The request by 
SMSP to build the nickel smelter on the peninsula simply ‘awoke’ an 
existing conflict whose resolution will take a long time.
Socioeconomic disparities within the indigenous community will increase 
in northern New Caledonia, and social differentiation and marginalisation 
will create new problems. But the development of the mining industry 
also enables new opportunities for marginalised peoples in remote 
villages. Employment, business creation and the establishment of rental 
housing and facilities generate revenues and wealth. At the same time, 
Kanak people continue to practise traditional activities such as subsistence 
farming, hunting and fishing, even when they have a regular income.
The environmental value of the estates where economic projects are 
implemented is changing. In terms of the environmental value model 
(Figure 3.3), the territorial perception of the Kanak population is moving 
away from the ‘traditional’ Melanesian model in which the cultural 
heritage value is considerably higher than the practical value. Greater 
involvement in the formal economy explains the loss of value of certain 
sacred places and their cultural heritage value. Young people who are 
working no longer have the time to care about such things, and are less 
interested in ‘traditional’ knowledge. The cultural heritage value of land 
is impaired by the loss of this historical or mythical knowledge (Kowasch 
2012a: 203), as local perceptions are transformed into a transitional or 
ecological model.
The Caledonian journalist and filmmaker Anne Pitoiset describes the role 
of the Koniambo project and the resulting societal transformations in an 
interview for the journal Hebdo:
For the pro-independence movement, the step towards independence is 
engaged for a long time, the plant is a financial instrument and also a 
symbol of their ability to fit into the economy. For the non-independence 
parties, the project represents a key factor for the maintenance of civil 
peace … But as Ian Pearce, the president of Xstrata says, the problems 
will really start with the beginning of production [of nickel metal]. The 
neighbours will see the factory fumes, they will experience increased 
traffic, their lives will be transformed in a way they struggle to imagine 
today. (Pitoiset 2013)
In early 2013, at the moment of the first pouring of nickel metal and one 
year before reaching full production capacity, the life of the communities 
was already changing. A new shopping centre had recently opened, the 
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first traffic lights in Koné would soon be in service, more clan members 
had salaried positions, rental yields from houses and apartments were 
increasing, four-wheel drive vehicles could be seen everywhere in the 
Kanak villages, and customary weddings were being held on weekends or 
during holidays in order to avoid working hours. Traditional knowledge 
and language skills should be preserved, but work and a regular salary 
seem to have a growing importance for most Kanak people nowadays.
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Following several years of severe tension between Kanak separatists on 
one hand, and the French state and descendants of the colonists on the 
other, the Matignon-Oudinot Agreements, which were signed in June 
1988, brought peace to New Caledonia. Two of the three provinces 
established at that time—North Province and Islands Province—have 
since been administered by the separatists. They set themselves the 
objective of developing these areas, which are populated mainly by 
Kanaks and had previously been considerably less affluent than South 
Province, which includes the capital Nouméa and is home to the bulk 
of the white population. However, the acceptance of these agreements 
by the Kanak nationalists from the Front de Libération Nationale Kanak 
Socialiste (FLNKS), and the associated concept of ‘economic rebalancing’, 
only made sense to them in the context of what remains their ultimate 
objective—the achievement of independence.
Naturally, nickel was the abundant resource that the elected 
representatives of North Province immediately tried to develop for this 
purpose. In  1990, the FLNKS established an entity called the Société 
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de Financement et d’Investissement de la Province Nord (SOFINOR), 
an ad hoc finance and investment vehicle that immediately purchased 
the mining company Société Minière du Sud Pacifique (SMSP), which 
was formerly a  subcontractor of New Caledonia’s oldest nickel mining 
company, Société Le Nickel (SLN). After 20 years of management by the 
separatists, SMSP had become a holding company that was no longer 
directly involved in the mining of nickel ore, but instead financed and 
developed a number of industrial and metal-processing projects. Since 
1995, it has been the world’s primary exporter of nickel and holds 
51  per  cent of the shares in the companies it manages in partnership 
with the Swiss company Glencore (formerly Xstrata), the South Korean 
company POSCO, and the Chinese company Jinchuan (see Chapters 2 
and 3, this volume). Through these arrangements, it provides revenues to 
North Province via SOFINOR, which holds 87 per cent of the company’s 
shares, and contributes to the establishment of other companies and 
also to the development of the local tourist industry and economic 
infrastructure.
The focus of this chapter is a sequence of political events surrounding the 
forced closure of one nickel mining operation in the Kanak municipality 
of Canala in 2002. Canala is located on the east coast of North Province, 
adjacent to the border with South Province (see Figure 2.1, Chapter 2). 
In 2009, its resident population was more than 3,300, and its territory 
hosted four major colonial chieftaincies (chefferies): Bwaaxéa, Kèrèduru, 
Nôôme and Penyîmê Nèkètè (or Nakéty). This municipality found itself 
in a strong position in the new economic and political system because it 
contained three major nickel deposits—Nakéty, Bogota and Boakaine—
that had been mined since the late nineteenth century, and accounted for 
25 per cent of New Caledonian nickel reserves in 2000 (Boisard 2002).
The exploitation of these deposits was in some ways symbolic of the new 
direction adopted by the separatist struggle. Indeed, Canala was selected 
as the location of the discussions held in August 1989 that led to the 
purchase of SMSP by North Province. These discussions were held in 
the wake of the Ouvéa Cave hostage crisis of May 1988, when 19 Kanak 
hostage-takers died in an operation mounted to express their opposition to 
proposals made by Bernard Pons, then Minister for Overseas Departments 
and Territories, during the course of a French presidential election. The 
new minister, Louis Le Pensec, accompanied Prime Minister Michel 
Rocard in this new round of discussions.
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The French politicians clearly chose Canala as the site of these discussions 
because it was home to some of the key actors in les événements of 1984. 
These ‘events’ had included the active boycott of the legislative elections 
held in that year, as well as blockades, land occupations and expulsions 
of colonial settlers. They visited the municipality, which was home to 
the separatist leader Eloi Machoro, the former general secretary of the 
separatist party Union Calédonienne. They also visited the traditional 
lands of Léopold Jorédié, a member of the same party, who became one of 
the leaders of the FLNKS after Machoro was assassinated in 1985. Jorédié 
had recently been appointed as mayor of the municipality of Canala, and 
was elected as the first president of the newly established North Province, 
having previously been director of the North ‘Region’ that preceded it 
between 1985 and 1988.1
The message conveyed to the representatives of the French state by 
the separatists in August 1989 was quite clear: it was essential that 
they be given the resources necessary to develop their provinces and 
municipalities. The agricultural micro-projects that had been developed 
in preceding periods would no longer satisfy them. The acquisition of 
a mining company and mining concessions was far more in line with their 
economic and political demands.
Having won that argument, the new directors of SMSP purchased 22 
concessions over the Boakaine deposit from SLN in 1991.2 Mining 
activity started in the following year, with local workers being recruited 
to participate in what was seen as part of the economic struggle for 
independence. However, ten years later, in 2002, the operation came 
to an abrupt end, despite the presence of extensive nickel reserves and 
its enormous symbolic resonance. The workforce was temporarily laid 
off after the suspension of the contract to supply a Japanese smelting 
company (PAMCO),3 and this event triggered a general strike and the 
ransacking of the site.
1  During that period, New Caledonia was divided into four ‘regions’—North, Centre, South and 
Loyalty Islands.
2  In the local language, Xârâcùù, the name Bwakaiinè (Boakaine) is derived from the words bwa 
(‘head’), kaii (‘light up’), and nè (‘fire’). This name alludes to the torch-lit processions that were held 
on the range and previously marked the opening of the yam harvest festival. Boakaine was the site of 
one of the very first concessions in the Grande Terre to be mined by a colonial settler (in 1874), and 
he was also one of the founders of SLN (in 1880). Like Nakéty, it has been more or less intensively 
mined at different periods since then.
3  This was before SMSP established a new partnership with the Korean company POSCO.
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Difficult working conditions, inadequate salaries and safety problems 
were cited by the local branch of a trade union as justifications for these 
actions. However, another kind of argument opened with a reading of the 
conflict in terms of the relationship between social classes. Furthermore, 
customary leaders (coutumiers) who embodied the Kanak political order 
also reminded people that SMSP had failed to keep promises made when 
the mine was opened. These involved the progressive handover of mining 
concessions or—at the very least—of operational control to the local 
population.
Despite the relaunch of negotiations between SMSP and local actors in 
recent years, the situation was not resolved in the decade following this 
strike. Attempts were made to establish an operating company whose 
shares would be held by the local clans, but the municipal authorities 
insisted that they should be the primary local partners of SMSP because 
of their responsibility for local economic development. So was this really 
a conflict between two legitimate political authorities—the elected 
municipal (and provincial) separatist leaders on one side, opposed by 
customary leaders from the four big chieftaincies on the other side?
In my attempt to answer this question, I adopt an approach from political 
anthropology that sets out to describe how colonised and formerly stateless, 
segmentary societies currently deal with the problem of segmentation. 
‘Segmentary societies’ are here understood to be those in which the 
‘political system’ consisted of groups organised by models of kinship 
(clans, lineages, etc.), whether or not they were headed by ‘chiefs’. In 
New Caledonia, chieftaincies have been associated with specific territories 
(reserves) and organised into ‘tribes’ (tribus) and customary ‘districts’ since 
the early colonial period, with the former headed by ‘small chiefs’ and the 
latter by ‘big chiefs’.4 The representative bodies are the ‘council of elders’ 
(now known as the ‘council of the clan chiefs’) at the tribal level, and the 
(customary) ‘district council’ at the level of the municipality. The district 
council comprises the big and small chiefs within the district, plus any 
presidents of the tribal councils who are not chiefs in their own right, and 
it elects its own president. The occupants of these various positions are all 
4  Reference to the big chieftaincies as separate ‘districts’ is avoided in the rest of this paper, since 
the term is also applied at a higher level, where the boundaries of the (customary) district are roughly 
aligned with those of the municipality. There is one small chieftaincy (Koh) that belongs to the 
neighbouring commune of Kouaoua but is part of the customary district of Canala.
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known as ‘customary leaders’ (coutumiers), but that term is also applied to 
the descendants of the first occupants of a place who may have ceded their 
authority to a ‘stranger chief ’.5
This is the context in which I explore the connections between two forms 
of legitimate authority (see Horowitz 2009). Does a conflict between 
them mean that ‘imported’ political legitimacy is never fully accepted, 
or that the prospect of economic benefits at a local level enables the 
reactivation of endogenous political legitimacy? My approach to this 
particular problem—which is based more broadly on an approach to 
social change in the colonial and post-colonial context—is in line with 
that of the so-called ‘Manchester School’, which was originally developed 
during the late colonial period in Southern Africa (Gluckman 1940a, 
1940b, 1942; see also Chapters 1 and 5, this volume).
Beyond the event represented by the closure of the Boakaine mine, 
my analysis aims to contribute to an explanation of the current status 
of sociopolitical relationships in New Caledonia at different levels, 
especially at the municipal level. Given that chieftaincies were colonial 
spatial and political constructs intended to reflect the traditional form of 
Kanak political organisation, linked to the legal framework under which 
native reserves were established through the second half of the nineteenth 
century,6 the municipal space (and not the municipality as a formal body) 
should be considered as a hybrid unit of analysis compared to Western 
political models. I also propose to consider the place of the municipality 
within its provincial context and, beyond this, in the context of an ‘overseas 
state’ that is still formally part of the French state but also in the throes of 
an already advanced movement towards independence. However, unlike 
Gluckman, who approached the political situation of the Zulu people in 
Zululand through a detailed account of the changing relationships between 
‘colour groups’ in the South African state, the situation I describe involves 
relationships between groups of Kanaks. This certainly applies at the level 
of the relationship between the municipal authority and the chieftaincies 
of Canala, from which the last colonial settlers were expelled during 
les événements of 1984, but also applies with respect to the relationship 
between the mining company and the ‘local populations’ at the provincial 
5  In Canala, people in this latter category are known as ‘great subjects’ (kwara aéé).
6  Reserved lands were decreed as inalienable (see Merle 2000). Since 1998, they have become 
‘customary lands’ as part of the process of negotiated decolonisation, and are still not subject to the 
common law.
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level. Accordingly, I not only take account of the effects of historical 
legacies and/or the reactions to foreign domination in my analysis of this 
intra-Kanak political game; I also consider, in particular, the question of 
the historical depth of Kanak participation in the territory’s political life 
since the 1950s, which makes them ‘political actors’ in a double sense 
(see Soriano 2013).
The current political context includes Kanak control of the provincial 
authorities (in two provinces), which has been seen as a springboard for 
the recovery of a sovereignty that has yet to be attained. The Boakaine 
conflict can only be fully understood against the backdrop of this very 
specific transitional context. From the perspective of the Kanaks, this is 
primarily what positions the operation of this mine—and the whole of 
SMSP— at the interface between an economic and political issue. And 
this is what also results when competition for responsibility for local 
development based on the mining industry can set different political 
levels or figures against each other, even though the Kanak political parties 
regard this development as a contemporary objective in their struggle for 
independence.
A Conflict Between Separatist Parties
In reality, an understanding of this conflict during the period before the 
mine was closed must go beyond the question of how Kanak actors have 
mobilised and prioritised the different sociopolitical repertoires available 
in a competition for control of the nickel economy. It depends more 
broadly on an understanding of Kanak involvement in the process of 
decolonisation, which in turn involves consideration of the relationship 
between traditional political legitimacy and partisan political struggles. 
When the mine was reopened in 1991, the future protagonists in the 
strike of 2002 presented themselves as separatists, not as customary 
leaders, and were proud to show that their party, the Union Calédonienne 
(UC), was strongly positioned as an actor involved in the new strategy 
that was adopted in the pursuit of political power. Gaetan Dowadé, who 
was Jorédié’s ‘right-hand man’ and deputy mayor in Canala at that time, 
explained this to me as follows:
At that time [in 1991], we took SMSP. Léo [Jorédié] said to me: ‘Set up 
a company in Canala, get the people together, we will see how we shall set 
about reopening Boakaine. We will take SMSP. We will see which mine 
will be opened after that.’ That’s when I knew that Jean Marie [Tjibaou] 
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presented proposals to [Jacques] Lafleur … for the repurchase of SMSP. 
So each municipality had to set up a municipal mining company. We 
would set the example. The miners set up there before, and they didn’t ask 
[permission] for anything. After the ‘events’, they had to go through us. 
(personal communication, Gaetan Dowadé, 26 July 2011)
Like other statements of the same nature, this quote from an interview 
leaves no doubt as to the capacity of the municipality’s militants to fulfil 
the objectives of the FLNKS by themselves. They shared, and indeed were 
among the initiators of, the vision of development through the mining 
sector that was known as ‘the vision for the country’, and was to be realised 
at the level of North Province in anticipation of the recovery of national 
sovereignty. This was not a vision that set the indigenous and non-
indigenous communities in opposition to each other, like the one that 
proposed to capture the mining revenues at the level of what were referred 
to in the 2000s as the ‘mining chieftaincies’ (Demmer 2007). Instead, to 
identify the logic of this conflict, it is necessary to look beyond a claim 
based purely on political identity, as represented in the argument that ‘the 
chieftaincies should be able to assume responsibility for development’. 
One must also consider the reference to customary political institutions 
as one that was made to serve ends other than the simple defence of 
a  certain kind of sub-national political legitimacy.7 In the present case, 
the explanation may perhaps be found in the particular—and sometimes 
tense—relationship between the municipality of Canala and North 
Province after the mine had been reopened in 1991.
As already mentioned, Léopold Jorédié was not only a native of Canala, 
but in 1989 he was both the mayor of this municipality and the first 
president of North Province. However, as an elected representative of 
the UC, he lost both of the mandates he had acquired in 1989—first 
at the municipal level in 1995, and then at the provincial level in 1999. 
In 1998, shortly before the signing of the Nouméa Agreement, Jorédié 
wanted to negotiate directly with the loyalists without being bound by the 
‘mining prerequisite’ that stipulated construction of a nickel processing 
plant in North Province (see Chapter 5, this volume). Supported by 
François Burck, another elected representative of the UC, and Raphaël 
Mapou, representing the Parti de Libération Kanak (PALIKA), 
7  Incidentally, in the context of Kanak emancipation and involvement in the nickel economy, my 
remarks highlight the extent to which an interpretation of actions taken to restrict control of natural 
resources in terms of the affirmation of indigenous people’s rights cannot fully reflect the dynamics of 
political relationships between mining companies and local populations in New Caledonia.
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he therefore established a new coordinating body known as the Comité 
de Coordination des Indépendantistes, which subsequently became the 
Fédération des Comités de Coordination Indépendantistes (FCCI).
These developments in the political career of Jorédié—and above all his 
electoral disappointments—prompted several of my informants to claim 
that he was trying to get some of his supporters to launch a strike at 
Boakaine with a view to creating difficulties for PALIKA, which was 
then the dominant party in the province, which was in turn the main 
shareholder in SMSP via SOFINOR. Given that he could not aspire to 
take control of the company again, this was a way of dealing a severe blow 
to a party that had achieved a leading role in the attainment of the new 
political and economic objectives established by the FLNKS, for  it was 
the UC that had been able to take credit for this achievement in the late 
1980s. In the words of Jorédié’s chief lieutenant, recalling the reopening 
of the mine in 1991:
We became indispensable on the level of the mine. I speak of us, the UC, 
the strongest people in Canala. It will be said … you have to go through 
the FLNKS. But we were UC FLNKS.
Removed from power in both politics and business, Jorédié would then 
attempt to damage SMSP and the party that controlled the province, 
both of which were heavily reliant on the Boakaine mine to supply the 
nickel required by their new Korean business partners.
Viewed in this way, the conflict is very specific—rooted as it is in the 
micro-political history of North Province—but also highly personalised. 
Accordingly, it will come as no surprise to learn that no other mine owned 
by SMSP experienced a conflict as serious as this one. Even if the supporters 
of parties other than PALIKA worked in the mines or were leaders of 
the municipalities or chieftaincies that hosted the mine sites, there was 
no situation like that which emerged in Canala, where the mayor who 
had represented the municipality had also been president of the province 
during negotiations over the role of mineral resource development in the 
struggle for independence.
However, it is necessary to go further in the analysis of this conflict, for it 
did not merely involve the settlement of a personal account by a politician 
whose political career was in decline. Examination of the facts leaves no 
room for doubt that the leaders of the strike that led to the closure of 
the mine were in the FCCI camp. Apart from the blow dealt to their 
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political opponents, the leaders of the strike clearly intended to position 
themselves as new partners in dialogue with SMSP, either in the short or 
medium term. It is in part the same people, the former leaders of the FCCI 
(which no longer exists),8 who proposed in 2011 to establish a clan-based 
company in Canala to manage the mine. One informant summarised the 
point as follows:
There was a political concern because Léo [Jorédié] belonged to the UC 
and the UC started the struggle, and he wanted to reassume control of 
Boakaine as a source of financial support for his party.
But beyond the question of party finance suggested by this informant, the 
conflict offers manifest evidence of the centrality of the issue of control 
over the mines for all the separatist parties, first from the time of the 
Matignon-Oudinot Agreements in 1988, and even more so from the time 
of the Bercy Agreement that contained the ‘mining prerequisite’ to the 
Nouméa Agreement of 1998.
In this regard, the logic of this strike—if not all of its immediate pretexts—
is liable to recur in the party political relationships found in all the mining 
municipalities. What is at stake today for each of the separatist parties is 
the need to demonstrate their capacity to respond to the current demands 
of the struggle: being the actors who know how to mine nickel means 
being those who are closest to the logic of decolonisation as this has been 
defined for almost 25 years. This contrasts with the earlier period of the 
‘regions’, when micro-development projects to ‘build Kanaky’ flourished, 
and many Kanak political actors were mainly concerned to promote 
the interests of their own party at a purely local level (Demmer 2016). 
The exercise of party political control over nickel mining has proven to be 
a means of winning points in the struggle for power at all levels of political 
organisation.
In the majority of cases, it would also be a mistake to simply interpret the 
attempts of Kanak political parties to access mineral revenues in terms of 
a quest for limited economic benefits. Although it is not possible to rule out 
such motives completely, it remains crucial to keep in mind the centrality 
8  Support for the FCCI waned after 2004, although Jorédié (who died in September 2013) 
organised a list of candidates for the North Province elections in 2009. Today, his right-hand man in 
Canala, Gaetan Dowadé, is an active member of Parti Travailliste.
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of mining issues for the separatists, in the context of decolonisation, in 
order to understand the ideological logic that has governed these ‘rent-
seeking’ practices.
There is another kind of economic logic that could help to explain the 
appearance of ultra-local development claims originating from political 
entities as varied as clans, chieftaincies, municipalities and newly defined 
‘customary areas’.9 There are no tax revenues from the operation of nickel 
mines that are allocated to local public expenditures. The creation (in 
2009) of a ‘nickel fund’ that is supposed to be financed from corporate 
income taxes and to pay for various forms of social insurance and 
environmental remediation in the mining sector is the only existing tax 
mechanism with direct local impact.10 These claims have their roots in the 
deeper problem of redistributing the wealth arising from the exploitation 
of the country’s primary natural resource.
This leads me to highlight an additional aspect of the political party contest 
over Boakaine. The elected representatives of Canala see themselves as 
being positioned at the end or bottom of the SOFINOR aid chain. As one 
of them put it:
SOFINOR! It took money from Boakaine and invested it in other 
structures. You should see the organisation chart for SOFINOR. There 
are plenty of subsidiaries but none in Canala, not for development or 
anything else!
Although I was unable to verify this particular allegation, the issue is one 
of concern to both the elected representatives and ordinary people of 
Canala. Moreover, the concern grew with the change in the province’s 
ruling majority, since Canala is one of the historical fiefdoms of the first 
political party that attracted popular Kanak support. The chieftaincies of 
this district were evangelised by Père Luneau between 1920 and 1940, 
and it was he who established the Union des Indigènes Calédoniens Amis 
de la Liberté dans l’Ordre, which later became the UC. Many of the 
municipality’s inhabitants have remained loyal to this party, and some 
9  Each of the eight ‘customary areas’ includes a number of customary districts and chieftaincies. 
They were established under the Matignon-Oudinot Agreements, and are defined by a mixture 
of linguistic and political criteria.
10  New Caledonia has struggled to abandon a fiscal regime that grants special favours to the 
mining industry. Registered mining companies are entitled to almost complete exemption from taxes 
for 15 years after the point at which their actual production reaches a threshold of 80 per cent of 
a nominal target, with a 50 per cent exemption for the following five years.
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believe that this is the reason why it has suffered discrimination at the 
hands of the PALIKA representatives at the provincial level, who think of 
Canala as the municipality of Léopold Jorédié. Some informants thought 
that the municipality had problems in securing provincial support for 
its development priorities because it was particularly ‘well served’ in the 
earlier period when Jorédié was the president, so this either represented the 
‘fair’ backswing of a partisan pendulum or a simple rebalancing between 
the municipalities in North Province over time.
My analysis of the conflict could conclude here if the question did not 
remain as to why the claim for control of Boakaine was initiated in 
2002 by FCCI members and supporters, but increasingly passed to the 
municipality’s chieftaincies. It is not only the big chieftaincies but the 
small chieftaincies of Mèèwèè (Méhoué), Bwakaiinè (Boakaine), Nôôwé 
(Nonhoué) and Mèrènèmè (Mérénémé), which have the strongest 
territorial links to the nickel deposits, that claim the mine for themselves. 
This insistence on the chieftaincies as legitimate beneficiaries is part of 
the contemporary debate about reopening the mine that has placed the 
municipality and the customary authorities in opposing positions.
How the Militants Became Customary 
Leaders
Following the purchase of the Boakaine mining concession in the wake 
of  ‘the events’, Raphaël Pidjot, then a director of SMSP, and André 
Dang Van Nha (commonly known as André Dang), the company’s 
chief executive officer, launched a series of local discussions about the 
participation of the people of Canala in its operation. It was explained to 
me that: ‘The customary people of the municipality were always involved 
in the discussions … It was said that the mine was a political and customary 
asset’. This discourse was easily sustained because the people who had 
been at the barricades in 1984 and 1988 included elected representatives 
of the municipality who were also customary leaders. However, what was 
mainly sustained in this process was the emergent belief of the separatists 
in a ‘Kanak way’ of organising production and establishing companies.
It was on this basis that the Compagnie Minière Kanak de Canala 
(COMIKA), the local partner of SMSP, was established in 1992 with 
capital amounting to one  million francs. All of the tribus (small 
chieftaincies) within the municipality held shares in this company through 
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different types of corporate entity—whether limited liability companies 
(sociétés à responsabilité limitée), ‘economic interest groups’ (groupements 
d’intérêt économique), or the hybrid entities known as ‘local groups with 
special rights’, groupements de droit particulier local (GDPLs).11 Together 
they held 20 per cent of the shares, while the remaining 80 per cent was 
held by SMSP.
The president of COMIKA was also the deputy mayor of Canala, so the 
municipal authority had close links with the tribus. His list of preferred 
candidates for the municipal election had been compiled through the 
selection of a candidate from among the leaders of each tribu. The economic 
ideal of the time was respected: the company involved segmentary groups 
and was identified as a communal structure.
COMIKA’s dividends were supposed to be paid into an investment fund 
dedicated to municipal development, and distribution of this money 
was entrusted to the councils of elders. According to one informant: 
‘They wanted a bank like SOFINOR but just for Canala.’ Economic 
rebalancing at the level of North Province presupposed development at 
the level of the mining municipalities, and it was they who were initially 
seen as having a legitimate interest in SOFINOR, the main shareholder 
of SMSP. In Canala, this could further consolidate the position of the UC 
and the municipal authority led by Jorédié.
According to my informants, COMIKA was dissolved in 1995. Officially, 
this was because SMSP pushed for its liquidation, having waited in vain 
for Canala’s inhabitants to increase their level of investment. Its failure 
was said to have been hastened by management problems. This event also 
coincided with the victory of the Union Nationale pour l’Indépendance 
(UNI), an FLNKS coalition that included PALIKA but not the UC, in 
the municipal elections of that year. This was the point at which Léopold 
Jorédié lost his own seat.
Following the liquidation of COMIKA, SMSP established Boakaine 
Mining with a view to enlisting the mineworkers as shareholders in the 
mining operation. André Dang was the company’s first president, and there 
11  A GDPL is a legally recognised form of organisation, with a legal personality, that is meant to 
promote economic activities on customary land. It brings together individuals who are connected 
through customary bonds (within a family, clan or tribu). Thus the GDPL is primarily constituted of 
persons with customary civil status and is managed under customary law. It may also be used in the 
context of land claims.
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were five locally based directors—Patrice Mwâsadi, Henri Suènô, Pwêêdi 
Chanel, Christian Onyiari and André Dowadé—who were ‘nominated 
by the people of Canala’. Some of these men joined the FCCI when it 
was established in 1998, while others remained loyal to the UC. Boakaine 
Mining was liquidated in 2002 following the strike. Some people did not 
regard it as a municipal entity but simply as an SMSP subsidiary.
In 1998, Patrice Mwâsadi, who was the president of the council of elders 
of  the Mèèwèè chieftaincy, and close to Jorédié, became the second 
president of Boakaine Mining. He is one of the kwara bwatù (‘subjects who 
lower themselves’), which refers in this context to the members of a host 
clan who are supporters of a ‘stranger chief ’. However, he claims that he 
was accused of lacking customary legitimacy by others groups asserting 
competing claims over the deposit. On this latter score, he pointed out 
that the big chieftaincy of Bwaaxéa had not had its own big chief for 
some time, and he was not only representing his own (small) chieftaincy 
of Mèèwèè in his capacity as president of its council of elders, but also 
represented all of the municipality’s tribus because Mèèwèè is the seat of 
the big chieftaincy of Bwaaxéa, and Bwaaxéa is itself the most senior of 
the four big chieftaincies in Canala.12 Furthermore, since the chieftaincy 
of Nôôwé had only been separated from that of Mèèwèè in 1940, and 
that of Bwakaiinè had only been separated from that of Nôôwé during the 
1990s, he could also present himself as being, in a sense, the ‘customary 
leader of Boakaine’. Mwâsadi explained his position as follows:
There was a political [and] customary line: Mèèwèè and Gélima (Xürüchaa) 
were the two recognised tribal entities. In relation to the Boakaine mine: 
it was Mèèwèè. There was a huge consensus on the nomination [of the 
board of Boakaine Mining]: Suènô is from Gélima, Pwêêdi Chanel is 
the chief of Mîâ/Xwinnè, and Dowadé is the president of the council of 
Mèrènèmè/Kakö. Onyiari was the jack-of-all-trades of Mèèwèè. Myself, 
I came back from Australia, I spoke English. Within the organisation 
of the UC in Canala, I was below Léo. With Dowadé, I assisted Léo in 
the North Province. And on the level of Mèèwèè, my clan was the most 
important clan of the chieftaincy. We are the kwara bwatù.
12  Most people agree with this last point. The Kèrèduru chieftaincy is said to be directly subordinate 
to Bwaaxéa, while Penyîmê Nèkètè is said to be subordinate to Nôôme, and Nôôme is ranked lower 
than Bwaaxéa.
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The other vehicle for dialogue between the mine’s operators and the 
local population was the so-called ‘recruitment committee’, also known 
as the ‘customary committee’, which was established at the same time 
as COMIKA. This committee was composed of six persons who all 
had traditional links with the Boakaine deposit—two each from the 
tribus of Mèèwèè, Nôôwé/Bwakaiinè, and Kakö/Mèrènèmè (also part 
of the big chieftaincy of Bwaaxéa). They constituted the link between 
the mining operation and three of the four big chieftaincies of Canala.13 
The committee members were paid about XPF18,000 each month for 
their attendance at two or three meetings with the mine’s management to 
discuss local people’s complaints (mainly on questions of pollution), and 
to find out what jobs needed to be filled and how current workers were 
performing. The chiefs and presidents of the council of elders of each tribu 
contacted by the committee then selected the local people who would fill 
any vacancies in the workforce. Each of the committee members paid 
XPF1,000 from their monthly stipend into a common fund intended 
to contribute to the purchase of a minibus for transporting the workers 
to and from their workplace. This payment was clearly requested by the 
committee members in exchange for maintaining social peace.
Prior to 1999, this committee had also ensured that the trade unions 
did not gain a foothold in the mine. As its first president explained: 
‘We did not want this … because we did not want to defend the lazy 
people. We fought to have this instrument, it was necessary for the people 
to work.’14 It was in the context of the breakdown of the dialogue between 
the mining company and the ‘local circle’ of former UC members around 
Léopold Jorédié that the trade unions gained access to the mine in 1999. 
Given that the leadership of the municipal authority had by then passed to 
the UNI, and Boakaine Mining was under the control of individuals who 
had remained loyal to the UC, the FCCI members attempted to regain 
control in a different way. It was they who encouraged two trade unions, 
first the Union des Syndicates des Ouvriers et Employés de Nouvelle-
Calédonie and then the Confédération Syndicale des Travailleurs de 
Nouvelle-Calédonie, to establish their presence at the mine site. It was the 
second of these unions that initiated the strike in 2001.
13  The big chieftaincy of Penyîmê Nèkètè (or Nakéty) was left out of this process because it has its 
own mining operations, and its inhabitants would prefer to work on these.
14  Much of the work involved filling the ore carriers for PAMCO (the Japanese foundry) as quickly 
as possible, and even working on Sundays due to the ‘urgency of the economic rebalancing’.
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The discourse concerning the lack of recognition of the chieftaincies 
emerged at the same time. The strike led to the recollection of 
commitments supposedly made by André Dang to the customary leaders 
in the chieftaincy of Mèèwèè in 1991 that entailed greater participation 
of the chieftaincies in the actual operation of the mine. Some informants 
referred to a promise that operational responsibilities would be transferred 
to COMIKA or its successor, Boakaine Mining, after ten years—or even 
earlier. Other informants recalled a proposal to increase COMIKA’s 
shares in the operating company to 51 per cent. Dang was also said to 
have promised that COMIKA would acquire ownership of the mine’s 
vehicles—mainly trucks—and thus become a primary subcontractor. 
More peripherally, in the area of corporate social responsibility, he was 
supposed to have promised help for the renovation of a church and 
a bridge and the remediation of a former spa. Accordingly, the municipal 
authority had established an association through which revenues from the 
mine would be used to fund these projects, but this was wound up after 
the municipal elections of 1995.
Proposals to increase the level of customary shareholding in the mine 
were seemingly abandoned in 1995, since they were not supported by 
the majority of newly elected representatives who then assumed control 
of the municipal authority. They were raised again in 1998, when Patrice 
Mwâsadi became the president of Boakaine Mining, and then resurfaced 
in 2002 as a justification for the previous year’s strike. While these 
demands made reference to local people’s connection with the land, they 
were not based on a discourse of indigeneity that places colonised peoples 
in opposition to their colonisers, but rather on a ‘localist’ discourse that 
was less concerned with resistance to a form of external domination than 
with the reaffirmation of a political and genealogical history, even though 
some of Canala’s clans could not claim that their ancestors had crossed the 
mineral tract of Boakaine at one time or another.
What was being demanded here was the recognition of a ‘local’ political 
authority based on the claim of some clans to precedence in the occupation 
of the land. This authority claims respect for those who were living in the 
environment of the mine, more than for those who accommodated the 
operators in a space to which they had distinctive rights based on their 
clan histories. From the way that the notion of ‘respect’ was invoked in 
my interviews, it became clear that this was a standard form of Kanak 
political logic—the logic of welcoming and hosting strangers according 
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to specific rules and duties, and that this was the mindset within which 
COMIKA was established in 1992, albeit at the level of the municipality 
rather than the chieftaincy.
To understand the previous claim to ownership of the mining company, 
it is important to remember who was making it. The trade union leaders 
involved in the strike negotiated with the local leaders of the FCCI because 
the customary leaders who were most involved in the claim were also close 
to this party. The FCCI backed its claim by reference to the recognition 
of customary land rights in the Nouméa Agreement, and the former UC 
militants who moved to the FCCI thereafter presented themselves as 
customary leaders:
Before the split [between the UC and the FCCI] we worked to have 
the mine reopened. We, the former members of the UC municipal 
authority  …  SMSP wanted to continue with us [FCCI] but we were 
outside the municipal authority. It [SMSP] preferred to continue to 
negotiate with us. It was they [the municipal authority] who blocked it. 
They wanted to erect a kind of barrier between us and Dang. They said: 
‘What happens at the mine is the municipal authority’s problem! It is not 
the [problem of ] the customary leaders.’ Because we became customary 
leaders when we left the mine. They [the municipal authority] tried to 
separate us. But we were still working with the people there [in SMSP].
What this FCCI supporter is saying is that the status of ‘customary leader’ 
presented his group with an opportunity to reassert their rights after they 
had lost control of both the mine and the municipality (not to mention 
the province), so the former UC militants ‘became customary leaders’. 
However, this was still a contentious designation, since the post-colonial 
segmentary logic that prevails in the customary domain meant that there 
were many different customary positions within the chieftaincies, partly 
originating in the structure of the colonial administration, which allowed 
for the assertion of competing claims. Therefore, conflicts between the 
directors of Boakaine Mining resulted in the emergence of a distinction 
between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ customary leaders, while those who 
claimed legitimacy in the context of their initial support for the FCCI 
closed ranks around the strikers and then wanted to be placed at the top 
of a clan-based shareholding company to recover control of the mine site.
Analysis of the first phase of the Boakaine conflict, up to the point of 
mine closure, provides a clear example of the instrumentalisation of the 
customary model of political organisation in a situation involving partisan 
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political competition. Furthermore, rather than argue that a Western form 
of political legitimacy is unattainable in a segmentary form of political 
organisation, it would seem more reasonable to say that individuals 
accept the state and its local authorities as fully integrated institutional 
frameworks while not discounting other political models and institutions 
that may be mobilised in certain situations.
The virtual disappearance of the FCCI from the New Caledonian 
political landscape in the mid-2000s has altered the terms of more recent 
debates between the municipality, the ‘customary leaders’ and SMSP 
about the project of reopening the Boakaine. For the political parties, 
mining Boakaine is a matter of development from the perspective of 
independence, but it has also become an issue between the political figures 
authorised to represent development at that level. Former FCCI leaders 
initially argued for control of the mine to be located at the customary 
district level because its boundaries matched those of the municipality. 
In the new phase of debate about reopening the mine, the conflict is more 
definitively located in the debate supported by the indigenous movement, 
and reflects the recent evolution of the wider political debate in which 
the question of independence is superimposed on that of institutional 
pluralism (Demmer 2016).
In 2011, Martial Tyuienon, then president of the customary district 
of Canala, and acting as the official spokesperson for claims being made 
against SMSP, was still insisting that no one could claim ownership of the 
nickel ore. Only in 2014 did he begin to claim material or intellectual 
property rights in the mineral resource, echoing the claims made by 
various indigenous movements all over the world. In 2011 he said:
You can say you are the owner of the mining land. That’s true. But not 
in relation to the nickel; you cannot know. We know who knows how to 
make yarn, grow taro, build houses, hunt animals, fish … but did anyone 
burn stone to make iron?
During my fieldwork in 2014 he stated:
With help from family magic, even if they had no use for the nickel, my 
ancestors knew where to find it. They had the gift of seeing. They maybe 
knew about the nickel and used it for other purposes: yam and taro …15
15  Martial Tyuienon died in 2016.
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The Contest over Reopening the Mine
Initially, in 2010, the council of the customary district of Canala, 
supported by Jorédié’s former vice-mayor (and most loyal ally), Gaetan 
Dowadé, was attempting to create a clan-based joint venture in the 
form of a société par actions simplifiée (SAS) with a view to reopening 
the Boakaine mine. This local development strategy would have bypassed 
both the municipality and the tribal councils. The clans in question were 
represented by ‘clan chiefs’ who are legally recognised in legislation that 
became effective in January 2007. Based on the sums paid by each clan at 
the outset (between XPF50,000 and XPF500,000), it was envisaged that 
the board of the SAS would distribute some of the dividends based on 
an evaluation of the clans’ needs, while reinvesting the rest in collective 
projects within their tribus (or small chieftaincies). In addition, these 
‘customary’ shareholders, through the district council and its president, 
would assume the role of the former ‘recruitment committee’ by selecting 
people to work at the mine. Decontamination and afforestation measures 
would be implemented by the district’s ‘mining committee’, which would 
charge an 8 per cent levy on contracts concluded between the SAS and 
SMSP. The tribus close to the mine would receive preferential treatment 
in these subcontracting arrangements.
While some of the former FCCI leaders may already have planned to 
establish a private company that would operate like a ‘municipal bank’, 
redistributing dividends among the clans rather than the tribus, the 
‘masterminds’ of this more recent project appeared to want to turn the 
customary district council into an administrative body that would be 
a real alternative to the municipal authority.16 Apart from the ‘mining 
committee’, the district would have a ‘training and education’ committee, 
an ‘environment committee’, a ‘social committee’ and yet another 
committee devoted to ‘customary affairs’. As far as the proponents of 
the ‘clan-based company’ were concerned, the Boakaine mine would act 
as a financial reservoir for the development of the district rather than 
the municipality of Canala.17 However, the policy model here was still 
16  This idea gained currency with the publication (in 2014) of the Charte du Peuple Kanak (Kanak 
People’s Charter), which inspired by of the discourse of indigenous people’s rights.
17  Customary leaders in Canala sometimes say that they are ready to share power with the municipal 
and provincial authorities, but sometimes say that they want to take it away. In this respect, they have 
had some difficulty coming to terms with the definition of legal pluralism contained in the Kanak 
People’s Charter.
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based on a ‘segmented’ conception of the general interest, in which the 
priority was not to serve the individual citizens who would be represented 
by the municipal authority, but to ensure the well-being of the clans 
through the elders who held power in the traditional political hierarchy 
(Demmer 2009).
This would conflict with the UC-run municipality’s conception of 
development. As previously noted, when the UNI secured its majority 
in the municipal elections of 1995, its assumption of responsibility for 
municipal development was combined with a challenge to the status of 
the recruitment committee ‘because that is not the law and the mine is 
the domain of the state’. Instead, the party proposed to deal with mining 
issues through the municipal mining committee, albeit with participation 
by the president of the customary district council and the president of 
the larger ‘customary area’ to which the district belonged. When the 
UC regained control of the municipality in 2001, the mayor, Gilbert 
Tyuienon, complained about the lack of benefits derived from local mining 
operations. The following comment was made at the mayor’s office:
In Nakéty, the country is given 19 billions of nickel per year. It should 
be the most beautiful and tranquil tribu … but it is often in the news 
for bad reasons … The people of Canala are tired of being forced to be 
nothing more than metal workers who borrow 17 or 20 million and pay 
XPF350,000 in instalments every month!
Such sentiments were linked to an expectation that the New Caledonian 
congress (the country’s legislature) would enter into serious discussions 
about increasing the level of taxes imposed on the industry and 
redistributing the benefits to the municipalities according to the principle 
of equalisation (or derivation).
In the first half of the current decade, the municipality’s own plans to 
reopen the Boakaine mine were made contingent on the assumption of 
majority (51 per cent) ownership of the operation by a joint venture (société 
par actions simplifiée) known as Société Anonyme d’Économie Mixte 
Locale de Canala (SAEML Canala). This had been established in 2010 to 
promote agricultural development in the area, and would henceforth be 
able to use mineral revenues to fund such activities. The customary leaders 
would be represented in this entity through four GDPLs (groupements 
de droit particulier local)—one for each of the municipality’s four big 
chieftaincies. Their involvement was seen as both a matter of principle, 
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allowing for a distinctively Kanak form of participation, and also as a way 
of allaying the latent tensions between the elected representatives and the 
customary leaders.
However, the proposed GDPLs were subject to criticism by the district 
council, as the advocate of the clans recognised by the 2007 law, on the 
grounds that they were ‘superficial’, ‘disconnected from real history’ 
and would not reflect the reality of the segmentary political system. 
Conversely, some of the people who opposed the new joint venture were 
equally sceptical of the legitimacy of the ‘new’ clans. As one of them put it:
The clan chiefs. That was done from the top down. It should be the other 
way around. That comes from the [Customary] Senate.18 The Senate is 
the form the French gave to this chamber. They thought of the French 
system. Suddenly, they subjugate from top to bottom. But it’s not like 
that. The people made the clan chiefs without a single thought! None 
at all!
Accordingly, representatives of the municipal authority and the customary 
district each can regard themselves as the most legitimate political actors, 
and believe that they should therefore control the benefits generated by 
the operation of local mines. During this most recent period, each side has 
asserted the longevity of its own institutions. The elected representatives 
might talk about the ‘immortality’ of the municipality, or their own 
capacity to get things done, while the customary leaders might respond by 
stating a preference for consensus over the principle of universal suffrage, 
or complaining that elected leaders are too far removed from their 
‘roots’. Both sides also complain that the other cannot be trusted in the 
management of money. However, the customary leaders will sometimes 
admit that ‘the municipality is the body that is closest to the population’, 
while the elected representatives will say that they do not want to exclude 
the customary leaders who are part of the political landscape in all Kanak 
municipalities.
In this particular case, the elected representatives also wanted to keep their 
distance from the group of actors who were identified with the FCCI 
but had aligned themselves with the customary sphere. The municipality 
could therefore say that it had nothing against the customary leaders 
themselves but distrusted this particular group during the course of the 
18  The Sénat Coutumier is an assembly of 16 senators, with two representing each of the eight 
customary areas.
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negotiations over the reopening of the mine. One Kanak businessman 
whom I interviewed did not even attempt to unravel these problems of 
identity and political legitimacy, but simply said that he understood the 
desire of the people living near a mine—whoever they were—to control 
the resource in the absence of a taxation system from which they derived 
any benefit (see Grochain and Poithily 2011).
A resolution was thus adopted in 2012, at a meeting held in in Mèèwèè, 
the ‘headquarters’ of the grand chieftaincy of Bwaaxéa, which stipulated 
that the customary leaders, the municipal authority and SMSP should 
all be involved in reopening the mine. For its part, SMSP understood 
the local people’s desire to get control over the resource, especially in the 
absence of localised taxation, and wanted to encourage the creation of 
subcontracting companies, as well as local employment, training and 
shareholding. Although SMSP was unwilling to transfer the mining titles 
demanded by some of the customary leaders in Canala, it was prepared 
to negotiate a solution with local actors—whether customary leaders or 
elected representatives—who had not been party to the conflict of 2002.
The elected representatives themselves decided to take a back seat in the 
negotiations in 2012. At the end of the day, no agreement was reached: the 
municipality has failed to hold discussions with the Boakaine tribus, while 
the district council still disagrees with the proposal to establish SAEML 
Canala, and SMSP is unwilling to transfer or farm out the mining titles to 
either the municipality or the district. The mine is still closed, and it will 
not reopen without a clear local agreement between the municipality and 
customary authorities and a negotiated arrangement between SMSP and 
the UC-led municipality. The first of these conditions seems more likely 
to be met, since the municipality is at odds with the UNI-run North 
Province over the redistribution of mining revenues and the support 
provided to Kanak private mining companies.
Conclusion
The conflict that led to the closure of Boakaine is a perfect entry point for 
understanding contemporary social relations in the Kanak world. In the 
context of the progressive decolonisation of New Caledonia, the conflict 
demonstrates the potency of this political issue for the pro-independence 
parties: they all see it as one that involves their status as leaders in the 
implementation of a project to prepare the economic grounds for 
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independence. What this conflict also reveals is that the mines are tools 
of regional development for all political actors, both Kanaks and non-
Kanaks. Local development depends largely on SMSP, a company owned 
and controlled by North Province, and tensions emerge from the (feeling 
of a) lack of direct benefits at the municipal level, as has been explained in 
the case of Canala. Whereas the FLNKS thinks of resource management 
at the scale of the whole territory, the local redistribution of mining 
revenues at the local level remains a contentious issue—all the more so 
with the complex coexistence of elected and customary political entities.
The direct and indirect employment generated in and around a mine is 
not enough to meet local people’s expectations on this score. In the era 
of neoliberal democracy, actors from the mining areas invite themselves 
to participate in the debate on this subject. Two closely related (though 
different) registers are mobilised in Canala. On one hand, people refer to 
a ‘localist’ legitimacy that reasserts the rights of ‘the people from the place’, 
meaning both the municipal residents and the subjects of the chieftaincies, 
or even the members of clans whose ancestors once traversed the mineral 
deposits. Due to the complex layering in the politics of recognition of 
Kanak customary entities since the colonial era, the definition of ‘the place’ 
can extend from the clan to the tribe, the district or even the customary 
area encompassing them. On the other hand, people adopt the  most 
recent language of indigenous mobilisation, defending in a generic and 
well-structured manner the rights of the first occupants of a settler colony. 
This ethnocultural discourse asserts more clearly the ideological cleavage 
between elected representatives and customary authorities—the latter 
now seen as more legitimate bodies for the management of the mines 
and indigenous populations. The proximity of the referendum on self-
determination can explain the flowering of this type of discourse as an 
alternative path towards decolonisation: the achievement of internal 
sovereignty through the legal recognition of cultural difference.
A change is worth noting here. In 2002, the need to consider customary 
areas, districts, chieftaincies and clans was expressed by Kanak politicians 
when they had lost their audience at a national or provincial level and 
tried to re-establish themselves at the local level. What is new here is that 
this strategy is not necessarily deployed to facilitate a return to electoral 
politics but that it still serves the political purposes of the customary 
actors themselves. Customary authority is invoked in its own right as an 
alternative form of power entitled to legal recognition. This evolution 
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opens up avenues for the establishment of differentiated political rights, 
which would reconfigure once again the relations between Kanaks and 
non-Kanaks, as well as among the Kanaks themselves.
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In late July 1996, the entrances to Plateau and Camps des Sapins, the 
two main mines in Thio, were blockaded by the commune’s Kanak 
inhabitants. Blockades were also placed on the ore transfer belt in nearby 
Thio Mission and on a Japanese ore carrier, the Tango Gracia, which was 
in the process of being loaded by its Filipino crew. The stand-off between 
the Thio coutumiers (‘customary representatives’) and the company Société 
Le  Nickel (SLN) lasted two weeks and culminated in a wide-ranging 
written agreement which, despite being local in scope, went beyond the 
context of work and touched on environmental and social issues, the 
question of the control of resources, and the redistribution of mining 
revenues (see Filer 1997; Bainton 2009).
1  This study was carried out as part of a research program financed by the National Centre for 
Technological Research, under the title ‘Nickel Politics between Local Governance and Corporate 
Governance: The Comparison of Mining and Industrial Development in New Caledonia’. I should 
like to sincerely thank Jean-Michel Sourisseau for his critical and constructive reading of an initial 
version of this text, and Susan Cox for translating it into English.
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Thio, a commune located on the east coast of South Province, was 
the country’s ‘nickel capital’ for a long time, and SLN, which was 
established in 1880 and based in Thio during the interwar period, 
enjoyed a dominant position in the production and processing of 
nickel in New Caledonia.2 The  town of Thio was also one of the focal 
sites of les événements (‘the events’), a period of violent clashes between 
1984 and 1988 that combined elements of civil war between the Kanak 
separatists and New Caledonian loyalists with the Kanak decolonisation 
struggle, so the location and protagonists in this particular tale are not 
without significance. Equally significant is the unfolding of this social 
movement—the blockade itself, the willingness to extend or escalate the 
conflict beyond the boundaries of the mine site and then the eventual 
agreement. Finally, the discursive structure of this conflict as a conflit des 
coutumiers also merits some explanation.
I shall start from the hypothesis that this conflict and the resulting 
agreement mark a turning point in local mining governance. This chapter 
will describe the configuration of actors, issues and discourses involved 
in the conflict, and will situate it in the previous history of local conflicts 
and in relation to the changes in mining affairs and the political situation 
in New Caledonia in the 1980s and 1990s. I shall then analyse the 
reconfigurations of the local arena prompted by the conflict negotiations 
from three perspectives. The first is that of landownership, specifically the 
contest between the political (or historical) and legal recognition of land 
rights. The second is that of politics—the redefinition of affiliations and 
locality, the reorganisation of chieftainship and the positioning of the town 
hall. The third is that of business, involving questions of subcontracting, 
local employment and business development.3
2  This monopoly was toppled in the 2000s, particularly in 2010, with the establishment of two 
new mining and industrial projects in the north and south of the island (see Chapters 2, 3 and 6, 
this volume).
3  The analysis is based on retrospective interviews carried out in Thio between 2008 and 2014, 
and on various documentary sources: newspaper articles published in Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes 
between 26 July and 7 August 1996; minutes of the consultation meeting of 9 August 1996; the 
text of the protocol to the agreement of 6 August 1996; the letter sent on 18 October 1996 by the 
presidents of the two districts of Thio (Philippe Nekaré and Charles Moindou) to the government 
delegate, Dominique Bur, and the chief executive of SLN, Jean-Jacques Mouradian, through Jean-
Michel Arlié, Deputy Commissioner of South Province, requesting compensation for the land 
washed away or polluted through the activities of SLN in light of the earlier agreement; the letter 
sent by the sous-préfecture (subdivision) to the deputy commissioner on 30 October 1996; a letter 
sent by the deputy commissioner to the chief executive of the Agency for Rural Development and 
Regional Planning; and other correspondence and minutes of follow-up meetings relating to the 
August agreement.
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The Conflict and the Agreement
The Conflict-Based Approach
The heuristic productivity of the conflict-based approach has long been 
acknowledged, in particular since the work of Max Gluckman, Victor 
Turner and other members of the ‘Manchester School’ (see Turner 1957). 
No society is exempt from conflict, so it constitutes a general empirical 
phenomenon. Conflicts constitute moments in time that crystallise and 
highlight opposing positions; they do not emerge haphazardly. They 
constitute spaces for the expression of arguments or registers of justification 
(revealing judgments, knowledge and information) that tend to ‘harden’ 
and gain in visibility over the course of a dispute. Finally, conflicts are 
not simply ‘revealing’ in the photographic sense of representing a pre-
existing sociopolitical topography; they are factors that reconfigure the 
rules of a game—mining governance in the case in point—and therefore 
constitute factors of institutional change. They are part of broader 
sequences of events that include their modes of resolution (in this case 
a written agreement), as well as measures of avoidance or patterns of 
re-emergence. Moreover, and in relation to the context of New Caledonia, 
disputes like that under consideration here are part of a long-term process, 
that of the consubstantial ‘meta-conflict’ of settler colonialism. We shall 
see clearly how this historical legacy is inscribed in the manner in which 
the question of landed property is negotiated. In this sense, conflicts fulfil 
a function, even if it is not that ascribed to them in advance. The point 
of view adopted here is processual and not functionalist, and leaves open 
the specific empirical question as to whether this was a conflict ‘about’ the 
control of resources, or whether control of resources became the pretext 
for a conflict about other things.
We can take inspiration here from the suggestions made by Glenn Banks 
in his analysis of mining conflicts in Papua New Guinea (Banks 2008). 
Banks stresses the overlaps between questions surrounding resources 
and affiliations and the continuity of a sociopolitical order. Secondly, he 
highlights their processual dimension: what is involved in most cases is 
the restoration of a balance rather than the regulation of a situation in the 
strict sense—in other words, a question of ‘peace’ rather than ‘justice’, to 
use the terms employed by Sten Hagberg in a completely different context 
(Hagberg 1998). Along the same lines, the compensation eventually paid 
is more ‘relational’ than ‘transactional’ in nature and, more often than 
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not, the requested and/or self-appointed mediators are interested and 
involved in the conflict arena, as opposed to being neutral and external, 
as would be desirable in a ‘United Nations’ style of mediation. Banks 
proposes, thirdly, that mining conflicts are both strongly embedded at 
a local level—in terms of actor configurations and normative repertoires—
and marked by, or the products of, the exogenous rupture constituted by 
the precipitous development of the mining project, as tragically shown 
in the case of the Panguna copper mine in Bougainville (Regan 1998, 
2014; see also Allen 2013 and Chapter 12, this volume). I argue that 
this rupture is expressed in a tension between inflows (of actors, material 
and immaterial resources) and a ‘normative gap’ that derives from failure 
to establish the ‘rules of the game’ in the early stages of mining projects. 
This tension, which should be viewed relative to the historicity of mining 
activity in a given location, is a powerful driver of conflict. It could also 
be argued that mining conflicts question the boundaries of the company, 
as an entity located on the interface between corporate governance and 
local arenas, and the enclave logic that inherently underlies a mining 
operation. The company is formed through the definition of a physical, 
institutional and ideological action perimeter—the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ 
(or externalities) of the company—and this perimeter is contested 
by certain actors.4
The Context
The context in which this localised conflict arose was that of the sequence 
of les événements and the resulting political agreements—the Matignon-
Oudinot Agreements in 1988, the Nouméa Agreement in 1998—the latter 
marking the advent of an original negotiated process of decolonisation. 
The context is also that of the increasing significance of mining as an 
issue, which the pro-independence parties placed at the heart of the 
political debate in the 1990s, resulting in the negotiation of a préalable 
minier (‘mining prerequisite’) in the Bercy Agreement of February 1998.5 
4  On the different forms of industrial pollution (e.g. ‘spillage’ versus ‘overflow’), see Letté (2009). 
On the notion of the mining enclave, see Le Meur et al. (2013) and Allen (2017).
5  The signature of the Bercy Agreement as a ‘mining prerequisite’ to the Nouméa Agreement of 
1998, which prompted the initiation of a process of negotiated decolonisation in New Caledonia, 
should not be seen retrospectively as the start of a harmonious and linear process. Its roots go back 
further, to the nationalisation of the Société Minière du Sud Pacifique in 1990. Debates among 
separatists on the opportunity to start thinking in capitalist terms were tempestuous, and the story of 
the appropriation of the issue of mining by the pro-independence groups was yet to unfold. I thank 
Jean-Michel Sourisseau for drawing my attention to this point (see also David et al. 2016: 33–39).
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This  was followed by the arrival of the mining multinationals in the 
2000s and the rise of environmental and indigenous rights discourses. 
In this regard, the conflict of 1996 may be seen as ‘pre-indigenous rights’ 
and, as we shall see, represents a turning point in relation to a number 
of issues—mining, land, indigeneity, customary authority, and so forth 
(see Chapters 4 and 6, this volume).
The Story
The conflict of 1996 started with a lockout that would last for 13 
days. The lockout was not the only form of expression used; it was also 
accompanied by written documents. On 25 July, a package of demands 
(cahier de revendications), signed by representatives of the two customary 
districts of Thio (Thio and Borendy),6 was submitted to SLN, to the 
High Commissioner of the Republic (the representative of the French 
central state in New Caledonia), to South Province and to the parties 
represented in the Congress of New Caledonia ‘because, according to the 
customary authorities, the demands concern all of the partners’ (Huillet 
1996a). The package of demands was divided into eight sections relating 
to: (1)  recruitment; (2)  the granting of mining licences by SLN to the 
customary authorities; (3) subcontracting, with a demand that Nouméan 
companies establish offices in Thio; (4) assignment to the commune of 
the Baie de la Mission housing development scheme (the issue had been 
blocked for three years); (5) the restitution of land and compensation for 
arable areas; (6) the establishment of an anti-pollution team at the mine; 
(7) financing for rehabilitation of environmental damage caused by the 
operation; and (8)  the creation of infrastructure that would ‘open up’ 
the commune.
A meeting was held in Thio on 29 July 1996 with a view to negotiating 
these demands. The leaders of the movement rejected an offer by SLN to 
transfer the meeting to its headquarters in Doniambo, near the Nouméa 
processing plant. They demanded that the meeting be held in the open air, 
on ‘their land’, on the access road to the Plateau mine.
6  The organisation of indirect colonial government through the administrative chieftaincy was 
gradually established with the creation of the ‘tribe’ in 1867, the chieftaincy (‘petit chef’, that is, 
‘little chief ’ or tribal chief ) in 1868, the institution of the régime de l’indigénat (‘indigenous legal 
code’) in 1887, and the district headed up by the ‘grand chef ’ (‘big chief ’) in 1897. The transfer of 
the Kanak population to reservations was carried out progressively during the same period, and was 
systematised with the grand cantonnement at the turn of the twentieth century under Governor Feillet 
(see Dauphiné 1987; Merle 1998, 2004).
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On 6 August 1996, an agreement was signed at the La Foa sous-
préfecture (‘subdivision’) office between SLN, the commune of Thio, 
and the two councils of the customary districts of Thio. The agreement 
basically constituted a response to the grievances outlined in the package 
of demands presented in July, and included:
• provisions for the resettlement of people located in the flood zone, 
based on the argument that the mining slag heaps had caused the 
silting up of the Thio River;
• provision by SLN of insurance policies to local farmers to cover the 
eventuality of damage to their crops; and
• the possibility of quadripartite mediation between the state, the 
commune, SLN and the two customary districts in cases of dispute.
Another meeting was held at the town hall on 9  August, following 
hot on the heels of the signing of the agreement. The agenda for this 
meeting also referred to the package of demands and the terms of the 
agreement. However, rather than focusing on questions directly related to 
the mine—recruitment, mining licences, subcontracting—it highlighted, 
in particular, the issues of land use planning, residential development and 
land redistribution. A monitoring committee was established and was 
active for around a decade, particularly in relation to the recruitment of 
the inhabitants of Thio. However, the mining licence took a long time 
to materialise. The new Kanak mining company, Société Minière des 
Kanak de Thio (SOMIKAT), was established in 2007 and commenced 
production in 2010 (Seyrane Belliot and Léopold Gnahou, interviews, 
29 March 2012).
The blockades were not located in the operational area of the mine, and 
there was no occupation of mining sites or offices as is often the case 
in labour conflicts. In this instance, the theatre of the conflict—which 
was not a traditional labour conflict—shifted towards the interfaces and 
thresholds between the town and the mine (the entrance to the Plateau 
and Camp des Sapins mines) and between the town and the outside world 
(the wharf ). The locations of the negotiations were also carefully selected: 
under no circumstances would they be held on SLN ground, whether 
in Thio or at the headquarters in Nouméa. The protesters insisted that 
they be held on the territory of the native inhabitants, that is, in front 
of the mine, at the town hall, which had been under the control of the 
pro-independence Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste 
(FLNKS) since 1986, or in the subdivision, in the ‘house of the state’.
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Some of the actors involved in the conflict, and some people who were 
still children at the time, recall the atmosphere in those two weeks as 
being rather festive and non-violent. Seyrane Belliot, the manager of 
SOMIKAT (until 2014), remembers playing with her friends amongst 
the adults, in a joyful hubbub involving political debates and barbecues 
in front of the entrance to the mine (interview, 19 November 2012).7 
At the same time, women from the tribes at the lower end of Thio worked 
in shifts to prepare meals for the blockaded Filipino sailors on their ore 
carrier, who were beginning to run out of supplies.8
The choice of the locations and the declarations of the local leaders 
express the same desire for access and opening up: it was about getting 
away from the usual form of confrontation with SLN, which always tried 
to resolve problems through the adoption of a private, bilateral logic of 
compensation.9 While condemning the lack of environmental awareness 
on the part of SLN, and the devastating effects of this negligence on 
the landscape of the commune, the customary leaders insisted that this 
state of affairs was equally the concern of ‘all parties’, that is, all political-
administrative levels of organisation. This strategy of ‘publicising’ the 
conflict leads us to the identification of the actors involved, and hence 
also to pinpointing important absences.
Actors and Absences
First, it is clear that the customary representatives were the driving force 
behind the process. The individuals in question were the two major chiefs, 
Damas Toura (Thio) and Philippe Nekaré (Borendy), who both enjoyed 
significant historical and ‘customary’ legitimacy beyond their positions 
as administrative chiefs, who were current or former employees of SLN, 
and who belonged to the loyalist political party, the Rassemblement pour 
la Calédonie dans la République, like the chief of Kouaré, Moïse Mapéri, 
7  Seyrane’s mother, Ithupane Tiéoué, a PALIKA militant and, at the time, secretary to the mayor 
of Thio, completely concurred with this account (interview, 26 November 2010).
8  The tension was clearly palpable at times—this was also an argument used in the negotiations—
but it is astonishing to note the extent to which the accounts provided in the anti-independence local 
daily newspaper Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes are partial in this regard, and insist solely and vehemently 
on the ‘tension that emanates from the strikers. A machete, a club or a rock in their hands, they guard 
the road blockade and rise to meet the least approach from outside’ (Huillet 1996a). The ‘primitivist’ 
tone of this account (e.g. the ‘club’) is noteworthy.
9  This had been the typical company response to all claims for damages, be it that involving the 
Thio Mission during the interwar period (Winslow 1993), or later involving European livestock 
breeders (R. Lacrose, interviews, 28 August and 11 September 2008).
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who was also active in the process. However, the leading personality in 
the conflict was Charles Moindou, the president of the district council of 
Thio, and also an active member of the Union Progressiste Mélanésienne 
(UPM), which was part of the pro-independence FLNKS alliance 
established in 1984. He and his two brothers, Joseph and Albert,10 formed 
a group with considerable accrued political and economic capital as 
members of the UPM, even though some people contested the legitimacy 
of their positions as customary leaders.
SLN was involved through its office in Thio, the governance of which 
was—and still is—based on a pairing formed by the head of the office, 
generally a metropolitan ‘expatriate’, and the human resources manager, 
who was normally integrated into the local social fabric, or at least of 
New  Caledonian origin, though not actually a member of the mine-
affected community.
The central or ‘metropolitan’ state was represented by the deputy 
commissioner (commissaire délégué) of South Province and, less directly, 
by three government departments—the Agence de Développement 
Rural et d’Aménagement Foncier, the Direction des Infrastructures, 
de la Topographie et des Transports Terrestres and the Direction du 
Développement Rural (the last two being part of New Caledonia’s 
territorial administration).11
Two other groups of actors may be characterised in more sociological terms. 
First, the town hall played the role of the ‘political-state intermediary’ due to 
its pivotal position as the bottom rung of the state apparatus and its elected 
leadership, especially as it had been taken over by the pro-independence 
FLNKS alliance after les événements.12 In addition to the town hall, which 
would remain a rather secondary force in the process, two men were chosen 
as official spokespersons by the customary leaders—Amédée Tiéoué and 
10  Joseph was an elected representative of the FLNKS in South Province from 1989 to 1995. Albert 
would become the mayor of Thio in 2001.
11  New Caledonian usage tends to equate the ‘state’ with the government of France, neglecting 
the fact that it contains different levels of political organisation, especially in the New Caledonian 
context, where the three provinces (South, North, Islands) established by the Matignon-Oudinot 
Agreements of 1988 enjoy wide-ranging powers, in particular with respect to economic development 
and the environment. The Nouméa Agreement of 1998 installed a collegial government at the level of 
the territory of New Caledonia, and the territorial congress, elected through indirect suffrage by the 
provincial assemblies, has its own legislative powers.
12  The current mayor, Louis Mapéri, was a member of the Parti de Libération Kanak (PALIKA), 
who had been elected to replace the former mayor, Roger Galliot, after a year-long period of municipal 
subjection to central state control.
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Joseph Moindou (the brother of Charles). Both of them belonged to 
economically influential families, and in 1982 had been co-founders of 
UNICONCEQ, one of the first Kanak enterprises in Thio (see Pitoiset 
2002; Le Meur et al. 2012). So their legitimacy as ‘political-economic’ 
intermediaries was based on their entrepreneurial expertise and (above all) 
their interpersonal political skills, rather than their customary authority, 
which was either weak or disputed. Nor did their position as ‘mediators’ in 
such a conflict entail a position of neutrality (see Banks 2008).
The second group consisted of the ‘youth’. This was a somewhat fluid 
category that involved a generational positioning of juniors against 
elders and a degree of political stigmatisation of ‘young people’ as being 
essentially ‘unruly’. They emerged as a group in the conflict of 1996 
through an association for the unemployed (association des chômeurs), 
which strongly supported the demand for local recruitment but found 
itself gradually ousted from the negotiations by the elders representing the 
customary authorities.
Other groups were either completely absent from the conflict, as in the 
case of the trade unions, or largely so, as in the case of the political parties. 
The absence of the trade unions confirms that this was not a labour-related 
conflict, even though some of the actors were union members, and despite 
the demands made in relation to recruitment and subcontracting.13 As for 
the marginal role of the political parties, it may be noted that support from 
the separatists who dominated the local authority was counterbalanced by 
the discursive definition of the conflict as a ‘conflict of the customary 
people’. Furthermore, despite the fact that the conflict took place in the 
wake of the process of provincialisation established by the Matignon-
Oudinot Agreements, the authorities of South Province were not involved 
in the process.14
13  In the same year, the dominant trade union of the time, SOENC, formed an alliance with the 
customary people of the Xârâcùù area in a dispute with the Société Minière du Sud Pacifique and 
a group of small mining companies (petits mineurs). It should also be noted that SLN made tactical 
use of ‘trade union sources’ when it suggested that the Thio blockade put the jobs of the workers at 
the Doniambo nickel processing plant temporarily at risk (Hervieu 1996).
14  The same absence would be observed in the conflict between the local population and 
multinational mining company in the neighbouring commune of Yaté a few years later (see Horowitz 
2012). North Province took a backseat position during the negotiation of the agreement between 
SLN and the river clans in the mining area of Tiébaghi, but later intervened in the establishment of 
the public–private partnership created to manage the local subcontracting arrangement. This point 
has been confirmed by the former head of the SLN office in Tiébaghi, who negotiated that agreement, 
as well as the 2008 agreement between SLN, the commune of Thio and South Province (René Féré, 
interview, 20 February 2012).
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The absence of the provincial authorities can be interpreted in several 
different ways that are not mutually exclusive. First, the provincial 
administration was still recently formed and underdeveloped. Second, 
responsibility for mining was only really devolved to the provinces with 
the passage of the Organic Law of 1999, and even then was subject to 
de facto control by the territorial Direction de l’Industrie, des Mines 
et de l’Énergie de la Nouvelle-Calédonie (see GoNC 2009). Third, the 
majority of provincial politicians were opposed to independence, so had 
no sympathy with the concerns of a pro-independence commune. And, 
finally, the local protagonists themselves wanted to localise the conflict, 
which gave the central state the possibility of assuming a custodial role 
in the process.
Localisation of the Conflict and Redefinition 
of Social and Political Affiliations
It should be emphasised here that the tension at the root of the conflict 
was the local version of a more general dispute, which was expressed in the 
political sequence of events extending from les événements to the Matignon-
Oudinot Agreements and (ultimately) to the Nouméa Agreement.
The historical perspective points to a series of events characterised by the 
deepening, extension and coalescence of local disputes, which, for many 
people, centred on the environmental damage caused by SLN’s poorly 
monitored mining activities—uncontrolled dumping, river silting, floods, 
the displacement and resettlement of certain tribes (Saint-Philippo I and 
Ouroué, for example)—and regulated by bilateral agreements between 
SLN and the affected persons. It should also be noted that some of the 
more serious conflicts made a deep impression, based among other things 
on the violence and repression involved, and had a significant impact. 
These included the N’Goye conflict in 1978, conflict around the Koindé 
sawmills (in the neighbouring commune of La Foa) in 1981, and that in 
Kouaré (on the other side of the central mountain range, but still in Thio) 
in 1982–83, which had both environmental and economic dimensions, 
since it involved forest resources and employment opportunities. And 
shortly before the conflict described here, on 3 February 1996, there was 
the list of grievances compiled by the customary area council of Xârâcùù, 
which contained the same types of demands but on a broader scale than 
those made in the present case. The Xârâcùù customary council demanded 
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compensation for Kanaks from the tribes living in the coastal zone from 
Mara Cape (in Canala) to the left bank of the Kakoué River (in Thio), 
the transfer of the mining licences to the customary authorities, and the 
transfer of land downstream of the mines to the customary landowning 
clans (Huillet 1996a).
At the same time, it is important to note the national context, which was 
characterised in the period 1995–96 by the negotiation of the follow-up 
to the Matignon-Oudinot Agreements. The FLNKS placed the issue of 
mining at the centre of the negotiations, demanding a ‘strong gesture’ on 
the part of the state, and a ‘mining precondition’ for continuation of the 
debate. It was this process that culminated in the Bercy Agreement signed 
on 1 February 1998 (before the Nouméa Agreement of 5 May 1998), 
which involved an exchange of mining concessions between SLN and the 
Société Minière du Sud Pacifique and the promise to build a smelter in 
North Province (see David et al. 2016; also Chapter 2, this volume).
Interviews conducted with two of Thio’s political leaders produced 
agreement on two points.15 The first, paradoxically, was that mining itself 
was not an issue in les événements in Thio, despite the burning down of 
the SLN offices in Thio Mission and the occupation of the company’s 
residential quarters. At the same time, however, the leaders insisted that 
this battle was their battle, this was the story of Thio, and it was not 
influenced by national arguments or slogans. This desire to separate and 
localise the struggle should be related to the emphasis placed on the role 
of the ‘customary people’ as protagonists. As Charles Moindou put it in 
a newspaper interview:
It has nothing to do [with the mining precondition]. Our movement is 
independent of politics. The customary people were the ones who took 
the decisions … From ’84 to ’88, SLN negotiated with the customary 
people. Why did it stop doing this? (Huillet 1996a)
This very common discourse concerning localisation and separation may 
be interpreted as denoting a concern for the recognition of a Kanak capacity 
for action, or agency, which is very often denied to them in (white) New 
Caledonian statements, especially when these refer to the ‘insurrection’ 
of 1984–85, when the town was occupied by separatists. According 
15  The leaders in question were François Burck, a native of Thio and president of the Caledonian 
Union until 1996 (interviews, 17 June and 25 August 2011) and Louis Mapéri, the PALIKA member 
who was mayor of Thio from 1986 to 2001 (interviews, 22 June and 24 August 2011).
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to widespread discourses among non-Kanak people, the relationships 
between the communities in Thio were supposedly good, and the factors 
or actors that came to disrupt them originated from elsewhere, partly 
in the person of separatist leaders like Eloi Machoro, who came from 
neighbouring Nakéty, but also because the separatists had the backing 
of the French socialist government from 1981 to 1986 (Roger Galliot, 
interview, 21 June 2011).16 SLN actually did look for Kanak mediators to 
help restart its production lines and restore its relationship with the local 
population at the time of the ‘insurrection’. One of them was Camillo 
Ipéré, who has been working for SLN since 1970, and invested his 
customary and unionist skills in the task of restoring a minimal level of 
confidence (interviews, 15 July and 25 September 2008), but was hardly 
a neutral mediator, given his role as a UPM militant and active participant 
in the pro-independence struggle.
The other side of this localisation is constituted by the rhetoric of custom. 
The discursive framing of the conflict as a ‘conflict of the customary 
people’ enables the elimination of two forms of internal division. The first 
of these is that of party affiliation: despite the fact that they enjoyed strong 
customary legitimacy, the two ‘big’ chiefs and some of the ‘small’ chiefs 
in the area belonged to the ‘loyalist’ Rassemblement pour la Calédonie 
dans la République. The second harks back to the pre-colonial or early 
colonial period, especially the war of 1878, when the clans of the central 
mountain range (mainly Owi and Koua) took the side of the insurgents in 
opposition to those of the lower valley of Thio (e.g. Toura, a chiefly clan 
of that area) (Dousset-Leenhardt 1976; Le Meur 2013). This touches on 
a paradox of the administrative chieftaincy, for when reference was made 
to the ‘customary people’ in 1996, what was in fact intended was the 
administrative chiefs who were signatories to the agreement signed with 
SLN, and the partly alien (colonial) origins of their own status enabled the 
relegation of the old lines of division to the background (Louis Mapéri, 
interview, 24 August 2011). However, land claims and allocations had 
revived these divisions in the context of the land reform launched in 1978.
This discursive framing presented a form of indigeneity that is in some 
ways ‘pre-indigenous’ from the point of view of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (see Demmer 2007; 
16  This theme of ‘betrayal’ by the metropolitan state is a recurrent feature of the New Caledonian 
interpretation of the events, as revealed in interviews I conducted with M.  Fels (a former SLN 
employee), G. Santacroce (an elderly farmer), and C. Bull in 2010 and 2011.
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Levacher 2016; also Chapters 6 and 9, this volume). At the same time, 
it  enabled the affirmation of a desire to regain control over natural 
resources and ‘traditional’ hierarchical principles, which sometimes ran 
‘counter’ to the demands of the youth and pro-independence political 
parties who were at the forefront during les événements. As a result, the 
social question was in some sense put on hold, even though it might 
have been expected to occupy a strategic position in a conflict between 
local Kanak people and the major industrial enterprise and source of 
employment in the area. An alternative interpretation, which would be 
consistent with the theory of the reaffirmation of traditional hierarchical 
principles, is that the social question was not really put on hold, but was 
reformulated within a ‘Kanak cultural framework’ that was mindful of the 
hierarchies based on antecedence and seniority.
This takes us to the strictly socioeconomic dimensions of the negotiations. 
With respect to subcontracting, it was possible to observe a shift between 
the original grievances and the concluding agreement in terms of a greater 
insistence on local employment. However, there was never any question 
of supporting the creation of a local subcontracting company, and this 
reluctance is difficult to explain, given the prevailing dependence on 
companies with headquarters elsewhere. The Nouméan companies were 
simply asked to establish offices in Thio. Local employment in the strict 
sense of ‘recruitment’ constituted the first point of the agreement:
SLN undertakes to recruit in the next four years at least 16 young people 
(males and females), with or without qualifications, from the tribes of 
Thio. SLN undertakes to provide theoretical and practical on-the-
job training in Thio for those without qualifications. Moreover, SLN 
undertakes to recruit three dockers within a period of six months, the first 
from September 1996.
The question of local employment was specifically raised by the association 
of the unemployed and, despite the fact that members of the association 
sometimes felt that they were being excluded from the negotiating table 
by their elders, results were achieved on this issue and were sustained 
through the establishment of a local recruitment monitoring committee.17 
The  intergenerational dimension of conflicts that are not necessarily 
organised around this particular topic has been observed in several other 
cases in Thio, including those associated with les événements.
17  There were some differences of opinion in this point (Ithupane Tiéoué, interview, 26 November 
2010).
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Apart from its intergenerational component, the question of local 
employment is by definition a ‘local’ matter. The history of mining in New 
Caledonia involved a ‘nickel boom’ in the period 1967–72, followed by 
a period of decline in the later 1970s (Freyss 1995). Many Kanaks moved 
to Thio at the time to work in the mines or for the subcontractors, and 
a good number were employed by companies of French origin. Some of 
them settled there permanently, married, and eventually became involved 
in local associations or militant movements. Prior to that, a large number of 
Kanaks from the Loyalty Islands, in particular Lifou and Ouvéa, had come 
to work for SLN. These workers inhabited an encampment beside the 
Plateau mine up to the 1970s, and later lived in the SLN housing estates 
near the wharf at Pawani. The Association des Kanak de la Grande Terre 
et des Îles emerged from these migratory movements. This ‘ethnonational’ 
association, initially led by pro-independence militants, later evolved into 
a neighbourhood association, the Association du Botaméré, which took 
its name from the sugarloaf-shaped mountain that looms over the Thio 
Mission estate. Both the association and its militant leaders, like Pierre 
Ayawa,18 remained very much in the background during the conflict 
of 1996. The end of the nickel boom had given rise to certain tensions 
between the Kanaks who were and were not natives of Thio.
At the same time, the promotion of employment and local entrepreneurship 
followed a logic of intertribal equity at the level of the commune of Thio. 
The objective was to balance the distribution of the mining revenues 
between the different tribes, even if the tribal entity—an administrative 
unit of colonial origin—is sometimes circumvented by a logic based on 
networks and alliances. This was the case in the choice of the new manager 
of SOMIKAT to replace Amédée Tiéoué, who resigned several years after 
the conflict, and was stigmatised as a ‘foreigner’ despite the fact that his 
grandfather had been a resident of Thio, and despite his role as both 
entrepreneur and official spokesman during the conflict itself.19 The new 
manager came from Nakéty in the neighbouring commune of Canala 
(see Chapter 4, this volume; also Figure 2.1), but his alliances meant that 
he could represent the tribe of Ouindo, which is based in Thio.
18  A native of Ponérihouen, Pierre Ayawa came to work for SLN in Thio in 1959 and has remained 
there since (interview, 7 October 2010).
19  He was known as ‘Lifou’ after the birthplace of his paternal great-great grandfather, though his 
clan originally came from the area of Poindimié on the north-east coast.
171
5. Conflict and Agreement
Hence, in the long term and, more specifically, through the conflict and 
agreement of 1996, it is possible to observe a process of reconfiguration of 
local citizenship, as has been the case in other mining situations. However, 
this was unlike the case of Lihir in Papua New Guinea (Bainton 2009; 
also Chapter 11, this volume), where the struggle over access to mining 
revenues triggered the construction of a local apparatus based on kinship, 
and hence with strong ethnic connotations. In Thio, it was more the issue 
of residency and communal affiliation that came to the fore, possibly 
because the racial ideological space was already occupied by the ‘meta-
conflict’ of settler colonialism, and since a considerable number of non-
Kanak Caledonians had left the area in the period 1984–88, the residential 
administrative unit of the tribe then achieved greater prominence in 
public debate. In line with what has already been said about the role of the 
administrative chieftaincy, this also enabled the circumvention of certain 
potential dividing lines within the local community.
The Localised Globalisation of the Conflict
The local appropriation of the conflict went hand in hand with a desire 
to ‘globalise’ it from the perspective of the issues and actors. Following 
Latour (2005:  173ff), this process can be understood in terms of 
a tension between three complementary aims: (1) to ‘localise the global’ 
by situating the latter as a form of the local characterised by a  greater 
density of connections with other sites, and not by a position of 
superiority; (2) to ‘redistribute the local’ by showing how it is generated 
through a  series of mediation and translation processes generating the 
intervention of exterior elements or agents; and (3) to ‘connect the [local 
and global] sites’ by means of measurement, classification, categorisation 
and standardisation procedures.
The objective here was, first and foremost, to get beyond the 
confrontation with SLN, which meant getting out of the mining enclave: 
‘SLN, the state, the provinces, and the territory each have their part 
to play’. The argument played out on several levels. First, it was a way 
of denouncing the past and present collusions between SLN and the 
territorial administration. It should also be seen as a way of restating the 
point that the scope of the conflict was not limited to the labour question 
within the boundaries controlled by the company. As an interviewed 
customary representative said:
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Thio has been exploited for 100 years with consequences for the 
environment, the displacement of communities, the problems of pollution 
and supply of drinking water (Huillet 1996a).
Finally, the objective was tactical: it was also a matter of seeking alliances. 
Hence, the environmental argument, which had been deployed for a long 
time by the Kanaks of Thio, as in the case of the N’Goye conflict of 1978, 
was taken up again by the head of the subdivision, Jean-Jacques Arlié, who 
raised the question of compensation when he asserted that ‘the customary 
people are right’. While SLN supported the establishment of what it called 
an ‘economic interest group’ (groupement d’intérêt économique) with the 
task of combating pollution, the company refused to accept responsibility 
for a century of negative impacts on the environment, and preferred to 
pass the buck to the state.20 While pollution of the environment could 
be seen as a mode of appropriation in its own right (Le Meur 2010), 
SLN also deployed the environmental argument in a technical register in 
the land negotiations: the lands being claimed by local people were not 
actually required for mining, but they would act as a buffer against the 
damage associated with the activity.
The politics of land was central. As Charles Moindou was quoted as saying: 
‘This country must be restored to the landowners’ (Huillet 1996a). In this 
regard, the localised conflict of 1996 is certainly part of the long trajectory 
of the ‘meta-conflict’ of settler colonialism, updated by demands for 
independence and land reform. The agreement of 1996 has several clauses 
dealing directly with land, concerning the Baie de la Mission residential 
development and claims over Koua, N’Goye and other land areas. These 
cases were to be dealt with by land allocations in the years that followed. 
However, the demand made by Charles Moindou referred to a different 
‘layer’ of land—that is, not the legal one dealt with through statutory 
claims, acquisitions and allocations,21 but the deeper, historical and 
identity-based layer that calls for a response in terms of the recognition of 
Kanak antecedence, indigeneity and equal dignity (see Honneth 2000). 
In this regard, the conflict of 1996 constituted a turning point as it was 
situated in the logic of the land reform that was in full swing by the 
1990s, while entirely prefiguring this demand for recognition without 
20  Jean-Michel Valois, the director of the company’s mining operations, was quoted as saying that 
‘[t]his problem is enormous but it is up to the state to take responsibility for it’ (Huillet 1996b).
21  The status of reserves, reserve extensions, clan-based transfers and the entities known as 
groupements de droit particulier local (‘local groups with special rights’) would be transformed by the 
provisions on customary lands in the Organic Law of 1999.
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necessarily involving any claims for the allocation of specific areas of land.22 
This demand would arise in several subsequent conflicts and agreements 
that were not confined to the mining sector, but lay at the root of other 
large-scale economic projects (Le Meur and Mennesson 2012; Le Meur 
et al. 2013).
Although the conflict of 1996 manifested a tendency to publicise local 
disputes more widely, as well as the increasingly complex politics of the 
mining arena, it was still characterised by a localised framework that 
had not yet been influenced by the global discourses that did not come 
to prominence in New Caledonia until the next decade. As previously 
indicated, there was no explicit mention of ‘indigenous rights’ in the sense 
defined by the United Nations, but this did not hinder the emergence 
of a discourse on identity, antecedence and local citizenship. Likewise, 
environmental non-governmental organisations had no part to play in 
the conflict, but this did not mean that environmental issues were absent 
from the conflict. There were no lawyers on the horizon, and that may 
be related to the presence of a centralised power represented by the sous-
préfecture (subdivision), expressing a political-administrative logic rather 
than one based on legalistic forms of conflict management.23 SLN had not 
yet woken up to the idea of corporate social responsibility, and sustainable 
development had not yet emerged as the conceptual mediator of divergent 
interests (Sourisseau et al. 2015). The very brief preamble to the 1996 
agreement confirms these absences, but in some respects, they are also 
hollow presences:
In consideration of the claims expressed by the councils of the two 
districts of Thio of 25  July 1996, in consideration of the responses 
provided by SLN, not wishing to further penalise the economic and social 
climate of the commune, mindful of the need to provide the population 
of this commune with a long-term development project through the 
management of natural resources, the following has been agreed.
22  The land reform process, which was launched in 1978 and continued in various institutional 
forms up to the 2000s, was based on the acquisition of areas of private land by a public agency 
and their redistribution in the legal form of customary land to Kanak collectives (tribes, clans or 
groups of clans) based on criteria that combined the logics of proof (historical group legitimacies) and 
negotiation (current land requirements) (Le Meur 2011).
23  This may be contrasted with the negotiation of the agreement negotiated for the Grand Sud 
(Goro) project, which was signed by the customary authorities, the indigenous association called 
Rhêêbù Nùù, and the Brazilian mining company Vale in 2008 (Horowitz 2012).
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A Turning Point in Local Mining Governance?
Twenty years have passed since the agreement of 1996, a period that gives 
us the distance required, first, to ascertain whether it has been complied 
with and had any effect and, second, to evaluate the extent to which it 
really was a turning point, or ‘bifurcation’ (Mahoney 2000), in the history 
of mining governance in Thio.
With regard to the first question, despite the non-binding character of 
the agreement, it cannot be denied that its various points have been 
translated into concrete action, albeit at varying speeds. The measure 
that took longest to implement was the granting of the mining licence 
to SOMIKAT. More than ten years passed before the local Kanak mining 
company was formally established in 2007. Priority was given to the 
question of local employment, and the committee established to monitor 
the implementation of the agreement functioned for around ten years.
The question of subcontracting leads to the second question. In this 
regard, the undertakings in the 1996 agreement were ultimately exceeded. 
Several local subcontractors were established and, in some cases, replaced 
well-established Nouméan companies. One such example is the local 
security company (APST) that was established in 2007 by Alcide Tiéoué, 
the brother of Amédée Tiéoué, after the latter had fallen out with the 
management of the Nouméan company that had previously dominated 
the local market for security services.24 Several of the local subcontracting 
companies established after 1996 opted for a logic of intertribal equity, 
but were also partly owned or operated by Wallisian, Indonesian and 
‘European’ elements of the population. One of them was even called 
the Société de Développement des Ethnies Réunies—the Company for 
the Development of United Ethnic Groups. Others, like those owned 
by members of the Moindou family, adopted a more individual and/or 
familial strategy, thereby risking the veiled criticism of some relatives, but 
not losing sight of this issue in their recruitment of personnel. In all cases, 
irrespective of the actors involved, the local dynamics exceeded the point 
reached by local people’s views and demands in 1996.
24  Amédée had been that company’s branch manager in Thio, which was one of the entrepreneurial 
roles he had played during the conflict.
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During the APST episode, SLN sided with Alcide Tiéoué and supported 
his enterprise, very probably out of concern to keep the social peace. 
So did things change completely? As Ithupane Tiéoué, former secretary 
to the mayor of Thio, reminds us: ‘With SLN, you always have to fight 
to get something’ (interview, 26 November 2010). The case of the tribe 
of Ouroué, whose history of environmental damage and displacement 
is closely associated with mining, further illuminates this point. Having 
obtained an agreement similar to that of 1996, also following a conflict, 
their leaders had to ‘increase the pressure again’ for the agreement to be 
implemented, even to the extent that new negotiations had to be held 
and a new text put on the table in 2007. Not insignificant in this regard is 
the fact that Narcisse Mapéri, the ‘small chief ’ of this tribe, wears a range 
of different hats: as a prominent member of the Union Syndicale des 
Travailleurs Kanak et des Exploités (USTKE), political party member 
(Parti Travailliste), and as the first president of the Comité Autochtone de 
Gestion des Ressources Naturelles (CAUGERN).25
The transformation of mining governance, inspired in part by the conflict 
and agreement of 1996, is obvious, and is located in the reconfiguration 
of the relationships between SLN, the commune and the customary 
authorities. SLN gradually withdrew from functions that did not have 
a direct economic significance and that it had long performed by acting as a 
substitute for the state (Le Meur 2009). Local networks and infrastructure 
were ‘communalised’, and the company’s housing schemes were privatised. 
The tripartite agreement between SLN, the commune and South Province, 
which was signed in 2008, further consolidated this trend.26 The fact that 
this agreement marked the entry of the province into the political process, 
and the relative marginalisation of the customary representatives, may 
be seen as a result of the electoral victory of the anti-separatist Avenir 
Ensemble (‘Future Together’) political party, which formed as a result of 
a split in the loyalist block, and which was representative at the time of a 
more ‘autonomist’ vision of New Caledonia’s destiny.27
25  CAUGERN was established in Thio in 2005. If it has a lasting political influence in the commune, 
that influence has been largely ‘subterranean’ (Narcisse Mapéri, interview, 2 October 2013).
26  This was the precursor of other agreements of the same nature with North Province that were 
signed in Poya and Koumac in August 2011.
27  This agreement was also far less localised than that of 1996 (or that of 2004 in Tiébaghi), and 
also reflected a distinctly ‘urban’ perspective (René Féré, interview, 20 February 2012).
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The mining governance regime that was developed in Thio after ‘the 
events’ is placed under the constantly evoked and constantly rejected 
horizon of the ‘post-nickel era’—primarily by SLN playing on the possible 
end of mining to calm down social movements, but also by other actors, 
especially the pro-independence mayors who have constantly striven to 
outline a post-mine future for Thio. This mining governance regime is 
characterised both by the mutual repositioning of SLN and the town 
hall, against a background of frequently difficult relationships,28 and by 
transformations in the customary world. The latter changes have arisen 
both in respect of land, with the growing importance of the demand for 
recognition without a direct link to claims for land redistribution (as seen 
earlier), and in respect of the chieftaincy, with the emergence of a new 
generation of younger chiefs who may have had careers as entrepreneurs.29
The conflict of 1996 was structured by the tension between localisation 
(of  situations, conflicts and arrangements) and globalisation (of the 
reference frameworks, arenas and discourses). Its emblematic nature as 
a turning point in mining governance should be appreciated on two 
different levels that reflect this tension. We have seen how, even if it is 
clear from a local perspective that this conflict constituted a turning point 
in terms of the scope of the mechanisms it triggered, the assessment of it 
should still be qualified. Viewed from a wider national perspective, and 
in the historical context featuring the Matignon-Oudinot and Nouméa 
agreements, the conflict of 1996 may be viewed retrospectively as the 
harbinger of a transformation of the mining policy domains, both from 
the discursive point of view, as in the qualification of the ‘pre–indigenous 
conflict’ or the ‘pre–sustainable development’ preamble to the agreement 
itself, but also in terms of the actor configuration. The way in which land 
issues and customary issues were combined in the framework of a renewed 
politics of recognition was also new.
28  The difficulties were documented in interviews with the current (post-2014) mayor, Jean-Patrick 
Toura, and his predecessors, Thierry Song (2005–14), Albert Moindou (2001–05), Louis Mapéri 
(1985–2001) and Roger Galliot (1971–85).
29  ‘The time when the Kanaks watched the trucks rolling past has gone,’ as M. Boéhé, the mayor 
of Houaïlou, another east coast mining commune, said in relation to the youth movements in his 
commune which opposed the pollution caused by SLN (Huillet 1996b).
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Final Remarks in the Light of Recent Events
To advance the analysis further, it is necessary to develop the comparative 
work initiated in the context of the research program on mining 
governance (e.g. Le Meur et al. 2012; Grochain 2013), and to shift the 
focus to other regional situations that are not exclusively associated with 
mining. For example, in New Zealand, a form of Maori entrepreneurship 
has emerged in a context characterised by the recognition of biculturalism, 
political-tribal reorganisation and neoliberal ideology (Rata 2000). 
The case of Papua New Guinea is also interesting in this respect, with 
the role (and shortcomings) of development forums, in which the local 
impacts and benefits of mining projects must be negotiated in advance 
(Filer 2008), and with the development of local entrepreneurship in 
the mining sector (Bainton and Macintyre 2013), which in many ways 
resembles the dynamics observed in New Caledonia.
Recent local developments in New Caledonia are also revealing, especially 
the chain of confrontations triggered in Thio by heavy rains and 
environmental damage in 2013. The ensuing mobilisation—with a mine 
blockade reminiscent of the 1996 conflict—encountered other sequences 
of events: one was the local implementation of mine site regulations 
stipulated by the 2009 mining code; another was the exploration campaign 
that several mining companies wished to launch on the ‘forgotten coast’—
south of Thio and north of Yaté—where mining operations had ceased 
30 years previously in another climate of conflict. These interlinked events 
confirm the turning point hypothesis in terms of a more complex mining 
arena with proliferating and recombining discursive repertoires (Le Meur 
2015a, 2015b). The 2013 conflict, with its focus on mining impacts, 
actually pushed companies into acting as honest corporate (and local) 
citizens. It represented at once a continuation of the 1996 dynamics—
with local people trying to regain control over their resources, territories 
and lives—and a major shift from away from the conflit des coutumiers, as 
the 2013 mobilisation adopted an explicitly transethnic stance, including 
Thio residents of European and Polynesian descent who played no part 
in the 1996 conflict. This inclusive strategy has not prevented communal 
leaders—some of them CAUGERN members30—from making use of 
30  This point is based on interviews with two CAUGERN members—the previously mentioned 
Narcisse Mapéri, USTKE member and former chief of the Ouroué tribe (2 October 2013), and Jean-
Guy M’bouéri, former customary senator and leader of the association created in the wake of the 
2013 conflict (4 October 2013 and 17 September 2014).
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the indigenous toolbox, for instance by invoking the principle of ‘free, 
prior and informed consent’ (Szablowski 2010). At the same time, the 
two-year mining ban on the ‘forgotten coast’ declared by Thio and Yaté 
customary authorities and indigenous organisations in 2014, after a series 
of meetings among local people and with mining companies, has followed 
a different pathway rooted in the discourses of clanship and indigeneity. 
However, these collective actions all display a strong sense of local identity 
and express the multilayered nature of citizenship and sovereignty (Joyce 
2013). By the same token, they also question the boundaries of the firm 
and the intricacies of corporate and local governance.
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6. Contesting the Goro Nickel 
Mining Project, New Caledonia: 
Indigenous Rights, Sustainable 
Development and the Land Issue
CLAIRE LEVACHER
Introduction
Since the middle of the 1990s, indigenous groups have become increasingly 
active in the international arena with a view to publicising the social, 
environmental, health and political impacts of mining projects on their 
lands, territories and resources. The extent of this activity contributed, in 
particular, to the formulation of Articles 26–32 of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was adopted in 
2007.1 These articles establish the right to redress, compensation, protection 
of the environment and, beyond this, the right to self-determination 
1  The articles in question concern the rights of indigenous peoples to lands, even in the absence 
of the allocation of formal property rights by the state; the recognition of this by the international 
community of states and the protection of the territories involved; the right to redress, restitution 
and compensation; the conservation of the environment and the production capacity of the lands; 
the mitigation of the adverse effects of production on the lands; and the absence of military activity. 
Article 32 states, finally, that: ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities 
and strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources.’ The states 
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in terms of development options. In fact, the mobilisation of environmental 
issues in the context of global mining conflicts frequently constitutes an 
argument for the rejection of industrial mining projects. And yet, the 
association of indigenous struggles with environmental battles is not 
systematic, particularly in countries in which the mining sector can 
constitute a development tool for the indigenous population (Ali 2009). 
This is precisely what I propose to investigate here through the examination 
of a conflict involving the company INCO (subsequently Vale) in relation 
to the Goro nickel mining project in the South Province of New Caledonia, 
which concluded in 2008 with the signing of a ‘sustainable development 
pact’ between the local Kanak population and the company—the Pacte 
pour un Développement Durable du Grand Sud.
Based on the results of a qualitative study carried out as part of a doctoral 
thesis from 2011 among the inhabitants of the municipality in question, 
institutional representatives, employees of the Goro Nickel Project, and 
other political actors, I aim to revisit the phases of a conflict with the 
mining company that has already been examined from both environmental 
(Horowitz 2009, 2010, 2012) and political (Demmer 2007, 2012; Djama 
2009; Le Meur 2010) perspectives. The various twists and turns in this 
mobilisation process, between 2001 and 2008, illustrate the progressive 
formalisation of an argument relating to the rights of indigenous peoples, 
which links the question of development with management of the natural 
environment.
The different actors who emerged during this period expressed different 
representations of links between people and land. The questions posed 
here concern the extent to which these representations enable us to gain 
a better understanding of the 2008 agreement, and what they tell us about 
the different actors’ visions of development. I begin this analysis with an 
account of the contemporary history of New Caledonia that will facilitate 
an understanding of the emergence of a discourse of indigenous rights in the 
country. I shall then revisit the different phases of the conflict with a view 
to comparing the economic and environmental aspects of the project, 
hence enabling a reinterpretation of the 2008 agreement. Thus I hope to 
highlight the issues on which it was silent, and investigate the role of the 
local public authorities and their own concept of development.
are obliged to consult them in relation to the use or exploitation of minerals, water and other resources 
and must establish redress mechanisms to mitigate harmful effects on the environmental, economic, 
social, cultural or spiritual levels.
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New Caledonia and the Indigenous Question
New Caledonia is currently involved in a process of ‘negotiated 
decolonisation’ triggered by the Matignon-Oudinot Agreements of 1988 
and confirmed by the Nouméa Agreement of 1998. These agreements 
contained provisions for the organisation of a referendum between 2014 
and 2019 that would define the country’s future and organise the transfer 
of powers from the French state to New Caledonia. The country has since 
been divided into three provinces (North, South and Loyalty Islands) 
with a view to promoting its economic, social and political ‘rebalancing’. 
The Nouméa Agreement provides for the legal and political recognition of 
the historical legitimacy of the Kanak people’s ties to the land. It recognises 
the existence of a Kanak people distinct from French people, and 
designates them as the basis for the construction of a ‘common destiny’ 
with the territory’s other ethnic groups. The recognition resulting from 
these agreements constituted a new stage in the history of the indigenous 
question in New Caledonia.
During the colonial period, the indigenous people were subjects of the 
French empire. Their categorisation by the French colonial administration 
was based on two factors: the recognition of a separate (customary) legal 
system described as a droit civil particulier (‘special civil law’) (Saada 2003: 
12–15), and the need of the European colonists to more clearly mark the 
legal boundaries between French citizens and the subjects of the empire. 
These boundaries were defined by the decree of 22 January 1868, which 
established the collective ownership of Melanesian territory by instituting 
the ‘reserve’ and the ‘tribe’ (tribu) as both land-based and administrative 
units.2 The land tenure regime resulted from the seizure of Kanak lands 
by the colonial settlers and caused the progressive regrouping and 
displacement of relatively dispersed settlements and political structures.
Prior to the colonial period, the customary Kanak chieftaincy was a political 
space delimited by the topographical landmarks of a ‘country’ (Bensa 1992), 
and the social identities of Kanak clans were based on group itineraries 
that provided the basis or justification for the appropriation of an area of 
land (Naepels 2006). The chieftaincies were broadly (re)structured by the 
colonial administration, which established a form of indirect rule in several 
steps over a period of almost 40 years (1860–1900) by creating a system of 
2  The term tribu originates from the segregation of the Kanak populations of New Caledonia 
in reserves, which was first carried out in 1876 (see Merle 1999).
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administration in which the grand chefs (‘big chiefs’) had authority over a 
district in which they nominated the petit chefs (‘little chiefs’) who were in 
charge of each tribu (Bensa 2000).
The 1970s witnessed the emergence of independence claims based on 
the recognition of the historical legitimacy of the Kanak people and 
their culture, and a demand for the right of self-determination. In many 
ways, the discourse on the link with the land developed by the Kanak 
nationalist movement during the 1970s adopted an indigenous rhetoric 
in the strict sense. It aimed to demonstrate the attachment of the people 
to their lands and the antecedence of this attachment.3 What was involved 
here was the constitution of the political entity of the ‘Kanak people’ 
and the legitimisation of the right to accommodate the ‘others’—the 
non-indigenous people who arrived with colonisation. The Matignon-
Oudinot and Nouméa agreements confirmed and substantiated this 
recognition through the establishment of new institutions. In the political 
domain, the chieftaincies now have their own representative bodies—
the Sénat Coutumier (formerly the Conseil Coutumier) and the eight 
customary area councils. Although it does not have any executive powers, 
the Customary Senate has a recognised right to be consulted on any 
proposals for laws or policies that ‘concern the Kanak identity’ (under 
Articles 1.2.5 and 2.1.4a of the Nouméa Agreement) or Kanak land 
(under Article 1.4). With regard to the latter, however, the recognition 
is mainly reflected in the establishment of the Agence de Développement 
Rural et d’Aménagement Foncier (ADRAF), which is responsible for 
implementing the rehabilitation of degraded land by means of a process of 
land reform—a process that is still underway today. The ‘customary lands’ 
involved in this process include the original reserves and the areas restored 
to customary ownership since 1946. They are governed by customary law, 
subject to the customary authorities, and are inalienable.
With the emergence of the United Nations discourse on the rights of 
indigenous peoples, the period launched by the Matignon-Oudinot 
Agreements saw the development of a new interpretation of the indigenous 
question in New Caledonia. By focusing reflection on the maintenance 
and defence of Kanak specificity in the context of the future state—
whether independent or not—the change in the local political idiom 
3  In French scholarship on Ancient Greece, it was the acknowledgment of a shared origin and 
antecedence that provided the basis for the establishment of specific rights, especially in Athens 
(Loraux 1996; Detienne 2003). Kanak demands were based on the same principle.
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was clearly rooted in the ‘politics of recognition’. This movement opened 
with the establishment of the Association pour la Commémoration de 
l’Année des Peuples Indigènes en Kanaky in 1993, and its successor, 
the Conseil National du Peuple Autochtone, against the background of the 
‘international decade of indigenous peoples’ (Monnerie 2005; Demmer 
2007). It testified to the multiplicity of possible interpretations of the 
future of New Caledonia, which ranged from the exercise of sovereignty 
within the French state to full and complete independence (Graff 2012).
The United Nations discourse on the rights of indigenous peoples 
was mobilised with particular reference to the management of natural 
and mineral resources. In effect, the Nouméa Agreement imposed the 
development of a schéma minier (‘mining plan’) through Article 39 of 
the  Organic Law, which stipulated that the ways in which natural 
resources are exploited had to be redefined. The mining sector represents 
the country’s second most important economic resource after transfers 
from the French Government, and was the subject of tough negotiations 
in the lead-up to the signature of the Nouméa Agreement. While the 
establishment of a nickel smelter in North Province was central to this 
process (see Chapters 2 and 3, this volume), the mining plan made no 
mention of the construction of another nickel processing plant on the 
Goro site in South Province. In 2002, a new association, Rhéébu Nùù 
(‘Eye of the Country’), was established on the initiative of the chieftaincies 
of Goro, Unia and Touaourou in the municipality of Yaté, where the 
Goro project is located. The aim of this body was to support indigenous 
rights as defined in the United Nations framework and to protect the 
environment. Following several years of conflict with the developers—
first INCO and then Vale4—the Pact for the Sustainable Development 
of the Great South was signed in September 2008.
This agreement rests on three pillars. The first explicitly provides for 
reparation through afforestation, the training of environmental technicians 
and the setting up of plant nurseries. The second establishes a consultative 
customary environmental committee to act as an intermediary between the 
company and the populations in the area around the project, and to ensure 
the participation of the customary bodies in environmental monitoring 
4  The Canadian transnational corporation INCO acquired the mining titles to the Goro massif 
in 1992. This company was acquired by Vale, a Brazilian transnational corporation, in 2006.
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activities. The third involves the establishment of a corporate foundation 
with a mission to involve the local populations ‘in socioeconomically and 
culturally sustainable development’.
The conflict with the company appeared to be rooted in the process 
of decentralisation or ‘provincialisation’ that resulted from the Matignon-
Oudinot Agreements and the unequal nature of power relations within 
and between the provinces. While the dominant political forces in North 
Province are pro-independence, South Province is dominated by loyalists 
who oppose the country’s independence from France. This situation 
has enabled the fragmentation of pro-independence political positions 
between the provinces. Provincialisation promoted the emergence of 
claims for additional collective rights by the southern Kanaks in the 
management of issues that have a direct impact on them, especially the 
plant in Mont-Dore and the mine in Yaté. As a result, they got involved in 
an ongoing quest for the rebalancing of power relations with the mining 
company and the province, and the production of strategies and tools 
to achieve it.
On one hand, the conflict with the company was rooted in a context 
characterised by the weakness of the regulatory framework: it contributed 
to, and took shape within, a new process of ‘bottom-up’ public policy 
production (Le Meur et al. 2013). Hence, there was a growing awareness 
of a situation of dependence at the local level, to which the claim for 
collective rights to the management of resources constituted a response.
On the other hand, the conflict also represented a struggle for recognition.5 
It was the customary authorities that initiated this quest for new rights, 
aimed at defining the territories and modalities of the exercise of their 
own power. Opposition to the mining project involved different levels 
of power and representations of the political arenas that emerged rapidly 
at the interface of the development and environmental issues raised by 
construction of the plant.
5  According to Taylor (1994), the concept of recognition is critical to an understanding of social 
conflict in the context of modern forms of nationalism, minority claims, and the quest for new rights. 
Struggles for recognition borrow from numerous registers that play a role in the reconstruction of 
arguments based on existing hybrid concepts of community and identity (Jacob and Le Meur 2010).
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Development and the Indigenous Shaping 
of Land Legitimacy
The desires and fears of the population with regard to this mining project 
emerged in the wake of the social impact study commissioned by INCO 
and carried out by the Géosystèmes, Environnements et Cartomatique 
Océaniens research unit of the Université Française du Pacifique. They 
can be summarised as having three focal points: jobs, environmental 
management and Kanak cultural specificity (Jost 1998). This and 
subsequent studies revealed elements comparable to the concerns of 
the people affected by the Koniambo nickel project in North Province 
(see Chapters 2 and 3, this volume). It was predicted that the Koniambo 
project would have ‘positive economic impacts through employment 
and training, that these economic effects [would] be shared equally 
between the people living in the project area and, finally, that the negative 
consequences on the level of the ecological environment [would] be 
minimised’ (Grochain 2007: 216).
The question of employment was initially considered at the level of the 
tribus in the area bordering the project. The tribus of Yaté were interested 
in the development of an economic system that would be able to combine 
customary principles with those of the market economy by using the 
institutions of the ‘special civil law’, especially the associations known 
as ‘local groups with special rights’, groupements de droit particulier local 
(GDPLs).6 However, the multiple economic initiatives that emerged at 
this time were caught up in a context characterised by profound divisions, 
and involved a competition for economic activities and spatial legitimacy 
between the two municipalities affected by the mining project—Yaté and 
Mont-Dore.
From the time of construction of the pilot plant in 1999, the establishment 
of the mining complex rekindled divisions between the two municipalities 
that were closely linked with an older contest over the spatial boundary 
between them (Frouin 2010). The tribus in each of the municipalities—
three from Yaté and two from Mont-Dore—initially aimed to establish 
their own companies, and in 1999 they tried to create a form of economic 
6  The GDPL is a legally recognised structure, with a legal personality, originally created to 
promote economic activities on customary lands, but also deployed in the context of land claims. 
It brings together individuals who are connected through customary ties—within a family, clan or 
tribu—and is managed under customary law. 
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organisation based on a land claim made by the chieftaincies of the two 
municipalities. In 2001, the same five tribus made another attempt to 
establish a single GDPL in order to organise the subcontracts in all areas of 
economic activity relating to the proposed smelter—including transport 
and logistics, earth-moving during the construction phase and subsequent 
extraction of the ores (Anon. 2001). However, a GDPL representing the 
tribu of Goro quickly broke ranks with this structure.
The withdrawal of the Goro tribu had the effect of refocusing the earlier 
GDPL within the municipality of Yaté alone. The municipal authority of 
Yaté established a monitoring committee in 2001, which was meant to 
cover all of the construction activities associated with the project.7 This 
was a forum through which the elected and customary representatives 
could regulate local individual initiatives by ensuring that they became 
integrated into the collective management of the mineral wealth. In 2002, 
this process resulted in the establishment of a model for the participation 
of the population of the Grand Sud (‘Great South’), which would later be 
replicated in North Province (see Chapter 2, this volume). This involved 
the establishment (in 2003) of a joint venture (société par actions simplifiée) 
called SAS Goro Mines, whose main function was to allocate project-
related subcontracts to local businesses.
This model (Figure  6.1) is based on the institutions associated with the 
‘special civil [Kanak] law’, namely the customary authorities and the 
GDPLs, combined within a type of non-trading company known as 
a  société civile de participation (SCP). In this instance, the Xéé Nùù SCP 
included all of the investors originating from the municipality, which 
meant that each tribu established had its own GDPL for the purpose of 
collective shareholding, alongside those ‘small shareholders’ who wished to 
make individual investments. The Xéé Nùù SCP itself held the majority 
of shares in SAS Goro Mines, and also had shares in another company 
called Sud Restauration. In terms of distributing the revenues generated 
by the mine, SAS Goro Mines was conceived as a way of combining the 
companies already positioned to secure subcontracts for the pilot plant, and 
then to accommodate other local companies that were yet to be established. 
The revenues that accrued to the SAS would be shared through the SCP 
7  This body included representatives of the mining company (Goro Nickel), the Betchel 
HatchTechnip consortium, which was in charge of the building works; the Chamber of Commerce; 
government officials, including personnel from ADRAF; local experts; the customary authorities of 
the Djubéa-Kapume area; and the elected representatives of the municipality.
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partnership between the different collective and individual shareholders. 
To avoid conflicts regarding the allocation of contracts between the 
entrepreneurs, and to ensure equal representation of all the tribus and clans 
of the Yaté municipality, the SCP also had the task of nominating managers 
for the companies participating in the SAS. The province was also involved 
in supporting the establishment of local companies, particularly in the 
catering sector, through a development fund called PROMOSUD, which 
was a separate element in the model of participation.
Figure 6.1 The model for participation of the population of the Grand 
Sud in development of the mining project.
Source: Author’s diagram.
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From a perspective akin to that described by Bainton (2009) in relation 
to the Lihir mine in Papua New Guinea, the aim of these arrangements 
was to provide an economic basis for the customary legitimacy of the 
municipality’s tribus. The adoption of this approach made it possible 
to circumvent the fact that the mine is not situated on land recognised 
as customary by the state. Within the total area of the municipality of 
Yaté, customary land is limited to a small coastal strip. Accordingly, the 
tribu of Goro, which is located on the seashore, at the foot of the plateau 
where the mining takes place, was recognised by the municipality’s other 
tribus as having a legitimate land-based claim to the area in which the 
mine is located. This is reflected in the model (Figure 6.1) by the greater 
number of shares in the SCP partnership held by the Goro GDPL. This 
extension of spatial claims without actual land acquisition, to achieve the 
recognition of customary legitimacy in the context of mining projects, 
was already observed in Thio (see Chapter 5, this volume).8 In the case 
of Yaté, the recognition of this group’s rights to the mining area enabled 
the negotiation of a share in the economic activities of the mining 
company, even while the municipality’s business base remained weak in 
terms of volume, skills and experience. This process may be viewed as a 
form of compensation that acts as a driving force in the development of 
the customary groups and, by extension, the municipality (see Bainton 
and Macintyre 2013: 142). However, in practice, it encouraged a tribal 
appropriation of relationships with the mining company, as evident in 
the fact that the son of the great chief of the Goro tribu was appointed 
as managing director of SAS Goro Mines.
The establishment of the SAS did not instantly result in its official 
recognition by the mining company as a partner and exclusive point of 
contact for the management and allocation of subcontracts, nor did this 
recognition feature in the 2008 agreement with the customary leaders of 
the region. The recognition in question was only achieved in 2011, with 
the signing of a framework agreement between the SAS and the mining 
company, but one year later, there was a change in the management 
of the SAS, and the new management got involved in a land claim on 
the Goro plateau. This claim demonstrated the difficulty posed by the 
problem of land tenure. Making the SAS into the sole preferred partner 
8  It should be noted that a land claim with land acquisition had been attempted in 1994, when 
two clans from Goro requested that South Province grant them two plots of land located in the 
municipality of Mont-Dore, in areas bordering or intersecting the project zone. An arbitration 
process resulted in the reduction of the 5,000 hectares requested to 400 (Jost 1998: 490).
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of the mining company entailed a recognition of the Goro company’s 
managing director as the ‘landowner’ of the site. It thus promoted 
competition for appropriation of the land (Kowasch 2012: 212–13), as 
well as the relationship with the mining company that was based upon it. 
Throughout this first phase in local dealings with the mining company, 
it appeared that the tribus were the instigators of economic initiatives, 
and that they were organised around the authority of the chieftaincies 
in the context of claims that extended beyond the reallocation of land 
rights to the appropriation of relationships with the mining corporation. 
The emergence of a discourse about natural resources, shaped by the 
international discourse of indigenous rights, confirmed this tendency to 
extend highly localised claims by reformulating the relationship with the 
land and natural environment.
International Indigenous Rights and 
Spatial Legitimacy
Through these initial attempts at economic organisation on the level 
of the chieftaincies, it would appear that the desire to participate in mining 
development in the region constituted a factor that determined the call 
for land-based legitimacy in dealings with the mining company. The 
transformation of the monitoring committee of the municipal authority 
of Yaté into an indigenous committee (Rhéébu Nùù) formalised the 
idea of a right to development based on a public discourse of legitimate 
control over geographical and political territories. Two shifts arose from 
this process: the first was political, and resulted from the recognition of 
the link with the land, while the second concerned the reformulation of 
Kanak perceptions of the natural environment. This dynamic was based 
to a large extent on claims that were both highly localised (on the level of 
the chieftaincies) and more extensive (at municipal and provincial levels). 
The appearance of elements originating from international discourse of 
indigenous rights also endorsed the spatial and discursive extent of the 
claims being made on the mining company.
When the monitoring committee of Yaté municipality became the 
Rhéébu Nùù Committee in 2002, the change of name was indicative 
of a change in structure. The collective body thereafter claimed to 
represent the chieftaincies of the south in a process that was supposed 
to overcome the aforementioned economic and political divisions, but 
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which also invoked the international rights of indigenous peoples that 
were still in the process of being formalised in the United Nations arena. 
The move by the chieftaincies to take control of the development process 
came to be part of a political process that made new connections between 
natural and political territories. This process went beyond the political 
recognition provided by the agreements, which was based on the idea 
of a link with the land, since it involved the extension of the customary 
authorities’ prerogatives to matters beyond those usually reserved to them. 
For one of the leaders of Rhéébu Nùù from the Unia tribu, the process 
of colonisation created administrative territories that did not relate to 
the institutions of pre-colonial society, in which territories were based 
not only on areas bounded by natural features and clan itineraries, but 
also on the political links between chieftaincies. In his view, this ancient 
political system established the legitimacy of the customary authorities on 
the land where the mining plant is located and in their relationship with 
the mining company.
This spatial right of the chieftaincies was incorporated into the framework 
of the recognition of the link with the land by the Nouméa Agreement, 
but the ways in which it was exercised were defined with reference to the 
international rights of indigenous peoples. The ‘Declaration on the Right 
over the Space and Natural and Cultural Heritage of Kanaky’, commonly 
known as the ‘Kanaky Declaration’, was produced on 22 August 2002. 
It refers to the concrete implementation of ‘the Kanak conception of 
the relationship with the space and the natural and mining heritage’, 
especially through the principle of free, prior and informed consent. This 
principle, as defined in Article 19 of the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, involves consultation of indigenous 
peoples by states prior to the approval of any measure that could have 
a direct impact on their rights, especially when it involves activities carried 
out on traditional indigenous territories.
The Kanaky Declaration specified the conditions for the implementation 
of the principle in New Caledonia, including consultation of the clans 
directly concerned, the chieftaincy, the neighbouring chieftaincies, 
the customary council and the Customary Senate. In many ways, the 
declaration may be considered as the founding charter for indigenous 
claims regarding the management of natural resources in New Caledonia. 
It linked the local customary authorities with the Customary Senate, 
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and  rendered visible the demand for participation in development and 
control of the territories that concern these authorities. The Kanaky 
Declaration states that:
In future, all major economic projects involving the exploitation 
of renewable and non-renewable natural resources shall involve the 
establishment of ways that enable the Kanak customary authorities to be 
actors … The indigenous Kanak people shall be actors in the definition 
of development plans [emphasis added].
The second aspect of the chieftaincies’ spatial management claim 
concerned the reformulation of Kanak perceptions of the natural 
environment. It aimed at the integration of such perceptions into the 
international legal and policy framework relating to indigenous peoples. 
The newly conceived Kanak role in the protection of nature was based, 
in particular, on legal texts such as those produced by the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, by the regional 
conferences held in Apia (1976) and Nouméa (1986), and by Article 8(j) 
of the Convention on Biological Diversity, which explicitly recognises the 
contribution made by indigenous communities to the conservation of the 
biodiversity of the regions they inhabit, thanks to their traditional way 
of life (Djama 2009: 55). This supported a discourse that not only made 
Kanak populations responsible for the protection of their own natural 
environments, but also cast them as a driving force for the establishment 
of environmental awareness at the national level:
What I would also like to clarify is that  …  the intensification of the 
exploitation of resources  …  raises the question of  …  the role of the 
indigenous peoples with respect to the conservation of their environment 
and, hence, the country’s environment … In a way, there is a need for the 
entire country to be at peace with nature … There is a need today to get 
this process underway through the rehabilitation of this concept of the 
natural heritage, the responsibility for which goes back to the indigenous 
peoples. (Mapou 2002: 23)
The evolution of Rhéébu Nùù’s discourse in support of environmental 
protection constitutes a twist in the relationship with the mining company, 
which involved a (re)construction of identity, while also extending the 
spatial extent of the claims being made. Through the environmental 
argument, local and regional identities, which were recognised as 
being based on the relationship with the land, became part of a kind 
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of ethnogenesis (Morin 2006)—a global and legal identity within the 
United Nations arena. The major advantage of this (re)constructed 
identity was that it appealed to the creative and imaginative force of the 
law in a context characterised by a legal void with respect to mining and 
environmental issues.
The provincial plan for the exploitation of mineral wealth was only 
completed in 2008, and the mining and environmental regulations in 
2009. The designation of the ‘Lagoons of New Caledonia’ as a UNESCO 
world heritage site was clearly enshrined in this process, and would mark 
the settlement of several years of technical struggles against the mining 
company for compliance with international environmental standards and 
greater respect for the environment. Hence, the environmental aspect of 
the Rhéébu Nùù Committee’s indigenous struggle took shape in a strategic 
alliance formed with environmentalists—especially local environmental 
organisations—with a particular focus on protection of the lagoon.9 
This alliance enabled the bundling of the expertise of the environmental 
organisations with the local people’s concerns about the risks posed by 
pollution and dumping of heavy metal wastes from the processing plant. 
The focus on protection of the lagoon thus involved a shift in the nature of 
indigenous interests from the mining site towards the sea. The extension 
of the geography of the claims therefore contributed to the entry of new 
actors and arguments into the ranks of the opposition to the project.
The Heritage in Question: Mining Rent at the 
Service of the Environment
The ‘heritage’ question provides a key to understanding the extent of the 
coexistence of environmental and development concerns expressed by 
Rhéébu Nùù through its interest in land issues. It links the environment 
with all the forms of value that can be attributed to it—economic, 
political or cultural. The signatories to the Kanaky Declaration defined 
their conception of the Kanak natural heritage as one that had to serve 
the causes of development and spatial management through the collection 
of a rent calculated on the basis of the value of the mined ore—or what 
9  This strategic alliance raised questions regarding the environmental studies carried out with 
respect to the mining project—whether impact studies commissioned by the developer or the 
numerous counter-studies commissioned by its opponents.
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would normally count as a kind of ‘royalty’.10 Hence, this patrimonial 
heritage assumes different dimensions that contribute to the economic, 
environmental, social and cultural shaping of the spaces and territories 
around the project. The discourse of the Rhéébu Nùù Committee 
established a link between the protection of the environment, the 
negotiation of economic rights to participate in the process of economic 
development, and the rights of the indigenous people through the 
definition of compensation for destruction of the environment that they 
considered as their property. This understanding of compensation was 
reflected in two specific demands: one for the creation of a municipal 
mining tax, and the other for the formation of a heritage fund for 
environmental rehabilitation.
Having been accused of wanting to negotiate the receipt of ‘royalties’, the 
indigenous leaders developed a more general point of view on the mineral 
tax regime at the national level, despite the fact that neither the plan for 
the use of mineral wealth nor the mining regulations, both of which 
were envisaged under the terms of the Nouméa Agreement, had actually 
been completed. The tax exemption measures of 2001 revealed the small 
share of benefits that the municipalities would be able to accrue from 
mining operations. The National Law on the Taxation of Nickel Mining 
for Major Metal-Processing Projects, which was passed in July that year, 
included corporate exemptions from business licensing taxes, property 
taxes, registration fees and general service taxes for a period of 15 years 
from the beginning of commercial operations. The mining tax payable to 
the municipality of Mont-Dore involved surcharges on these exempted 
taxes, and the reason why these surcharges only applied to Mont-Dore is 
that mining taxes are currently only levied on the processing of ore and not 
on its extraction. The demands of the Rhéébu Nùù leaders for a ‘mining 
tax for the benefit of the municipalities and populations affected by this 
activity’ (Anon. 2003) were made in this context of uncertainty about the 
definition and distribution of the economic benefits of mining both at 
the local level and for New Caledonia as a whole, where there were many 
possibilities offered by the reconstitution of the tax regime. As others 
saw it, a share of mining taxes constituted an alternative to the proposed 
acquisition of a stake in the mining company, in particular through 
a proposition for the buyback of part of the capital. The recognition of 
10  While royalties are commonly defined as a kind of tax collected by the state or ‘crown’ in its 
capacity as the owner of subsurface mineral resources, customary landowners in Papua New Guinea 
have long been recognised as having an entitlement to a share of this type of mineral revenue.
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the link with the land depended on the greater economic involvement 
of the local population, whether by means of equity or taxation, since 
these appeared to be the only possible levers for obtaining real partnership 
and an effective commitment on the part of the mining company to the 
development of the region and the country.11
The Rhéébu Nùù Committee’s detractors accused it of negotiating a tax 
regime that would solely benefit the chieftaincies, without regard for the 
discourse of environmental protection. In 2006, Philippe Gomes, the 
new president of South Province, firmly opposed the payment of any kind 
of royalties to the owners of the land on which one or more of the mines 
were operating, basing his argument on the view that ‘the Caledonian 
industrial projects lead the local populations to be actors involved in 
development and not rentiers’ (Pitoiset and Prandi 2006). While some 
people now acknowledge that they had envisaged such an outcome, 
they say it would have been abandoned quickly in favour of the current 
model of participation (Figure  6.1), which was conceived as a means 
of distributing the benefits equitably while favouring individual and 
clan-based economic initiatives and financial incentives. The municipal 
mining tax system also made it possible to ward off or avoid financial and 
land claims through the integration of the concerns of the chieftaincies 
and the municipality for local development on the same level. In this 
regard, another indigenous representative body, the Comité Autochtone 
de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles (CAUGERN), which was formed 
in 2005, has initiated a process of joint reflection by the chieftaincies that 
wanted to be involved in development and the municipalities that wanted 
to benefit from additional resources, since both believed themselves to 
be entitled to enter into a relationship with the mining company and to 
benefit from the associated economic spin-offs (Demmer 2012: 36; also 
Chapter 4, this volume).12
From 2002, the demands of the Rhéébu Nùù Committee also involved 
the establishment of a ‘heritage fund’ that was, in the words of the Kanaky 
Declaration, to be ‘determined on the basis of the intrinsic value of the 
processed primary resource’. So the declaration established the fact that 
providing employment was not enough, and that each cubic metre 
11  A majority shareholding in the mining project was to be the route taken in the case of the 
Koniambo project in North Province (see Chapter 2, this volume).
12  This fusion of interests was achieved in Yaté through the municipal elections of 2008, which 
resulted in the election of a mayor from a list of Rhéébu Nùù candidates.
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of nickel extracted has an economic value that should be used as a basis 
for the establishment of a financial entity devoted to the promotion, 
restoration and protection of the Kanak natural and cultural heritage, 
in the name of the rights of the clans and chieftaincies to their ‘natural 
space’, and under their own political control. Rhéébu Nùù defined this 
fund in 2003 as ‘the cornerstone of the indigenous process’, and stated 
that it should also be based on what the Kanaky Declaration called the 
‘value of the replacement of the 1000 hectares of forest that had already 
been destroyed’. In 2004, the president of Rhéébu Nùù again raised the 
question of an output-based mining fee, to which the mining company 
responded by pointing out the lack of New Caledonian legislation in 
this area. In 2005, the question was back in the spotlight and expressed 
as follows:
It is essential that part of the mining wealth be used to compensate for the 
consequences of decades of exploitation. A special tax should be created 
to finance the environmental rehabilitation of the area damaged by the 
mine. (Frédière 2005)
The demands of the Rhéébu Nùù Committee and CAUGERN were 
completely in line with the thinking of the Comité Stratégique Industriel, 
which was established in 2010. This is a bipartisan body composed of 
government and mining company representatives, under the leadership 
of Anne Duthilleul, representing the French Government, which has 
been tasked with production of a mining and industrial strategy for New 
Caledonia. In 2005, a report by the Senate of the French Government 
on tax exemptions for the nickel processing plants expressed concern 
that a kind of ‘freedom from tax’ was being ordained, and preferred the 
adoption of a ‘mining fee’ of the kind proposed by Anne Duthilleul: 
‘it is essential that the local authorities be given the resources to fulfil 
their general interest functions; the interventions of the state cannot 
entirely replace the just and fair taxation of the mining sector’ (quoted in 
Le Meur and Mennesson 2011: 9).
This suggestion was not completely rejected by the loyalist parties in New 
Caledonia, since one of them had drafted a proposal in 2004 for the 
creation of a heritage fund for the benefit of the populations affected by 
the Goro project. This proposal was not implemented, but there is now 
a de facto rehabilitation fund (the ‘Nickel Fund’) that redistributes the 
land taxes paid by the mining companies to the municipalities that have 
old mine sites in need of rehabilitation.
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As we can see here, the indigenous collective that initiated the battle with 
the mining project expanded the content and scope of its demands beyond 
the issue of environmental protection. Through defence of the natural 
environment, not only was the question of environmental conservation 
tackled but also the means of achieving it and, beyond this, the means 
of attaining sustainable development based on the collection of a mining 
rent.
Conclusion: The Pact, Mining Rent and 
Sustainable Development
I set out to demonstrate that different types of arguments were mobilised 
by the strategic groups that have constituted and transformed Rhéébu 
Nùù as an indigenous collective, while also subject to change in their own 
internal constitution. As a result, the rights of indigenous people have 
become rights that link environmental protection and rehabilitation with 
economic development. These rights have served in the negotiation of 
more specific rights to the management and administration of the project-
affected areas. The shift from a localised economic perspective towards 
a broader environmental one, in terms of both demands and actors, does 
not mean that the two approaches are mutually exclusive. This spatial 
and discursive expansion of the indigenous struggle had complementary 
impacts from the point of view of the legal provisions that emerged from 
it, and it also reflects different conceptions of sustainable development.13
The ‘environmental turning point’ in the battle against the industrial 
project has in a way contributed to shaping new questions for public 
policy by underlining the environmental effects of mining activities. The 
Environmental Regulations of South Province refer to the principle of 
consent, the establishment of an environmental compensation fund and 
the formalisation of environmental impact studies. The designation of the 
Lagoons of New Caledonia as a UNESCO world heritage site in 2008, 
and the establishment of New Caledonia’s environmental monitoring 
agency, the Observatoire pour l’Environnement, in South Province in 
13  In fact, the ‘sustainable development’ frame of reference only emerged on the interface between 
the mining sector and its local management in New Caledonia in the early 2000s. Until then, the 
development models were dominated by the transition from an ‘assisted economy’ (Freyss 1995) to 
economic independence based on mining rent, economic ‘rebalancing’ and state transfers (Sourisseau 
et al. 2015).
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2009, are events that clearly link environmental protection to mining 
development. They also raise new ways of thinking about sustainable 
development in New Caledonia. The strategy for the integration of 
sustainable development into provincial policy only took shape in 2007, 
by linking economic and environmental issues around ecotourism 
projects that were conceived as a form of compensation for the negative 
impacts of mining activities (Sourisseau et al. 2013). In this regard, South 
Province’s absence from the Pact for the Sustainable Development of the 
Great South could be indicative of a sustainable development conception 
that is more focused on ‘rurality’ and on spatial conservation than on the 
regulation of the mining sector (Le Meur et al. 2013).
The pact itself made sustainable development into a point connecting 
the diverging interests of indigenous peoples and mining companies. 
While the former wanted to protect their natural, social and economic 
environment, the latter wanted to reduce the risk of facing more stringent 
legislation and greater civil society mobilisation (see O’Faircheallaigh 
2011). As a point of overlap between international ‘soft laws’—like the 
‘good practice guides’ developed by the International Council on Mining 
and Metals or the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples—
the pact tends to maintain the enclave logic inherent in projects of this 
type with a certain definition of sustainable development being applied to 
specific areas. For the customary people of the south, and for the Rhéébu 
Nùù collective in particular, the local implementation of sustainable 
development principles appeared to take root in forms of negotiation over 
the distribution of mineral resource rent. The local model of participation 
(Figure  6.1) highlighted two things: first, that landownership was not 
a sufficient basis for establishing a relationship with the industrial concern; 
and second, that the internal redistribution mechanisms would constitute 
a driver of development on customary lands, and especially of private 
economic initiatives.
The pact was also conceived as a form of compensation in the sense that 
it put an end to an abusive relationship. In this case, the recognition 
of customary rights did not unfold through the payment of rent to 
customary landowners in exchange for land acquisition by the state, as 
has been observed in Papua New Guinea (Strathern 1993; Filer 1997), 
but through the establishment of new mechanisms and new customary 
structures that enabled the negotiation and regulation of the development 
process (see Banks 2008). Beyond the strict economic mechanisms to 
which it could be reduced, analysis of the compensation arrangements 
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in terms of relationships reveals the strength of the institutions that 
further optimised local control over natural resources. Thus a form of 
rent collection and relationship with the industrial concern depends on 
each of these levels of organisation and negotiation, be it the chieftaincy, 
the municipality, or the Djubéa-Kapume area as a whole. However, the 
extension of the discourse of Rhéébu Nùù to the mining tax regime aimed 
to leave behind this localising logic in favour of considering the mode of 
industrial development and the meaning of sustainable development. Like 
the reflection on sustainable development, the 2002 Kanaky Declaration 
testifies to this desire to consider in their totality the areas being developed 
or earmarked for development. What is involved, therefore, is the 
collective consideration of environmental conservation, compensation 
and the benefits to be gained from mining, at both the local level and that 
of New Caledonia as a whole.
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7. Dissecting Corporate Community 
Development in the Large-Scale 
Melanesian Mining Sector
GLENN BANKS, DORA KUIR-AYIUS, DAVID KOMBAKO 
AND BILL F. SAGIR
The chapter reports on an NZAID-funded project into corporate 
community development (CCD) initiatives at four Papua New Guinea 
(PNG) mine sites.1 The project was undertaken by a joint team of 
researchers from Massey University and the University of PNG. The 
study was framed to examine the motivations and attitudes of mining 
corporations to community development, to document the activities 
they carried out under the banner of CCD, to see what lessons had been 
learned in terms of both successes and failures, and to explore the nature 
of interactions between local, national and international stakeholders. 
Before reporting on these findings and implications, we set the broader 
context within which CCD initiatives occur.
1  NZAID has been reincorporated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade as the New 
Zealand Aid Program. For reasons that should become obvious, we use the term ‘corporate community 
development’ as an alternative to the term ‘corporate social responsibility’, which is often preferred 
by industry (see Banks et al. 2016).
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What Drives Corporate Community 
Development?
A starting point is to consider the nature of the relationship between 
a multinational miner and the local community that is affected by it. 
Large-scale mining and its developmental effects are the subjects of both 
contention and ambiguity (Bebbington et al. 2008). The contradictions 
that mining poses, we believe, can be put down, in part at least, to an 
under-theorised approach to the nature of the relationship between these 
mining operations and affected communities. While there are a variety 
of ways of characterising this relationship (through the lens of power 
relations and agreements, human rights, or environmental impacts, 
among others) it is the economic flows from the mine that can be seen as 
central to shaping and driving this relationship through time. In the PNG 
context, these flows are shaped by the nature of the operation itself, as well 
as various sets of government regulations and pre-mining negotiations 
between the central stakeholders (including the community).
It is the compensation, wages, business contracts, royalties and equity 
dividends that are not only the inducements that entice communities to 
agree to mining developments on their land in the first place, but also 
drive the variety of processes that occur within communities around 
large-scale mines. Inward migration, one of the most destructive aspects 
of mining developments for local communities is, for instance, largely 
a consequence of people moving to the area seeking to access a share of some 
of the economic opportunities that the mine creates (see Chapter 11, this 
volume). Likewise, shifts to a cash economy, enhanced entrepreneurialism 
and individual ambition are all responses, through local cultural lenses, to 
the economic flows that spill out from the mining company. The social 
ills we associate with large-scale mining—gambling, prostitution, alcohol 
and violence—are not unconnected to these processes (Johnson 2011) 
(see Figure 7.1).
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Figure 7.1 Mining and immanent development.
Source: Authors’ diagram.
These internal processes can be regarded as what Cowen and Shenton 
(1996) describe as forms of ‘immanent’ development: inherent within 
community change, often unruly, typically energetic, always aspirational 
and frequently conflictual. Cowen and Shenton discuss these processes 
in the context of nineteenth-century European industrialisation and 
capitalism, describing how these broader forces recast the nature of 
European societies in ways that were often unpredictable and, in many 
cases, threatening to the established order. In the context of mining 
in Melanesia, terms such as ‘social disintegration’ (Filer 1990) or the 
‘pathologies’ of mining (Golub 2006) are often used to characterise the 
rapid transformations that arise from the social effects of these mining 
operations on local communities. And despite many of these effects being 
seen as problematic by locals and observers, there is also a sense in which 
they are the sum of processes that people actively engage in to bring 
change to their lives and societies. There is an aspirational or progressive 
nature to much of what people are trying to do. We should also note 
here that these are precisely the sorts of social changes and processes that 
are regarded as raising social risks and threats to the mining operations 
themselves. The economic flows, then, drive processes that in turn are 
often regarded as a menace to the mining projects themselves, which are 
the sources of the flows. Significantly, though, when we talk of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), it is clear that these immanent processes are 
not typically perceived as the sort of development space that resource 
companies can or should intervene in, or for which they should take any 
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‘social responsibility’. This is despite Colin Filer’s (1990) argument that 
the extent, structure and nature of the economic flows from the mine are 
a primary influence on the speed and form of these ‘immanent’ processes.
One cautionary note in relation to the language used here is the degree 
of convergence and overlap between the oppositional categories just 
outlined: ‘the mining company’ and ‘the local community’ are not entirely 
distinct entities. At Porgera, a 2.5 per cent share of the equity in the joint 
venture is held by a local entity on behalf of the mining lease landowners, 
and ‘local’ employees make up more than two-thirds of the operational 
workforce of the company. Equity stakes have varied at other sites, but 
in all cases local employees make up the dominant component of the 
workforce. In other words, the ‘local’ is an element of the capital (albeit 
minor) and the labour (a much more significant share) of the company 
and, indeed, there is also overlap to an extent in the visions for local 
development that many in the community and company hold.
At least since the closure of Bougainville in 1989, and certainly in the 
context of discourses around compliance to CSR standards and codes of 
the past decade, mining companies have moved to engage more directly 
in community development efforts (see Imbun 1994, 2006). In part 
we can see that these CCD programs seek to reduce the risk posed to 
the operation by the immanent forms of development already discussed 
(see Figure 7.2).
These corporate initiatives fit neatly into what Cowen and Shenton 
(1996) characterise as ‘intentional’ forms of development interventions. 
They are usually driven by forces external to the communities,2 and are 
deliberate, strategic interventions into community processes. Cowen 
and Shenton’s original concern was with the early form of religious and 
secular interventions during the industrial revolution that targeted those 
who had been marginalised by the ‘immanent’ development processes 
that capitalism and industrialism had sparked. They then applied this 
understanding to the contemporary aid and development landscape. What 
the authors highlighted was that these intentional forms of development 
are economically, socially and culturally conservative, and seek to essentially 
counter the unruly forms of change that immanent development creates. 
In what follows, we identify a range of corporative initiatives that fit this 
2  Lihir is something of an exception to this rule (see Bainton 2010).
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notion of conservative forms of intentional development in corporate 
programs that promote governance, law and order, education, health 
and cultural heritage.
Figure 7.2 Mining, immanent and intentional forms of development.
Source: Authors’ diagram.
There are two further points to be made in relation to the tensions 
between the immanent and the intentional. First, there is a constant 
tension between many of the ‘intentional’ projects and the ‘immanent’ 
processes they seek to counter. Corporate resource commitments to CCD 
are typically nowhere near as significant as what the community receives 
from the economic flows, and hence it is easy to identify cases where the 
intentional corporate development projects and schemes are undermined 
by, or remain marginal to, the broader immanent processes.
Second, drawing on the work of Ferguson (1990) and Li (2007) in relation 
to donor-funded development projects, we can also discern depoliticising 
tendencies at work in the intentional development work of CCD. 
The ‘immanent’ processes of community change are intensely political at 
local and higher levels, in part due to contests over the distribution of the 
revenue flows from the mine (see Burton 2014; Golub 2014). In contrast, 
the corporations tend to avoid becoming implicated in these political 
processes and, reflecting this, their intentional development programs 
have depoliticising tendencies: they seek to remain apolitical and focused 
on technical or material interventions, or what we can characterise as 
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strengthening of infrastructure and institutions. Seeking an apolitical 
presence—depoliticising development—is itself, however, an intensely 
conservative political movement.
The Project
With this conceptual frame by way of backdrop, we now turn to report 
on a research project funded by NZAID, the New Zealand Government’s 
aid and development agency, between 2009 and 2010. The project had 
two primary aims:
• to gain an understanding of the ways in which CCD programs 
reconciled tensions between community expectations and aspirations 
and corporate demands and constraints;
• to provide an initial investigation of the effectiveness of CCD programs 
at four mine sites in terms of broader measures of development 
effectiveness.
In broad terms, we were keen to gain and promote a greater 
understanding of CCD programs and use this to facilitate more integration 
between state, donor and corporate development initiatives. All four of us 
had previously worked in community development and/or the extractive 
sector in PNG, with both Sagir and Banks having long-standing research 
interests in the area, and the current project built on this existing body of 
research and knowledge. We visited four mine sites—Ramu and Porgera 
in June 2009, Lihir in February 2010, and Ok Tedi in October 2010—for 
periods of between three and seven days (see Figure 7.3). The sites were 
chosen in part to reflect the different geographical settings—from insular 
Lihir to the huge area impacted by the Ok Tedi mine—and in part to 
reflect the length of time they had been operating —Ok Tedi since 1984, 
Porgera since 1991, Lihir since 1997, and Ramu, which was still halfway 
through construction during our visit.
At each site we interviewed management, community affairs staff and 
other company personnel involved in local community development, local 
government officials, and local representatives and organisations. We also 
collected and collated secondary data on community development at each 
site, and spoke to representatives of other national stakeholders, such as 
the PNG Chamber of Mines and Petroleum.
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Figure 7.3 Papua New Guinea mining operations.
Source: PNG Chamber of Mines and Petroleum (pngchamberminpet.com.pg/mining-in-png/).
Research Findings
There is not scope here to provide even a brief overview of the CCD 
programs at each of the operations visited (see Banks et al. 2013 for more 
details). Instead, what follows is organised around five key themes that 
emerged from the research.
Scale and Range of Programs
First, it was clear that the scale and range of current CCD activities at 
each site made them very significant local drivers of development. Indeed, 
several were larger than the programs of most donor agencies operating 
in PNG. On Lihir, for example, the Lihir Sustainable Development Plan 
receives K32 million annually3 from Newcrest Mining to support Lihirian 
development activities that range from health and education initiatives to 
cultural heritage and housing and infrastructure work. This payment is 
not the only support that Newcrest provides, but it is the most substantial. 
3  The amount is adjusted each year to reflect movements in the consumer price index. The revised 
integrated benefits package was originally worth K20 million per year over five years.
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In contrast, the Ok Tedi and Fly River Development Program Business 
Plan (OTFRDP 2010) outlined potential project funding sources worth 
up to K400 million.
The range of development activities undertaken by the companies was 
also notable, and included:
• law and order initiatives, particularly at Porgera (see BGC 2014);
• support for women’s activities at Porgera, Ok Tedi and Lihir 
(see Chapter 10, this volume);
• various forms of support for local and provincial health services, 
especially at Lihir and Ok Tedi (see NFHSDP 2013);
• support for cultural heritage programs at Lihir (see Bainton et  al. 
2011);
• livelihood programs at Ramu, and to a lesser extent Ok Tedi and 
Porgera; and
• various forms of support for business development at all sites 
(see Johnson 2012; Bainton and Macintyre 2013).
While the list here is necessarily selective, all of these activities clearly 
align with the idea of this CCD support being targeted at conservative, 
apolitical initiatives: supporting law and order, women (and by 
implication traditional family structures), health, cultural heritage and 
small-scale (orderly) livelihood and business development. These forms of 
CCD thus fit neatly within Cowen and Shenton’s model of ‘intentional 
development’.
Motivations
There was a wide variety of motivations behind these various CCD 
initiatives. Indeed, different initiatives by the same mining company 
were typically carried out for a mix of different reasons, and even single 
programs or activities rarely had just one motivation. The motivations 
identified spanned a spectrum of ‘voluntariness’ that compounds the 
difficulty of discussing such activities as ‘voluntary CSR’ initiatives. 
We are able to identify and briefly sketch seven potential motivations for 
different types of activity.
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The least voluntary of these community development activities are what 
can be labelled negotiated obligations, where commitments are encoded 
in agreements: ‘we do these because we have to—it is in the agreement’. 
At the next level are risk management activities: ‘we do these things to keep 
our operations safe’. The Restoring Justice Initiative developed by Barrick 
Gold in association with local district administration, provincial and 
national governments, and community stakeholders is a clear example 
of this form of community development (BGC 2014).
Less directly tied to operational safety are initiatives that can be seen to be 
linked to the idea of the social licence to operate (Owen and Kemp 2013): 
‘if we don’t do these things the community will become frustrated and can 
pose a threat to the operation’. At times, this motivation can also stretch to 
individuals or groups within the community: the need to appease specific 
groups and individuals who can affect the operation arises regularly, and 
companies (sometimes unwillingly) feel obligated to meet these demands. 
It is often these focused initiatives targeted at certain groups that draw the 
ire of other locals who do not receive the same treatment.
These initiatives are closely aligned with, but distinctly different from, 
what can be more directly seen as CSR-driven initiatives. To varying 
degrees the multinational miners bring weighty global charters and lofty 
community-focused corporate rhetoric to their local programs. The 
Barrick response to the Human Rights Watch investigations into rape and 
sexual harassment by mine security personnel (HRW 2011), while rightly 
focused on seeking ways to reduce violence against women at Porgera, can 
be seen as an example, with the various initiatives seemingly tied more to 
global rhetoric and practices than local conditions and realities (see Burton 
2014). Indeed, it appears to us that the differences between the ‘social 
licence to operate’ and CSR initiatives boil down to the degree to which 
they reflect local conditions as opposed to global corporate fixations.
In some cases, and in line with much of the critical literature on CSR 
and mining, the public relations value of some community development 
programs was certainly identified by both corporate and external 
interviewees as being of importance. The glossy photo for corporate 
sustainability reports and websites was a factor that provided a motivation 
for the corporate support for some programs, in part at least because it 
could be used to try to negate negative criticism of their presence by other 
(usually international) groups such as non-governmental organisations. 
Rarely, though, was it the sole or even primary motivation for activities 
or programs.
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Also discernible was a strong element of altruism behind some corporate 
initiatives. Most of the ‘community development’ sections of the companies 
were staffed and managed by people with experience in, and commitment 
to, community development. These people often want to do the right 
thing by the community and empathised with local people’s situation: 
at least one operation used the slogan ‘leaving behind a better future’ 
for its CCD strategy. There is, then, a ‘will to improve’ (Li 2007), even 
if this does not always translate into sustainable forms of development. 
Critics—both local and external—appear to overlook the extent to which 
staff in these sections are genuinely trying to bring about positive change 
for the affected communities, working within contexts that are not always 
conducive to this outcome.
Finally, in terms of motivation, business development assistance is an 
example of CCD initiatives that can have a relatively direct economic 
payoff for the companies involved. These activities can certainly lead 
to reduced contracting and operating costs, given that local contractors 
are likely to be significantly cheaper than national or international 
companies. Hence there can be an economic motivation behind some 
initiatives, although, like public relations, this was not the sole or primary 
motivation for any of the activities we identified.
What we can see, then, in terms of these ‘intentional’ development 
activities is a variety of motivations, some of which are clearly ‘defensive’ and 
some deliberately depoliticising and socially conservative (see Table 7.1). 
As previously noted, within any single program or activity there is often 
a degree of overlap between these categories—they are certainly not 
mutually exclusive. It is also worth pointing out two further points related 
to motivations.
First, in some senses, motivations matter less than outcomes, and there 
clearly are some CCD projects that, even if designed with strong elements 
of self-interest in mind, have delivered benefits to elements of some 
communities. There is also the view, among some of the corporate actors, 
that self-interested and self-managed corporate programs are more likely 
to be completed, and hence to deliver ‘outcomes’, than those that rely 
on government or local parties for their implementation. Sometimes 
such outcomes are additional to what was planned, and sometimes 
they are completely unintended but, regardless, these opportunities 
and improvements in livelihoods for individuals, and sometimes whole 
communities, have been significant at different points in time.
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Second, and by way of contrast, there is good evidence from the world 
of development that undertaking activities with a mix of motives 
(e.g.  self-interest and poverty reduction) is likely to be less effective 
than having programs with singular and clear motivations. Undertaking 
community development projects with the aim of achieving multiple 
goals (e.g. community development and risk reduction) is unlikely to be 
effective in achieving any one goal.




Motivation Rationale and examples
LOW Negotiated responsibility ‘It’s in the agreement: we are required 
to do it’ (compensation and royalty 
flows, resettlement programs, specified 
infrastructure)
Risk management ‘If we don’t do it, we will get closed 
down’ (restoring justice)
Social licence to operate ‘If we want to maintain community 




‘If we want to maintain business 
reputation and international image, we 
need to do this’ (HIV/AIDS)
Public relations ‘Looks good on our flashy brochures’ 
(some footbridges, aid posts, 
schools, etc.)
‘The will to improve’ ‘Leaving behind a better future’ 
(livelihood programs, women’s groups) 
HIGH Direct business case Cost reduction (business development, 
local training and education)
Source: Banks et al. 2013.
Organisational Structure
The research highlighted a wide diversity of organisational structures 
adopted to plan and deliver these CCD activities. There is clearly no one 
model of how corporations can or should deliver community development 
programs. As with the motivations behind their different initiatives, 
corporations utilise a variety of mechanisms for this purpose.
At one end sits the Lihir Sustainable Development Plan (LSDP). 
As  previously noted, this program is funded directly by Newcrest, but 
in many senses it operates at arm’s length from the company. The LSDP 
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is the outcome of the second formal round of negotiations between the 
Lihir community and mine’s operator, although the negotiations were 
concluded before Newcrest took over the operation, after the first round 
had resulted in a more standard set of agreements bundled together as 
an ‘integrated benefits package’.4 Much of the design of the LSDP, and 
perhaps more importantly its vision for community development, has 
come from the Lihir Mine Area Landowners Association (LMALA).5 
And despite the problem of ‘elite capture’—the binding of local elites 
to corporate interests—the LSDP represents an all-encompassing, locally 
driven, designed and delivered community ‘development’ agency that 
leaves most donor programs far behind in terms of local ‘ownership’ 
of development.
Ok Tedi has a long (30-year) history of various development projects and 
initiatives. The present iteration is relatively recent and complex, in part 
a legacy of previous agreements and arrangements, as well as more recent 
initiatives that were envisaged to last beyond the current mine life (see 
Chapter 8, this volume). At the core sits the new Ok Tedi and Fly River 
Development Program (OTFRDP), which is gradually assuming a greater 
proportion of the previous community development roles performed by 
Ok Tedi Mining Ltd (OTML), and aims to increase its independence from 
OTML over the next few years. The structure is designed externally, but 
is now working closely with communities up and down the extensive Ok 
Tedi Fly River system to be able to respond better to community needs. 
The relationship between OTFRDP and other stakeholders, including 
the local and provincial governments, as well as the mine’s operator, is 
still being developed, especially through the implementation of ‘mine 
continuation agreements with local communities’, but the intention is 
that OTFRDP should become the primary mechanism for delivering 
community development in Western Province by the time the  mine 
finally closes.6
4  With some additions to the ‘standard package’, including having the mine’s environmental plan 
included in the agreement. The third version of these agreements was still being negotiated in 2016.
5  Nick Bainton (personal communication, November 2015) has correctly noted that while 
the LSDP was largely conceived and written by LMALA, it contains an integrated vision for 
the development of the island with reference to consolidated local development budgets and 
multistakeholder management structures.
6  Organisational relationships were complicated by the nationalisation of the PNG Sustainable 
Development Program Ltd in 2013 (see Chapter 8, this volume).
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At Porgera, CCD projects and programs have been much more centrally, 
perhaps conventionally, controlled and directed by the operator’s 
community development department.7 This has meant that the Porgera 
Joint Venture has been able to respond more rapidly to threats and 
opportunities that have arisen in its relationship with local communities, 
but it has lacked a clear systematic vision and consistent long-term approach 
to community development. In this sense, there is less independence from 
short-term, on-site and corporate head office decision-making, and the 
company’s CCD efforts certainly have less of a community-driven flavour 
when compared to those at Lihir.
The nature of these different institutional arrangements is dependent on 
a range of factors, such as the various negotiated agreements that have 
specified particular systems and structures (as at Lihir and Ok Tedi), 
the history of company–community relationships (as at Porgera) and 
a mix of corporate, management and local decisions. The situation at the 
Ramu project, for example, shifted away from an emphasis on the Ramu 
Nickel Foundation with the arrival of the China Metallurgical Group 
Corporation as the project’s developer. The geographical and cultural 
context also influences the type and scale of delivery mechanism that is 
used. The difference between Ok Tedi, with its huge riverine footprint, 
fragmented and culturally diverse population, and the small contained 
island environment at Lihir, where the local population has a cultural 
predisposition to visionary planning, is in part responsible for the very 
different approaches that have been adopted.
Sustainable Successes Hard to Find
One of the striking features of our survey was the limited number of 
successful sustainable initiatives that could be identified. Ok Tedi has been 
operating for more than 30 years, Porgera for more than 20 years, and 
Lihir since 1997. All, as we have seen above, have committed substantial 
sums to ‘community development’ in various guises over this time. And 
yet there were a limited number of ‘successes’ that could be pointed to 
in terms of corporate initiatives. Certainly a lot of new activities and 
programs had been developed in recent years, but far fewer longer-term 
projects were regarded by stakeholders as having made a difference to 
7  The title of this agency has changed several times during the life of the project.
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community development.8 This was reflected in the impression one of the 
newer members of our team had that ‘the companies were only starting 
community development work in the last couple of years’.
In large part this can be linked to the argument that these ‘intentional’ 
corporate development initiatives are responding to, and occur within, 
a context of the much broader ‘immanent’ social and economic trends 
within the surrounding communities. In other words, despite their size 
and resources, the companies have limited ability (or will) to shape the 
longer-term trajectory of community social and economic change around 
their operations. There is also the issue of an almost complete absence 
of long-term data against which community change, and the effects of 
corporate activities, can be tracked—a point to which we shall return.
Some projects and activities have clearly had significant outcomes for the 
affected communities. The ones that are discussed now are projects that 
in 2009–10 were regarded as having been beneficial to the communities 
over a longer time period. The Porgera District Women’s Association is 
an institution that with ongoing corporate support has had a significant 
presence and impact for women at Porgera over a 20-year period. It has 
coordinated awareness campaigns for women, supported a microcredit 
scheme, and provided assistance with various livelihood activities 
(dressmaking and chicken farming, for example). At Lihir and Ok Tedi, 
there are long-standing health programs and facilities that have been 
highly effective in terms of health outcomes (Hemer 2005; Bentley 2011; 
Thomason and Hancock 2011). In economic terms, company assistance 
with ‘landowner umbrella companies’ has typically had a chequered path, 
but at Ok Tedi (Star Mountain Investment Holdings), Lihir (Anitua 
and its subsidiary, National Catering Services) and Porgera (Ipili Porgera 
Investments), some landowner companies have developed into major 
national companies with multimillion dollar businesses (Jackson 2015). 
These companies have the potential to be major diversified economic assets 
for the local communities in the post-mine environment, and represent 
a  significant contribution to long-term development that was achieved 
with the active support of the mining companies involved.
8  This may also be a function of a shift from social impact monitoring to reporting, a point for 
which we thank Nick Bainton.
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We were able to identify a number of instances where the resource company 
had provided support (mostly logistical) to government or donor projects, 
particularly health interventions. The Porgera Joint Venture (PJV), for 
example, had supported at least two Asian Development Bank health 
initiatives, including most recently an HIV/AIDs program at Porgera, 
building on studies by the PNG Institute of Medical Research that 
the PJV had also supported. Such collaboration is seen as particularly 
beneficial as it combines the developmental focus of the donor with the 
resources and logistics of the companies involved.
The relationship between the mining companies and the local and 
provincial governments in and around their operations had varied 
significantly through time and by location. There were situations where 
the developmental efforts of the company were closely linked with those 
of the district administrations and local-level governments, although the 
latter were usually highly politicised and of limited effectiveness in each of 
the locations. There were also cases, such as Porgera and Ok Tedi, where 
a number of attempts, largely funded and driven by the company, were 
made to develop a district planning framework, yet there was very little 
effective coordination in delivering development to communities. There 
was a tension here, though, with the widely observed ‘retreat of the state’ 
from these resource enclaves (see Filer 1997). This was partly driven by 
the pressure on companies to act as a ‘pseudo-government’ (see Chapter 8, 
this volume), partly by the huge apparent disparity in resources, capacity 
and effectiveness between company and local government, yet partly by 
the desire for companies to work more closely with local actors, including 
government actors. This latter trend, a reflection of best practice in the aid 
and development arena, is made more difficult where local government 
is barely present in the vicinity of the mine sites. This reflects broader 
concerns with the ways in which governmentality is constructed and 
practiced in relation to resource extraction (Ferguson 2005; Le Meur 
et al. 2013).
Corporations are Not Donors
The final issue we discuss here is the difference between these CCD 
activities and those of bilateral and multilateral donors. It is worth 
stressing the obvious and stating, as much of the critical literature on 
CSR does, that these mining companies are not bilateral development 
donors, and indeed their primary motivation is profit, not community 
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development. Within this context, and to a large extent reflecting the 
range of motivations identified earlier, we can identify some significant 
differences between the community development activities of donors and 
those of these four mining operations.
The first is that community participation in the identification, design 
and implementation of CCD programs is often limited. While best 
practice development planning would involve a participatory approach 
from the start, and would be influenced by notions of development as 
empowerment, with a focus on building capacity and skills within the 
target community, the mining companies give little systematic attention 
to such approaches. Apart from a number of the key projects already 
identified, such as those at Lihir, very little of this was evident in terms of 
the practice of these CCD initiatives.
In part, this could be put down to the context within which these CCD 
programs operated. A significant element of this was the high degree of 
dependence on the mining company exhibited by local communities, 
which limits commitment by the community, and ultimately the 
company, to these community development projects. There is often 
limited broad-based community support for many of the initiatives 
because they are often not seen as being driven by local priorities. These 
priorities are typically dominated by the effects of the highly politically 
charged nature of the immanent development processes, including 
in-migration, landownership, representation and identity. This apathy 
and dependency is a trait frequently maligned by external observers: the 
lazy, greedy resource owner or landowner is a common stereotype within 
PNG. However, from the local perspective, given the obvious power, 
wealth and resource imbalances that exist between the corporation, the 
state and the local community, a range of culturally derived positions on 
dependency and reciprocity could be anticipated. Although these are now 
recognised in the development literature (see Mawdsley 2012), they are 
probably poorly understood and rarely dealt with by corporate actors.
In terms of other differences from donor development programs, there was 
an almost total absence of systematic monitoring and evaluation for these 
corporate programs. This is in contrast to the development industry, for 
which monitoring and evaluation are central to contemporary practice, 
and for which there is a specialised branch of the industry. Here we can 
identify the lack of clear accountability as a factor: lines of accountability 
for these programs remain closely tied to internal corporate systems rather 
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than reflecting a notion of programs and projects being accountable to 
the recipient communities, as current aid practice at least normatively 
preaches. We see this as being important in terms of the success of these 
corporate programs, since without clear monitoring and evaluation of 
results—and tying this into institutional learning regarding what makes 
for successful development—there is little requirement for these programs 
to be accountable beyond the banal corporate financial accounting for 
all expenditures. CSR expectations today ensure that the corporations 
continue to expend resources on their community development 
sections regardless of their developmental outcomes, underlining the 
mix of corporate motivations noted earlier. What we do know from the 
literature is that mixed motivations for bilateral aid—classically trying 
to mix strategic and developmental objectives—reduces the effectiveness 
and sustainability of these efforts, and can even further undermine the 
development of the recipient. Our review here suggests the danger of the 
same poor outcomes arising from CCD programs that try to achieve a mix 
of objectives—risk management, development, meeting CSR obligations, 
and so forth.
Conclusions
Large-scale multinational mining projects are long-term ventures, 
typically lasting more than 20 years, in contrast to the generally much 
shorter time horizon of bilateral and multilateral donors. As a result, CCD 
programs have the potential to provide long-term development assistance 
to surrounding communities (UNDP 2014). What we have shown here 
is that these CCD efforts vary across the PNG mining operations, but 
all are a significant presence for local communities, and sometimes, as in 
the case of Ok Tedi, much more broadly (see Chapter 8, this volume). 
Unfortunately, the results of these efforts have typically been piecemeal, 
and successful sustainable activities are relatively rare. We hope that our 
review here can provide the start of a discussion about why this is the case.
We would argue that untangling the motivation for CCD programs is 
likely to improve their effectiveness (see GoA 1997). Mixing motives that 
include external CSR concerns with risk management, social licence and 
a desire for ‘real’ development is always going to lead to contradictions 
and compromised outcomes.
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It is also clear that there was potential for substantial learning and greater 
cooperation across sectors. The corporations have carried out various 
forms of community development for decades, tried a variety of formats 
and approaches, and had a range of successes and failures. They have, as 
noted earlier, resources and a logistical capacity that is unrivalled in remote 
parts of the country. At the same time, it is clear from our review that 
there are elements of current development practice, such as monitoring 
and evaluation and designing effective participatory approaches, that 
could be of considerable benefit to the companies and, by implication, 
the recipient communities. More attention to these ‘front-end’ and ‘back-
end’ aspects of projects and programs does mean both loosening up 
control over the design and subsequent direction of the programs, and 
being more open, transparent and accountable for the failures as well as 
the successes of these initiatives.
Finally, in terms of the schematic model that was posed at the start of this 
chapter, there is a need for more attention to the linking and integration 
of the CCD programs with the financial flows that the mining operations 
engender. The ‘intentional development’ of these corporate initiatives 
and programs occurs within the context of, and is often undermined 
by, the much broader and rapid ‘immanent development’ processes that 
are initiated by these financial flows. Indeed, in many respects CCD 
is, from the community viewpoint, peripheral to the ‘main game’: the 
negotiations and conflicts around the distribution of the economic flows 
from the operations. We would argue that this will remain the case until 
companies and communities are able to link these flows to participatory 
development activities that seek to address, in a positive way, the major 
‘immanent’ shifts and transformations in the communities that are driven 
by these same financial flows. This may involve corporations being more 
interventionist in terms of the realm of local politics, for example by 
negotiating more integrated benefit sharing and community development 
programs. But failure to do so means not only abdicating responsibility 
for the ‘immanent development’ that their economic presence drives; 
it will also continue to mean that their CCD efforts will produce few 
sustainable, beneficial development outcomes for affected communities.
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8. Negotiating Community Support 
for Closure or Continuation of the 
Ok Tedi Mine in Papua New Guinea
COLIN FILER AND PHILLIPA JENKINS
Introduction
The Ok Tedi mine has some claim to be an extreme case of a large-scale 
mine whose closure is beset by politics. Ever since the mine began to 
operate in 1984, there has been ongoing political debate about whether its 
operations should continue and, if so, under what conditions. At several 
moments in its history—in 1985, 1989, 1996, 2001, 2006 and, most 
recently, 2013—the Papua New Guinea (PNG) Government has been 
obliged to confront this question directly, and on each occasion it has 
come down in favour of continuation. Nevertheless, the mining company 
has already begun to scale down its operations in preparation for closure 
by 2025, if not before, because most of the ore contained in its original 
deposit of gold and copper has already been mined.
The political significance of the choice between closure and continuation 
is primarily a function of the mine’s international reputation as an 
environmental disaster. The choice has therefore been represented 
as a  ‘trade-off’ between environmental costs and economic benefits. 
In 2005, at the peak of its output, it was estimated that this one mine 
was responsible for 15  per cent of PNG’s gross domestic product, 
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25  per  cent of  the country’s export revenues and roughly 20  per cent 
of  the tax revenues raised by the PNG Government (Faulkner 2005). 
The environmental costs are almost impossible to calculate.
When the PNG Government approved the start of mine construction 
in 1981, there were plans to store the waste material in containment 
facilities close to the mine site. But when a landslide halted work on 
these facilities in 1984, the mine’s operator, Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd 
(BHP), sought to persuade the government that there was no safe method 
of storing this material without destroying the project’s economic viability 
(Jackson 1993). Once this argument had been reluctantly accepted by 
the government, the mine proceeded to discharge its waste material into 
the Alice (or Ok Tedi) River. The effects of this practice were magnified 
in 1987, as the mine began to produce large quantities of copper in 
addition to the gold that was its first target, and the volume of waste 
material increased accordingly. The mine was soon discharging more than 
80 million tonnes of tailings and waste rock into the Alice River each year, 
and a growing proportion of this material was finding its way into the Fly 
River, more than 100 kilometres south of the mine site. The consequential 
damage to local ecosystems has been the subject of numerous scientific 
studies whose content we do not propose to summarise. But as the mine 
continued to operate, and these studies continued to accumulate, so the 
terms of the trade-off began to change. The longer the mine continued to 
operate, the more time it would take for local ecosystems to recover from 
the damage it had caused, but the longer it continued to operate, the more 
time and money the operators could spend on finding the best ways and 
means to limit the extent of this damage.
The trade-off between the economic benefits and environmental costs 
of the Ok Tedi mine has sometimes been represented as a dilemma for 
the PNG Government, rather than other stakeholders, or as a trade-off 
between benefits to the nation as a whole and costs to the people of the 
mine-affected area—especially the area downstream of the mine where 
the level of environmental damage has been most acute. But matters are 
not quite so simple. The PNG Government has certainly experienced 
an enduring conflict of interest as a result of its triple role as the mine’s 
regulator, tax collector and joint venture partner (Jackson 1982; Pintz 
1984). This means that different agencies or ministries within the national 
government have taken different positions on the question of continuation 
when the question has been raised. When the mine was first developed, 
BHP and the other private partners in Ok Tedi Mining Ltd (OTML) may 
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well have discounted the mine’s environmental costs in comparison with 
the profits to be made for their own shareholders, but the environmental 
costs became reputational costs before the profits from operation of the 
mine could offset the cost of its construction. BHP stopped operating 
the mine in 2001 because the company’s directors had come to see it 
as a political and economic liability for which no future profits could 
compensate their shareholders. But the people of the mine-affected area 
could not remove themselves from either the costs or the benefits of the 
mine by means of such a calculated judgment. Throughout the period of 
its operation, these people have received a growing share of the economic 
benefits the mine has produced for the nation, even while many have 
suffered from the growth of its environmental costs. So if the national 
government has persistently discounted these local costs in the name of 
a greater national benefit, this does not mean that local stakeholders can 
equally discount the local benefits of the mine when they protest against 
the government’s neglect of its environmental obligations.
There is another form of government neglect that has served to accentuate 
the dependency of the mine-affected area on the continued operation 
of the mine. This consists in the long-standing failure of the Fly River 
Provincial Government to use its own share of mine-related benefits to 
provide public goods and services to the people of Western Province as 
a whole, including that half of the provincial population which officially 
lives in the mine-affected area (Burton 1998). The PNG Government has 
generally done very little to discourage mining companies from assuming 
this type of public function, but the Ok Tedi mine has produced a ‘proxy 
state’ which is larger and more complex than others of its kind, and might 
even hold a world record to match its more familiar global reputation for 
polluting the natural environment. The size of this proxy state has grown 
in step with the size of the mine-affected area and the various agreements 
made to compensate some of its residents for the environmental damage 
caused by the mine. But its complexity was also enhanced by the specific 
set of agreements which enabled the mine to keep operating after BHP 
had stopped operating it.
Under the terms of the Mining (Ok Tedi Mine Continuation [Ninth 
Supplemental] Agreement) Act 2001, BHP Billiton (as it had then become) 
transferred its 52 per cent stake in OTML to a corporate body that was 
registered in Singapore as PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd 
(SDP). This body was required to act like a cross between a provincial 
government, an international aid agency and an intergenerational trust 
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fund. So long as the mine continued to operate, SDP would invest two-
thirds of its net income from the mine in a ‘long term fund’ that would 
be used to mitigate the negative impacts of mine closure for a period of 
40 years after the mine had closed and, in the meantime, would put the 
remaining third of its net income into a ‘development fund’ to be spent 
on ‘sustainable development projects’ in PNG. Sustainable development 
projects in Western Province would account for one-third of the spending 
from the ‘development fund’, while the other two-thirds would be spent 
in other parts of PNG.
The Ninth Supplemental Agreement also required OTML to establish and 
fund a body known as the Ok Tedi Development Foundation (OTDF). 
This was the successor to a body known as the Lower Ok Tedi/Fly River 
Development Trust, which was established under the terms of a previous 
agreement made with the PNG Government in 1989. Like SDP, the new 
body had a broad mission to ‘promote equitable and sustainable social 
and economic development’ in the whole of Western Province, but its 
funding was primarily meant to benefit those mine-affected communities 
whose members would agree to relinquish their rights to sue BHP or 
the PNG Government for any additional compensation for the damage 
caused by the mine. In effect, OTDF became the vehicle through which 
OTML assumed responsibility for the management of a complex web 
of compensation and benefit streams earmarked for the people of the 
mine-affected area under a set of agreements that was already growing 
before 2001 and has continued to evolve since then. At various points in 
time, it has also been the vehicle through which OTML has managed the 
spending of government money earmarked for the people of this area or 
the rest of Western Province.
While BHP was happy to wash its hands of the Ok Tedi mine in 2001, 
SDP had a vested interest in keeping the mine open as long as possible so 
long as it made a profit. By 2010, SDP held 63.4 per cent of the shares 
in OTML. The balance was held by the PNG Government, half of which 
was held in trust for Western Province stakeholders, including the Fly 
River Provincial Government. The SDP stake yielded a net income of 
roughly US$1.8 billion between the start of 2001 and the end of 2012. 
If the mine continues to operate until 2022, the ‘long term fund’ could 
be worth US$3.7 billion when it closes (Howes and Kwa 2011). However, 
the profits which grew from the rise in copper prices over the period since 
2001 created a predictable dilemma for this arm of the Ok Tedi proxy 
state. The greater its apparent wealth and power, the greater the incentive 
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for the national and provincial governments to challenge its apparent lack 
of accountability to anyone except its own board of seven directors, only 
two of whom were government nominees. In 2013, the PNG parliament 
passed a bill which made it government property, and thus turned the 
mine into a wholly state-owned enterprise.
It is not our intention to explore the whole political process that led to this 
act of expropriation, but rather to understand how ‘local communities’ 
have come to be engaged in the political process through which the 
question of mine closure continues to be addressed. In a paper written 
many years ago, John Burton argued that OTML (or BHP) was taken 
by surprise when an environmental protest movement first emerged in 
the mine-affected area, because ‘politics’ was a less significant feature of 
traditional culture in this area than it was in many other parts of PNG 
(Burton 1997:  33). At the same time, Stuart Kirsch argued that this 
protest movement ‘gave rise to a new generation of political leaders who 
were able to transcend the traditional limits on power’ (Kirsch 1997: 126). 
Both papers were published in a volume devoted to understanding the 
sequence of activities that led some local people to sue BHP for damages 
in an Australian court and eventually win an out-of-court settlement of 
their case in which BHP promised a substantial compensation package for 
people living downstream of the mine (Banks and Ballard 1997).
This sequence of activities was well under way by 1991, and the local 
leaders of the protest movement became international celebrities when the 
court case received extensive media coverage in 1994. It is a moot point 
whether they took the lead in mobilising their own local supporters, or 
whether the leaders themselves were mobilised or engaged by a coalition 
of national and international advocates for environmental justice and the 
rights of indigenous peoples (Filer 1997; Kirsch 2007). Kirsch thought that 
the lawsuit gave rise to new forms of social and political solidarity in the 
mine-affected area, but Burton noted that leaders of the protest movement 
won only a small fraction of the local vote in the national election of 
1997, and put this down to the persistence of an ‘apolitical’ culture: ‘With 
few connected traditional political structures above the lineage they had 
little chance of binding people together into viable political voting blocks, 
no matter how well-known they were’ (Burton 1997: 53).
The question we address in this chapter is the question of how power 
has been distributed and redistributed between ‘local communities’ and 
the other stakeholders involved in making the choice between closure 
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and continuation of the Ok Tedi mine. Our main focus is on the way 
that this choice has been framed in the period since the legal foundations 
of the company’s operations were amended in ways that placed the 
representation of mine-affected communities at the heart of this political 
and economic choice.
To Close or Not to Close: The Context of the 
Ninth Supplemental Agreement
The out-of-court settlement agreed in 1996 said that BHP and the 
‘claimants’ who had taken it to court would commit to the implementation 
of any ‘tailings option’ proposed by the PNG Government provided 
that BHP regarded it as ‘economically and technically feasible’ (Banks 
and Ballard 1997:  216). What actually happened was that OTML 
commissioned a series of technical reports under the terms of its Mine 
Waste Management Project and summarised their findings in the form of 
a ‘risk assessment’ that was presented to the PNG Government in 1999 
(OTML 1999). In this report, the risks were attached to four alternative 
courses of action that could be taken in light of the fact that OTML had 
already initiated a ‘trial river dredging program’ in the lower reaches of the 
Alice River in order to shift some of the waste material from the river-bed 
to the river banks. The first option was to keep mining and keep dredging 
until the ‘scheduled end of mine life’ in 2010; the second was to stop 
dredging but keep mining until the point of mine closure; the third was 
to keep mining and build a new tailings dam by 2001 as an alternative 
to riverine tailing disposal; and the fourth was to close the mine in 2000.
The report recognised that none of these four options would put a halt 
to the environmental damage caused by the previous deposition of waste 
material into the Alice River. It was predicted that the Fly River catchment 
would continue to sustain such damage for decades after the mine closed, 
regardless of whether it closed in 2000 or 2010. BHP’s preference was 
to close the mine sooner rather than later, because the first and second 
options would still cause more environmental damage than the fourth 
option, while the economic cost of implementing the third option would 
not produce enough environmental benefits to make it economically 
worthwhile (Sharp and Offor 2008:  3). Some of the plaintiffs in the 
previous court case then decided to sue BHP for breach of contract in 
discounting the feasibility of the third option (Kalinoe 2008: 7), but BHP 
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had already declared that continued operation of the mine would be 
inconsistent with its own ‘environmental values’, which had apparently 
been reconstructed over the course of the previous three years.1
This placed the PNG Government in a familiar quandary. This time the 
government hedged its bets by asking the World Bank to review the risk 
assessment report and provide a review of the ‘independent reviews’ already 
commissioned by OTML. The bank’s reviewers agreed that immediate 
closure was the best option from an ‘environmental standpoint’, but ‘from 
a social standpoint this would result in a potentially disastrous situation 
because there is no preparedness for mine closure’ (World Bank 2000: 8). 
They were also concerned by the lack of socioeconomic information in the 
various technical reports:
The complex social environment in which Ok Tedi is situated, 
exacerbated or arguably caused by the fact that Ok Tedi is the only 
agent of development in the Western Province, has meant that closure 
has multiple ramifications for the community impacted by its operations 
and for the government with whom overall responsibility rests for the 
welfare of its citizens. Thus, much more information is needed regarding 
the social and cultural history and characteristics of the communities 
affected by the [mine’s] operations and the impacts need to be examined 
under four major aspects, namely consultation and participation of local 
communities; compensation; local distribution of benefits and related 
social, economic and cultural impacts; and employment impacts during 
and after mine operations. (ibid.: 16–17)
The reviewers therefore suggested that the government should engage in 
a process of public consultation in order to assess ‘the political dimensions 
of the problem’, and allow the mine to operate until a draft mine closure 
plan had been subjected to a social, as well as an environmental, impact 
assessment (ibid.: 20, 31).
For its part, OTML was still one step ahead of the government because 
its managers had already initiated the process of ‘community consultation’ 
when the risk assessment report was completed in 1999 (Kalinoe 
2008). It was this process that resulted in the six Community Mine 
Continuation Agreements that were signed by the company’s managers 
and local community representatives and attached as schedules to the 
1  BHP’s desire to wash its hands of the whole operation and avoid a new round of negative 
publicity may well have been a function of market pressures associated with its imminent merger with 
Billiton (Kirsch 2007: 309).
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Ninth Supplemental Agreement in 2001. These agreements contained 
a commitment by OTML to spend an additional K180  million to 
compensate the mine-affected communities over the remaining life of 
the mine or, more specifically, to compensate those communities whose 
representatives agreed to withdraw their support for the new lawsuit 
against BHP Billiton before the end of 2002 (Kalinoe 2008: 7). Fifty-
eight per cent of the value of this new compensation package was to be 
provided in the form of ‘development projects’, while 16 per cent was to 
be paid in cash to community members and the remaining 26 per cent 
was to be held in trust for future generations, rather like the money that 
was due to accumulate in the ‘long term fund’ administered by SDP. 
Each of the six agreements contained a declaration that ‘the economic 
opportunities offered by the Company’s Commitments represent to the 
Communities an acceptable trade-off for the environmental impacts of the 
future operation of the mine’, which was still expected to close in 2010.
Political Constructions and Divisions of the 
Mine-Affected Area
The problem of negotiating community support for any agreement 
relating to the closure or continuation of the Ok Tedi mine has grown 
more complex as the outer limits of the mine-affected area have expanded 
while the internal social and economic divisions of its population have 
deepened. The people who were invited to accept the trade-off postulated 
in the Ninth Supplemental Agreement were not simply the sons 
and daughters of the people who were regarded as members of mine-
affected communities when the Mining (Ok Tedi Agreement) Act was 
passed in 1976, before the need for such a trade-off was envisaged. That 
first agreement between BHP and the PNG Government contained a 
pair of clauses which declared that the developers of the mine would, 
where ‘practicable’, give first preference in project employment and 
local business development to ‘the landowners in and other people 
originating from the Kiunga and Telefomin sub-provinces’. The creation 
of this ‘preferred area’, which now comprises the North Fly District of 
Western Province and the adjoining Telefomin District of West Sepik 
Province, was not intended as a form of compensation for any sort of 
environmental damage, but as an extra benefit that was justified by the 
underdevelopment of this area in comparison with other parts of the 
country (Filer 2005). The 1980 national census, which was conducted 
before the start of mine construction, counted 38,440 people resident 
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in this preferred area, nearly all of whom were rural villagers. Less than 
3 per cent of these people qualified as ‘mine area landowners’ who would 
be compensated for the sacrifice of their customary land to the mine and 
its associated infrastructure, and only 1 per cent would receive a share of 
mining royalties because they were customary owners of the mountain 
that was going to be excavated (Filer 1997: 64).
The boundaries of the ‘mine-affected area’ were radically transformed 
when the Lower Ok Tedi/Fly River Development Trust was established 
in 1990 as a means to compensate communities downstream of the mine 
whose members were beginning to suffer the effects of riverine waste and 
tailings disposal. One hundred and two villages containing about 30,000 
people were initially identified as beneficiaries of the trust. Nineteen of 
these villages were located in the ‘Ningerum area’, immediately south of 
Tabubil and the ‘mine area villages’, while another ten were located further 
south in the ‘Alice area’, along the lower reaches of the Alice (Ok Tedi) 
River, where the environmental damage was most acute. The traditional 
inhabitants of these 29 villages accounted for one-sixth of the trust’s 
individual beneficiaries, but they also accounted for 8  per cent of the 
59,337 people recorded as residents of the original ‘preferred area’ in the 
1990 national census. In effect, the mine-affected area had now been 
divided between an ‘upstream area’, which contained the other 92 per cent 
of the people living in the original preferred area, and a ‘downstream area’, 
which contained the people entitled to a new form of compensation from 
the mining company.
But new forms of social division were also emerging within each of these 
areas. The downstream area was like a corridor passing a set of traditional 
cultural rooms or spaces whose occupants were now suffering different 
forms and degrees of damage to their natural environment, while the 
upstream area was more like a set of concentric circles (or semicircles) 
whose occupants had more or less access to the material benefits derived 
from the mining operation. The main axis along which the two areas were 
divided from each other was the road connecting the towns of Tabubil 
and Kiunga, which was the first stage in the route by which the products 
of the mine found their way to the world market. According to the census, 
these two towns had a combined population of 8,688 in 1990, and thus 
accounted for 15 per cent of the residents in the original preferred area. 
Many of the people living in these towns had been recruited from villages 
in the preferred area and were now dependent on cash incomes generated 
by the mining operation and its associated service economy. As a general 
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rule, the cost of getting from a rural community to one of the two towns 
was inversely related to the number of its members who were able to 
obtain a share of such incomes.
New forms of social division were most acute in that part of the 
downstream area whose inhabitants were now suffering the most extensive 
damage to their natural environment. The indigenous inhabitants of the 
‘Alice area’ were divided between two traditional cultures—the Yonggom 
people on the western side of the river and the Awin people on the eastern 
side. The Australian colonial administration encouraged the members of 
both ethnic groups to form larger settlements along the banks of the river 
in order to facilitate communication (by boat) with what was then the 
administrative outpost at Kiunga (Jackson 2003). Other members of the 
Awin group spontaneously formed new settlements along the route of 
the Tabubil–Kiunga road as mining plans were developed in the 1970s 
(Jackson 1979), so the Awin people have since been divided between those 
in the upstream area (along the road) and those in the downstream area 
(along the river). The history of resettlement created a situation in which 
the members of Awin and Yonggom communities in the ‘Alice area’ were 
divided in the strength of their traditional claims to ownership of the land 
and resources that were now being damaged by mining operations, and 
hence to compensation for such damage (Kirsch 1995; Jackson 2003). 
Meanwhile, another form of social division was created when a  large 
number of Yonggom refugees from the Indonesian province of Irian 
Jaya (or West Papua) took up residence on the PNG side of the border 
in 1984, thus creating additional pressure on the land and resources of 
the Yonggom people who were already living there (Kirsch 1989; King 
1997). By 1990, migrants from traditional Yonggom and Awin villages 
had already established sizeable settlements in the town of Kiunga (King 
1993), but the ‘Alice people’ who remained in their riverside villages 
suffered a degree of relative deprivation as the Tabubil–Kiunga road 
became the main economic axis of the North Fly region (Jackson 2003).
When the mine development agreements were renegotiated in 1990, 
provision was made for the mine area landowners to receive 30 per cent 
of the royalties collected by the national government, instead of the 5 per 
cent to which they were previously entitled, while the share allocated to the 
Fly River Provincial Government was correspondingly reduced from 95 to 
70 per cent. This entailed a new degree of economic inequality among the 
people of the ten ‘mine area villages’, who then numbered about 2,200. 
The four villages containing the customary owners of the mine site would 
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get 25 per cent of the royalties, while the village containing the customary 
owners of the mining town would get 5  per cent. Four villages would 
continue to receive rental payments for the land containing the tailings 
storage facility that was never built, but they were now being treated as part 
of the downstream ‘Ningerum area’, so the ‘mine area landowners’ were now 
understood to consist of about 1,500 people living in the other six villages.
Under the terms of these new development agreements, the Fly River 
Provincial Government also undertook to spend about half of its own 
revenues for the benefit of ‘landowners in the project lease areas, along the 
Tabubil–Kiunga road, along the Ok Tedi–Fly River, and in the Fly River 
Delta area’ (Jackson 1993: 71). This meant that people in the eastern part 
of the original area of preference in Kiunga (now North Fly) District were 
removed from the ‘mine-affected area’ within Western Province. Specific 
proportions of the new benefit package were earmarked for the mine area 
villages, the ‘Alice villages’ (including villages in the Ningerum area), the 
‘Highway villages’, and the ‘Middle Fly’ and ‘South Fly’ villages. These 
proportions seem to have reflected the relative size of the respective village 
populations rather than the extent of environmental damage in each area 
(Filer 1997: 70). But this division of the mine-affected area was rather less 
significant than the one that accompanied the establishment of the Lower 
Ok Tedi/Fly River Development Trust because OTML already had far 
more capacity to deliver on its undertakings.
OTML adopted its own development program for the ‘Highway villages’ 
in 1995, but this was worth a great deal less than the Lower Ok Tedi 
Agreement that emerged from the out-of-court settlement of the Australian 
court case in 1997. The beneficiaries of this agreement were the residents 
of eight Yonggom villages and seven Awin villages in the ‘Alice area’ whose 
residents had claims over the land to be affected by OTML’s trial dredging 
program. The distribution of compensation between these villages was to 
be a function of the size of their populations, the length of their respective 
riverside frontage, and the extent of the damage caused to the rest of their 
traditional territories (Banks and Ballard 1997: 207–10; Filer et al. 2000: 
60–1). This compensation package was essentially a premium paid on top 
of the entitlement of all downstream communities to benefit from the 
development trust and to receive additional compensation under the terms 
of the Restated Eighth Supplemental Agreement concluded in 1995.
Between 1990 and 2000, the resident population in the downstream part 
of the mine-affected area increased by almost 100 per cent, from 30,000 
to nearly 60,000. This was partly due to a 40 per cent increase in the 
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number of village communities that were included within its boundaries. 
The national census recorded a similar rate of increase in the combined 
population of Tabubil and Kiunga, which rose from 8,688 to 16,944, 
but this was partly due to in-migration, not to any change in the town 
boundaries. By 2000, the population of the six mine area villages near 
Tabubil had grown to about 2,300, while almost 50,000 people were 
living in other rural villages in the upstream part of the original preferred 
area, including Telefomin District in West Sepik Province. In its broadest 
definition, the mine-affected area therefore contained about 130,000 
people, and accounted for roughly two-thirds of the population of 
Western Province alone.
A total of 149 village representatives signed the six ‘community mine 
continuation agreements’ (CMCAs) that were finalised in 2002. The six 
mine area villages made up one of the six ‘CMCA trust regions’. The other 
five regions were North Ok Tedi (the Ningerum area), Lower Ok Tedi 
(the Alice area), the Highway, the Middle Fly and the South Fly (Kalinoe 
2008: 19–20). When the CMCAs were reviewed and renegotiated in 2006, 
the number of trust regions grew from six to nine, as the South Fly region 
was divided into four parts (see Figure 8.1). There was a slight increase 
(from 149 to 156) in the number of village representatives who signed the 
new agreements because of a reduction in the number of villages whose 
representatives had refused to sign the previous agreements (Menzies and 
Harley 2012: 4).
An unofficial annual census conducted by OTML showed that the 
combined population of all the CMCA villages rose from 81,136 in 
2007 to 101,413 in 2011. These figures included people who were not 
normally resident in their home villages but were still recognised (and 
paid) as members of the affected communities. Most of these absentees 
were living in urban areas in Western Province—especially the towns 
of Tabubil, Kiunga and Daru—and some had jobs associated with the 
mining operation. If the official national census figures from 2011 are 
reasonably accurate, this means that the ‘CMCA people’ accounted for 
56 per cent of the population of Western Province in that year. The trust 
deeds and other institutional arrangements negotiated and renegotiated 
through the CMCA process produced a definition of the mine-affected 
area as one from which the ‘non-CMCA people’ in the original preferred 
area were now largely excluded. However, these villages were combined 
with all the other non-CMCA villages in Western Province as beneficiaries 
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of what is officially (and rather confusingly) known as the ‘non-CMCA 
region peoples trust account’. No such account has been established for 
the people of Telefomin District in West Sepik Province.
Figure 8.1 CMCA trust regions in Western Province.
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University.
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By 2007, the three districts of Western Province (North, Middle and South 
Fly) had been officially subdivided into 14 local-level government (LLG) 
areas under the terms of the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and 
Local-Level Governments 1995. Kiunga was one of three towns with its 
own local government, but Tabubil was treated as a single ward (with 
one local councillor) in the Star Mountains LLG area, which was one of 
11 rural LLG areas in the province. The Star Mountains LLG area had 
13 wards altogether, including the six ‘mine area villages’ and six other 
rural wards, some of which had previously been treated as part of the 
Ningerum area. If one compares a map of the CMCA trust regions with 
a map of the rural LLG boundaries in Western Province, it is evident that 
9 of the 11 rural LLG areas contain some CMCA trust villages, but some 
of them contain a lot more than others. The internal divisions of the Ok 
Tedi proxy state have thus come to diverge from those of the official state, 
but those of the official state are in many ways less real than those of the 
proxy state because the institutions of the proxy state deliver most of the 
economic benefits which matter to the people of the mine-affected area, 
whatever its outer limits may be.
The institutions of the proxy state also do a better job of counting the 
number of people in the mine-affected area. According to the official 
national census, the whole of the Star Mountains LLG area, including the 
township of Tabubil, had a population of 15,458 in 2011. But an OTML 
survey of the ‘Tabubil Plateau’, which accounts for roughly half of that 
area, counted 23,071 residents in 2009. Of these, 7,721 (33 per cent) were 
living in the town itself, 4,785 (21 per cent) in the six mine area villages 
(or council wards) and 10,565 (46 per cent) in a number of peri-urban 
squatter settlements whose populations seem to have been overlooked 
in the official census two years later. There is certainly no evidence of 
mass emigration (or eviction) from these settlements in the intervening 
period. It is also known that the population of the town may have been 
under-enumerated in the OTML survey because some of the residents 
were concealing the presence of ‘unauthorised dependants’. So  the real 
population of the Star Mountains LLG area in 2011 (including the six 
council wards formerly in the Ningerum area) was almost certainly in 
excess of 25,000. The official census counted 11,260 residents in Kiunga 
township in 2011, which is probably a more accurate number. The 
combined population of the two townships in 2011 would therefore 
have been more than 19,000, which suggests a 20 per cent increase over 
the urban population enumerated in 2000. But what is almost certainly 
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more significant is the parallel increase in the population of peri-urban 
settlements, especially around the township of Tabubil, which is the 
epicentre of the regional mining economy.
It is notable that the population of the six mine area villages was seven 
times greater in 2009 than it was 30 years earlier, before the start of mine 
construction. This was not the result of an extraordinary rate of natural 
increase, but was largely due to the immigration of people from other 
Mountain Ok (or Min) communities within the original preferred area, 
including parts of Telefomin District. About two-thirds of the people 
living in Tabubil town, and one-third of those living in the peri-urban 
settlements, also seem to have been born in the original preferred area. 
Some of these would have been ‘CMCA people’ from the Ningerum, 
Alice and Highway villages, but the proportion has not been established. 
In the 2009 survey, more than half of the 3,176 households on the 
Tabubil Plateau were found to contain at least one wage-earner, and most 
of the jobs they occupied were directly or indirectly dependent on the 
mine’s continued operation. Even the households without a wage-earner, 
including 70 per cent of the households in the squatter settlements, had 
livelihoods that would be hard to sustain if the mine were to close.
The Politics of Community Mine Continuation 
Agreements
Section 8 of the Ninth Supplemental Agreement states that the ‘signature 
or other execution’ of a CMCA by a ‘person representing or purporting 
to represent a Community or clan, or that person’s delegate’, binds all 
members of the group to the agreement, even if there is no ‘express 
authority’ for that person to represent the members of the group, or some 
group representatives have not signed the agreement, or some group 
members are not party to it. The same section then goes on to state that 
the real or purported group representative who signs or executes a CMCA 
binds all future members of the group to the agreement, even if they have 
not yet been born.
These clauses have attracted a good deal of critical academic scrutiny 
because of their apparent denial of what might normally be regarded as 
natural justice and human rights (Kirsch 2004, 2007; Kalinoe 2008). 
The powers they ascribed to individuals who might only be ‘purporting’ 
to represent all sorts of other people can partly be explained by the 
Large-Scale Mines and Local-Level Politics
244
fact that some of these other people were unwilling to accept another 
big compensation package in return for a promise to desist from legal 
action against BHP. But the problematic framing of the social relations 
of representation in the mine-affected area can also be seen as a reflection 
of the long-standing difficulties faced by OTML staff, and even by ‘real’ 
government officials, in their efforts to manufacture consensus or consent 
in communities without strong leaders.
Interactions between OTML staff and members of downstream 
communities in the mine-affected area were already characterised by a 
politics of mutual distrust in the period following the establishment of 
the Lower Ok Tedi/Fly River Development Trust. The two sides to this 
relationship were equally unable to believe that the other side had anything 
other than a set of personal and political agendas that were unrelated to 
the actual impact of the mine on local livelihoods (Filer 1997: 78–9). In 
the years preceding the settlement of 1996, matters were complicated by 
the split between the two branches of the company that were responsible 
for community affairs and environmental management, each of which 
was holding separate talks with local villagers. Even after the settlement, 
company staff were concerned that talk about compensation for 
environmental damage was covering up the need for local communities 
to have their own plans and strategies for ‘sustainable development’ 
(Simpson 2002: 52). The legal and institutional separation of the OTDF 
from OTML’s core business was seen by company management as an 
opportunity to address this problem, but the question of compensation 
was still central to the political process through which community 
members or their ‘representatives’ elected to opt in or out of the CMCAs 
between 2000 and 2002 (Kalinoe 2008:  7). However, the amount of 
politics in this process was substantially reduced by the absence of any 
opportunity for community representatives or members to negotiate the 
contents of the agreements (ibid.: 34).
Each of the six CMCAs made provision for the establishment of one 
or more community development foundations or trusts administered 
by OTML through the OTDF, with trustees from each of the villages 
represented in the agreement.2 The local trustees were to meet with their 
administrator once a quarter to decide how best to spend the 58 per cent 
of the K176  million compensation package that was earmarked for 
2  It is not clear how the trustees were selected or appointed, or how many of them had been 
‘representative signatories’ of the CMCAs in 2002.
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community development projects rather than cash payments or 
investments for future generations. It seems that OTML staff made 
a deliberate effort to avoid the appointment of local government ward 
councillors as local trustees, and thus created ‘a whole new structure of 
community organisation and governance’ (Kalinoe 2008:  10). At the 
lowest level of this new form of political organisation, the trustees would 
consult with ‘village development committees’ made up of ‘village elders’. 
The consultation process has been described as one in which the trustees 
were ‘required to go back to their village community and do patrols, 
possibly with OTML community relations officials, if not by themselves, 
and then inform their village community of the decision taken at the last 
trust meeting’ (ibid.: 22). As a result, there was a tendency for them to be 
regarded by their own constituents as functionaries of the proxy state who 
were curiously removed from the realm of politics by means of a social 
contract that ruled out any talk of additional compensation beyond that 
which the ‘communities’ had already accepted (Crook 2004: 128).
If the original CMCAs can now be seen, in retrospect, as agreements 
between OTML and the PNG Government about the way that ‘community 
consent’ would be obtained for the continuation of mining operations, 
they did leave one space for community leaders or members to renegotiate 
the terms of that consent once they had purportedly given up their right 
to take further legal action. This was a requirement for the agreements to 
be reviewed after a period of five years. The company’s senior managers 
decided that this constituted an opportunity for a ‘fresh approach’ to the 
business of negotiating community support, ‘involving contemporary 
village leadership, as well as other interested stakeholders not already 
parties to the original agreement’ (Offor and Sharp 2012: 217). At the 
same time, a fresh approach was needed because OTML’s community 
relations staff were reporting a decline in the level of community support 
as benefits formerly anticipated had failed to materialise, even while the 
company’s environmental scientists were projecting an increase in the scale 
and intensity of the environmental damage caused by mining operations 
(ibid.: 214).
The consultants engaged to design the review process have described the 
new approach as one that sought to establish an ‘informed consensus’ based 
on three ‘guiding principles’, namely: ‘multi-party mediation; interest-
based negotiation; and relationship-based communication’ (Sharp and 
Offor 2008: 15; Offor and Sharp 2012: 214). The second and third of 
these principles were said to be ‘culturally appropriate to the PNG setting 
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as they are inherent in the Melanesian style and practice of negotiation in 
ordinary life’ within a ‘relationship-based culture’ which has ‘a firm view 
as to the longevity of an important relationship for the wellbeing of the 
community’ (Sharp and Offor 2008: 19). An ‘interest-based’ negotiation 
was contrasted with one based on people’s ‘positions’ within the political 
space constructed by previous actions and negotiations (Offor and Sharp 
2012: 219).
The review process consisted of six three-day meetings of a working group 
comprising representatives of 15 groups of stakeholders over a period of 
18 months in 2006 and 2007. Aside from the designers of the process, 
OTML also hired a collection of independent facilitators, advisers 
and observers to mediate between the different interests at play in the 
negotiations. The mine-affected communities were now divided between 
nine regions, rather than six, while separate representation was granted to 
‘women and youth’ and to church organisations from within the mine-
affected area, and to a national non-governmental organisation concerned 
with environmental matters. Community representation in the review 
process was based on the election of village representatives by village 
meetings ‘supported’ by OTML staff, and then on the appointment of 
three delegates to the working group by the village representatives elected 
from each of the nine regions (Offor and Sharp 2012:  218). Regional 
meetings of village representatives were held after the second working 
group meeting, meetings were held in all villages after the third working 
group meeting, and both types of meeting were reconvened after the final 
working group meeting in order to discuss and approve the outcome 
of the whole review process (ibid.: 221).
That outcome consisted of a compensation package worth K324 million 
over the seven years between 2007 and 2013—the latter now scheduled as 
the year of mine closure—and a greater level of community participation 
in the design and management of development projects funded from this 
and other sources. Each of the nine ‘regional communities’ would also 
have a representative on a body advising the board of the OTDF, which 
would henceforth operate as the Ok Tedi and Fly River Development 
Program. This advisory body would not only have the power to vet all 
development project proposals, but would also appoint three ‘associate 
directors’ to the board to sit alongside the two directors representing 
OTML and the two directors representing SDP and the PNG Government 
respectively (Offor and Sharp 2012: 228). While OTML would still 
hold three of the four shares in the OTDF, and SDP would hold one 
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share, one of the OTML shares was supposed to be transferred to a new 
representative body called the Ok Tedi Impact Area Association in 2012, 
one year before the anticipated date of mine closure. Despite the fact that 
there were no women among the village representatives involved in the 
review process, there was also an agreement that each of the representative 
bodies involved in implementing the new deal, from the OTDF board 
down to the level of ‘village planning committees’, would have to involve 
some female participation, and that 10 per cent of the benefits should be 
allocated to a Women and Children’s Fund (Menzies and Harley 2012).
Despite the growing level of corporate investment in the production 
of an ‘informed consensus’ among the relevant stakeholders, the ‘CMCA 
people’ were still defined as the beneficiaries of the new deal, while 
responsibility for its delivery still fell to the employees of the OTML 
proxy state. The latter were still imbued with a ‘technocratic ethos’ that 
made it hard for them to ‘do’ community development, while the former 
were still failing to ‘drive’ their own community development because of 
internal wrangles about the structures of participation and representation. 
A survey of community attitudes to implementation of the new deal, five 
years after it had been concluded, found that local people still thought 
that the village planning committees failed to ‘faithfully represent 
community interests’ because the members were hoarding information or 
keeping benefits ‘for their personal or family gain’ (Menzies and Harley 
2012: 7). Most of the committees were found to have only one female 
member, often a wife or other relative of the male chairman, and some of 
these chairmen were living in urban areas, not in the villages for which 
their plans were being made. The authors of this study found that ‘intra-
village politics’ and ‘elite capture’ were still slowing down the delivery 
of ‘community development’ by the ‘technocratic’ agents of the proxy 
state, but the bureaucratic agencies of the real state were delivering even 
less, even though local members of the national parliament now had 
access to substantial ‘constituency development funds’. ‘Compounding 
this, the largely parallel CMCA governance structures are not linked to 
local government; thus village planning committees do not coordinate 
with ward development committees, and relations between the mine, 
Foundation, the PNG Sustainable Development Program, and the 
provincial government are a topic of continuing concern’ (ibid.:  10). 
So  ‘politics’ was conceived as a problem at every level of political 
organisation.
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The Politics of the Mine Closure 
Planning Process
Continuation and closure might seem like two sides of the same coin, 
but do not seem that way when considered as subjects of negotiation 
between local communities and the real or proxy state. While community 
representatives were drawn into a conversation about the mine’s 
continuation at the time of the Ninth Supplemental Agreement, they 
were for many years excluded from a separate channel of communication 
through which OTML sought government approval for its own mine 
closure plans.
As we have seen, the World Bank cited the absence of a mine closure plan 
as one of the reasons for keeping the mine open after BHP decided to 
wash its hands of the operation in 2000. The need for such a plan had in 
fact been recognised ten years previously, when the national government 
made an undertaking to commission a ‘long-term economic development 
plan’ for what was then known as Tabubil District—an area which now 
comprises the Star Mountains and Olsobip LLG areas in the far north of 
Western Province. The Department of Finance and Planning made some 
effort to honour this commitment in 1993, with terms of reference that 
clearly related to the problem of mine closure, but a fiscal crisis consumed 
the money that would have been used to pay the consultants. By the time 
the plan was eventually drafted (Jackson 1999), its geographic scope had 
been made redundant by changes in the definition of the mine-affected 
area, so in that sense it was true that the company and the government 
had no plans to deal with the impact of mine closure on communities 
downstream of the mine.
By that time, the Department of Mining was already working on a new 
mine closure policy that called for the establishment of mine closure 
planning committees for each of the big mining projects that were 
already in operation. The Ok Tedi Mine Closure Planning Committee 
was established in 2000, and was meant to include representatives 
from OTML, the Fly River Provincial Government and five national 
government departments. Although the committee was notionally 
chaired by the Department of Mining, it was in effect a sounding board 
for plans made by the mining company. ‘While the MCPC [Mine Closure 
Planning Committee] members may commit to a plan there is no reason 
to believe, on the basis of past experience, that anyone other than OTML 
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will follow the plan given that some of its recommendations are likely to 
be unpalatable to provincial politicians, the Administration and mine-
affected communities’ (Simpson 2002: 49). The likelihood that provincial 
politicians or members of mine-affected communities would object to the 
company’s plans was somewhat diluted by the fact there were no provincial 
government or local community representatives on the committee when 
OTML produced the first of its new plans in 2002 (ibid.: 48).
The Ninth Supplemental Agreement required the company to establish 
a ‘financial assurance fund’ that would pay for the implementation 
of its mine closure plan, once this had been approved by the national 
government. In the meantime, the company was required to produce draft 
mine closure plans at two-yearly intervals, each time to be accompanied 
by ‘a report on the social and economic impacts of mine closure and the 
status of economic programs being undertaken relevant to those impacts 
by the Company, the Ok Tedi Development Foundation, the Western 
Province Capacity Building Project, Government and other agencies’. The 
Western Province Capacity Building Project was itself funded by OTML 
under the terms of a separate agreement with the national government 
after the latter had stripped the Fly River Provincial Government of its 
financial powers in 1999 (Simpson 2002: 46; Kalinoe 2008: 40). In effect, 
this meant that the long arm of the proxy state had already reached into 
the field of provincial administration when the planning process got 
under way, and that helps to explain why the provincial administration 
was notable for its absence from the Mine Closure Planning Committee.
By 2005, when OTML’s managing director brought numerous 
stakeholders together for a mine closure planning workshop at Tabubil,3 
the provincial government was back in business, and the provincial 
planner sought to persuade the other workshop participants that the plans 
of OTML and SDP should henceforth be subordinated to the one that he 
had recently produced for Western Province as a whole. This looked even 
less likely than the prospect of collaboration between the two divisions 
of the proxy state, whose own plans bore no clear relationship to each 
other. But among the numerous stakeholders at the workshop, there 
were still none who directly represented the mine-affected communities. 
The community representatives (or at least some of them) held their own 
3  One of us (Filer) was a participant observer at this workshop.
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meeting at Kiunga, where they showed much less enthusiasm for mine 
closure than OTML’s managing director displayed in his address to the 
meeting at Tabubil.
The climax of the [Kiunga] meeting occurred when one of the speakers, 
using the call-and-response preaching style of public speaking that has 
become popular, called out to the participants, asking them, ‘Do you 
want the environment or money?’ Only a few people responded by 
saying ‘environment’. There was a loud murmuring as the participants 
discussed the question among themselves. Finally, someone called out 
in Melanesian Pidgin, ‘Tupela wantaim!’ or ‘Both of them at once’, and 
the crowd loudly indicated its approval. In other words, they want to 
simultaneously protect the environment and have access to development 
opportunities and money. It is almost impossible for them to contemplate 
early mine closure when so much of the regional economy is dependent 
on its operation, and when so many of the villages have already been 
significantly affected by pollution and need the extra income provided 
by compensation payments to feed their families. They cannot imagine 
letting the mine close down without gaining some lasting form of 
economic benefit in return for all the damage that it has done to their 
environment. (Kirsch 2007: 314)
When OTML came to produce the third of its draft mine closure plans in 
2006, the space that might have been occupied by a form of community 
consultation was already occupied by the CMCA review process, so if 
continuation and closure really were two sides of the same coin, each 
side had a distinctive group of stakeholders involved in a different type of 
conversation.
One thing that set the mine closure planning conversation apart from the 
mine continuation conversation was the uncertainty about when the mine 
would actually close. In 2001, at the time of the Ninth Supplemental 
Agreement, it was expected that the mine would close in 2010. Five 
years later, the moment of closure had been pushed back by two years. 
By 2009, one more year had been added to the mine’s life expectancy, 
but the moment of closure was still coming closer. As OTML now faced 
the prospect of submitting a ‘detailed’ (and possibly final) mine closure 
plan to the national government, its new managing director decided that 
there was no longer room for two separate conversations about the future, 
but shortly afterwards he announced that consultations with ‘Western 
provincial leaders’ had opened up the possibility of postponing the moment 
of closure by another seven years (Anon. 2009). Two years later, the four 
politicians representing Western Province in the national parliament 
251
8. Negotiating Community Support for Closure or Continuation of the Ok Tedi Mine in Papua New Guinea
issued a joint statement demanding that the mine be closed in 2013, 
in accordance with the latest plan (Anon. 2011), but OTML countered 
this demand with the announcement of a Mine Life Extension Plan that 
would keep the mine in operation until 2022 or even 2025 (Hriehwazi 
2011; Anon. 2012a). Local community support for this alternative plan 
was harnessed through a process of consultation that was understood to 
constitute the second review of the CMCAs. Representatives from each of 
the nine CMCA trust regions had signed up to the new deal by the end 
of 2012, five years after completion of the previous review (Anon. 2012b).
In September 2013, the government of Peter O’Neill enacted a Tenth 
Supplemental Agreement which deprived SDP of its majority stake in 
OTML and thus made the mining company a wholly state-owned 
enterprise. This action was justified by a claim that SDP’s board of 
directors was not accountable to anyone but BHP Billiton. This set the 
scene for a protracted legal battle over property rights, with a specific 
focus on control of the ‘long term fund’ established under the terms of 
the Ninth Supplemental Agreement. The more immediate effect was to 
prevent OTML from making any further payments to SDP, which meant 
that the latter was obliged to shut down its operations and lay off its 
staff. At the same time, the national government acquired a much bigger 
financial stake in the continued operation of the mine, so long as it could 
still make a profit, and the prime minister seems to have thought that he 
now had more power to persuade the recalcitrant politicians of Western 
Province that mine continuation could serve their interests as well. As one 
of his spokesmen put it: 
It is time for the CMCA leaders to work with their newly elected LLG 
leaders, their provincial government, and national leaders to ensure the 
new OTML and the new PNGSDP delivers the programs and projects 
that will go a long way in improving their lives and sustaining that for 
some time (Martin 2013).
Some of the ‘CMCA leaders’ objected to the nationalisation of the mine on 
the grounds that this was not a subject on which they had been consulted 
when they agreed to the Mine Life Extension Plan and, more importantly 
perhaps, because the national government was under no obligation to use 
any of the dividends derived from the shares formerly owned by SDP for 
the benefit of people in the mine-affected area.4 However, their right of 
4  The legislation simply enabled the state ‘to restructure PNGSDP and its operations to ensure 
that PNGSDP applies its funds for the exclusive benefit of the people of Western Province’.
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complaint was challenged by the president of the Ok Tedi Mine Impact 
Area Association, who claimed that his association was now the legitimate 
representative of all nine trust regions (Anon. 2013). There has not been 
an end to debate within Western Province on the timing of mine closure, 
and since there was a sharp fall in OTML’s profits between 2012 and 
2013, the national government may yet lose interest in extending the life 
of the mine.
Conclusion
Has the Ok Tedi proxy state operated like an ‘anti-politics machine’ that 
has sucked the lifeblood out of the real state in Western Province even at 
the same time that it has created a form of economic dependency that 
is inherently unsustainable? Have its engineers and mechanics managed 
to produce a semblance of community support for mine continuation 
that conceals the absence of traditional cultural and political institutions 
through which ‘communities’ could make any collective decisions about 
their future? Has the operation now reached a tipping point at which the 
number of politicians who sense an opportunity to seize control of money 
held in trust for mine-affected communities is more than a match for 
the number of technocrats or bureaucrats who have so far been charged 
with spending it on ‘equitable and sustainable social and economic 
development’?
While we have done our best to summarise the evidence that might 
seem relevant to questions such as these, we do not think that it provides 
the answers. Even if we had more evidence, the answers would remain 
equivocal.
If the Fly River Provincial Government has failed the test of good 
governance throughout the life of the mining operation, this does not 
necessarily mean that it would have done a better job of providing 
public goods and services if the mine had never existed. Perhaps it 
makes more sense to assert that ‘cultural attitudes have taken over the 
economic management of the province’, and that is why the province has 
displayed a ‘limitless capacity for “disappearing” any money given to it 
for development’ (Burton 1998: 173). But this only leads us to another 
question, which is whether ‘political culture’ does more to explain the 
failure of the real state to deliver ‘real development’ in this province, as 
compared with other provinces, than do various measurable forms of 
253
8. Negotiating Community Support for Closure or Continuation of the Ok Tedi Mine in Papua New Guinea
poverty or backwardness that ought to be alleviated by the economic 
benefits of mining, but may have been exaggerated by the impact of 
mining on the physical environment. The concept of political culture 
bears an even bigger load if it is then used to explain the inability of 
communities or community leaders in the mine-affected area to negotiate 
a more sustainable or equitable compensation package (Burton 1997). 
But we might then wonder how that culture is related to the ‘relationship-
based culture’ that has been represented as something in which the mining 
company needs to participate if it wishes to secure community support 
for the maintenance of its own operations (Sharp and Offor 2008).
It is still a moot point whether the capacity of the Ok Tedi proxy state 
to secure this type of community support is a function of its capacity to 
understand and engage with the political culture of Western Province or 
its capacity to function as a substitute for the provincial government. The 
proxy state is clearly not a democratic state, so its engineers and mechanics 
do not have to satisfy the desires of the local population in order to keep 
their own jobs; they only have to satisfy their own superiors that they are 
doing something that is good for both the mining company and its mine-
affected clients. From their point of view, ‘local politics’ or ‘community 
attitudes’ are liable to be seen as obstacles to the achievement of this goal, 
and not as things that need to be appreciated on the way. The social and 
political landscape of the mine-affected area is thus perceived as a two-
dimensional object, as flat as the flood plain of the Fly River, divided and 
subdivided into separate zones of entitlement to specific benefit streams 
whose dispensation is ideally free of any political interference.
There are two reasons to regard this as an optical illusion. The first is 
that the machinery of dispensation is nowhere near as efficient as the 
mills that churn up the rocks excavated from the remains of Mount 
Fubilan. The proxy state has been cobbled together from a disparate 
set of agreements with several government agencies and an assortment 
of ‘community representatives’. With the passage of time it has become 
a sort of institutional jungle that lacks any mechanical or rational capacity 
to distribute money, goods or services in ways that are proportional to 
the impact of the mine or the needs of different groups of mine-affected 
people.
The second reason is that the growth of this institutional jungle has 
been matched by the continual enlargement of the ‘mine-affected area’ 
and the parallel detachment of a growing proportion of its resident 
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population from livelihoods dependent on the land and natural resources 
contained within each zone of entitlement. There are still many villagers 
in the region who continue to make a living from what remains of their 
customary land, even when that land has been degraded by the impact of 
the mine, but the institutions of the proxy state may be no more accessible 
to such people than regular health and education services provided by 
the government or the churches. As the mining operation has matured, 
so has the tendency of rural ‘community leaders’ to gravitate towards the 
towns where they can mediate or manipulate the distribution of money, 
goods and services from all quarters. As a result, the superficial distinction 
between national, provincial and local-level politics, even in the operation 
of the ‘anti-politics machine’, has given way to a triangular relationship 
between elected and appointed leaders who spend various amounts of 
time in Port Moresby, Kiunga and Tabubil.5
Despite the efforts of the proxy state to produce a transparent process of 
‘community consultation’ in the mine-affected area, it is this triangular 
urban space in which the political choice between mine closure and mine 
continuation must ultimately be negotiated. This choice is not quite as 
stark as it sometimes appears. Mine closure is normally a process in which 
operations gradually wind down before they finally cease altogether. In the 
present case, the process already began when OTML laid off a substantial 
proportion of its workforce at the end of 2013, and even if operations 
continue for another decade or more, the process could last much longer 
than it normally does because the institutional jungle contains a number 
of financial mechanisms designed to benefit the people of Western 
Province and the mine-affected area for many years after the mine itself 
has finally closed. With an ongoing decline in the proportion of people in 
the mine-affected area who make their living from wages paid by OTML 
or its contractors, we can safely anticipate a corresponding increase in 
the proportion whose primary economic interest lies in the distribution 
of what is broadly understood to be compensation for environmental 
damage. This, in turn, would seem to entail the disappearance of the 
demarcation lines that have previously separated positions of leadership 
in the real state and the proxy state. The battle for control of SDP can be 
understood as the start of this political process. Instead of assuming that 
the proxy state has somehow caused the real state to ‘wither away’, we may 
5  Although Daru remains the official capital of Western Province, Kiunga is now the headquarters 
of the Fly River Provincial Government.
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now see that the real state has begun to consume the proxy state as the 
number of people employed to protect the latter from the former has also 
begun to fall.
Hitherto, the provincial governor and the three other members of the 
national parliament elected to represent the people of Western Province 
have been inclined to call for the mine to be closed sooner rather than 
later. This in itself does not seem to explain the frequency with which they 
have then gone on to lose their seats at the next national election, since 
their replacements have then made the same call. Although sometimes 
dressed in the language of environmental justice, their choices were 
more likely based on the resentment of their inability to control the 
operation of the proxy state and therefore use the promise of mine-related 
benefits to win over the hearts and minds of their constituents. In recent 
years, there has been a steady increase in the value of the ‘constituency 
development funds’ placed under the direct control of all members of 
parliament, and provision has recently been made for LLG presidents, 
who are now directly elected by their own constituents, to be granted 
their own share of the national development budget. One might suppose 
that this would give the elected politicians of Western Province less reason 
to push for control of the proxy state’s own ‘development budget’, and 
yet the nationalisation of the mine seems to have changed the balance 
of incentives as well as the balance of power.6 It remains to be seen what 
new forms of social solidarity or political accountability might emerge in 
these new circumstances, but only a bold prophet would predict a more 
equitable or sustainable set of development outcomes any time soon.
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9. Disconnected Development 
Worlds: Responsibility towards Local 
Communities in Papua New Guinea
JOHN BURTON AND JOYCE ONGUGLO
Introduction
Following the publication of the Brundtland Report (UN 1987), diverse 
global agendas concerned with development, social and environmental 
sustainability, and the responsibilities of governments and corporations 
have come to prominence.
A concern arises that, far from being interlocked or even internally 
consistent, initiatives that play to particular audiences become 
disconnected from one another and even fail to engage properly with 
their original objectives. In Papua New Guinea (PNG), where we have 
been working, it is well known that the state has made a considerable 
effort to get its planning system in order (GoPNG 2009), while at the 
same time remaining ‘off track’, and achieving few of the Millennium 
Development Goals targets by the end of 2015 (UNDP and GoPNG 
2014, Appendix 4). Equally, the Global Mining Initiative and its successor, 
the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) project, 
which ran from 2000 to 2002, were imagined as marking a new dawn in 
dealings between mining companies and the communities hosting mining 
projects. But the MMSD project did not engage with, and its final report 
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(MMSD 2002) contains no reference to, the global development agenda 
framed by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), despite both 
being launched in the same year (see Buxton 2012).
A plausible scenario is the creation of separate ‘development worlds’, 
each with worthy aims but likely to work at cross purposes because of the 
different priorities of the stakeholders. Our discussion looks at three of 
them, centring around the issues of mine-community grievances and the 
social and economic development of mine-area communities, for evidence 
that the founding objectives are being adhered to (see Figure 9.1). Our 
particular focus is the position of indigenous peoples on whose land 
mining operations are so frequently located. The MMSD project took 
a special interest in this:
The post-colonial era has not seen a marked improvement in the status of 
indigenous peoples or their relationships to the minerals industry in many 
parts of the world (Danielson 2003: ix).
Figure 9.1 Three ‘development worlds’.
Source: Authors’ diagram.
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The loss of two mines in PNG were case studies: the armed conflict that 
closed the Panguna mine in Bougainville in 1989, majority owned by what 
is now Rio Tinto; and litigation brought against BHP, the then majority 
owner of the Ok Tedi mine, in 1994 over environmental damage, causing 
the exit of the company from this project in 2001 (May and Spriggs 1990; 
Filer 1990, 1997; Banks and Ballard 1997).
A permanent organisation was born from the MMSD project. This 
was the  International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), whose 
membership in 2015 comprised 21 mining companies—including Rio 
Tinto and a restructured BHP Billiton—and 35  mining associations 
worldwide. The ICMM was founded with the goal of improving company 
performance in the mining and metals industry generally, tied to a set 
of sustainable development principles (see Box 9.1) and an expanding 
collection of guidance documents on its website that its members must 
follow, to make as certain as possible that social and environmental 
disasters like those seen in Bougainville and at Ok Tedi never happen again.
Box 9.1 The ICMM sustainable development principles.
1. Implement and maintain ethical business practices and sound systems of 
corporate governance.
2. Integrate sustainable development considerations within the corporate decision-
making process.
3. Uphold fundamental human rights and respect cultures, customs and values 
in dealings with employees and others who are affected by our activities.
4. Implement risk management strategies based on valid data and sound science.
5. Seek continual improvement of our health and safety performance.
6. Seek continual improvement of our environmental performance.
7. Contribute to conservation of biodiversity and integrated approaches to land 
use planning.
8. Facilitate and encourage responsible product design, use, re-use, recycling 
and disposal of our products.
9. Contribute to the social, economic and institutional development of the 
communities in which we operate.
10. Implement effective and transparent engagement, communication and 
independently verified reporting arrangements with our stakeholders.
Source: www.icmm.com (version in force during the period discussed in the text).
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Mining Agreements in Papua New Guinea
Between 2007 and 2014, we have worked in communities around 
four mining projects in PNG—Porgera and Ok Tedi (Burton), Lihir 
and Hidden  Valley (Burton and Onguglo). All of this work has had 
the central focus of  evaluating the balance between social impacts and 
the opportunities for development that mining brings, with a special focus 
on whether the lives of customary landowners have seen any improvement.
In PNG, a mining agreement is the social contract entered into when 
a tribal people grants permission for mining on its land. The three basic 
elements of an agreement are:
• Free, prior and informed consent (FPIC)—the decision to allow 
mining and the negotiation of mining agreements are arrived at in 
a fair manner, following the principles of FPIC.
• Stakeholder identification—customary owners and other stakeholder 
groups are properly identified and written into the various sections 
of an agreement with accuracy, clarity and safeguards to ensure that 
recognition shifts do not occur over time.
• Agreement governance—processes are specified, and their costs 
underwritten, that ensure: benefits (royalties, compensation for loss, 
lease payments, employment, business spin-offs, improvements to local 
infrastructure, commitments to social programs) will be appropriate 
and divided fairly among stakeholder groups; beneficiaries receive 
what the agreement says without hidden transaction costs throughout 
the mine life; there are appropriate protections for vulnerable people; 
monitoring and evaluation is carried out to professional standards; 
and reviews are held following an agreed timetable and to the same 
standard as used in the original agreement-making process, or better.
A local innovation to try to achieve parts of the above is the ‘development 
forum’, first used in the negotiations for the Porgera gold mine in 1988–
89 (Golub 2007; Filer 2008). Today, the Mining Act 1992 lays out the 
specifications of a forum and sets out a list of parties the mining minister 
should consider inviting.
At Hidden Valley, a forum was launched on 4 August 2004 (Bonai 2004). 
The provincial administrator, Manasupe Zurenuoc, praised the cultural 
appropriateness of the talks, saying that ‘in a country such as PNG the 
Melanesian approach was the secret to success’ (Anon. 2004a). However, 
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the participants were not the six sets of communities, labelled Stakeholder 
Groups A–E, in the impact area that were identified in the company’s 
social impact assessment, the document that should have guided the 
minister (MCG 2004a). Only Group A—represented by the mine lease 
landowners’ Nakuwi Association—participated in them.
The process ceased to be referred to as a ‘forum’ after two weeks (Anon. 
2004b). Sporadic media reports referred to ‘talks’ until a year later, when the 
Hidden Valley memorandum of agreement (MOA) was signed (GoPNG 
2005). After the mine construction period, emergency negotiations had 
to be held with Group B, an omitted stakeholder group made up of the 
Watut River communities, when their land was impacted by the discharge 
of waste rock.
On these counts, the process cannot be described as a ‘forum’ or, for 
that matter, be said to reflect an inclusive, ‘Melanesian’ approach. What 
in fact happened was that decisions were made over the interests of the 
unrepresented stakeholder communities without their consent.
A surprising inclusion in the MOA was that the six local-level governments 
(LLGs) surrounding the mine in Bulolo District were allocated royalty 
shares amounting to 20 per cent of the total. But, here again, the body 
created to plan the expenditure of funds by LLGs under the Organic Law 
on Provincial Governments and Local-Level Governments, the Joint District 
Planning and Budget Priorities Committee (JDPBPC), was excluded 
from the agreement-making process.
In short, the MOA process was deficient: in respect of stakeholder 
identification because it did not properly represent the parties that should 
have been involved; in respect of FPIC because of the closed-door nature 
of the talks; and in respect of agreement governance because it handed 
money to government entities in a way that bypassed the coordinating 
body established to guide district development.
This was evident at the time, but it was not until 2015 that any agency 
reported on the effectiveness of the MOA. This was in the form of research 
privately commissioned from the PNG National Research Institute (NRI) 
by the Bulolo District JDPBPC. The NRI’s report authors concluded that, 
while the financial flows to MOA parties were largely as set out by the 
MOA, the systems in place for managing them were ineffective and their 
impacts on development were ‘minimal’ (Sanida et  al. 2015:  viii,  61). 
The Nakuwi Association, the ‘link between the mine and customary 
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landowners’, was described as ‘defective’ and its business subsidiary had 
not submitted a tax return for ten years (ibid.: 48). This is not a surprise: 
the pathologies can be traced back to the 1980s, when a previous business 
subsidiary delivered little to its community owners (Burton 2003: 215).
These things flow on to agreement governance as a whole—the technical 
work of seeing that what agreements say is actually implemented. 
The former Department of Mining noted the ‘isolation of the development 
forum from the process of planning for sustainable development’ more 
than a decade ago (GoPNG 2003, para 2.3.1.10), and we can widen 
this to say that the more the state leaves most of the work of agreement-
making to local parties, the less likely it is that attention will be paid to 
agreement governance, frustrating the broader national and international 
objectives of poverty reduction.
Reporting Sustainability Performance
A major change since the millennium is that members of the ICMM 
undertake to report transparently on their performance each year 
(Principle 10). Member companies must publish a ‘sustainability report’ 
that is compliant with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), while non-
member companies are encouraged by peer example to do so voluntarily. 
All should seek to continually improve their environmental and social 
performance, and obtain better development outcomes for communities 
in mining areas.
In practice, few mining companies follow the ICMM guidelines. 
In the case of 33 mining companies with interests in PNG in 2013–14 
(see Figure 9.2), 27 (82 per cent) did not refer to sustainability on their 
websites or publish a sustainability report on their PNG operations.1
1  The 33 companies are mining companies that had detectable interests in PNG in the 2014 
reporting year; there may be 50 or more companies altogether. Of the 33, Barrick, Anglo American 
and Glencore were ICMM members. In 2011, Anglo American and Teck held 11.1 per cent and 
6.8 per cent respectively of the shares of Nautilus Mining, the developer of the Solwara deep-sea 
mining project in PNG (Nautilus Minerals 2011). Neither mentioned this in annual sustainability 
reporting. Teck has since divested but Anglo American retained 5.95  per cent in 2015. Anglo 
American invested in a Star Mountains exploration project in 2014, but did not mention this in its 
report for that year (Anglo American 2015).
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Of the remainder, six (18 per cent) did sustainability reporting (Table 9.1). 
Of these, four (12  per cent) were to the standard required by ICMM 
or better, one (Ok Tedi Mining Limited) was non-compliant, and one 
(PanAust) was in the process of acquiring a PNG operation; so, while 
it reported on operations in Laos and Thailand, it did not do so for its 
(Frieda River) operation in PNG for the part of the first year in which it 
was involved.
Figure 9.2 Sustainability reporting by 33 mining companies with PNG 
interests in 2013–14.
Source: Authors’ diagram.
Table 9.1 Disclosures in relation to mining on the lands of indigenous 
peoples by six mining companies undertaking sustainability reporting 
in PNG.








Porgera G3 In Australia, North America 




























There is a reference to a page 
about free, prior and informed 
consent and the Community 
Mine Continuation Agreements, 
but indigenous peoples are not 
mentioned on it
For latest reporting period available: cy = calendar year (1 January–31 December); fy = financial 
year (1 July–30 June).
Sources: BGC (2014a); OTML (2014); Glencore (2015); NML (2015); PanAust (2015).
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Indicators of Heightened Importance 
to Indigenous Peoples
As noted already, all mining in PNG takes places on the customary 
land of tribal landowners. What content is there in GRI reporting that 
might help raise the alarm over incipient conflicts or the grievances that 
landowners may have over mine operations?
The GRI framework requires that organisations address a standard set of 
indicators—79 at the G3 standard and 91 at the newer G4 standard—
plus an additional 11 Mining and Metals Sector Supplement (MMSS) 
indicators for mining companies (GRI 2010). A subset of the indicators 
are of heightened importance to local communities and deal with human 
rights, grievances and resettlement: HR1, HR9, MM5, MM6, MM7 and 
MM9 (and HR12 in the G4 standard) (see Table 9.2). Four indicators 
specifically refer to indigenous people. An immediate difficulty is that 
not all of the six reporting companies acknowledge that they run mines 
in PNG on the territories of indigenous peoples.
Digression: Who Are Indigenous Peoples?
What factors define an individual or group as being 
‘indigenous’?
The special status of indigenous peoples arose in the context of the 
colonial occupation of tribal lands, though scant progress was achieved 
prior to the advent of the post-war international institutions. Thus Chief 
Deskaheh (1873–1925) led a delegation of Six Nations Iroquois, the 
largest First Nation band in Canada, to Geneva in 1923, helped by the 
Bureau International pour la Défense des Indigènes, but was blocked from 
making a formal presentation at the League of Nations by Britain, the 
United States and Canada, all worried by the wider implications (Smith 
2000; Niezen 2003: 31–5). Once the United Nations (UN) came into 
existence, the focus in respect of subject peoples in their own lands was 
decolonisation. Tribal peoples within larger settler nations still struggled 
for self-determination, arguably bringing into being ‘indigenous peoples’ 
as a category distinct from other subject peoples by virtue of being ethnic 
minorities. Definitional issues of this nature, however, were resolved by 
the UN Special Rapporteur José Martínez Cobo in a multivolume study 
in the 1980s (Box 9.2). This study informed two subsequent international 
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agreements: the International Labour Organization’s Convention No. 169, 
adopted in 1989, and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, adopted by the General Assembly in 2007.
Box 9.2 Definition of Indigenous people by the UN Special 
Rapporteur José R. Martínez Cobo.
379. Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, 
consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those 
territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and 
are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral 
territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, 
in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.
380. This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period 
reaching into the present, of one or more of the following factors:
a. Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them;
b. Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands;
c. Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under 
a tribal system, membership of an indigenous community, dress, means of 
livelihood, life-style, etc.);
d. Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the 
habitual means of communication at home or in the family, or as the main, 
preferred, habitual, general or normal language);
e. Residence in certain parts of the country, or in certain regions of the world;
f. Other relevant factors.
381. On an individual basis, an indigenous person is one who belongs to these 
indigenous populations through self-identification as indigenous (group consciousness) 
and is recognized and accepted by these populations as one of its members 
(acceptance by the group).
Source: Martínez Cobo (1987).
In another example of disconnection between the ‘development worlds’, 
the mining industry (Danielson 2003; ICMM 2010) and global 
development agendas (Caruso et  al. 2003; Anaya 2011) have both 
embraced the need for special care when indigenous peoples are involved, 
but the Pacific island states as a bloc—PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, 
Fiji, Nauru, Palau, Marshall Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Kiribati—have not. 
They were absent from the UN General Assembly at the time of the vote 
on the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
More pointedly, a PNG Department of Mineral Policy and Geohazards 
Management presentation explained it would be ‘wrongful’ for a legislative 
amendment to give effect to the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples within the Mining Act, because PNG was not among the parties 
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that had adopted it (GoPNG 2012). This creates a potential consultation 
gap in respect of mining on tribal lands. The development forum has 
come into play in PNG prior to the granting of mining leases but this 
has given rise to the paradox of state institutions handing most of the 
work of agreement-making to local parties—empowering indigenous 
landowners—yet propped up by an official position that, logically, denies 
their existence.
On Lihir Island, the mining lease is wholly on ‘ancestral land’ and 
royalty is calculated and paid on the basis of its customary ownership 
by matrilineal clans. Indeed, ICMM’s Good Practice Guide (2010) was 
developed by experts from the Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining 
at the University of Queensland with the collaboration of the mine’s 
operator (see also Macintyre 2007).
In 2010, the mine was acquired by Newcrest Mining Limited. 
The company was specific in using one criterion, that of ‘non-dominant 
sectors of society’ (paragraph 379 in Box  9.2), to rule that its PNG 
operations did not involve indigenous people:
On the basis of this definition, it is only Newcrest’s Australian operations 
where issues of specific Indigenous rights arise. Community relation 
issues with regards to Indonesia and Papua New Guinea operations are 
reported elsewhere in this report. (NML 2011: 57; see also NML 2012)
Barrick became the operator of the Porgera mine in 2006. Its position 
on indigenous people reads as follows:
Barrick endorses the ICMM Position Statement on Indigenous Peoples 
and Mining, which includes specific commitments and obligations 
related to Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC). Barrick is committed 
to implementing the Position Statement globally. (BGC 2013: 29)
But though successive sustainability reports show that Barrick considers 
communities in Chile, Australia and North America to be indigenous, it 
does not include the Ipili people of Porgera, even though land issues are 
handled through Ipili agents empowered under a section of PNG’s Land 
Act that deals with customary land (Golub 2007).
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In the two cases, a single one of the special rapporteur’s criteria was used 
to  trump the full set. In reality, all landowners in PNG fit the overall 
definition: they occupy their ancestral lands; they are distinguished 
by specific customs setting them apart from their neighbours; they 
speak their own language as the habitual means of communication 
within the community; they reside in ‘certain parts of the country’, 
namely on their tribal territories; and they transmit these ‘to future 
generations  …  in  accordance with their own  …  legal systems’, not 
state ones.
In the 2012 reporting year, perhaps in response to a draft of this 
paper  circulated after the Nouméa conference in November 2011 
(see Chapter 1, this volume), Newcrest (NML 2013: 62) began counting 
its PNG landowners as indigenous people. Barrick did not follow suit.
Sustainability Reporting Continued
A good test of whether the mining industry agenda is on track with its 
founding objectives is to weigh up whether company disclosures can 
provide an alert for the kinds of mine-community grievances and conflicts 
that can lead companies to ‘lose the mine’.
We evaluate the companies in Table 9.2 on the way they reported the 
previously mentioned indicators in 2009–10, before the Nouméa 
conference, and again in 2013–14. Two of the companies began using 
the newer GRI G4 standard in the second period, which meant that a 
new indicator (HR12) was added for them, relating to the handling of 
grievances. In both periods, the most recent available report was examined, 
depending on the reporting cycles of the organisations.
The significance of claiming not to deal with indigenous people may be 
seen in the manner in which sustainability reporting is curtailed. Table 9.2 
shows that in the earlier period none of the companies acknowledged 
the presence of indigenous people, making four indicators unreportable. 
In the later period, two now did so, but the commonest answer to the 
indicators about disputes was to say there were none. This is not really 
believable in PNG: there is always something to report, whether a minor 
grievance or something more serious.
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Table 9.2 Seven Global Reporting Initiative indicators of heightened 
importance to local communities and indigenous peoples, for the Lihir, 
Hidden Valley, Porgera and Ok Tedi mines, 2009–10 and 2013–14.
HR1 Percentage and total number of significant investment agreements that 
include human rights clauses or that have undergone human rights screening.
2009–10 LGL: not addressed, Newcrest: not addressed, Harmony: 
indicator not reported, Barrick: globally reported—cannot 
disaggregate Porgera, OTML: (non-GRI).
2013–14 Newcrest: ‘human rights [not yet screened] in investment 
agreements’, Harmony: indicator not reported, Barrick: uses 
TRACE International anti-corruption screening system, OTML: 
indicator omitted.
HR9 Total number of incidents of violations involving rights of indigenous people 
and actions taken.
2009–10 LGL: l + ‘No incidents’, Newcrest: l, Harmony: l, Barrick: l, 
OTML: (non-GRI).
2013–14 Newcrest: l ‘No incidents [involving the Company] … The 
Company, on occasion, has been impacted by intra-communal 
tensions in the surrounding communities’, Harmony: l indicator 
not reported, Barrick: l, OTML: l indicator omitted.
MM5 Total number of operations taking place in or adjacent to indigenous peoples’ 
territories, and number and percentage of operations or sites where there are 
formal agreements with indigenous peoples’ communities.
2009–10 LGL: l, Newcrest: l, Harmony: l, Barrick: l, OTML: (non-
GRI).
2013–14 Newcrest: l correctly reported. Harmony: l correctly reported, 
Barrick: l, OTML: l discussion omits indigenous people.
MM6 Number and description of significant disputes relating to land use, 
customary rights of local communities and indigenous peoples.
2009–10 LGL: l, Newcrest: l + ‘Union of Watut River Communities 
published a list of claims’, Harmony: l, Barrick: l, OTML: (non-
GRI).
2013–14 Newcrest: l ‘2 significant disputes’ (at Lihir only), Harmony: l 
‘There were no disputes during the year’, Barrick: l, OTML: l 
correctly reported.
MM7 The extent to which grievance mechanisms were used to resolve disputes 
relating to land use, customary rights of local communities and indigenous 
peoples, and the outcomes.
2009–10 LGL: ll, Newcrest: l, Harmony: l, Barrick: l, OTML: (non-
GRI).
2013–14 Newcrest: l Lihir—correctly reported, Hidden Valley—‘total of 
276 grievances were received across Hidden Valley, Wafi-
Golpu and exploration operations’, Harmony: l indicator not 
addressed—see HR12, Barrick: l, OTML: l correctly reported.
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MM9 Sites where resettlements took place, the number of households resettled in 
each, and how their livelihoods were affected in the process.
2009–10 LGL: not addressed, Newcrest: ‘one instance of resettlement’, 
Harmony: indicator not reported, Barrick: not addressed, 
XStrata: ‘In 2009, we resettled 116 households in four 
locations’, OTML: (non-GRI).
2013–14 Newcrest: correctly reported, Harmony: indicator not reported, 




Number of grievances about human rights impacts filed, addressed and 
resolved through formal grievance mechanisms.
2013–14 Harmony: ‘illegal strike activity occurred in March 2014, when 
six days were lost due to grievances’, OTML: indicator not 
reported.
LGL = Lihir Gold Limited, OTML = Ok Tedi Mining Limited. LGL merged with Newcrest in mid-
2010.
Indigenous people: l = recognised l = not recognised l = unclear.
Sources: LGL (2010); HGMC (2010, 2014); BGC (2011, 2014a); NML (2011, 2015); OTML 
(2012a, 2012b, 2014).
Lihir
Lihir Gold Limited (LGL) was one of the reporters saying it had 
‘no  incidents’ in 2009 (LGL 2010:  115), but in reality the mine had 
a shutdown over landowner grievances:
Australia’s second-biggest listed gold producer, has been forced to shut its 
mine in Papua New Guinea because of landowner disputes, the firm said 
on Monday (Anon. 2009).
A mine shutdown is a material incident to report under HR9 and MM6. 
In Table 9.2, it can be seen that we score LGL for this year as both l and 
l  on the MM7 indicator. LGL was one of the companies that denied 
the presence of indigenous people but (confusingly) had grievance 
policies in place that were tailored to suit dealings with indigenous people 
(LGL  2010:  69). The subsequent owner, Newcrest, has prevaricated 
about whether incidents are ‘indigenous’ or not. In 2012–13, it reported 
‘no  incidents’ under HR9 (NML 2014a, vol.  2:  12) when landowners 
shut down mine operations ‘by placing the traditional gorgor plant 
around the mine site’ (Nalu 2012). The use of gorgor shows that it was a 
dispute where an indigenous people pressed their case using a customary 
rite. It was also serious enough to affect the share price (Fitzgerald 2012). 
On both counts it was an HR9 incident and should have been reported 
as such. In 2013–14, Newcrest again said there were ‘no incidents’ on this 
indicator, but added:
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The Lihir operation is subject to a number of agreements with local 
landowners, which cover (among other things) compensation and other 
benefits, including commercial opportunities related to land ownership. 
The Lihir agreements are subject to periodic review, with an ongoing 
review at the time of this report. In the context of the current review, the 
Company and landowners have outlined matters that they would like 
addressed within the review, including the implementation of projects 
under the agreements, compensation payments (including distribution of 
benefits among landowners), the impacts of the mine and the impact of 
certain practices on the mine operations. These matters will be advanced 
as part of the ongoing Lihir agreements review. (NML 2015, vol. 2: 19)
This was a long-winded way of avoiding saying anything of substance. 
In reality, an impasse had been reached in reviewing agreements signed in 
1995 and 2007. The Lihir Mine Area Landowners Association (LMALA) 
was reported as being ‘angry’ (Anon. 2014a) and had described a deal 
between the provincial and local-level governments ‘as illegal’ (Anon. 
2014b). In mid-year, the company reported ‘receiving threats’ from 
LMALA to shut the mine (Anon. 2014c). In August and October 2014, 
a ‘rebel group’ erected roadblocks at the North Kapit stockpile. On the 
one hand, Newcrest said that it only dealt with LMALA, but on the other 
it facilitated a K6 million finance deal with the dissident group (Anon. 
2014d).
To not report the incidents was to follow a very pedantic reading of 
HR9 on the grounds that it was unproven that the mining company had 
violated indigenous rights. Delayed (or cancelled) Bougainville Copper 
Agreement reviews were a key factor leading to conflict at Panguna in 
1988–89 (see May and Spriggs 1990; Oliver 1991; also Chapter 12, this 
volume), and observers with long memories also recall that the present 
governor of New Ireland Province, where Lihir is located, said in 1986 
that Lihirians were living in a ‘sociological time-bomb’ (Filer 1990: 78). 
To fudge the difficulties faced on Lihir must be judged imprudent.
Hidden Valley
At Hidden Valley in 2014, Harmony reported ‘no disputes’ under MM6 
(HGMC 2014: 187), but elsewhere in the same report the company said 
that ‘illegal strike activity occurred in March 2014, when six days were lost 
due to grievances’ that were then handled by the Employee Representative 
Council (ibid.: 69). The question is, did the strike have anything to do 
with customary rights?
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The strike was about terms and conditions for semi-skilled workers and, 
after it turned violent, three employees were taken to hospital (Anon. 
2014e; Keslep 2014). This was a significant incident, and Harmony 
correctly reported it under ‘labour disputes and strikes’, as well as flagging 
that this was relevant to the GRI’s new HR12 indicator. However, Annex B 
of the Hidden Valley MOA, the mine’s ‘employment and training plan’, 
clearly sets out that all unskilled positions are reserved for landowners—
the bona fides of the latter being vouched for by the Nakuwi Association—
and that landowners would have the highest priority for recruitment and 
training as heavy equipment operators, maintenance workers and drill 
and blast operators (MCG 2004b, sections 2.4, 3.2, and 3.5.1). This 
means that the complainants were local landowners whose jobs came into 
existence through their connection to the land needed for mining. They 
were correct to link their grievances to the principal mining agreement, 
whether or not they were right about the substance of them.
The strike was illegal only if legislation allowed employment contracts 
to outlaw industrial action, but as far as is known this was not the case. 
On the other hand, anyone involved in issuing threats or using violence 
‘to the person or property of another’ in or near a workplace is likely to 
have been committing offences under the section 508 of the Criminal 
Code. It was incorrect to call the strike itself illegal.
Newcrest mentioned that it had handled 276 grievances at Hidden 
Valley and Wafi (a nearby exploration site) in 2013–14, ‘tracking them 
to ensure that a resolution is ultimately reached’ (NML 2015, vol. 1: 43). 
But this drew a veil over whether there had been a strike or a shutdown. 
In  reporting the MM4 indicator (‘total strikes and lock-outs exceeding 
one week’), it said in one place that there had been none in 2013–14 
(ibid., vol. 2: 9), but in another that there had been one at Hidden Valley 
(ibid., vol. 3: 30). Cryptically, it noted in a market release that there was 
‘an 8% reduction in mill throughput’ in the first quarter of the year (NML 
2014b: 5) but it did not say why.
Porgera
In the 2009 reporting year, the Porgera Joint Venture published a 354-
page Porgera-specific environmental monitoring report (PJV 2010), but 
cast a veil over ‘landowner concerns’ that had prevented environmental 
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sampling at various times and locations in the impact area. Actually, 
we know these were physical stand-offs between company staff and 
landowners, and therefore reportable ‘incidents’.
But ‘concerns’ were not the half of it. Warlords were directing conflicts 
among well-armed factions in various parts of the Porgera Valley, 
including in and around the leases. Figures given in a policy document for 
local consumption, ‘Restoring Justice’, show that there were 70 killings 
during 2007 (Kikala et al. 2008: 5). If the population of the valley was 
about 35,000, this represented a spike in the homicide rate touching 
200/100,000—a rate not reported globally outside war zones (see Burton 
2014).
Barrick buried this news in passages such as ‘sustainable development … may 
mean … developing a greater capacity to plan for and manage the changes 
of modern life, including new law and order issues’ in an optimistic 60-
page publicity report (BNL 2009). This stood in stark contrast to the 
realism of the ‘Restoring Justice’ document (Kikala et al. 2008), which 
preceded it by about three months, and to raw reality six weeks later when 
a police and defence force sweep called ‘Operation Ipili’ was launched ‘to 
flush out the warlords’ (Eroro 2009; Muri 2009a).
The police action targeted a section of the community living inside the 
boundaries of the mining lease at Porgera, which included about 7,000 
recognised landowners at the time. Approximately 300 houses were 
destroyed in the raid, which received widespread coverage internationally 
and was investigated by at least four civil society groups. Barrick’s 2009 
Responsibility Report (BGC 2010) remained silent on the matter. The 
company received the maximum possible rating in the ICMM’s annual 
‘member performance table’2 and its quality assurer wrote that the report 
gave ‘a fair representation of Barrick’s activities over the reporting period’ 
(Bureau Veritas 2010).
Both Amnesty and Human Rights Watch took Barrick to task during 
the second half of 2010 (Amnesty International 2010; HRW 2011), and 
after this it was no longer possible to issue blandishments. Barrick’s next 
Responsibility Report (BGC 2011) addressed their findings, conceding 
abuses by the company’s security force. There was further coverage under 
the title ‘Human Rights and Security at Porgera’ on the company website. 
2  www.icmm.com/en-gb/members/member-reporting-and-performance.
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This was promising, but it still fell short of the GRI requirements in respect 
of mining on the land of indigenous peoples (HR9, MM6), and there was 
no mention of whether, if effective grievance mechanisms (MM7) had 
been in place, complaints such as those affecting the security force could 
have been avoided.
In respect of the resettlement indicator (MM9), Barrick started a program 
to move customary owners to land away from the mining lease in 2006. 
The program was cancelled in late 2007 but Barrick said no more than 
that it ‘works together with host governments to manage the resettlement 
of people that may be affected by our planned operations in a manner 
consistent with local laws and international best practice’ (BGC 2007: 15, 
2008:  15). For two years after cancelling the program, Barrick said 
nothing about it (or in answer to MM9), but then said that ‘[r]esettlement 
activities continued at Porgera … in 2010’ (BGC 2011: 72).
None of this commentary would give any reader a clue that the issue of 
resettlement had been a running sore for years (e.g. Anon. 2002; Muri 
2009b) compounded by the (local) mismanagement of benefit streams 
that might have made mine-area villages pleasant to live in (Johnson 
2012). At the time of the Nouméa conference, the answer to the question 
of what progress had been made at Porgera in respect of the ICMM 
objectives is that a litany of blunders at Porgera had a 20-year history 
of obfuscation and denial (Bonnell 1994; Filer 1999; Filer et al. 2008; 
Wiessner 2010; Burton 2014). Since the conference, the mine’s oversight 
body, the Porgera Environmental Advisory Komiti, has published a report 
on the plight of women in Porgera (Johnson 2011), and Barrick has 
issued a ‘framework of remediation initiatives’ to help women abused 
by company guards (PJV and BGC 2012). This went some of the way 
towards completing the requirements of a grievance mechanism and has 
commendably undergone a recent review (BGC 2014b). It should not 
have been preceded by years of denial.
Ok Tedi
A joint venture led by BHP operated the Ok Tedi copper and gold mine 
from 1984 to 2001. After litigation by landowners (Banks and Ballard 
1997), BHP divested its majority shareholding to a holding company, 
PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd (SDP) in 2001. SDP’s share 
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was in turn nationalised in 2013 and the operator, Ok Tedi Mining 
Limited (OTML), is now a state-owned enterprise (see Chapter 8, this 
volume, for further detail).
OTML has historically disclosed information to the public in a patchy 
manner. In 2011, Howes and Kwa noted that ‘OTML has been promising 
to use the internationally recognized Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
standards for some time, but has failed to do so’ (Howes and Kwa 
2011: 39). Its next two annual reviews were claimed to be ‘prepared in 
accordance with the Global Reporting Initiative’ (OTML 2012b:  3, 
2013a:  ii), but neither reported any indicators. No environment report 
to date (most recently OTML 2013b) has mentioned the GRI at all or 
reported against the more than 30 environmental indicators (34 from 
2013). This is a serious omission, given Ok Tedi’s place in the history of 
mining and the environment.
In its Annual Review 2013, general standard disclosures are finally 
reported and three of the indicators of Table 9.2 are correctly reported 
(OTML 2014: 125–9). This represents progress, as is also demonstrated 
by the voluminous documentation on the ‘community mine continuation 
agreement’ (CMCA) process to be found on its website,3 as published by 
the facilitators who led the first round of negotiations in 2006–07 (Sharp 
and Offor 2008; Offor and Sharp 2012), and as further reported by World 
Bank observers (Eftimie 2010; Popoitai and Ofosu-Amaah 2013).
In large part, the CMCA outcomes were expressed in terms of new 
benefits for the environmentally affected communities: spending on 
infrastructure, community projects and annual payments in cash. They 
are an intensification of activities in the Ok Tedi impact area handled 
by SDP and the OTML-funded Ok Tedi Development Foundation 
(OTDF) since 2001. But how can we tell if the infrastructure is in place, 
the projects work, and the CMCA communities are satisfied with their 
benefit shares?
SDP produced annual reports during its 12-year lifespan. These show 
that total spending on development projects (throughout PNG) was 
US$578  million, in line with SDP’s articles of association. Reports 
up to 2012 discuss projects and the company’s strategy, but the word 
‘evaluation’ does not make an appearance until the year of the Howes and 
3  www.oktedi.com/our-corporate-social-responsibility/mine-continuation-consultation.
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Kwa report (2011). Thereafter, the ‘design and rollout of an appropriate 
monitoring and evaluation system’ for all projects was flagged for 2012. 
The government then announced it would nationalise the mine (Elapa 
2013), and after the single-page chief executive officer’s message, the 
entirety of the final report is taken up by a tabulation of all the projects 
undertaken by SDP over 12 years (SDP 2013: 3–31). No evaluation of 
them was published.
As OTDF did not have a website until 2011, its activities prior to that 
year are unclear. Annual reports for 2011, 2012 and 2013, detailing 
projects undertaken, are available. A monitoring and evaluation policy 
was introduced in 2013 (OTDF 2014:  14), but no results had been 
published by the time of writing.
Discussion
Being able to talk about social and environmental sustainability is not 
the same as being able to show ‘a marked improvement in the status 
of indigenous peoples’ around mining projects.
In terms of the three worlds of development model (Figure 9.1), starting 
with the mining industry’s sustainability agenda, our discussion of projects 
in PNG points to poor—if any—use of the new reporting tools. Devised 
both to warn of difficulty in a company’s social and environmental 
performance, and to provide internal feedback, the evidence that 
managements understand their purpose is not convincing. Corporate 
media offices, the presumed source of sustainability reports, leave gaps 
and recast alarming accounts of protests, strikes and conflicts in impact 
areas in more soothing prose: ‘threats’ to close a mine dissolve into an 
‘ongoing agreements review’; a violent melee with tribal workers is diluted 
into ‘grievances’ handled by a review process; and ‘warlords’ on a killing 
spree around a mine become ‘landowner concerns’. This is unlikely to alert 
managements, communities or the public in general before a future social 
or environmental crisis is triggered, any better than the failed systems in 
place prior to the Bougainville and Ok Tedi crises two decades ago.
The world of the state’s development planning agenda intersects with this 
situation to the extent that the biggest stakeholder in mining is always the 
state. At the national level, royalties, taxes and duties are collected, planning 
objectives set, and funds channelled to the lower levels of government 
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for implementation. But at all mining projects in PNG, observers find 
themselves struck by the failure of the state to use its windfall incomes 
to run essential services, let alone to progress its long-term objectives. 
Now that the Ok Tedi mine has been nationalised, we may speculate 
as to whether the livelihoods of the impact-area communities, and the 
quality of information bearing on their situation, will take a turn for the 
better or the worse. The state’s performance in managing the Tolukuma 
mine, acquired in 2008, is not propitious: information on the website of 
Petromin, the state-owned enterprise of which the mine is a subsidiary, 
was not updated during the seven years of national ownership, and no 
financial report has been published since 2012. The mine closed in 2015.
A paradox is that it is often visitors from other parts of government 
who blow the whistle on service delivery failures. The director of PNG’s 
National Research Institute went to Porgera and said afterwards that ‘the 
local primary schools were closed … the high school was closed … the 
communities are missing out’ (Howes 2012). His researcher showed 
that it was ‘impossible to see where the money has gone’ because local 
governance institutions did not produce financial reports (Johnson 2012: 
xii, 89–90). As noted, National Research Institute researchers found that 
development impacts around Hidden Valley were ‘minimal’ (Sanida et al. 
2015). And, rather dramatically, during a parliamentary committee tour 
of Western Province, home of the Ok Tedi mine, an MP burst into tears 
when visiting a broken-down health centre (Alphonse 2015).
The world of the global development agenda barely intersects with this. 
The 2014 National Human Development Report (UNDP and GoPNG 
2014) is a valiant attempt to gauge the impact of the country’s resource 
incomes on poverty reduction. But since it concluded that PNG was 
‘off track’ to achieve the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets 
(ibid.: Appendix 4), the answer can be given that, despite a substantial 
economic boost from the extractive industries, only weak gains have been 
made in human development. The report did not attempt a lower-level 
audit of progress in mining areas.
If MDG8—‘global partnership for development’—or the post-2015 
replacement SDG17—‘partnerships for the goals’—were working 
properly, then the three different development worlds would have become 
integrated long ago, but they have not. When the Sustainable Development 
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Goals4 were launched at the UN on 25 September 2015, the UN’s expert 
panel declared a ‘One World: One Sustainable Development Agenda’ 
(UN 2013: 4; see also UNDP and GoPNG 2013). On the evidence of 
what we have seen, there is a great deal of work to be done even to reach 
the starting line.
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10. Gender Mainstreaming and 
Local Politics: Women, Women’s 
Associations and Mining in Lihir
SUSAN R. HEMER
Introduction
In 2004, Lihirian women staged a silent protest march in Londolovit town 
with banners calling for greater involvement in discussions surrounding 
the review of the agreement (integrated benefits package) between the 
operators of the Lihir gold mine and the local community. They presented 
the chairman of the review committee with a petition arguing that women 
had been left out of ‘all aspects of the planning, decision-making and 
programming for development issues’ (Lihir i Lamel 2004: 5). This protest 
was led by the Petztorme Women’s Association, and was unprecedented in 
the history of Lihir. In part, this chapter aims to understand the strategies 
that have been employed by women’s associations in Lihir to advance the 
position of Lihirian women and to call for greater political representation, 
and to appreciate why some have been more successful than others.
The Lihir gold mine, operated by Newcrest Mining Ltd, is located on 
the main island of the Lihir group of islands in New Ireland Province, 
Papua New Guinea (PNG). Construction began in 1995, and production 
in 1997. At the time of writing, active mining was set to continue until 
2031, with production from stockpiles for a further ten years or so. 
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Annual production has been in the realm of 600,000 to 800,000 ounces. 
Prior to mining, the Lihir Islands were home to 7,000 Lihirians, whose 
livelihoods consisted of subsistence production and a small amount 
of income from cash crops and remittances. Since mining began, the 
population has grown to include some 16,000 Lihirians, about 4,000 
informal migrants, and a further 4,000 migrant employees of the mine 
and its contractor companies. Vast changes have occurred on the islands, 
including the construction of a township and a ring road, a medical centre 
and improved education facilities, as well as increased consumption of 
alcohol and store-bought goods.
It is unsurprising that with these changes there have been both positive 
and negative impacts on men and women, and on the relationships 
between them. Briefly, both men and women have benefited from greater 
access to health, education and transportation services in Lihir. Paid 
work is now available for many on the island group through the mining 
company or its contractors, though this is dominated by men, particularly 
in more senior roles. Money has also become available through the 
payment of compensation and royalties, largely paid to men, but onward 
distribution of this money through lineages has been problematic, and 
women rarely have any access to it. With money, alcohol consumption 
has increased dramatically, leading to increases in violence, including 
domestic violence, and to motor vehicle accidents. Women continue to 
bear a heavy load of subsistence agriculture, child-rearing and household 
work, and this remains the case even when women have paid employment. 
It is mostly Lihirian men who have moved into positions of authority in 
negotiations with the mining company, who have positions in the local-
level government (LLG), the Lihir Mining Area Landowner’s Association 
and village development committees, as well as being the ones much more 
likely to hold more highly paying positions in the mining company, to 
have their own business or to be on the boards of businesses (Macintyre 
2003a; Bainton 2010; Hemer 2013).
Two women’s associations on Lihir, Petztorme and Tutorme, have 
aimed to improve the position of women, but have developed quite 
different strategies to do so. Petztorme has drawn upon international 
understandings and conventions on gender and development to work for 
women’s development at the international, national and local level, and to 
argue for greater representation in local-level politics and decision making. 
Tutorme, on the other hand, has remained focused on the local level and 
has gained support from both the LLG and the company managing the 
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mine. Through an analysis of this case, I argue that gender mainstreaming 
has not been effective at the local level in Lihir, and that instead women 
continue to gain their status from their role as guardians of the future 
through children, youth and health. I begin with an analysis of the 
broader framework of literature on gender and mining to contextualise 
the Lihir case.
Gender and Mining
Male domination of the mining industry around the world is well 
documented, and the Pacific is no exception. In recent years, however, 
a number of studies have demonstrated and discussed women’s involvement 
in the industry, with a key aim being to challenge the hegemonic notion 
of mining as masculine (e.g. Eveline and Booth 2002; Gier and Mercier 
2006; Lahiri-Dutt and Macintyre 2006; Moretti 2006; Lahiri-Dutt and 
Robinson 2008; Lahiri-Dutt 2012).
Mining has also been characterised by its negative impacts, particularly on 
women. Oxfam Australia (2009) notes that the impacts of mining are not 
gender neutral. There is a great deal of literature that describes and analyses 
the impacts of mining on women as miners, as wives and as community 
members. Women have often been excluded from employment or, as 
miners, have suffered from poor working conditions, less pay and fewer 
opportunities for advancement than men (Lahiri-Dutt and Robinson 
2008; Sharma 2010). Mining has also been discussed in terms of its 
negative impact on women’s psychological well-being as wives and 
mothers, in terms of isolation from friends and family in remote locations 
(Sharma 2010), and also on family life through long working hours and 
shift work (Chase 2001). As community members, women have been 
viewed as bearing the brunt of the negative impacts of mining, with little 
input to negotiations between mining companies and local communities. 
In the Melanesian context, women have little say in negotiations or 
control over the compensation that flows into communities (Byford 
2002; Macintyre 2002; Oxfam Australia 2009; Wainetti 2013). While 
Scheyvens and Lagisa (1998) aim to show how women resist mining and 
logging activities, their paper documents much more thoroughly the lack 
of empowerment in economic, social, psychological and political domains 
in regard to mining in Lihir and logging in Solomon Islands, than the 
ways in which women resist these activities.
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It is in the context of these negative impacts that there have been calls for 
gender mainstreaming in mining. Gender mainstreaming is the ‘process 
of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, 
including legislation, policies and programmes in all areas and at all 
levels … [so that] women and men benefit equally and inequality is not 
perpetuated’ (UN 1997: 27). Lahiri-Dutt (2006) has argued that gender 
mainstreaming is the right direction for mining projects, yet there have 
also been critiques of the concept, arguing that women face structural 
disadvantages that gender mainstreaming is unable to overcome. The 
common approach is still to add women as a concern rather than have 
gender as an integral part of planning and processes. As Macintyre 
(2011: 30) states:
Whatever gender mainstreaming might be in academic terms, by the time 
it gets into aid projects or workplace policies it has become ‘add women 
and stir’ with nobody prepared to actually do this.
There are concerns that ‘gender mainstreaming’, with its emphasis on 
‘gender’, draws the focus away from women’s specific disadvantages 
(O’Neill 2004; Macintyre 2011). Moreover, it has been suggested that 
mainstreaming universalises notions of gender that can disempower 
women even further (Rimoldi 2011).
In recent years, a number of analyses have begun to document and move 
beyond the ‘negative impacts of mining’ to understand women as agents 
who can strategically draw upon mining to improve their lives. Mahy 
(2011) aims to move beyond the dichotomous representations of women as 
either indigenous blameless victims of their husbands’ sexuality in mining 
areas or as blameworthy migrant sex workers, to understand the livelihood 
choices and strategies of sex workers and community women. Lahiri-Dutt 
(2012) seeks to understand women’s agency in mining, whether this be in 
terms of how women draw upon mining as one of a number of livelihood 
strategies, or how they act as political agents in protests around mining. 
Lahiri-Dutt argues that there is a need to appreciate ‘the enormous 
evidence of women’s agency—in their productive roles in mines and at 
home, and in their resistance to exploitations of mining’ (2012: 193). It is 
these differing forms of strategy and agency—the ways in which Lihirian 
women are actively navigating local politics to position themselves to 
benefit from mining—that I explore in this paper. In what ways have they 
succeeded and how are they positioned as a result?
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Petztorme and Tutorme: A Tale of Two 
Associations
Early in the history of the Lihir gold mine there was recognition of the 
need for an overarching women’s association to provide a forum for 
women’s participation in decision making and development programs. 
So in 1991, with the assistance of the mining company’s community 
relations department and a female consultant, Suzy Bonnell, the Petztorme 
Women’s Association was formed (Membup 2003). Petztorme, meaning 
‘work together’ in the local language, was founded on the church structures 
of the Katolik Mamas (‘Catholic Mothers’) and United Church Women’s 
Fellowship already in place in Lihir (Membup and Macintyre 2000). 
The majority of Lihir villages are predominantly Catholic, with seven 
United Church villages and a handful of other denominations present in 
the islands (Hemer 2011). Each village in the island group had its own 
women’s group, with a president, vice-president, secretary and treasurer. 
The Petztorme executive mirrored this structure, with a president, vice-
president, secretary and treasurer and the presidents of the women’s 
groups in the four local churches (Catholic, United, Pentecostal and 
Seventh-Day Adventist). Petztorme also had a general council comprising 
representatives of each council ward on Lihir.1
Since 2014, Petztorme has altered its structure to require financial 
membership rather than simply encompassing all women on Lihir. Groups 
of 5–20 women choose to become financial members of Petztorme by 
paying a small fee (K50 in 2014). There were 35 member groups in 2014, 
from nine of the 15 council wards. This financial membership seems to 
promote more active presence and membership at meetings, and more 
engagement with the programs of the association.
In the early years of mining, Petztorme worked with women who were 
being relocated from two villages in order to allow mining to go ahead. 
It also began a number of income-generating projects: a nursery, market 
and can crusher in order to provide incremental self-help development 
for women. The difficulties with this approach, and the sectarian divisions 
in the association, have been well documented by Macintyre (2003b), 
who argues that most women’s projects in PNG fail due to issues with 
leadership once external advisers or funders withdraw.
1  Lihir is divided into 15 wards for the purpose of the local government council system. Most wards 
comprise two or three villages.
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By 2000, when I began work in the mining company’s community 
relations department, Petztorme was still being supported by the ‘women’s 
section’ of this department to successfully undertake a number of projects 
and programs with local women. While the nursery and can crusher had 
failed, the market was still functional, and was earning Petztorme a good 
ongoing revenue. It was at this time that a new project began, emerging out 
of a cultural exchange program between expatriate and Lihirian women, 
and the desire for training in sewing skills. A training centre was set up, 
with an expatriate seamstress able to train Lihirian women in sewing skills 
(see Hemer 2016; Macintyre 2003b).
This training centre came to be known as the Tutorme Training and 
Sewing Centre, and functioned out of a small building provided by the 
mining company.2 It was managed by an advisory committee of expatriate 
and Lihirian women, including myself as secretary. The seamstress became 
the key trainer, with her salary provided by the mining company as well. 
Sewing training was taken up with gusto, with some 200 women paying 
to take classes in sewing by 2002. Many had completed a full sequence 
of training, and a select number had found employment with Tutorme. 
In 2001, Tutorme moved to a new building, once again provided by the 
mining company, and had taken on a number of commercial sewing 
projects, such as providing curtains for dormitories and embroidering 
company logos on uniforms. It was also during this year that Tutorme was 
registered as an association, much to the concern of Petztorme women, 
who argued that having two associations for women in Lihir was likely 
to be a source of confusion and friction.
Even at this early stage, sectarian divisions within the two associations, 
as well as between them, threatened the continued viability of Tutorme. 
In 2002, the mining company provided Petztorme with a building of its 
own, at least partially to placate the Petztorme executive members who 
were critical of their lack of input into the direction in which Tutorme 
was heading. While this temporarily appeased most women, and provided 
a much-needed office space within the township, tensions between 
Tutorme, now managed through a financial advisory committee heavily 
composed of expatriates, and the Petztorme executive continued.
2  Tutorme means ‘stand together’ (tu torme), rather than ‘tutor me’.
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From 2002, Tutorme continued for some time as a relatively successful 
sewing centre. Then, with the departure of the expatriate manager in 
2005, its continued viability was threatened. In about 2008, the building 
that housed Tutorme was condemned and, while the sewing machines 
remained onsite and the intention was to relocate these to a new building, 
in reality Tutorme as a sewing centre is now defunct. This building 
has since been refurbished for use as a general conference and meeting 
space, and named the Lihir Meri Developmen Senta (‘Lihir Women’s 
Development Centre’). Its use is not restricted to any particular women’s 
group, or to women in general, though any revenue from use of the centre 
is allocated to women.
In 2009, Tutorme re-emerged on the Lihir scene as the Lihir Tutorme 
Women’s Association, a general women’s association working for women’s 
development. This re-emergence was in response to concerns in the mid-
2000s about the lack of programs for Lihirian women, and Petztorme’s 
lack of financial transparency. There was a failed attempt to change the 
executive committee of Petztorme, and eventually it was decided to bypass 
it by creating a new association.
Local Initiatives in Women’s Development
Both Tutorme and Petztorme have run a number of successful initiatives on 
Lihir. In its new incarnation Tutorme has been functional for a number of 
years, and in that time has focused on education and awareness programs 
for women and youth in villages, covering topics such as law and order 
issues, education and adult literacy. One of its recent programs was to hire 
a theatre group to provide entertaining and engaging education on HIV/
AIDS. Tutorme has drawn upon the Nimamar Rural LLG, links with 
the mining company (formerly Lihir Gold Limited, now Newcrest), and 
the Lihir Sustainable Development Plan (LSDP),3 both for small annual 
budgets and for material assistance and transport to implement these 
initiatives.
3  The LSDP arose out of the review of the integrated benefits package, the agreement between the 
Lihir community and the mining company which specifies the benefits to be provided to Lihirians on 
a five-yearly cycle. The LSDP is a plan for the development of Lihir using mining revenue, and is also 
an organisation with a budget to carry out that plan.
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Petztorme has also been involved in women’s health programs in Lihir. 
In the early 2000s, the association was a key partner and supporter of 
initiatives by the Lihir Medical Centre and the mining company’s women’s 
section as they carried out programs on nutrition in villages around 
the island group. Petztorme was also heavily involved in supporting 
the programs of the medical centre’s maternal and child health clinic, 
including the key nurse in her work on family planning. There were 
concerns in the early 2000s about population and family planning issues, 
and Petztorme organised and supported a workshop on this issue, with 
Petztorme members taking information back to their village groups. This 
interest in health has continued since that time, and programs on healthy 
families and villages were scheduled for 2014.
Petztorme continued to manage the market in the township until its 
‘temporary closure’ in 2011, and this provided a source of revenue to 
fund more projects.4 In late 2003, it launched a women’s microcredit 
scheme with loans of K500–700 charging 10 per cent interest and, in 
2004, employed a woman to coordinate this project. This seems to have 
been problematic, however, as the credit scheme was halted in 2005 and 
had not been relaunched at the time of writing. Also in 2004, Petztorme 
was successful in gaining grants from the LLG of K10,000 per ward for 
women’s projects, hence a total of K150,000. This money was to be used 
for vegetable gardens, bakeries, vanilla plants and small market houses to 
provide ongoing sources of money to women in villages. More recently, 
Petztorme has provided a route for providing information to women 
about financial opportunities provided by organisations like the New 
Ireland Savings and Loan Society and the Nationwide Microbank, and 
more generally on financial management and literacy.
On a more political note, in the early 2000s Petztorme pushed for 
women’s representation in local government, leading to the appointment 
of two women’s representatives to the Nimamar Rural LLG. This LLG is 
made up of 15 elected members, one each for the 15 wards in Lihir. The 
two female representatives are additional to this body, and were chosen by 
Petztorme to be the conduit for women’s views to be taken to the LLG and 
for information from the government to be brought back to Petztorme 
4  The temporary closure came about due to concerns over the cleanliness of the market and 
continued upkeep of the area, as well as debates over the position of migrants selling goods at the 
market and forcing prices too high. While ‘temporary’, it proved very difficult to resolve these issues 
and the market was closed for at least 12 months.
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and hence to Lihir village women. Also, as noted at the beginning of 
the chapter, Petztorme successfully lobbied for the inclusion of women 
in negotiations between the community and the mining company, and 
an additional woman was added to the Joint Negotiating Committee 
in the 2000–07 negotiations to bring the total to two. However, in the 
more recent negotiations beginning in 2012, Lihirian women have again 
struggled to get representation on the Joint Negotiating Committee 
despite Petztorme executives asking for this. In this respect, it can be seen 
that Petztorme has been more overtly concerned than Tutorme with the 
processes of local politics.
The initiatives of Petztorme and Tutorme at the local level have generally 
focused on aspects of everyday life understood as key concerns for 
women. These include gardening, cooking and sewing, and sometimes 
the sale of fruit and vegetables, or cooked food and sewn items, to make 
small amounts of money. Health is also seen as another key concern for 
women, as it is women who oversee the health and nutritional needs of 
their families. However, the claims by Petztorme for greater involvement 
and representation in local politics and negotiations signal a more global 
understanding of gender relations.
Petztorme: Going National and Global
In the two decades since the inception of Petztorme, the association 
has begun to choose to work beyond the local arena of Lihir. At the 
national level, members of Petztorme participated in the two ‘women 
in mining’ conferences held in Madang in 2003 and 2005 and spoke 
about the experiences of Lihirian women (Membup 2003). Petztorme has 
also provided a link between initiatives at the national level and women 
in Lihir. Members of Petztorme attended information sessions in Port 
Moresby about small grants from the United Nations Development 
Programme (on climate change and the environment) and the Women 
in Mining National Action Plan, then conveyed what they learned to 
women in Lihir, and planned to apply for grants under these programs.
One member whom I shall call Mary has also been sponsored by the 
Centre for Environmental Research and Development (CERD), a PNG 
non-governmental organisation largely funded by Oxfam Australia, to be 
a member of the Mine Affected Women’s Foundation. Mary was able 
to attend the 2005 women in mining conference, as well as the 2007 
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Pacific women and mining conference (Oxfam Australia 2009), and was 
a signatory to the 2007 declaration by CERD opposing any new mines 
in PNG. Mary has also been able to raise Lihirian women’s concerns over 
mining at a global level through overseas travel, interviews and publications. 
In 2003, she travelled to Portugal for a meeting of the World Bank’s 
Extractive Industries Review, as well as making a written submission to it 
in 2004. Mary also travelled to London to raise environmental concerns 
at Rio Tinto’s annual general meeting in 2003, when Rio Tinto still had 
a controlling interest in the Lihir mine. She was interviewed by Friends 
of the Earth International, and her comments about environmental 
disruption in Lihir are recorded in a 2003 publication as well as on their 
website.5
One Petztorme executive member is also the co-author of a chapter in 
an internationally published book that documents concern about the 
social and environmental risks of large-scale mining projects (Moody 
2005). The Petztorme executive as a whole has been active and able to 
raise Lihirian women’s concerns about the impacts of mining on Lihirian 
women and youth in particular, and also on the Lihirian environment, 
to national and global levels. At the national level in PNG, understandings 
of women in mining have been shaped by global discourses on gender.
Gender Mainstreaming and the National 
Action Plan
The PNG Government developed its Women in Mining National Action 
Plan as a result of national conferences on ‘women in mining’ held in 2003 
and 2005 (GoPNG 2007). These conferences were themselves part of an 
institutional strengthening project funded by the World Bank. The aim 
of the National Action Plan is to draw attention to the issues affecting 
women in mining areas in the country, and to then set the direction 
for addressing these issues. The plan draws upon key international 
conventions and obligations including the Millennium Development 
Goals, the Beijing Declaration, and the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women. In this respect, it highlights 
5  In order to maintain confidentiality, I am not including the reference for these comments here.
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the importance of gender mainstreaming for the PNG Government in 
aiming to achieve women’s empowerment and equality. As outlined in the 
National Action Plan, gender mainstreaming in mining is the:
equitable distribution of the resources, opportunities and benefits of the 
development process and addresses gender inequalities in the mainstream 
of organizational policies, plans and programs, not just as separate, ad-hoc 
activities (GoPNG 2007: 3).
There is a clear recognition, then, that gender mainstreaming in mining 
aims to move beyond approaches that simply add a recognition of women 
to supposedly neutral plans and programs.
The National Action Plan lists eight goals which are, very briefly, to 
raise women’s education and literacy; to improve access to reproductive 
health services; to prevent or control communicable diseases, including 
tuberculosis and sexually transmitted infections; to increase women’s 
participation in economic, political, cultural and social life; to ensure that 
women’s associations function beyond mine closure; to ensure sustainable 
livelihoods; to mitigate or avoid environmental degradation; and to 
promote security and peace in communities. Each of these goals has related 
objectives, strategies and targets. Many of these involve awareness raising, 
and numbered or named targets such as, for example, a certain number 
of training sessions held, water tanks at six health facilities, or 10 per cent 
of women multiskilled by 2012. It is clear that such an ambitious plan 
would require high-level coordination, and this is acknowledged in the 
implementation framework, yet there is little discussion of how this 
would actually occur.
The plan acknowledges that women should be involved ‘in the development 
of policies, design and management of programs at all stages and levels 
of decision making’ (GoPNG 2007: 3). This then becomes part of the 
fourth goal of the plan, which is to increase women’s participation in the 
economic, political, cultural and social life of their communities. One of 
the objectives of this goal is for women’s participation in local political 
processes, such as landowner associations and mine closure committees, as 
well as in employment. This is one of the few goals that have an objective 
that aims for equality, such as 50  per cent participation in landowner 
associations. Most of the objectives, even in this goal, aim for an addition 
of women to existing committees, or for awareness raising and ‘gender 
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sensitivity’ amongst males. Yet once again there is little discussion in the 
plan of how participation of women in local political processes will be 
achieved, other than by awareness and sensitivity training.
Most of the goals in the plan, despite its acknowledged context, have 
little to do with gender mainstreaming and equality, whether this be in 
education, health or agriculture. Most of the targets (such as a 50 per cent 
increase in female student enrolment) are set without any discussion of 
the communities’ needs and strengths prior to the plan, which would vary 
between the different mine sites around the country. Overall, the aim of 
the plan is for improvements to the current conditions that women face, 
rather than for gender mainstreaming or equality.
There is little evidence of the National Action Plan having any impact in 
Lihir. Despite the number of Lihirian women attending the women in 
mining conferences, no one I spoke to in 2011, 2012 or 2014 mentioned 
the existence of the plan. One of the leaders of Tutorme did say that 
their emphasis on awareness programs arose out of one of the conferences, 
which was possibly a reference to the plan, since awareness programs were 
a key feature of the activities listed in it. Yet there is no explicit discussion 
of the plan itself. This suggests at the least that women are unlikely to be 
using the plan to leverage changes in Lihir. Of the eight goals mentioned 
in the plan, some were already being pursued, funded and organised 
through relevant organisations such as the Lihir Medical Centre or the 
LLG, but no one carrying out these activities seemed to be aware that 
they were fulfilling the goals of the National Action Plan, so it seems quite 
likely that the goals were being pursued by accident rather than by design.
There were few calls for gender mainstreaming in Lihir. Where there was 
some activism was in terms of calls for some level of representation for 
women in local politics and on bodies negotiating over the benefits of 
mining, as noted at the beginning of this chapter. More recent years have 
seen sustained activism against gender violence. Women also called for 
more business opportunities and for the need for access to sources of 
funding. In the realm of employment there was little activism around 
equity of access or rates of pay.6 The ways these issues became part 
of local practice, however, was in terms of adding women in to existing 
6  Where there was activism in relation to employment, it tended to be in terms of Lihirians’ access 
to employment and conditions relative to other Papua New Guineans, rather than being concerned 
with differences between men and women.
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processes—the ‘add women and stir’ approach (Macintyre 2011: 30)—
rather than significantly challenging the processes or practices themselves. 
Hence more global notions of gender mainstreaming and equality had 
little currency in Lihir, where other understandings of gender relationships 
held sway—in particular, relationships between men and women based in 
nurturance, respect and work.
Women’s Status in Lihir: Sio, Ertnin and Pniez
Lihirians are members of both lineages and named clans with matrilineal 
descent. Land tenure is said to be based on matrilineal inheritance, but is 
complex and has cognatic tendencies. As argued by Macintyre (2003b), 
in pre-colonial times it is unlikely that women participated in exchanges 
in their own right, and even today they assert little control over land or 
ritual events. Despite this, a woman could develop the reputation and 
status of a ‘big woman’ (wok tohe) on rare occasions, and more commonly 
it was known that the renown of ‘big men’ (a tohe) rested largely upon 
their wives and sisters (Bainton 2010: 83–5).
Women’s status is best understood through the concept of sio, meaning 
the respect shown to someone or that someone has earned. Sio is most 
commonly used in reference to big men, to indicate that people respect 
them by demonstrating respectful behaviour and providing them with 
shell money (a le) with which they could participate in exchanges. Thus 
the respect shown to a big man would allow for the further development 
of the reputation of the clan through ritual exchanges.
Women did not receive sio in the form of shell money, but gained it 
through the bearing and raising of children, and through the production 
of garden food and pigs that could be exchanged for shell money. The key 
term used to refer to these processes is ertnin, a term that indicates 
a productive future-oriented practice, often meaning nurturance (Hemer 
2013). Hence a woman would carefully nurture her children, gardens and 
pigs. As a mother she would aim to have many children, but space them 
carefully so they would all grow to healthy maturity. A woman who was 
highly productive, with large gardens full of yams and pigs grown fat to 
adulthood was one who was highly valued by her husband, and one who 
could inspire the jealousy of her husband’s male rivals. Sometimes she 
would be the subject of sorcery attacks intended to inhibit her capacities. 
Such a woman was one of high status—one who had earned sio.
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Sio was also demonstrated through appropriate behaviour between classes 
of kin. For example, sisters were understood to be mutually supportive. 
A brother and sister should not speak of sexual matters in one another’s 
presence, nor should a sister walk past her sleeping brother’s head. Male 
and female cross-cousins should refrain from using each other’s names, but 
were expected to joke. Male cross-cousins were expected to have a highly 
supportive relationship that was not the site for jealousy or anger. It was 
understood that often behaviour did not necessarily meet these ideals, 
and was the focus for angry confrontations and relationship tension. 
Yet conformity with these expectations was a demonstration and practice 
of respect, and in itself could earn respect. Many of these expectations 
underpin both the practice of gender relations and the interpretation 
of appropriate and respectful conduct.
While it is understood that both benefits and respect can be gained either 
through hard work or through positions or associations, women generally 
gained their sio not through their positions or associations, but through 
their own hard work (pniez). In the context of mining there has been some 
backlash against benefits received through positions, like the royalties 
gained by a person as a member of a particular lineage. This backlash 
is particularly strong where these royalties are then not distributed 
throughout the lineage, as it seems that the receipt of these benefits relies 
on relational qualities that are simultaneously denied. This has meant that 
the moral value of pniez as the source of benefits has become more acutely 
understood. This point is key to understanding the criticisms made 
of some Lihirian women.
Women’s Associations and Women’s Status
In order to carry out many of its programs, Petztorme has drawn upon 
Lihir women’s voluntary labour. This has been one of the weak points of 
the organisation, in the sense that Lihirian women already have many 
other things that draw upon their time. As many men and young women 
have gained employment with the mine, the volume of work carried out by 
village women has increased, meaning that there is even less time available 
for voluntary communal work (Macintyre 2003b). Given that much of 
the work for Petztorme drew upon existing skills and understandings of 
women’s work, such as growing plants or vegetables for sale or providing 
health and nutrition information, it has not been the basis for gaining 
additional respect nor a source of challenge to conventional notions of 
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women’s status. Although it constitutes an extra obligation for women 
who are already very busy, this work at the local level has still been seen as 
generally appropriate for women.
Similarly, Tutorme in its first incarnation extended this understanding 
of appropriate women’s activities through its sewing training. Most of 
the women who sought training were able to use these skills to provide 
for their families in the village setting: only a handful went on to gain 
employment with Tutorme. For those who did, like women who work 
for the mine, their earnings are expected to be used to provide for their 
immediate family or for the customary work and feasting of their lineage. 
The new incarnation of Tutorme likewise draws upon women’s time 
and work to provide further awareness and health education for women 
and youth in the village. At this local level, then, the strategies of both 
Petztorme and Tutorme confirm and bolster women’s status based in their 
work and the nurturance of families, gardens and pigs.
The activities of Petztorme at the national and global level were perceived 
quite differently. For most women, the travels of women like Mary or 
other executives of Petztorme were seen not as working for the broader 
benefit of Lihirian women. Rather, these were seen as a personal 
benefit—a chance for them to experience the wider world and gain a 
name for themselves. Their efforts to raise the concerns of Lihirian 
women at the national and international levels, and their experience with 
government and non-governmental organisations, have not translated to 
additional sio for them at the local level. While the ability to speak up 
about the concerns of women, particularly in front of men, is valued by 
other women, it is generally not highly valued by Lihirian men, and does 
not appear to be a source of sio. Mary, for example, has instead been 
the subject of much criticism about ‘doing nothing’ for Lihirians while 
benefiting from her position in the Petztorme executive. Her actions are 
not perceived as morally valued work. Thus Mary has been caught in the 
disjunction between national and global discourses on gender and mining 
on the one hand, and local Lihirian notions of the appropriate work and 
place of women on the other.
The existence of two women’s associations, and divisions both within 
and between them, has been a continual focus of criticism on the part of 
Lihirian men. Men have continually pointed to the mismanagement (or 
lack of management) of programs, equipment and buildings as evidence of 
Lihirian women’s inability to work cooperatively or organise development 
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initiatives. There has been ongoing insistence that Lihirian women 
need to develop ‘one voice’ before they should seek to have an input to 
negotiations over benefits from the mine. Lihirian women have largely 
accepted this insistence and justification for their lack of representation 
in local political and economic matters, and have continually attempted 
to develop models for reconciliation or cooperation. This was ongoing 
even as recently as 2016, with men insisting that women reconcile to have 
‘one voice’ in order to contribute to the agreement review process, and 
women concurring. There is often little reflection by women on the lack 
of cooperation among men or among the various groups that represent 
them. There is also very little comment on the different conditions for 
other associations, often with almost exclusively male membership, which 
do not rely on voluntary labour. These include the Nimamar Rural LLG 
and the Lihir Mining Area Landowners’ Association, in which men are 
salaried, and the boards of various businesses that pay men but require 
little work. Thus far, the differences among women’s groups have proven 
too difficult to resolve despite lengthy efforts to achieve reconciliation, and 
women remain largely excluded from local politics and decision making.
Lihir Women’s Status and Gender 
Mainstreaming
In a context where value is placed upon women’s nurturance of children, 
gardens and pigs, gender mainstreaming can appear as a threat to these 
traditional sources of status. Women, through Petztorme and Tutorme, 
have appealed to other women, and to both expatriate and local Lihirian 
males, in their roles as guardians of the future to effect changes at the local 
level. This has been an effective strategy in gaining acceptance of programs 
about health or sewing, to make changes at the market run by Petztorme, 
or to call for changes to the sale of alcohol. Such activities fit well with 
the broader understanding of women’s position and positively contribute 
to their status or standing (sio). In particular, Lihirian men have been 
supportive of such approaches, and hence there has been funding support 
for programs such as these by the Nimamar Rural LLG and the Lihir 
Sustainable Development Plan.
Yet when Lihirian women aim or argue for greater access or representation, 
particularly in the realms of politics and employment, they undercut 
those understandings of women’s status. Instead, women then become 
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the subject of criticism and jealousy from other women as they are seen 
to be benefiting themselves rather than performing morally valued work. 
It also appears that, as they draw less upon those nurturance roles, they 
have to build their status in new ways. This roughly translates as being 
seen to be ‘doing something’, often in various forms of leadership, which 
may include proposing and organising successful meetings, training 
opportunities and projects from which Lihirian women can benefit. Yet 
such a definition of success in raising their status leaves them open to 
criticism similar to that which many Lihirian men also face. Thus Mary 
and other members of the Petztorme executive over the past ten years have 
been subject to charges of misuse of funds or association property, and 
of responsibility for a lack of real development for Lihirian women. As 
argued by Macintyre (2003b), the local model of successful leadership is 
one where leaders must distribute largesse; if they are unable to do so then 
their leadership, and hence their standing in the community, is contested.
If gender mainstreaming, as defined internationally, implies that women 
should be the equals of men in their access to employment, politics, and 
hence sources of status, then such a model can be problematic in a country 
such as PNG. Rimoldi has pointed out the danger in a discussion of the 
Leitana Nehan Women’s Development Agency in Bougainville:
By taking on the vocabulary and orientation of international development 
or welfare agencies (and affiliating with them), this once very grassroots 
organisation gradually came to believe that it was dependent on aid money 
for existence. In a sense it looks like a ‘buy out’ of women’s influence and 
authority intrinsic to their traditional standing in Bougainville society. 
(Rimoldi 2011: 191)
Rimoldi goes on to question what precisely ‘mainstream’ means, and how 
gender in Bougainville may be shaped in response to these international 
concerns (ibid.: 191–2).
Onyeke has argued, in the context of PNG, that it is necessary to go 
beyond notions of equality to aim more broadly for respect:
[T]he idea of using political or leadership gender equality to measure 
the value and dignity of PNG women is far too simplistic and overly 
optimistic (Onyeke 2010: 12).
This respect should be based on the dignity of the person rather than due 
to their roles or achievements. This accords with Walby’s (2005) argument 
that, where gender mainstreaming implies women gaining equality on 
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terms set by male norms, there is a risk that women’s sources of authority 
can be undermined. This is clearly the case for Lihir, where a woman’s 
status continues to be tied to her capacity to contribute through the 
nurturance of children, gardens and pigs, and in a lesser way through 
the contribution of her earnings to her family and lineage. Similarly 
for Onyeke, mothering—and by extension the ‘social act of caring and 
nurturing’—should be the model and basis for respect of women (Onyeke 
2010: 13). It is possible that these activities of nurturance may come to 
be understood as of lesser value by Lihirian men and women if arguments 
for equality become more commonplace in Lihir.
Conclusion
In moving away from analyses that emphasise the negative impacts of 
mining on women, it is possible to productively examine the strategies 
and choices made by women in the context of mining developments. 
The two women’s associations on Lihir have followed different strategies 
in an attempt to advance women’s positions: both Tutorme and Petztorme 
emphasise traditional forms of women’s status, yet Petztorme has appealed 
to a broader audience and more global understandings of gender and 
mining. Strategies adopted at the local level by both associations have 
aimed to consolidate and strengthen traditional sources of women’s status 
through work on the nurturance of children and youth, with attention to 
human health and a productive environment. Yet such a focus does little 
to challenge Lihir women’s position relative to men and their lack of local 
political representation, as well as the real conditions of disadvantage that 
they face.
Petztorme’s efforts at the national and global levels to raise the concerns of 
Lihirian women about the impact of mining, and to call for a place in local 
political representation and decision making, clearly resonate with some 
of the aims for equality and access that characterise gender mainstreaming. 
To date their claims fall well short of the ‘equitable distribution of 
resources, opportunities and benefits’, and equal participation in policies, 
plans and programs, that are core to gender mainstreaming (GoPNG 
2007: 3). Even in this partial form, the strategies of Petztorme have not 
been met with much enthusiasm or acclaim on Lihir, and speak to the 
difficulty of improving the conditions for women and their representation 
in local political processes.
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At present, it is uncertain how successful each of the strategies adopted 
by Lihirian women’s associations will be. It may well be the case that the 
strategy of Tutorme, which places greater emphasis on the nurturing roles 
of women, will be much more successful in this local context. Rather 
than directly challenging men and arguing for equality, it highlights the 
strengths of the unique contributions that women can make to social 
life. Yet it is clear that women should have a voice and a place at the 
negotiation table, as well as equitable access to any opportunities and 
benefits afforded by mining within their community. It would appear that 
gender mainstreaming, as understood at the national and international 
levels, is unlikely to prove to be a workable model, at least for Lihirian 
women. To judge by the local perception of Petztorme’s efforts at the 
national and global levels, it is quite possible that their strategy may work 
against Lihirian women in the long run by undercutting their traditional 
sources of status, which would place them at an even greater disadvantage.
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11. Migrants, Labourers and 




The Papua New Guinea (PNG) landscape is punctuated by large-scale 
resource extraction projects that have created concentrated nodes of 
hyper-intensive capital development that draw people from near and 
far. Existing patterns and processes of uneven development have found 
new expression in these enclave spaces that have reshaped the national 
‘metageography’ of development (Sidaway 2007). These new centres attract 
hopeful migrants who seek economic opportunities and access to services 
that remain absent throughout many rural districts in contemporary 
PNG. The movement of people around resource development projects, 
or what the International Finance Corporation calls ‘project-induced 
in-migration’ (IFC 2009), or what Glenn Banks has more aptly described 
in the PNG context as ‘rural-to-resource migration’ (Banks 2005: 135), 
is a common social phenomenon in developing country contexts. While 
the drift towards resource development projects throughout PNG is 
motivated by similar aspirations as rural-to-urban migration (Strathern 
1975; Clunies Ross 1984), and bears some resemblance to rural-to-rural 
migration, there are several distinguishing spatial and temporal features.
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Migration has been a central feature of PNG’s human landscape for 
centuries, as part of the maintenance of kin relations, marriage, trade 
and exchange or displacement from warfare and, more recently, in 
response to environmental hazards (Connell 2012). In many cases, it is 
regulated by customary norms and reciprocal obligations over extended 
periods of time. In contrast, rural-to-resource migration typically occurs 
at a greater pace over a more compressed period of time. There is often 
an increased level of in-migration during project construction, but 
it can vary over time as operations expand and contract. It is strongly 
influenced by existing regional development and settlement patterns that 
are usually concentrated around project areas. While most migrants draw 
upon regional networks and existing social relations with project area 
communities, the process is also formulated as an opportunistic strategy 
whereby migrants with previously limited social connections to the project 
area forge new relationships in order to legitimise their presence. For many 
migrants, the intention is to stay as long as the resource project remains 
in operation, or as long as it remains socially and economically feasible. 
In addition to unprecedented forms of social and environmental change 
generated by large-scale resource development (Bainton 2010; Golub 
2014; Kirsch 2014), in-migration places enormous pressure upon host 
communities, project operators, and local government authorities. If  it 
is readily acknowledged that resource projects provide many of the pull 
factors that influence regional migration patterns, it is also evident that 
host communities play a major determining role in shaping in-migration 
and settlement patterns. As such, in-migration can create complex and 
overwhelming consequences, and the question of so-called ‘migrant 
management’ is a vexed issue for all parties.
This chapter presents material collected through a long-term demographic 
monitoring program that covers the Lihir Islands in PNG’s New 
Ireland Province, where the Lihir gold mine is situated. The scale of 
in-migration around the Lihir project is smaller than that associated with 
some resource projects on the PNG mainland, but an awareness of this 
difference has only served to sharpen local concerns over the growing 
presence of outsiders in Lihir. Elsewhere I have explored Lihirian cultural 
and political responses to migrants, which are largely characterised by 
the emergence of a strong sense of ethnic and cultural difference that 
Lihirians regularly articulate in relation to outsiders, the transformation 
of guests into strangers, and the codification of Lihirian identity (Bainton 
2009). In different ways, each response attempts to manage or exclude 
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outsiders in order to contain mine-related benefits within Lihir, and 
these responses can be seen as part of the social relations of compensation 
(see Chapter 1, this volume). In this chapter, I look more closely at the 
migrant population. I propose that in-migration, or rural-to-resource 
migration, is best understood as a socially embedded phenomenon that 
arises from the strategic opportunism exercised by both migrants and 
host communities or, in other words, as the socioeconomic result of 
a dialectical resourcefulness. In Lihir, this is best exemplified through the 
complex and often contradictory intersection between migrant labour 
and landowner business development, the strategies that migrants pursue 
in order to secure access to land, accommodation and livelihoods, and 
the precarious nature of their lives. I conclude with some reflections on 
the practical implications for the management of this phenomenon.
Resource Enclaves, Project Corridors 
and Migrant Groups
The legal recognition of customary landownership in PNG ensures that 
resource companies are drawn into intense and continuing engagement 
with local landowners or their representatives over access to land and 
resources and the operational activities that occur once leases have been 
granted. Benefit-sharing agreements outline the conditions for the payment 
of statutory compensation and royalties to lease-area landowners and the 
provision of a broader set of benefits such as employment opportunities, 
service delivery and economic opportunities, which may also filter out to 
the wider host community (Filer 2012). Even when resource development 
projects require the relocation of village communities, landowners often 
remain within close vicinity of the project. Notwithstanding trips abroad 
or the minority elite who establish themselves in urban centres like Port 
Moresby, it is rare for local landowners to permanently migrate away from 
project areas and their related disturbances.1 If this reflects the difficulties 
that people may face in securing access to land in other areas, it also 
reflects their desire to maintain claims over new forms of development 
and the fear that, by relocating elsewhere, they might relinquish any rights 
1  The PNG context tells a rather different story compared to other mining-dependent countries 
like Peru, where local communities are known to migrate away from the project area, while more 
skilled migrants settle around the mine (Bury 2007). Thanks to Glenn Banks for bringing this point 
to my attention.
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over this new ‘inheritance’. In some locations, such as Porgera, it also 
reflects a fear among landowners that other people may come and take 
up residence on their land if they do not stay to protect their interests. 
Social pressures increase as people from neighbouring villages, and from 
other valleys, islands and provinces similarly gravitate towards these areas 
in search of the ‘good life’. As a result, the nature and scale of rural-to-
resource migration often irreversibly restructures regional networks and 
relationships. Local communities may well feel dispossessed, marginalised 
or displaced, not only by the project, but from the sheer number of people 
arriving on their lands (Banks 2009: 49).
Without overstating the differences, it is possible to draw some basic 
distinctions between migrant ‘types’ around resource development 
projects in PNG. The bulk of the migrant population is often composed 
of semi-skilled rural people seeking employment with local companies 
or the developer, or indirect engagement with the resource economy as 
entrepreneurs or market sellers, or access to better services. And in some 
locations the glitter of artisanal gold mining is simply too much to resist. 
These migrants differ from the small number of people posted to project 
areas to work in essential government services where accommodation 
is provided, and skilled professionals and tradespeople who come to 
manage or work for local businesses. These migrants are distinct from the 
employees of the developer or major contractor companies, who are often 
engaged on fly-in/fly-out arrangements from their home and stay in camp 
accommodation during their work rotation.2
The Wau-Bulolo region of what is now Morobe Province hosted the first 
major mining operations in PNG in the 1920s and drew in large numbers 
of migrants, many of whom were recruited from the Sepik region 
through the government’s labour recruitment program. Pre-existing 
tensions surrounding the presence of outsiders working on plantations 
and in administrative roles in Bougainville during the period after World 
War II were compounded when mining operations started in that region 
in the early 1970s. The presence of thousands of outside labourers, 
termed ‘redskins’ by local Bougainvilleans due to their comparatively 
light skin colour, was a major contributing factor that led to widespread 
dissatisfaction around the operation of the mine (Nash and Ogan 1990; 
also Chapter 12, this volume). By contrast, the Misima gold mine in 
2  For an overview of fly-in/fly-out employment in the PNG mining sector, see McGavin et al. 
(2001). See also Storey (2001) and Markey (2010).
317
11. Migrants, Labourers and Landowners at the Lihir Gold Mine, Papua New Guinea
Milne Bay Province is one of the few operations in PNG that was not 
impacted by in-migration, partly as a result of its remote location and 
the lack of transport options, the limited economic opportunities for 
contractors, and the policy adopted by Misima Mines Ltd to maximise 
local recruitment.
At the Ok Tedi mine daily life for the previously isolated Wopkaimin people 
has certainly been affected as thousands of people from cognate Mountain 
Ok language groups and from further afield have moved into the area and 
settled around Tabubil town. The prospect of instant riches sparked a gold 
rush at Mt Kare and lured vast numbers to that inhospitable landscape 
(Ryan 1991; Vail 1995). But nothing compares to the Porgera gold mine, 
where tens of thousands of people have been drawn to the Porgera Valley by 
the allure of mine-related development and an artisanal gold mining boom 
(Callister 2008). The pre-mining population has increased from roughly 
2,500 people recorded in 1957 (Meggitt 1957:  33), to approximately 
10,000 in 1990 (Filer 1999:  3) and an estimated 45,000 in 2012 
(BGC 2012).3 Many people have exploited a combination of customary 
ties and local Ipili people’s notions of incorporation that make it possible 
for people from outside the valley to come and live there (Golub 2007). 
In-migration was further encouraged as Ipili people strategically allowed 
‘outsiders’ to come and reside in the valley in order to increase the number 
of their allies and supporters for greater security and to expand the network 
of economic possibilities that they might exploit. The socially embedded 
nature of in-migration makes it difficult for local community members to 
now ‘manage’ or stop the influx of outsiders. Ipili people fear retribution 
for any attempt to remove outsiders, particularly from their neighbours 
who feel entitled to benefit from the mining project. Mounting pressure to 
resettle the large population residing in congested settlements on lease areas 
close to mining activities presents an intractable problem for all parties: the 
complex ties between landowners and migrants have made it impossible 
for the Porgera Joint Venture to forge a clear distinction between these 
household units and to establish eligibility for relocation packages (Kemp 
and Owen 2015). At the same time, as the company and local authorities 
contemplate the eventual closure of the mine, they face difficult questions 
around the provision of post-mining services that will adequately support 
a large community that is heavily concentrated around the project area with 
3  In the absence of firm census figures, estimates of the population resident in the Porgera Valley 
have been the subject of some debate. A recent report for the Restoring Justice Initiative suggests that 
the population in the valley may be as high as 73,000 people (Robinson 2014).
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little incentive to move elsewhere. The question of relinquishing the mining 
lease at the end of its term may become seriously problematic in light of the 
difficulties surrounding the safe decommissioning of the mine site when 
hundreds of so-called ‘illegal miners’ (BGC 2010) continue to enter the 
lease area and tunnel and sift through stockpiles and pit walls in search of 
gold. These miners will doubtless expect to have access to remaining gold 
traces as their main form of livelihood in the post-mining era.
Whereas mining operations often produce more concentrated impact 
zones, and benefit streams tend to accumulate in quite discrete geographic 
locations, oil and gas projects are temporally different and generate more 
spatially distributed impacts.4 PNG’s new liquefied natural gas project, 
operated by ExxonMobil, sources gas from various fields and wells, 
incorporating these locations into a wider productive landscape as gas 
is piped to export facilities on the outskirts of Port Moresby. This gas 
network covers the lands of many culturally and linguistically different 
groups and will reconfigure relationships at a much larger scale as a more 
diverse group of people gravitate towards wells and proposed pipeline 
corridors in anticipation of economic opportunities (Goldman 2009). 
Instead of coalescing around a single project site, the extended network of 
facilities has provided migrants with a multitude of possible destinations, 
and this could mean that a much greater number of communities will 
experience social and demographic pressures without the development 
offsets that are sometimes found in mining enclaves.
Lihir and Its Gold Mine
The Lihir Islands are situated off the east coast of mainland New Ireland 
and are divided into 15 local-level government wards. The Lihir gold 
mine, which commenced operations in 1997 and is currently operated 
by Newcrest Mining Ltd, is located in Ward  2 on the main island of 
Aniolam (Figure  11.1). While the mining lease areas occupy slightly 
more than 12  per cent of Aniolam Island, the social and economic 
4  Of course, some projects, like the Ok Tedi mine, have generated far-reaching downstream 
impacts. In other locations, mining projects may develop infrastructure across wide geographic zones, 
including ports, pipelines, power stations, roads and railways that increase both the possibilities and 
complexity of in-migration patterns. Work elsewhere, particularly in Africa and South America, where 
oil and gas pipelines thread across parts of those continents, provides useful points of comparison 
(e.g. Thibault and Blaney 2003; Lavachery et al. 2005; Smith 2005; Finer et al. 2008).
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footprint of the operation has encompassed the entire island group 
and all villages have experienced substantial social, economic, cultural 
and political change.5 As with other resource development projects in 
PNG, unmanaged in-migration has generated major social impacts and 
numerous operational risks.
Lihirians historically lived in scattered hamlets along the coastal strips. 
Land and other property rights are generally held by matrilineal descent 
groups, although this pattern is changing due to greater emphasis being 
placed on the nuclear family unit and fathers looking to secure land and 
resources for their children or pass on permanent houses to their sons. 
Matrilineages traditionally occupied their own hamlets, and male leaders 
were responsible for maintaining the men’s house of the lineage. Men’s 
house sites were a primary locus for the social reproduction of lineage 
groups through the performance of customary feasts and the exchange 
of pigs and shell money. Mining has introduced greater amounts of cash 
and commodities that are now incorporated into these events, thereby 
boosting the local ceremonial economy and reaffirming the symbolic 
importance of the men’s house (Bainton and Macintyre 2016).
Lihirians have strong cultural links throughout New Ireland with people 
from the Namatanai, Tanga and Tabar districts, and with people from 
West New Britain. Historical migration patterns, both within Lihir and 
the broader region, tended to be more short term. People travelled to 
other areas to engage in feasting and exchange activities and to maintain 
relations established through marriage and clan ties. Reciprocal notions 
of hospitality, coupled with comparatively less pressure upon land, meant 
that if people chose to stay on for extended periods of time they could 
be granted access to land and resources for subsistence. Some people also 
migrated to pursue work on plantations or in urban areas.
5  The total land mass on Aniolam Island is 19,960 hectares. The combined area of the special 
mining lease, the lease for mining purposes, and the mining easement is 2,527 hectares—about 
12 per cent of the island.
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Figure 11.1 Villages and council wards on Aniolam Island.
Source: Newcrest Lihir Lands and Geographic Information System unit.
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At the crudest level, resource development has divided Lihir into ‘affected’ 
and ‘non-affected’ areas. This distinction is crystallised in the 1995 
‘integrated benefits package’ (IBP) agreement and is based upon whether 
village land has been disturbed for mining purposes.6 Those Lihirians who 
own land within the mining lease areas receive royalties, compensation 
and other economic benefits. The wider community benefits in more 
indirect ways such as employment, service provision and community 
development projects. Development of the mine in the Louise Caldera 
required the relocation of two coastal villages, Putput and Kapit (Owen 
and Kemp 2014). The physical relocation of Kapit village and the 
subsequent resettlement programs have been complex and protracted, and 
are still incomplete. Due to a lack of customary land within the vicinity 
of the original village of Kapit, the community was divided as households 
were relocated around Lihir to areas where they have clan connections. 
Few of these relocated families have strong land tenure rights in these 
new locations, further compounding their vulnerability. The people of 
Putput were resettled as a relatively cohesive community to nearby land 
where they had customary land rights. Putput village is largely composed 
of Lihirians who claim ownership over land within the ‘special mining 
lease’ (SML) area and is consequently positioned at the top of the new 
socioeconomic hierarchy. Other nearby villages, including Zuen, Kunaie 
and Londolovit, also contain many Lihirians who claim ownership over 
land within the SML and the ‘lease for mining purposes’ (LMP) area. 
These villages were not relocated to make way for the mining operation, 
but because portions of their land were alienated for the LMP, the airport 
or the mining easements, these villages are also classified as affected areas 
and have received specific benefits and compensation.
Most Lihirians maintain high expectations for mine-derived development, 
and many lease-area landowners feel entitled to an exclusive claim over 
economic benefits and opportunities that arise from the project. At 
6  The 1995 IBP was signed by the developer, the landowners and the government. It was 
organised into four chapters which represented the fourfold classification of compensation presented 
by the landowners during negotiations—compensation for destruction, development, security 
and rehabilitation. It contains the compensation and relocation agreements and three memoranda 
of agreement (MOAs) between the landowners and the three tiers of government, as well as the 
environmental monitoring plan and provisions for trust funds. The MOAs establish the distribution of 
royalties and define the responsibilities and undertakings of the parties in relation to the development 
of the mine and its benefits for the community. The MOAs were included in the agreement so that 
the landowners could see the entire package of compensation and benefits they would receive from 
the mining operation. The IBP agreement was revised in 2007 (Bainton 2010) and is the subject of 
a current review process.
Large-Scale Mines and Local-Level Politics
322
the same time, the technical or legal distinction between affected and 
non-affected areas fails to capture the extent to which the so-called non-
affected villages have also experienced the social impacts arising from 
the operation. Consequently, the unequal distribution of the costs and 
benefits associated with the project has generated considerable tensions 
and divisions throughout Lihir.
Demographic Monitoring
The social impact monitoring program for the Lihir gold mine, managed 
by  the company’s social performance department, has maintained 
a consistent focus on demographic monitoring. The current program has 
its origins in the baseline population survey and landowner identification 
work, and the earlier mapping of Lihirian men’s houses (Filer 1992; 
Burton  1994). In 1994, John Burton developed the Lihir ‘village 
population system’ (VPS) database built on his customised genealogy 
software. An in-house team of research officers continues to work closely 
with a group of village-based informants to collect quarterly population 
updates for the VPS database, and since 2003 demographer John Vail has 
provided the team with technical support and produced annual population 
reports. The VPS now comprises a genealogical database of the Lihirian 
population and a database for the non-Lihirian population. The reason 
for this separation reflects Lihirian concerns over maintaining the ‘purity’ 
of Lihirian data to ensure that non-Lihirians are not mistakenly ascribed 
Lihirian status, which might allow them to access mining benefits. 
These two databases are linked through a third geographic information 
system database that combines aerial imagery and ground-level surveys, 
and contains information on the location of residential houses and their 
inhabitants.
Research officers and village informants have maintained relatively 
accurate data on the Lihirian population, partly due to the quality of 
the original genealogical survey, the ease of identifying Lihirians, and 
because many Lihirians tend to reside close to their natal village. On the 
other hand, it has proven more difficult to maintain accurate data on 
the migrant population because it is more mobile and less integrated 
into Lihirian society. For this reason, a residential household mapping 
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approach has been required. Demographic datasets collected through 
a  variety of other sources, including birth and death records from the 
health centres, attendance at maternal and child health clinics, school 
enrolment records and employment applications, are cross-referenced for 
inclusion in the VPS.
Overall, the longevity of this program has started to allow for a more 
sophisticated analysis of changes in fertility, mortality and life expectancy 
in the Lihirian population, and a more detailed understanding of the 
migrant population and its residential patterns. The VPS has proven to be 
an important corporate risk management tool, as it allows for a detailed 
level of information on local demographic trends and broader stakeholder 
connections. It also provides the basis for understanding the customary 
ownership of mining lease areas, the lack of which has been the source of 
considerable social tension and financial cost at other operations in PNG. 
In the absence of reliable government census data, the VPS has been of great 
value to local stakeholders, including the landowner association and the 
local-level government, and it has assisted with community development 
planning and land dispute resolution. While the VPS has many positive 
applications, and is maintained with the express endorsement of the 
landowner association and the local-level government, in its capacity as 
the curator or manager of this genealogical and personal identity database, 
the company has a clear duty of care to safeguard against its improper use 
and ensure its preservation for future generations (Burton 2007).
Demographic Shifts in the Mining Era
Over the past century the Lihirian population has increased from around 
3,600 in the 1920s to 5,500 in 1980, and approximately 9,890 in 1995.7 
By the end of 2013 the Lihirian population was 16,095 (Figure 11.2). 
These shifts partly reflect a combination of improved community health 
7  It was estimated that in the early 1980s around 500 Lihirians were absent from the islands. 
Many of these Lihirians were married to non-Lihirians and later returned to Lihir with their families 
to seek better living conditions. By the late 1990s, this group of returnees comprised some 2,000 
people. Many of the women in this group were of childbearing age, which contributed to natural 
population increase.
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facilities, increased life expectancy and lower infant mortality rates.8 
The bulk of the Lihirian and migrant population now resides in a broad arc 
across the northeast of Aniolam Island, which is mainly a result of people 
moving closer to services and employment opportunities.
Figure 11.2 Lihir population by ward group, 2002–13.
Source: Newcrest Lihir Social Impact Monitoring unit.
The expanding migrant population in Lihir can be broadly divided into 
three categories: those who claim some form of existing or historical social 
connection; those who have forged relatively recent relations with Lihirians; 
and those people with very tenuous social connections in Lihir.9 In local 
Tok Pisin terms, Lihirians tend to regard people from the first two groups 
as ol wantok (literally ‘one talk’), a flexible and contextually contingent 
relational category that can be extended to relatives, people who share 
the same language or ancestry, people from the same province or region, 
8  In 1997, John Burton concluded that single motherhood had been a common feature in Lihir 
since Independence, a period for which accurate data was available (Burton 1997a). Datasets for 
1975–97 indicated that one in every seven families was headed by a woman, and one in every nine 
births, or about 10.8 per cent of all births, was to a single mother. Inquiries as to the whereabouts of 
the father were met with the habitual reply em karim pikinini long rot (‘the child was conceived during 
her wanderings’). More recent data suggests a further increase, with 36 per cent of births recorded 
to single mothers in 2014. We might conclude that this increase is a result of rapid social changes; 
however, more research is required to understand whether these mothers are indeed single, or if this 
reflects an increase in de facto relationships that Lihirians may not report or ‘recognise’ as legitimate 
marriages for religious or cultural reasons. At this stage, it is impossible to conclude whether an 
increase in the number of single mothers has contributed to population growth. Similarly, more work 
is required to understand whether the growth rate has actually slowed over the past decade as more 
women have become empowered through access to employment and incomes.
9  This does not include temporary visitors from the surrounding parts of New Ireland Province, 
who mainly come for specific purposes for short periods of time and later return to their home village 
or town, or the fly-in/fly-out workforce associated with the mining operation.
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or simply friends.10 In other instances, Lihirians regard incorporated 
migrants as their bisnis (‘business’), a term that Lihirians use to denote 
both their extended relatives and exchange partners and the practice of 
small-scale enterprise. In their relationships with migrants, these social 
and economic meanings often converge. Alternatively, migrants with little 
or no incorporation in Lihir, or those from the third category, are typically 
glossed as ol autsait lain (‘outsiders’) or ol weira (effectively ‘strangers’). 
The latter term is deliberately derogatory and may be applied to migrants 
from neighbouring islands or remote mainland districts as a way of 
positioning them in terms of perceived social connections or their ‘rights’ 
over mine-derived development.
Although in-migration has peaked throughout the mining era, during the 
colonial period large numbers of labourers were recruited from other parts 
of PNG to work on Lihir plantations (Bainton 2008: 297). Not all of these 
labourers were able to return to their home districts, and several of them 
are now quite elderly and find themselves especially dependent upon 
their landowner patrons and still work as labourers in order to survive 
(Figure 11.3). Rather than an instant influx, in-migration has increased 
in step with the development and expansion of the mining operation 
and the local economy. Migrants first arrived from the surrounding New 
Ireland and New Britain region, drawing upon established networks and 
relationships and settling in hamlets as incorporated guests in similar ways 
to some of the early informal settlements found in other urban areas in 
PNG (Numbasa and Koczberski 2012). While the number of migrants 
was comparatively low during this early period of mining operations, 
there was already a level of concern among some Lihirians about the 
prospect of further in-migration and the negative impacts that this 
might have. Women in particular were rather vocal about the prospect of 
migrant women seeking to marry Lihirian men in order to claim access to 
mine-related benefits.
10  Tok Pisin is the lingua franca in PNG and used in conversation between Lihirians and migrants. 
Lihirians generally communicate among themselves in the Lihirian language (but see Bainton 2015).
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Figure 11.3 Former plantation labourers from Sandaun Province.
Note: Those shown are (from left to right) Thomas Waipano, Paulus Make, Nelson Sira, Camillus 
Mawe and Albert Esiuke. 
Source: Photo by John Burton.
During this earlier phase there were fewer economic opportunities. 
The  mining company was the main source of employment and non-
Lihirians were predominantly engaged on fly-in/fly-out rosters. 
Nevertheless, migrants still arrived in search of employment, moving 
between villages and attaching themselves to other migrants. In-migration 
was further encouraged by a small number of Lihirian men with prior 
business experience outside Lihir who later returned to establish small 
companies. Some of these men were shrewd businessmen, refused to 
employ relatives, and remained aloof in order to avoid demands from 
kin that would compromise their business pursuits (see Martin 2007). 
As local business development increased, more migrants were employed 
by private or local companies contracted to the mining operation, not 
all of which had formal provisions for accommodation. Many migrants 
came to sell goods at the town market, being regularly supplied by people 
from their home areas with betelnut and other produce for sale. These 
people were soon the target of Lihirian resentment as they were seen 
to be making money that Lihirians felt entitled to. In a typical chain 
migration sequence, these migrants were joined by other relatives seeking 
similar opportunities, although subsequent migrants were often far less 
incorporated, particularly unaccompanied young males.
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By the early 2000s, greater numbers of people were arriving from the 
Highland and Momase regions. One Lihirian man in particular provided 
initial support for migrants to settle in the previously unoccupied interior 
area between Londolovit and Kunaie villages, in the hamlets of Kul and 
Bombel. He was one of several outliers who bolstered personal support 
and renown through the patronage of migrant settlers. Before long, 
these interior hamlet areas were predominantly occupied by migrants. 
The growth of the migrant population is closely linked to the expansion 
of the local business environment, which has created a more diverse 
range of economic opportunities. Lihir is easily accessed by daily flights 
and the regular movement of dinghies from mainland New Ireland. 
The number of boats travelling to Lihir has increased as more money has 
spread throughout the region, and the advent of cheap mobile phones 
has enabled migrants to regularly contact relatives and friends to arrange 
their passage to Lihir or maintain a constant supply of market goods. 
Some of the more savvy entrepreneurs now utilise courier services to 
import goods and artefacts for sale. These strategies ultimately enable 
them to remain in Lihir for longer periods of time.
There is now a distinct clustering around the affected-area villages in the 
local government wards that are closest to the mine site (Figure 11.4).11 
The number of people from New Ireland, and from the broader Islands, 
Momase and Highlands regions, has increased (Figure  11.5). Migrants 
outnumber Lihirians in Ward  1, and it is likely that they outnumber 
Lihirians in Ward 11 as well. The number of migrants residing in Putput 
village, in Ward 2, is comparatively lower, but the impact of their presence 
is compounded by existing land pressure and other rapid social changes 
related to resettlement. In these areas the migrant population is weighted 
towards younger mobile males from the Islands Region in the 20–35-year 
age range, but there are also many young families who seek employment 
and access to services and a small number of elderly migrants.
11  Due to the likely under-enumeration of the non-Lihirian population in the affected-area wards, 
an attempt has been made to reach a more conclusive estimate of the non-Lihirian population in these 
areas. Figure 11.4 presents positively enumerated figures. The adjusted population figures for non-
Lihirians are derived from certain assumptions based upon known residency patterns, the number of 
mapped residential structures, and average household numbers. See Vail (2011) for technical details 
for calculating the adjusted non-Lihirian figures.
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Figure 11.4 Enumerated Lihirian and non-Lihirian population figures, 
and adjusted non-Lihirian population figures, December 2013.
Source: Newcrest Lihir Social Impact Monitoring unit.
One of the most attractive services for migrant families is the well-
resourced Lihir medical centre that provides vital primary health care 
to mine employees and the residents of Lihir. This has led to a form of 
‘medical tourism’ as people come to access services that are not available 
elsewhere in the province, or many other parts of the country for that 
matter.12 While there have been major improvements in the health of 
the Lihirian community, successful health initiatives must also reach 
the migrant population, which is a considerably more difficult task.13 
12  The Namatanai hospital, which is located in the nearest town on the mainland of New Ireland, 
also in the electorate of the former Minister for Mining, Byron Chan, has remained chronically 
dilapidated for many years. Redevelopment of the Namatanai hospital would certainly help to 
redirect in-migration and reduce the burden upon the Lihir medical centre, which has seen patient 
numbers more than double between 2005 and 2012, from approximately 36,000 to around 80,000 
visits per year. In 2012, more than half of these patients were recorded as being contractors or their 
dependents, and the overall majority were recorded as non-Lihirians. More recently there has been a 
slight reduction in patient numbers due to the decline of contractor opportunities. However, there is 
still a need to integrate health service provisions across the district to meet future demands.
13  For more information on recent health programs see Bentley (2011) and Mitjà et al. (2011, 
2012, 2013, 2015).
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Scheduled village health programs typically exclude the settlement areas, 
which is partly due to political decisions by Lihirian leaders to restrict 
the distribution of benefits. But, as health workers well understand, the 
settlement areas are only a short walk from the medical centre and the 
environmental conditions in these locations present major health risks 
for residents, which in turn places greater pressure upon health services.
Figure 11.5 Birthplace of enumerated resident non-Lihirians, 
December 2013.
Source: Newcrest Lihir Social Impact Monitoring unit.
As the affected-area villages have been steadily urbanised, settlement 
patterns have remained regulated by customary land boundaries and 
more recent village planning exercises. On the other hand, in the 
interior hamlet areas of Kul and Bombel, and more recently the upper 
Londolovit and the Landolam valleys, settlement is more sporadic and 
opportunistic, and reflects more temporary arrangements. Although most 
of the migrants residing in these areas have limited social incorporation in 
Lihir, and have been the target of wider Lihirian frustration in relation to 
in-migration, many of these migrants remain in Lihir at the sufferance or 
direct sponsorship of specific landowners. However, as we shall see, many 
of these landowners have also lost control as patrons.
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The Contractor Labour Force
At its most recent peak in 2012, the mining company engaged a direct 
workforce of approximately 2,400 people and more than 4,100 contract 
labourers (NML 2013). In the earlier years of the operation, the contract 
labour force was considerably smaller, but as the project has expanded 
this has created more opportunities for local companies. Following the 
initial construction boom, the operation of the mine brought the need for 
reliable service provision and generated opportunities for local companies. 
These companies varied in size and composition and gained a range of 
business contracts including grass cutting, rubbish collection, gardening, 
transport services, construction, electrical and maintenance work and 
other mine-related services. From the outset, Lihirian landowners have 
been more interested in gaining business contracts for these services rather 
than performing the actual work themselves. This has opened up avenues 
for migrant labourers, many of whom have settled in the interior valleys 
and affected-area villages. By 2012, some 650 businesses were registered 
in Lihir, although certainly not all of these companies had contracts with 
the mine or any other kind of current operation. The largest and most 
successful of these business operations is the Lihirian-owned Anitua 
group of companies, which includes several companies that offer security, 
drilling, retail, catering and mining services. In 2012, the Anitua group 
employed over 2,000 people, with at least 45 per cent of its workforce 
coming from Lihir, 51  per cent from other parts of PNG, and the 
remainder from overseas.
Most of the companies in Lihir are small, locally owned businesses seeking 
contracts with the mining operation. Many of these companies provide 
labour hire services, sourcing Lihirian and non-Lihirian labourers for 
various work packages. Local businessmen not only recruit migrants on 
Lihir but regularly travel to other parts of PNG to find labourers for current 
or anticipated contracts. In 2008 the mining company commenced a major 
upgrade of the processing plant facilities, which included K40  million 
in seed capital to landowner companies, and provided millions of kina 
in commercial opportunities to local businesses. In order to maximise 
the contracting opportunities and to organise the distribution of the seed 
capital, Lihirian leaders amalgamated many of the smaller companies in 
a set of larger ‘specific issues companies’ that represent the landowners 
from particular lease areas (such as the plant site, the pit, the town and 
airport), collapsing the clan-based and geographical distinctions that 
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operate elsewhere. This also had the peculiar effect of turning ‘issues’ into 
commercial entities, which has precluded the resolution of certain issues 
and guaranteed further ‘compensation’ through commercial contracts. 
Despite the anticipated economies of scale to be achieved through the 
consolidation of small and often unsustainable landowner companies, 
some landowners have found this umbrella model unsatisfactory. Not 
all of the new umbrella companies have operated effectively or regularly 
distributed dividends to the landowners they represent. Moreover, the 
distribution of contracting opportunities has remained uneven, which in 
turn has increased the existing divisions between landowners over access 
to business opportunities.
According to the environmental impact statement (EIS) for the plant 
upgrade, it was anticipated that the construction phase of this upgrade, 
completed in 2012, would require approximately 500 additional 
labourers (CNS 2009). Landowners and migrants took advantage of the 
opportunities for contract labour, and it now appears that a far greater 
number of hopeful migrant labourers have made their way to Lihir than 
what was originally projected in the EIS.14 The number of companies 
and labourers seeking contracts in Lihir has now outstripped the available 
opportunities. The  proliferation of companies has arisen for several 
interconnected reasons: the perceived low start-up costs; the modern status 
associated with owning a business and employing people; a ready supply 
of migrant labour; and the expectation among landowners for business 
contracts based upon the belief that, because the mine is operating on 
their land within the lease areas, they are entitled to exclusive business 
opportunities, which is best characterised by the local catchcry ‘my 
land, my work’ (Bainton and Macintyre 2013). In this sense, landowner 
business development is perhaps better understood as another form of 
compensation or rent, or a kind of ‘tax’ levied against developers for access 
to resources. This kind of ‘rentier capitalism’ is now a common feature 
of the PNG resource sector and many landowners seem to conceptualise 
business development in terms of ‘risk-free entrepreneurialism’, which 
requires developers to carry the cost and exposure of local business 
development so that landowners might collect their due entitlement 
(Jackson 2015). If this appears to outside observers like a form of 
dependency or unsustainable development, from a local landowner 
14  See Banks (2013) for a discussion on the social and environmental impact statement for the 
Lihir plant upgrade.
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perspective it is more likely perceived as a way of securing a guaranteed 
income for life, or at least exploiting an immediate opportunity.15 In the 
Lihir context, the relationship between landowners, migrants and the 
mining company is thoroughly shaped by local forms of patronage and 
the art of ‘rentier leadership’ (Burton 1997b).
Housing the Labourers
Two main scenarios for employee accommodation were tabled during the 
negotiation phase of the mine: a fly-in/fly-out arrangement and a full-
scale mining town that would house workers and their families. Lihirian 
leaders wanted to maximise the opportunities for urban development 
and the associated economic spin-offs but feared the negative impacts 
that might accompany an influx of migrant workers. The end result was 
a combination of both options. The mining company utilised a dormant 
plantation on the Marahun plateau to construct a mining camp for fly-
in/fly-out employees. A purpose-built mining town was also developed 
adjacent to the camp with around 70 houses for expatriate and senior 
national employees who reside in Lihir with their families, and 35 
houses for government employees. A local commercial service centre 
was constructed in the nearby lower Londolovit area (also previously 
used as a plantation), and a ring road was cleared around Aniolam Island 
linking all villages to the town and the camp. Prior to the establishment 
of Londolovit town, the nearby Potzlaka government station and the Palie 
mission station in the southwestern corner of the island were the only 
places that might be considered ‘public’ spaces, and were the main link to 
the outside world. The previous lack of transport options, compared with 
today, also ensured far less internal and outbound travel.
According to the terms of the 1995 mining development contract and the 
2007 revised IBP agreement, non-Lihirian employees and contractors were 
to be engaged on fly-in/fly-out arrangements. Local Lihirian employees 
travel to work from their home villages, and it was originally hoped that 
this would generate less disruption to daily village life. The intention was 
to somehow ‘contain’ the large and predominantly male non-Lihirian 
workforce within the confines of the mining lease areas in order to limit 
15  Thanks to Richard Jackson for bringing this point to my attention.
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the social footprint of the operation. This strategy is premised upon the 
developer being the main source of employment. However, as the number 
of landowner and joint venture companies operating in Lihir has increased, 
there has been a much higher demand for employee accommodation.
While some of the contracts gained by local companies include provisions 
for employee accommodation, this does not always ensure that these 
companies fulfil their obligations to their employees, including adequate 
accommodation, standard employee entitlements, or even regular meals. 
Some of the larger companies have built basic ‘camp’ accommodation, 
but in many cases non-Lihirian employees are forced to seek other 
arrangements. Not all of the Anitua group employees are housed within 
the mining camp, which is partly due to the size of the camp, but also 
because many of the lower-paid and semi-skilled positions do not 
include provisions for camp accommodation. For most migrants in Lihir, 
the primary intention is to gain employment or secure some form of 
livelihood. Access to land remains a secondary consideration since long-
term residence is not the ultimate goal.
Since 1995, more than 1,000 permanent timber kit houses have 
been provided to the wider Lihirian community through the ‘village 
development scheme’ that is part of the IBP agreement (Figure  11.6). 
Lihirians have recognised a flourishing rental market, and many rent their 
new houses to migrant workers and their families. As more local businesses 
source migrant labour, there is a shortage of suitable accommodation. 
In the villages of Zuen, Kunaie, Londolovit and Putput, landowners 
can charge K1,000–3,500 (approximately A$450–1,500) per month to 
rent a  wooden kit house. Most houses in these villages are connected 
to electricity and have access to rainwater tanks or mains water. The high 
rental rates do not always reflect real landowner expenses, especially given 
that most houses are provided under the benefits package. Landowners 
have seized upon the inflated resource economy and the demand for 
housing, and these rates could be seen as another type of ‘tax’ levied 
against migrants for access to Lihirian economic development.
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Figure 11.6 Village development scheme house.
Source: Photo by Nicholas A. Bainton.
For many migrant tenants, this is rarely an unproblematic rental 
arrangement. In some cases, landowners remain on the same block of 
land  in a semi-permanent or bush material house and share water 
tanks and sometimes illegally connect electricity to their houses. These 
arrangements can create tensions between tenants and landlords, especially 
when tenants expect exclusive use of the house and any amenities. Some 
tenants complain that landlords demand additional contributions or 
advance payments on rent for customary feasting or other forms of 
daily consumption.16 This situation is only compounded by the absence 
of rental contracts.
16  For examples of these additional demands in other contexts, see Curry and Koczberski (2009), 
Allen (2012) and Koczberski et al. (2012).
335
11. Migrants, Labourers and Landowners at the Lihir Gold Mine, Papua New Guinea
Settlers, Squatters and Opportunistic 
Businessmen
In Lihir the term ‘rent’ is applied loosely to cover a variety of informal 
arrangements that provide migrants with temporary access to housing or 
land upon which they may erect housing or grow food gardens.17 As yet, 
migrants have not utilised this land for agro-economic development, and 
there are few de facto changes to customary land tenure because Lihirians 
refuse to extend long-term use rights to migrant families. Effectively, 
landowners retain and exert their land rights: insecure or temporary 
use rights might be granted, and informal agreements established, but 
customary land is by no means alienated.
A technical legal distinction can be drawn between squatters, as people 
who enter and live on unoccupied land without permission, and settlers, 
who are invited to stay on land for a long period with express or tacit 
approval. In Lihir, these categories are often blurred and highly contextual. 
For instance, each of the 18 migrant settlement clusters identified in a 
social mapping exercise in the Landolam Valley area in 2011 were found 
to be sponsored by specific landowners (Burton and Onguglo 2011). 
Migrants living in these clusters exist in patron–client style relationships 
with individual landowners or local lineages. Some of these migrant 
settlers rent semi-permanent housing, while others are granted access to 
land upon which they erect makeshift homes. Settlers may pay from K20 
to K100 on a semi-regular basis for access to land, and make additional 
contributions that help to sustain the relationship. Landowners often 
collect another form of ‘rent’ by asking a group of residents to ‘raise 
funds’ for an upcoming customary event. At the same time, many of 
these landowners also claim that they are overwhelmed by additional 
migrants who were not originally given permission to settle on their land 
regardless of any collective ‘rental’ payments that might have been made 
on their behalf. Rapid chain migration has meant that many landowners 
have lost control as patrons. Consequently, Lihirian political leaders often 
characterise all migrants as squatters, conveniently homogenising them as 
‘illegal trespassers’. In some cases the label is clearly correct, as people are 
squatting on customary or leased land without permission. In other cases, 
17  This is similar to Koczberski et al.’s (2009: 35) observations in the PNG oil palm sector. See also 
Koczberski et al.’s (2017) discussion on informal land markets in PNG.
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migrants have ongoing economic and social relationships with individual 
landowners, complicating any simplistic image of migrants as unlawful 
tenants or parasitic vagrants.
In order to maintain use rights over land and access to residences, 
migrants frequently maximise new opportunities for social incorporation 
with Lihirian lineage groups. This is commonly expressed by migrants 
as: Mipela kamap bisnis wantaim sampela papagraon bilong Lihir (‘We are 
incorporated with some Lihirian landowners’); or Mipela pas wantaim 
dispela lain (‘We are connected to this lineage group’). This relationship 
may be confirmed by Lihirians with expressions like: Ol i pas wantaim 
klen bilong mi (‘They are connected to my clan’); Ol i kam ananit long 
lain bilong mi (‘They are incorporated under our lineage’); or Em ol bisnis 
bilong mipela (‘They are our “business”’). In the context of landowner–
migrant relations, both the social and economic meanings of bisnis are 
emphasised. As migrant families become partially incorporated into 
Lihirian clans, as a sort of subgroup of the landowning lineage, the 
social (and economic) relationship is foregrounded and frames property 
rights. Migrants remain indebted to their hosts, who retain control 
over property and grant temporary forms of access. These relations are 
forged and maintained through contributions to funerals and large 
feasting and exchange activities (sometimes involving several thousand 
kina for the purchase of pigs), and more regular gifts of food and cash 
to landowner households and support for community projects. These 
public displays of support and involvement in community life confirm 
landowner patronage and help to erase the social differences that are made 
explicit in other contexts. At the same time, this can also compromise the 
ability of Lihirians to decide who resides upon their land or to remove 
unwanted tenants. Migrants have recognised the economic changes to 
customary activities and exploit the increased opportunities to establish 
and strengthen relationships with Lihirians. On the flip side, when rent 
or other contributions are not adequately distributed within the lineage, 
disgruntled members who fail to benefit from migrant settlers may well 
deny or contest their social inclusion, reflecting the vulnerable nature 
of migrant lives.
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Vulnerable Migrants and Marginal 
Landowners
At various times over the past ten years, the local political elite have 
incited community-level fervour for large-scale evictions, highlighting the 
contradictions in the relationship between Lihirians and migrants. This 
has generated a widespread desire for immediate action, and unfortunately 
reinforced the view among many people that the major social problems 
encountered in Lihir are best addressed through a singular focus on mass 
evictions. While much of this attention is directed at the growing number 
of people living in the interior areas close to the Londolovit town site, 
migrants residing in other villages are sometimes equally targeted. This 
is regardless of whether they are working for landowner companies and 
legitimately renting houses, or are young families eking out a living, 
or are some of the mass of mobile males ‘drifting without kin’, money 
or a connection to place (Reed 2003: 70).
This deliberate homogenisation reflects the larger sense in which Lihirians 
feel beset by migrant-related social changes. The close correlation between 
unmitigated in-migration, squatter settlements, growing law and order 
problems, and interethnic tensions between Lihirians and migrants, and 
between different migrant groups, has given rise to a definite sense of 
civic insecurity. This reached new heights in mid-2015 when several 
male migrants were arrested for torturing three women from Southern 
Highlands Province who were accused of sorcery by their fellow migrants 
and their Lihirian patron. Police station records show that in recent years 
there has been a definite increase in the number of reported crimes and 
charges. The data indicate that the migrant community has contributed 
to a quantitative shift in the level of social disturbance as the number of 
charges for theft, assault, sex-related crimes, drugs and general disturbances 
to public order have increased annually. Lihirian protestations would also 
suggest that the migrant community is solely to blame for a qualitative 
shift in social disturbance. However, such assertions are not supported 
by the records, which demonstrate that Lihirians are often involved or 
implicated in similar activities. On another level, even though Lihirian 
women may experience an acute fear of outsiders, especially in some 
affected-area villages where there is a high ratio of migrant males to females, 
these fears may be somewhat misplaced, since police and hospital records 
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suggest that the level of domestic violence inflicted upon Lihirian women 
by their Lihirian husbands and relatives presents a more immediate threat 
to their everyday well-being.
The Lihirian tendency to attribute negative influences to the migrant 
population masks a certain level of social disintegration within Lihirian 
society. It also hides the ways in which the general vilification of migrants is 
intersected and undermined by individual interests and the social relations 
of compensation. This point is well illustrated in one documented instance 
involving a complicated dispute over a portion of land within the lease area 
in the Landolam Valley. This intergenerational and interclan dispute is the 
principal reason why one Lihirian family group has taken up residence on 
the lease, and have surrounded themselves with a considerable number 
of migrants who help them financially and offer moral support (Burton 
and Onguglo 2011). Their presence on the lease land was a double act 
of public defiance directed at the mining company and the landowner 
association, who they claimed had disregarded their land rights and 
denied them access to benefits and compensation. The senior widow of the 
lineage blamed her leg ailment on the landowner association—claiming 
she was poisoned by someone involved in the dispute—which resulted in 
her leg being amputated in 2010. She was then confined to a wheelchair 
that had to be carried across the boggy settlement grounds. A member of 
the association allegedly promised support for an artificial limb, but this 
never materialised, and in 2011 she died (Figure 11.7). Even if there is no 
discernible moral to this miserable outcome, this account demonstrates 
that not all landowner patrons are equally empowered, that some are even 
more vulnerable than their migrant tenants and are just as likely to be 
excluded by their fellow clan members on their own ground. And in this 
way the blanket characterisation of migrants helps to cover over some very 
uncomfortable social realities.
Eviction exercises planned by the local-level government have manifestly 
failed because of the tendency of landowners to consider ‘their’ migrants 
as useful guests (or economic resources), while all others are deemed 
an illegitimate nuisance. While a handful of landowners have evicted 
squatters from their land and burnt their houses, the historical lack of 
capacity within the local government to manage and mobilise coordinated 
eviction exercises, or deliver basic governance, has precluded meaningful 
action, reducing its efforts to vitriolic statements. Most Lihirians expect 
that the mining company will take direct action, which partly reflects the 
extent to which people feel overwhelmed and frustrated by current social 
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changes, and the belief among some people that the company is both 
the source and only solution to these problems. At a minimum, there 
is a need for strong management of contract labour and the adequate 
provision of accommodation for contractor employees. In most cases, this 
is not the sort of action that Lihirians envision. This might even generate 
resistance from local businessmen who have come to rely upon ready 
access to a pool of migrant labour that can be easily mobilised for short-
term contracts. Rather, there is an expectation that the company will fund 
a private security firm to round up recalcitrant migrants and march them 
off the island. The contradiction between benefiting from migrant labour 
skills and simultaneously wanting to evict all outsiders is apparent.
Figure 11.7 Late Anna Ikuluom of Tinetalgo clan in lower Landolam, 
2011.
Source: Photo by Joyce Onguglo.
In these ways, Lihirian landowners, local business owners and the mining 
company provide a major pathway for in-migration. So, if it is true that 
some business owners have been hoodwinked into employing or entering 
into commercial arrangements with migrants, or have been overwhelmed 
by the effects of chain migration, then it is also the case that many have 
been blinded to these ramifications through their pursuit of business 
development, and that the mining company’s contractor management 
processes have historically been inadequate for the task. The eagerness 
with which landowners have employed or entered into joint ventures 
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with business-savvy migrants has only encouraged further in-migration 
and settlement. The inability or refusal of some landowners to accept 
responsibility for the welfare or actions of migrant employees and their 
families has directly contributed to the growing lack of control over the 
migrant population and the difficulties associated with retrospectively 
acknowledging and addressing these issues.
The other side of this scenario is the emergence of a vulnerable workforce. 
Classic labour theories tend to emphasise mobility as a key asset of the 
labourer. But in the PNG mining context it is questionable whether these 
theories are adequate. In Lihir, there are many migrant labourers and their 
families who experience entrenched conditions of unacceptable poverty 
and face considerable constraints upon their mobility. A lack of organised 
labour unions reduces their bargaining power and reinforces their reliance 
upon landowners for livelihoods and residence. The short-term nature 
of their employment contracts, the lack of suitable accommodation, 
the long working hours away from home, the inflated cost of living in 
a project enclave and their precarious social position place them under 
enormous pressure. These people live in a bind: they have less opportunity 
for investing in quality family life, better living conditions, or more 
sustainable livelihoods; there are few who can afford to travel back to 
their home village with their families; and they do not necessarily want 
to return to under-serviced rural areas. These migrants are perhaps better 
understood as a kind of ‘landless rural peasantry’, or a local example of the 
so-called ‘precariat’ (Standing 2011). Such vulnerability echoes Tawney’s 
classic image of the ‘man standing permanently up to the neck in water, so 
that even a ripple is sufficient to drown him’ (Tawney 1932: 77). The total 
reliance upon landowners for land and livelihoods makes it difficult for 
migrants in this position to pursue alternative options. The deliberate 
conflation of migrant labourers and their families with more troublesome 
young mobile males ensures that the climate of fear is experienced both 
ways, ultimately exacerbating dependency upon landowner patrons.
Conclusion: Some Practical Considerations
The seemingly intractable challenges and impacts surrounding rural-to-
resource migration, and the difficulties that developers, landowners and 
governments encounter when addressing this issue, point to the need for 
greater attention to in-migration management strategies in the planning 
stages of resource projects. As detailed elsewhere (Bainton et al. 2017), 
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the basic operational capabilities, or enablers, for understanding and 
managing in-migration are often missing in the industry’s approach 
to social performance in practice. The planners and managers of many 
large-scale resource projects in PNG have paid insufficient attention to 
the different forms of in-migration that can occur throughout the life of 
a project, or the social and geographical factors that may influence these 
trends. The standards of planning and compliance that were common 
in the 1980s and 1990s—the period when several of the major projects 
currently operating in PNG were being developed—are no longer suitable 
(IFC 2012). International standards now require prospective projects to 
undertake detailed studies on potential project-induced in-migration and 
the related risks and impacts for the operation and host communities 
(IFC 2009). These standards also require the development of mitigation 
strategies to alleviate disturbances and risks associated with in-migration.
Freedom of movement is guaranteed in PNG’s National Constitution, 
and developers cannot stop people migrating to project areas in search 
of new opportunities. This does not exempt developers from addressing 
in-migration, especially when in-migration becomes entwined with 
local contracting processes, or when migrants settle upon lease areas, or 
when they are severely disadvantaged. A lack of attention to the poor 
living and working conditions of subcontractors may result in these 
workers becoming ‘hidden’ within the overall workforce. These and 
other ‘omitted social conditions’ (Roberts 1995) of large-scale resource 
development represent another way in which the costs of production 
may be externalised on to local society. Ignoring in-migration until it 
results in operational, financial or reputational costs invariably creates 
situations where developers and local actors can only hope to address 
the symptoms of in-migration. The significant amounts of financial, legal 
and human resources that are directed towards reactive approaches to the 
impacts of in-migration detract from efforts to deliver upon agreed social 
and economic commitments to host communities. In the long run, this 
may well jeopardise a developer’s ability to operate, as local frustrations 
mount over the slow delivery of benefits and agreed-upon projects, or the 
seemingly limited responses to migrant-related issues. Declining levels of 
community trust create further challenges for establishing more proactive 
approaches to in-migration that positively engage host communities and 
other relevant actors.
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Incursions on to lease land and the presence of illegal squatter settlements 
or relocated villages on lease areas create immediate operational risks. 
In 2010 the issue of project-induced in-migration at the Porgera gold 
mine became an international scandal when images of burning houses 
and homeless people appeared on the front pages of international 
newspapers, together with indignant statements on human rights by 
non-governmental organisations (Amnesty International 2010; HRW 
2011). At the very least, increased scrutiny from the media and non-
governmental organisations requires developers to pay careful attention 
to the activities of employees, security personnel or police forces engaged 
in any form of migrant management, particularly where this may involve 
involuntary movement or resettlement. The tendency among some 
external commentators to look for simple moral narratives often obscures 
the complexity of these contexts, the factors that may influence company 
decisions, or the ways in which various state and local actors are also 
implicated. Recent access to smart phones and internet connectivity across 
PNG has also given rise to new forms of real-time exposure through the 
use of social media to broadcast or contest the real and perceived impacts 
of resource development. As a result, the planning and execution of any 
sort of relocation or broader ‘population management’ on or around lease 
land should be approached in a transparent rights-based manner.
Community members who feel overwhelmed by in-migration, regardless 
of their role in facilitating or hosting migrants, will often argue that 
developers are morally bound to provide assistance, since from their 
perspective it is the operation that has attracted in-migrants. In their 
efforts to avoid playing the role of a surrogate state, it is apparent that 
developers cannot unilaterally address the problems surrounding in-
migration, which in turn points to more complex issues surrounding the 
limits or boundaries of corporate social responsibility (Banks 2006), and 
the difficulties involved in developing strong working partnerships with 
private companies, local communities and the public sector. Certainly the 
strategic investment in community development projects outside the core 
project area, in neighbouring towns or provincial centres for instance, 
could help to direct migrants away from affected areas. But the difficulties 
that many developers face in fulfilling their primary community 
obligations may well undermine these kinds of initiatives as lease-area 
landowners demand that all resources be invested locally.
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The Lihir context highlights the need for integrated approaches that 
extend beyond the immediate vicinity of lease areas and involve local, 
provincial and national actors. In PNG, these goals are hard to realise 
since developers often operate with limited input from state functionaries. 
This can be partly attributed to the isolation and remoteness of project 
locations, but is perhaps more closely related to the capacity and resourcing 
of state regulators. These conditions are further compounded by a lack 
of civil society in many mining locations. While provincial governments 
maintain strong interests in resource projects, their attention is usually 
directed towards the capture of royalties as opposed to managing site-
specific issues. These tasks are often left to landowners, developers and 
local-level governments. But as we have seen in Southern Highlands 
Province (Haley and May 2007), the amplified pressures of resource 
development may contribute to the collapse of local governance or the 
inability of local governments to provide the most basic public services, 
let alone address complex socioeconomic phenomena like in-migration.
In the end, developers and local authorities do well to remember that 
migrants provide much of the necessary entrepreneurial energy for the 
local economy, bring capital, innovation (both economic and cultural), 
specific skills and technical knowledge, and make up for labour shortfalls. 
From a provincial or national perspective, they are crucial in the wider 
distribution or remittance of benefits—financial, social, political and 
educational (Rigg 2007: 169). If this point is often lost in local discourses on 
in-migration, this reflects the complex connections between in-migration, 
livelihood strategies, identity, landownership and economic development. 
By drawing attention to these conjunctions, I have sought to illuminate 
some of the conditions of migrant lives in resource enclaves and the 
qualitative and quantitative features of rural-to-resource in-migration. 
Host communities of resource projects frequently face major social 
upheavals as large numbers of migrants come and reside on customary 
land yet exist outside traditional mechanisms for social control. These 
issues are often magnified on the PNG mainland, where project corridors 
and enclaves encompass larger and more diverse groups. But as the Lihir 
case demonstrates, small islands are by no means immune; the scale may 
be reduced, but in some ways the impacts can be more intense as they are 
compressed and contained within a smaller location.
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The 50-year relationship between large-scale mining (LSM) and local-
level politics in Bougainville has been complex and fraught. Bougainville 
is the only place in the world where host community violence has resulted 
in the long-term closure of a large-scale mine. Bougainville Copper Ltd 
(BCL), a subsidiary of Conzinc RioTinto Australia (CRA), operated the 
huge Panguna copper and gold mine from 1972 to 1989 under a 1967 
agreement with the Australian colonial administration of the then 
Territory of Papua and New Guinea (TPNG). The first large-scale mine 
in what is now Papua New Guinea (PNG), it closed in 1989, early in 
a violent conflict that lasted from 1988 to 1997 (Regan 1998, 2011; 
Braithwaite et al. 2010), and it was still closed in 2016.
Widespread perceptions exist, especially outside Bougainville, that mine 
closure resulted mainly from generalised Bougainvillean rejection of 
mining. While several main strands of causal factors have been proposed—
including ethnonationalism, culture and class (Regan 1998) and local 
cosmology (Kenema 2010)—most published accounts see the conflict 
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originating in violent action by young mine-impacted landowners seeking 
permanent mine closure (e.g. Dorney 1990; Filer 1990; Connell 1991, 
1992; Boege 1999; Denoon 2000; Gillespie 2009; Lasslett 2014).
Some observers (e.g. Jubilee 2014; Lasslett 2014) assert that the mine 
lease landowners continue to be generally opposed to any resumption 
of mining operations at Panguna, or that Bougainvilleans in general are 
opposed to large-scale mining. However, since being established in 2005 
under provisions of the PNG Constitution implementing the Bougainville 
Peace Agreement (BPA) of August 2001, the Autonomous Bougainville 
Government (ABG) has considered reopening the Panguna mine as the 
most realistic path to achieving the fiscal self-reliance needed for either 
the autonomy or possible independence contemplated by the BPA, and 
claims widespread (though not unanimous) community support for this 
approach.
This chapter examines whether the conflict was in fact a consequence of 
mine-impacted landowner commitment to permanent mine closure, and 
whether broad-based opposition to mining—by either mine-impacted 
landowners or Bougainvilleans more generally—was central to local 
politics in 2016. The chapter is in three main parts. The first outlines 
aspects of the context in which the conflict originated that are critical to 
better understanding of both its origins and some new evidence (advanced 
here) about several distinct Bougainvillean stakeholder groups other 
than young mine lease landowners, all deeply involved in the conflict 
origins. They occupy the ‘community corner’ in a rectangular model of 
relationships involving four main sets (or ‘corners’) of stakeholders, the 
other three being the state, mining companies, and the ‘fourth estate’ 
(Ballard and Banks 2003; also Chapter 1, this volume). The second part 
focuses on this new evidence, outlining the origins, concerns, roles and 
goals of these other ‘community’ stakeholders, and their relationships 
to one another, as well as to the state and the company. The third part 
discusses continuities and changes in these relationships since the conflict 
began, and the extent to which generalised opposition to LSM now exists.
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Context of Conflict Origins
Bougainville and PNG
Bougainville’s population in 2016 is approximately 300,000 (less than 
4  per cent of PNG’s total population). Its 9,438 square kilometres is 
roughly 2 per cent of PNG’s total land area. Pre-colonial Bougainvilleans 
were organised mainly around tiny stateless societies involving great 
diversity in language,1 culture (Ogan 2005), and identities (Regan 2005a). 
Despite major social and economic changes since colonial ‘rule’ began 
in the late nineteenth century, the most significant social groups today 
continue to be nuclear and extended families, the localised clan-based 
landowning lineages to which those families belong (typically containing 
50–150 members), and flexible groupings of such lineages.
While under nominal German colonial control from 1884 to 1915, the 
first administrative centre was only established in 1905, and Australia 
took control from 1914 to 1975. Under colonialism, interactions with 
people from elsewhere in PNG contributed to a pan-Bougainvillean 
identity, with the dark skin colour of most Bougainvilleans as the primary 
marker (Nash and Ogan 1990). Identity politicisation occurred after 
World War II, when:
because of the natural affluence of their village life and the coverage of 
the [Bougainville] district by Christian missions (mainly Catholic and 
non-Australian), the administration neglected to play a conspicuous role 
in development almost until copper was discovered. Bougainville was 
known as the ‘Cinderella’ district not because it was poor but because 
it was ostensibly neglected (Griffin et al. 1979: 150).
Identity politicisation was intensified by resentment of colonial racism 
(Ogan 1965, 1971a, 1972) and by development of the mine, which was 
seen as something imposed to benefit the rest of PNG with little regard to 
detrimental impacts on Bougainville itself.
A major manifestation of change since 1905 has been the expanding 
range of groups or organisations to which Bougainvilleans belong or relate 
(churches, women’s groups, local governments, economic enterprises, 
political parties, etc.). Nevertheless, the autonomy long enjoyed by local 
1  There were 25 languages and a comparable number of sub-languages or dialects (Tryon 2005).
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lineages and other pre-colonial social groupings remains the default 
position for Bougainvillean understandings of how to relate to these 
new social phenomena. This expectation of autonomy helps to explain 
the extent to which the diverse groups involved in the origins of the 
conflict expected autonomy from one another, as do groups involved in 
contemporary debates on the future of mining.
For most rural Bougainvilleans, PNG remains remote (Tanis 2005: 468). 
This was even more so in 1963, when PNG-wide politics first developed 
around the election of TPNG’s first representative legislature, which 
included just one Bougainvillean representative. Concerns about national 
representation of Bougainville probably had little effect on voters in the 
1963 and 1968 elections (Ogan 1965, 1971a; Anis et al. 1976). However, 
rapid changes associated with development of the mine led to much wider 
understanding of such matters in the 1972 elections, contributing to the 
election of a young Catholic priest from Buin, John Momis, a critic of the 
mine and the administration, who continues to be a key political figure 
in Bougainville.
Growing agitation for a special political and financial status saw an interim 
Bougainville Provincial Government established in 1974 (Ghai and 
Regan 1992: 55–9), and disputes over its mine revenue share precipitated 
Bougainville’s attempted secession from PNG on 1 September 1975, 
just before PNG’s Independence Day. The crisis was resolved in mid-
1976, when the PNG Government agreed to constitutional provision 
for provincial government and guaranteed that the new North Solomons 
Provincial Government (NSPG)2 would receive all of the royalties from 
the mine aside from the 5 per cent already payable to some of the Panguna 
mine lease landowners (Bedford and Mamak 1977). Many Bougainvilleans 
concluded that only intense confrontation with PNG brought results, and 
that the little understood process of secession (Ogan 1990: 36) and status 
of independence would remedy many problems.
Following the 1976 agreement to end attempted secession, Bougainvilleans 
had high expectations of the NSPG. In 1977, John Momis became the 
PNG minister responsible for the new provincial government system 
established under the agreement. Strong support for autonomy of the 
NSPG was now expected from the centre, and these expectations were 
reinforced by establishment of the Momis-led Melanesian Alliance (MA) 
2  See Regan (2005b) on reasons for use of the different names, ‘North Solomons’ and ‘Bougainville’.
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party in 1980. The MA soon dominated both NSPG politics (especially 
from 1984) and Bougainville’s four seats in the PNG Parliament. But 
neither Momis nor his party had a significant impact on PNG policy 
towards Bougainville. By the mid-1980s, the NSPG’s lack of expected 
powers over areas of growing concern, such as mining, land and internal 
migration, was a source of widespread disappointment (Ghai and Regan 
2000, 2006). For many, the failure to pursue secession appeared to have 
been a mistake.
Mine Revenue Distribution and Landowner 
Compensation
The social, economic and environmental impacts of mine exploration 
and feasibility work (1963–69), construction (1969–72) and operation 
(1972–89) were especially shocking for mine lease landowners but also 
shocked most other Bougainvilleans on many levels. The 10,000-strong 
construction workforce—mostly recruited from elsewhere in PNG—
was more than 10  per cent of Bougainville’s total population at the 
time. From 1972, the permanent workforce was around 3,500, about 
80 per cent of them Papua New Guineans, less than a third of whom were 
Bougainvilleans (Quodling 1991: 37).
The limited mine employment opportunities were resented, but the 
far more limited mine revenue share received, not only by mine lease 
landowners but also by Bougainville as a whole, was of even greater concern 
for multiple groups involved in the origins of the conflict. Between 1972 
and 1989 the four main recipients of mine-derived revenue were:
• mine lease landowners, receiving 5 per cent of royalties, occupation 
fees and various forms of compensation;
• from 1977 the NSPG, receiving 95 per cent of royalties, some local 
taxes, and other limited payments;
• the PNG Government, receiving company tax, other tax receipts, 
and dividends in its capacity as the largest minority (19.1 per cent) 
shareholder in BCL; and
• private investors (including CRA as the majority BCL shareholder) 
receiving dividends (see Table 12.1).
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Table 12.1 Distribution of Panguna cash revenues, 1972–89.
Stakeholder Kina (million) %
PNG Government 1,078 61.46
Private investors 577 32.90
North Solomons Provincial Government 75 4.28
Local landowners 24 1.37
Total 1,754 100.00
Source: Author’s table, based on data from Quodling (1991: 34).
The landowner revenue share was a tiny percentage of total revenues, was 
distributed in ways that were poorly understood by most people, and 
involved significant sources of inequality.
Development of the mine entailed a number of leases, the main ones being 
state leases to BCL of land held under customary arrangements by small 
matrilineages from six different language groups—Torau, Nasioi, Eivo, 
Nagovisi, Baitsi and Piva—the majority being Nasioi speakers. BCL’s 
three main leases,3 together covering 13,047 hectares, comprised a ‘special 
mining lease’ (SML) for the open-cut pit, processing plant and associated 
facilities; a ‘port-mine access road lease’ (PMARL) over land from the 
east coast to the mine; and a ‘tailings lease’ over the Kawerong-Jaba river 
system, covering land from the mine to the west coast. After BCL’s land 
needs were finalised in mid-1969, colonial patrol officers (kiaps) spent 
much of the next three years walking every part of the lease areas with 
community members, demarcating the boundaries of the 829 land parcels 
or ‘blocks’,4 of which there were 509 in the SML, 62 in the PMARL and 
258 in the tailings lease.
Members of occupying lineages were henceforth generally referred to as 
mine lease ‘landowners’, though most had hazy ideas of what the term 
meant (Tanis 2005). The administration and BCL were just as hazy about 
precise identification of landowning lineage membership, as nothing 
akin to what is now known as social mapping was ever done to identify 
the members of the lineages involved. In part this was because of lack 
of precedents (this being PNG’s first large-scale mine), but also because 
of pressure from CRA to finalise land demarcation as quickly as possible 
3  There were also numerous much smaller leases (McNee 2015).




from mid-1969, resulting in the kiaps involved having no time to compile 
the group genealogies that they were trained to use whenever acquiring 
land for the state.
From 1966 until about 1970, many mine lease area lineage members 
opposed both exploration and mining (Bedford and Mamak 1977; 
Denoon 2000; Vernon 2005; Brown 2014). Overt opposition ended after 
the deployment of significant colonial administration resources (kiaps 
and police), when ‘protests and expectations became apparently more 
futile’ (Connell 1990: 28), and after agreement was reached on four main 
types of compensation payable to affected landowners, in addition to the 
5 per cent share of royalties already payable to SML landowners (Bedford 
and Mamak 1977). Compensation involved:
• payments for damage to land, buildings and crops, most being made 
during the exploration and construction phases;
• occupation fees paid at a uniform rate per hectare to the ‘customary 
heads’ of lineages owning the 829 blocks in the expectation that they 
would distribute the funds they received to other lineage members 
in accordance with custom;
• new houses for people whose land in the SML and tailings lease was 
actually destroyed, with some relocation costs; and
• compensation for fish populations in mine-impacted creeks and rivers, 
which was paid to customary right holders (known as ‘fish-owners’).
Acceptance of such payments did not entail landowner acquiescence. 
When compensation rates were initially determined, the recipients had no 
concept of the scale of the future impacts. As the enormity of the impacts 
became evident, community unhappiness grew.
In public hearings between 1969 and 1974, the PNG Land Titles 
Commission (LTC)5 determined the ‘customary heads’6 of the landowning 
lineages and the boundaries of each of the 829 blocks, relying heavily on 
the prior work of the kiaps. Bedford and Mamak (1977: 71) found that 
‘approximately 440 registered owners [‘customary heads’] … represent at 
least 2,000 men, women and children’.7 The number of ‘customary heads’ 
5  The files from these hearings are held by the LTC office in Port Moresby. I am grateful to the 
Chief Land Titles Commissioner, Benedict Batata, for locating and providing access to these records.
6  While ‘customary head’ was the term used almost universally by the LTC, ‘the terms title holder 
and owners do appear’ in the relevant LTC files (McNee 2015: 206).
7  The actual number of people is not known, but was probably over 4,000.
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was so much smaller than the number of blocks because a person could 
be a member and a ‘customary head’ of lineages occupying more than one 
block. Amounts paid to ‘customary heads’ varied immensely, depending 
on the number and size of the blocks involved (see Table 12.2). The largest 
blocks were in coastal areas of the tailings lease, the most sparsely populated 
area within the three main leases, where the single largest block was 960 
hectares, 27 were larger than 100 hectares, and almost two thirds of 258 
blocks were over 10 hectares. By contrast, in the SML and the PMARL, 
no block was larger than 100 hectares, and almost three quarters were 
less than 10  hectares. More than half the total occupation fees for all 
three leases went to just 114 ‘customary heads’ from 14 villages in the 
tailings lease. One quarter went to the people of just one relocated village 
(Bedford and Mamak 1977: 69–76).
Table 12.2 Numbers of blocks in the three main BCL leases.
Area SML PMARL Tailings Lease
< 1 hectare 96 12 16
1–10 hectares 297 40 77
10–100 hectares 116 10 138
100–200 hectares 0 0 20
200–300 hectares 0 0 3
> 300 hectares 0 0 4
Total Blocks 509 62 258
Sources: PNG Land Titles Commission files and BCL compensation and occupation fee payment 
records.
Under the last compensation agreement between BCL and landowner 
representatives, signed in March 1986, K604,440.57 in occupation fees 
and bush compensation was payable annually to ‘customary heads’ from 
1986 to 1989. From this total, K195,738.01 would go to the SML, 
K20,741.15 to the PMARL, and K487,961.41 to the tailings lease. 
If this money were distributed equally between the 829 blocks, it would 
mean an annual payment of K729 per block. An additional amount of 
K259,687 was to be paid each year to the ‘fish-owners’, and if this money 
were distributed equally between their 1,200 ‘group leaders’, then each 
one would receive an annual payment of K216.40. However, for reasons 
already discussed, there were great disparities in the amounts received 
by the ‘customary heads’ or ‘group leaders’, and hence in the amounts 
available to be redistributed to lineage or group members.
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Problems arising from the totality of the compensation arrangements 
undoubtedly contributed to the origins of the conflict. There were at least 
five issues that contributed to landowners having limited understanding 
of the arrangements:
• Most lineage members had little exposure to ideas of land ownership 
that would have made sense of the designation of a particular lineage 
as the owner of a block, or a particular person as its ‘customary head’ 
(Filer 2005; Tanis 2005; Kenema 2010).
• Expectations that ‘customary heads’ would distribute occupation 
fees and compensation payments to lineage members in accordance 
with ‘custom’ ignored the fact that neither the title nor the role of 
these individuals was customary, and there were no customary norms 
about distributing cash compensation paid for land that was used for 
previously unknown purposes such as industrial mining (Filer 1990).8
• The lack of ‘social mapping’ to identify the social and leadership 
structures or membership of ‘landowning’ lineages meant that 
there was no certainty about who might be entitled to a share of 
the payment for each block, leaving ‘customary heads’ with much 
discretion in distribution, some being renowned for favouritism to 
particular relatives while largely ignoring others with similar standing 
in the lineage.
• Most lineage members had limited knowledge of either English or Tok 
Pisin, which limited their understanding of the LTC process, which 
made it possible for people to be designated as ‘customary heads’ when 
this designation might otherwise be contested.
• When compensation rates were determined, few lineage members had 
any idea of the scale of mine impacts. What initially seemed reasonable 
was often questioned by the time the mine was operating.
These sources of limited understanding amplified the impacts of an 
additional set of five problems related to actual or perceived inequality in 
compensation arrangements:
• The payment of uniform rates per hectare took no account of the scale 
of impacts in different locations. Some communities suffered far more 
than others due to land destruction (by the pit or the tailings) and 
8  This may help to explain why the term ‘customary head’ was soon almost universally replaced by 
the term ‘title-holder’ in virtually all contexts except LTC documentation.
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village relocation.9 Small block size and higher population densities 
in the SML and upper parts of the tailings lease meant that small 
amounts were distributed to many more people than in lower parts of 
the tailings lease.
• Secondary land rights were ignored, although they could be significant, 
and lack of compensation for their loss caused resentment, especially 
where land was destroyed.
• Some ‘customary heads’ treated payments as being made to them as 
individuals, with no need for distribution to other lineage members or 
other persons who believed they had rights to the block in question. 
This was partly a consequence of ‘customary heads’ becoming generally 
known as ‘title-holders’, which led some to assume they had individual 
ownership rights. However, individuals rather than customary groups 
could sometimes have semi-exclusive rights to particular blocks under 
custom (Ogan 1971b; Mitchell 1976: 22), and most ‘customary 
heads’ registered for the largest blocks in the tailings lease fell into this 
category.
• No account was taken of rapid population growth and the numbers of 
young people reaching adulthood, resulting in gradual but inexorable 
diminution in the size of average available payments, with little 
reaching most young adults. Combined with other problems, the 
extent of the discretion of ‘customary heads’ caused seriously unequal 
intergenerational distribution.
• The limited compensation rights of communities outside but adjacent 
to BCL leases, whose members often experienced significant mining 
impacts, generated a particular sense of injustice.
Impacts and resentment were greatest amongst SML communities, due 
to the significant proportions of people relocated, the small average block 
size and high population density, proximity of the mine pit and its noise 
and dust, and the presence of many outsiders on their land. Many SML 
9  Relocation housing was neither of high standard nor maintained by BCL, and lacked provision 
for newly married couples, causing significant overcrowding and cultural stresses through the breach 
of post-marriage residence rules. Relocated SML villages lost all or most of their gardening land. 
Residents of villages near the mouth of the Jaba River were relocated to land over which they had 
few rights, resulting in ongoing tensions with the original owners. Such problems continue today, 
exacerbated by the absence of compensation payments since 1990, and by rapid population growth 
in both settler and host communities (personal communications, Albert Magoi, Ben Paula and 
Bernadine Kirra, July 2011).
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community members had the mine or its facilities in plain sight, and 
access to all SML villages and hamlets was by means of a road through 
the lease.
By the late 1970s, landowner concerns grew, and BCL’s slow responses 
caused anger. In 1979, landowners looted the Panguna supermarket, and 
their first representative body, the Panguna Landowners Association (PLA), 
was established. In 1980, landowners marched on BCL’s Panguna offices 
and erected roadblocks, causing temporary mine closure. Despite pressure 
from PNG’s police minister to deploy police mobile squads to clear the 
roadblocks, Ila Geno, then commander of the New Guinea Islands police 
region (including Bougainville and four other provinces) refused to do so. 
Instead he travelled from his base in East New Britain Province to work with 
the NSPG to negotiate with landowner leaders, including Francis Ona, 
to remove the roadblock (personal communication, Ila Geno, July 2014). 
These events contributed to pressure for a new compensation agreement 
between BCL and the PLA. Signed later in 1980, it provided for higher 
compensation rates, indexing of occupation fee rates, regular reviews, and 
a new compensation category called ‘social inconvenience compensation’ 
(SIC). The SIC was to be paid into a new landowner-controlled entity, the 
Road Mine Tailings Lease Trust Fund (RMTLTF), which was required to 
utilise the income for landowner benefit (Okole 1990; Oliver 1991: 153, 
203–4; Connell 1992: 38–43; Griffin and Togolo 1997: 376). Under the 
subsequent 1986 Agreement, the annual SIC payment was K393,838.69.
Hopes that the 1980 Agreement would improve the landowner situation 
were not met. The new landowner bodies, the PLA and RMTLTF, 
became sources of new problems. Unresolved concerns about unequal 
impacts and compensation were exacerbated by control of both bodies 
by a few ‘customary heads’, all older generation males. Emerging younger 
generation leaders complained that the PLA failed to pursue landowner 
concerns with sufficient vigour.
In the 1980s, younger generation leaders from SML communities, 
including Perpetua Serero and Francis Ona, had particular reasons for 
intense resentment due to issues of the kind previously outlined. Amongst 
other things, Ona and Serero were from a village close to the mine pit, in 
an area with relatively high population density, with land rights derived 
from the male line rather than the usually more significant female line 
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(Ogan 1990: 37). More important, what rights they had were to several 
blocks where an uncle, Matthew Kove, was registered as the ‘customary 
head’, and ignored their claims to shares in land compensation.10
The RMTLTF board initially made low-interest loans to landowners, but 
limited funds soon saw complaints of inequitable distribution. In 1983, 
Severinus Ampaoi, a landowner leader and senior BCL employee, became 
chairman of the board. Substantial bad debts were written off and a stricter 
financial regime introduced, with an end to the distribution of immediate 
benefits to landowners. An accumulation strategy was adopted to provide 
a basis for long-term benefit distribution.11 Shares were purchased in 
Bougainville Development Corporation (BDC), the successful business 
arm of the NSPG, in circumstances of great controversy. Funds were also 
invested in urban real estate and two plantations. Close cooperation with 
the BDC board contributed to perceptions that the RMTLTF board 
was part of a remote, wealthy Bougainvillean elite. There were mounting 
accusations of mismanagement, of directors ‘eating’ the money, of a lack 
of spending on landowner social amenities, of irregular board meetings, 
of a lack of information and of the board being dominated by ‘outsiders’ 
(Connell 1992: 42–5; Thompson and MacWilliam 1992: 36; see also 
Okole 1990; Turner 1990; Oliver 1991: 203–4). The central problem 
involved perceptions that a compensation category intended to benefit 
landowners in general now mainly benefited older men who were already 
wealthy and were too close to BCL.
The Bougainvillean Elite
A small Bougainvillean elite, mainly involved in copra production, 
first emerged in the 1950s (MacWilliam 2005), growing from the 
1960s as smallholder cocoa production expanded. From the 1970s, 
burgeoning cocoa production contributed to land pressures and growing 
economic  inequality (Mitchell 1976, 1982; Connell 1978, 1988; Tanis 
2005: 456–9; MacWilliam 2013). Unequal compensation from the mine 
created another wealthy group (Tanis 2005: 455), as did establishment 
10  Dorney (1990: 123) and Jubilee Australia (2014: 20) suggest that designation of males as 
‘customary heads’ was contrary to custom. In fact, well over half of those so designated were females, 
and as males are members of the lineages recognised as occupying land, and may well also have 
individual rights to land under custom, there is no reason in principle why males should not have this 
designation.
11  The mine was then expected to close around the year 2000.
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of mine-associated businesses. Growing inequality fuelled resentment in 
societies until recently highly egalitarian (Ogan 1990: 36; Regan 1998: 
271–2, 274–6).
A major source of disquiet was the BDC board’s response to a 1985 
request from the newly elected, MA-dominated NSPG for most board 
members to resign. The board members included the recently ousted 
premier, Leo Hannett, and others close to him. The board response was 
to issue new shares, diluting NSPG’s 57 per cent equity to 29 per cent. 
Moreover, without any offer being made to the majority shareholder, 
the new shares were allotted to six corporate entities and an individual. 
The new shareholders included the family companies of board members, 
the RMTLTF, BCL’s superannuation fund, and the ‘Severinus Ampaoi 
Group’. While BDC shares had previously been worth K9, the new 
shares were priced at K1.30, which entailed a major loss for the NSPG 
but a windfall gain for the new shareholders (Griffin and Togolo 1997: 
375). The NSPG challenged this action in widely publicised National 
and Supreme Court proceedings. Although eruption of the conflict in 
late 1988 meant the case was never finally determined, a 1988 Supreme 
Court ruling12 held that the NSPG ‘had, prima facie, good grounds for 
challenging the share issue’ (see Griffin and Togolo 1997: 374).
A widespread perception developed of joint action between BDC 
and the RMTLTF to enrich board members at the expense of other 
Bougainvilleans (Thompson and MacWilliam 1992; Wesley-Smith 
1992a). The involvement of BCL in the BDC share issue (through its 
superannuation fund) and allocation of BDC shares to the RMTLTF 
and the Ampaoi family completed the picture. Many people, particularly 
MA supporters, saw the share issue as the culmination of BDC’s general 
performance, allegedly hijacking lucrative business opportunities 
and blocking local Bougainvillean small and medium-sized business 
participation in spin-offs from the mine (Griffin and Togolo 1997: 374). 
As a result, BDC was ‘seen in the village as a private business benefitting 
a few individuals’, becoming ‘an object of exactly the same kind of anger 
and resentment’ as the PLA and RMTLTF (Tanis 2005: 466). ‘In the 
popular mind, grievances against BDC, the directors of the landowners’ 
trust fund [RMTLTF] and BCL (which had been patron of and provided 
advice to BDC) became intertwined’ (Griffin and Togolo 1997: 375). 
12  North Solomons Provincial Government v Bougainville Development Corporation Ltd [1988] 
PGSC 26, 21 December.
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As we shall see, the MA’s trenchant mid-1980s critique of Bougainvillean 
‘big business’ was to be echoed strongly in 1988 statements and demands 
by Francis Ona and the ‘new’ PLA.
Population Growth and Youth Unemployment
Bougainville’s population grew rapidly after World War II, from about 
41,000 in 1950 (Nelson 2005: 196) to about 73,000 in 1966 (Laracy 
2005: 125), about 109,000 in 1980 (Oliver 1991: 160–1), and about 
150,000 in 1986. This means an annual growth rate of between 3.4 and 
3.5 per cent (NSPG 1986a; Oliver 1991: 161). Much of Bougainville’s 
land is unsuitable for intensive agriculture (Oliver 1991: 10–12). In the 
1980s, more than 80 per cent of Bougainvilleans were concentrated in 
the limited areas of accessible arable land, heavily reliant on subsistence 
farming, with some cash crop cultivation. Both population growth 
and cocoa expansion from the 1960s depleted forest and other natural 
resources in proximity to the most densely populated areas and intensified 
local land shortages (Connell 1978, 1988; Mitchell 1982; Tyler 1988; 
Lummani 2005; MacWilliam 2013: 144–9, 184–6, 193). Economic 
inequality grew in many relatively densely populated parts of central 
and southwest Bougainville, including the Nasioi, Siwai, Nagovisi and 
Buin language areas (Mitchell 1982: 8; Connell 1988: 84–5; Tanis 2005: 
456–7).13
In the mid-1980s, more than 47,000 Bougainvilleans were aged from 
twelve to twenty-five years and classified as ‘youth’; 68 per cent of them 
were living in rural villages, 9  per cent in other rural settlements, and 
23 per cent in urban areas (NSPG 1986a). Twenty-five per cent of these 
young people had no formal education, 18 per cent had some primary 
schooling up to grade 5, and 39 per cent only to grade 6. Only 18 per cent 
had completed any high school grade. Further training or education 
opportunities were limited, as was wage employment. Only 19 per cent of 
young people were in formal employment, another third being involved 
in agriculture. Bougainvilleans enjoyed little preference in mine-related 
business and employment opportunities. Young males with little or no 
13  Pre-colonial migration into parts of the Siwai area, which had been caused by localised conflict, 
resulted in the presence of people who still had limited rights to land in the 1980s (personal 
communications, Michael Kouro 1999, Marie Tyler 2011, and Jonathan Ngati 2003). Some of them 




formal education faced particular problems, many having little access to 
land for cash cropping (Regan 1998: 274–6). Those with some education, 
but not enough to gain employment, often had unrealistic expectations 
and experienced difficulty fitting into village life (NSPG 1986a: 28–9).
Resentment of Outsiders
An unknown but significant number of residents in pre-conflict 
Bougainville (perhaps 20,000 out of a total population of about 150,000) 
originated from elsewhere in PNG. Several thousand worked as labourers 
on Bougainville’s mainly foreign-owned copra and cocoa plantations 
(Lummani 2005: 253), often staying on in Bougainville when their 
contracts expired. Similarly, some of the 10,000-strong mine construction 
workforce stayed on after construction ended (Mamak et al. 1974: 11–12). 
Others came later, attracted by Bougainville’s economic opportunities.
In the closely linked urban areas largely servicing the mine—Arawa, 
Panguna, Kieta and Toniva—and in ‘squatter settlements’ in both 
nearby rural areas and parts of the mine lease areas (Tanis 2005: 467), 
the numbers of ‘outsiders’ grew rapidly from the 1970s. An April 1988 
household survey (NSPG 1988a) showed a population of 17,314 (many 
from elsewhere in PNG) in ‘formal’ housing areas of Arawa and nearby 
urban areas, and 4,259 (most from elsewhere in PNG) in nearby ‘informal 
settlements’. Connell (1990: 48–9) reports a population of about 3,500 
for Panguna, and the proportion of Bougainvilleans in the towns as being 
‘barely more than a third of the total’. A 1986 report discussed the many 
problems with informal settlements that ‘caused … conflict with the local 
people which in turn puts greater pressure on the Government to take 
action’ (NSPG 1986b).
Many Bougainvilleans blamed ‘outsider’ squatters for increased crime and 
land disputes, and for taking over the economy, including formal sector 
jobs, local fruit and vegetable markets, and small-scale mine-related and 
other businesses (NSPG 1986b, 1988a; Tanis 2005: 466). In the 1988 
NSPG election, a non-Bougainvillean was elected to the provincial 
assembly by votes from the growing concentration of non-Bougainvilleans. 
In his home area of Nagovisi, James Tanis (2005: 466) reports worries 
that this showed outsiders ‘were taking over the government, and would 
control power, protect the squatter settlements and threaten customary 
land ownership’.
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In March 1988, in response to such concerns, the NSPG announced 
a joint operation with the police force, known as Operation Mekim Save 
(‘Make Them Take Notice’). However, this did not lead to the expected 
expulsion of unemployed non-Bougainvilleans and destruction of squatter 
settlements. Instead, an NSPG report talked of PNG constitutional 
rights protecting outsiders (NSPG 1988a). Tanis describes how frustrated 
villagers felt that the right to freedom of movement under the PNG 
Constitution:
was now being exercised by outsiders at the expense of the rights of 
Bougainvilleans to the freedom to enjoy their customary land … Whereas 
the category of ‘threatened’ landowners was once restricted to those 
living in mine lease areas, increasingly there was a sense in which all 
Bougainvillean landowners felt threatened by, and had grievances against, 
outsiders (Tanis 2005: 466–7).
Church Allegiances
The three Christian churches with earliest access to Bougainville 
gained  significant influence there. The Catholics arrived first in 1901, 
followed by the Methodists in 1917 and Seventh Day Adventists in 1924 
(Oliver 1991: 58–64). By the 1960s, the Catholics had ‘converted up to 
80 per cent of the people … with the Methodists—later the Uniting—
Church 15 per cent and the Seventh Day Adventists five per cent’ (Griffin 
1995: 10). All three main churches combined spiritual ‘formation’ 
with provision of health and education services. An almost complete 
lack of government services in most areas of Bougainville contributed 
to commonly expressed grievances about colonial neglect.14 Catholic 
Church activity was especially pervasive: an amazing 30 stations operated 
across Bougainville in 1966 (roughly one per 2,000 Catholics), most with 
associated schools and clinics (Laracy 2005: 125; see also Oliver 1991: 
58–68).
Catholic education was partly directed to training local priests in an elite 
seminary system. Though most of the trainees never became priests, they 
constituted a linked and articulate elite, familiar with Catholic social 
teachings. While the Methodist and Seventh Day Adventist churches 
were generally supportive of the colonial administration, the Catholics 
were more independent. From the early 1960s, they sponsored economic 
14  There were no government schools at all until the 1950s.
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development activities, initially largely in reaction to the grievances of 
the Buka-based Hahalis Welfare Society, which accused the church 
of neglecting the material well-being of its adherents (Rimoldi and 
Rimoldi 1992; Laracy 2005: 131). Some priests publicly criticised the 
administration’s treatment of ‘natives’ in relation to forestry and other 
projects (Fingleton 1970; Laracy 2005: 131).
In a series of press releases, church publications and a strong letter to 
the colonial administrator, all in 1966, the head of the Catholic Church 
in Bougainville, Bishop Lemay, criticised the administration’s actions 
in the early stages of mine exploration, describing colonial mining law 
as ‘unsuitable and as contravening native land customs and traditions’ 
(Lemay 1966, cited in Laracy 1999: 583). This stand caused considerable 
concern in the colonial administration (Downs 1980: 350–2; Laracy 
2005).15
In 1975, Lemay’s successor, Gregory Singkai, the first Bougainvillean 
bishop, supported secession, saying ‘we realised that most of the people 
involved in the independence movement … are Catholic and we decided 
it is better for us to be with them as Catholics and have influence than be 
on the outside’ (Woolford 1975: 208; see also Griffin et al. 1979: 216–17). 
By this time, however, the Methodist and Seventh Day Adventist churches 
also supported secession. This consolidation of church support for 
Bougainvillean political initiatives helped to legitimise broader demands 
arising from the politicisation of Bougainvillean identity.
The Impetus for Conflict
While there was no planning for the major violent conflict that occurred 
from 1988, the elements of the situation just surveyed combined 
to contribute to a widespread sense of grievance amongst many 
Bougainvilleans. They resented a remote Port Moresby–based government 
for the imposition of the mine, for the limited share of mine revenue 
15  Amongst the vocal clergy at the time was an American priest, Father Bob Wiley, then based at 
Tunuru, near Arawa. He was the parish priest at Panguna when the conflict began in 1988 and, in 
1991, he claimed to have warned BCL ‘big men’ in the 1960s that it would be the then schoolchildren 
who would fight back later, when they grew up. He quoted one such schoolboy, Philip Takaung, 
who later told him that that the church personnel ‘were the only ones who told us the truth … no 
one could believe that the mountain was going to be removed’ (Wiley 1991, cited in Laracy 2005: 
132). In 2016, Philip Takaung was the vice-president of the Me’ekamui Government of Unity, based 
at Panguna.
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received by Bougainvilleans, for the influx of people from elsewhere in 
PNG, and for the problems that phenomenon was thought to be causing. 
The mine contributed to growing economic inequality, which was 
a particular source of tension in a situation of rapid population growth, 
where a high proportion of young adult males had little or no education 
and few opportunities for economic advancement, and where outsiders 
were seen as taking opportunities that should have been provided to 
Bougainvilleans.
Mine lease landowners—in particular younger adults—had even 
stronger feelings of grievance: about inadequate and unfairly distributed 
compensation, unfair access to mine employment and business 
opportunities, and environmental and related impacts. The rejection 
by younger adult leaders of key figures amongst their older compatriots 
resonated with concerns amongst many other Bougainvilleans about 
growing inequality and an emerging Bougainvillean elite. Grievances 
were articulated by leaders emerging from a small Catholic Church–
educated elite. Church sympathy for landowner grievances gave strong 
legitimacy to their cause. While the NSPG and Bougainvillean MPs 
in the PNG parliament were strongly sympathetic to Bougainvillean 
concerns, they were powerless to deliver change. This combination of 
circumstances provided fertile ground for the emergence of an alternative 
leadership voicing the grievances and demands of various elements of the 
Bougainvillean population.
Conflict Origins: Groups, Concerns 
and Agendas16
The sequence of events leading to mine closure in 1989 began with the 
theft of BCL explosives, damage to mine offices, and destruction of pylons 
carrying electricity to the mine from the coast. These were widely reported 
16  The account in this part of the chapter draws on multiple sources, including many documents 
from the 1980s held in my files; personal communications over the past 20 years from key actors; and 
my observation of, or participation in, discussions amongst Bougainvillean leaders during preparations 
for, and conduct of, negotiations about the content and implementation of the BPA. Personal 
communications of particular importance came from Theodore Miriung (1994–96), Stephen Monei 
(1994–96), Joseph Kabui (1998–2008), Cornelius Besia (1999–2016), Jonathan Ngati (1999–2005), 
James Tanis (1999–2016), Damien Dameng (2002–05), Dennis Kuiai (2003–16), Albert Magoi 
(2011–12), William Mungta (2011), Ben Paula (2011–16), Lawrence Uakai (2011–14), Eddie Mohin 
(2013–16) and John Amuna (2015).
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as the actions of ‘young generation’ mine lease landowners—a view 
echoed in most subsequent accounts of the conflict origins. The ‘young 
generation’ mainly comprised adults under forty years of age, who were 
too young to have participated in the 1980 compensation negotiations.
Key young generation leaders included the subsequent Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army (BRA) leader, Francis Ona, and his cousin-sister, 
Perpetua Serero, respectively secretary and chair of the ‘new PLA’ (NPLA), 
which emerged from wider attempts to wrest PLA control from older 
generation leaders in August 1987. The NPLA’s objectives are typically 
described as being to ‘close the mine and arrest social disintegration’ 
(Denoon 2000: 196). However, accounts emphasising the concerns and 
objectives of young generation leaders are almost invariably unbalanced. 
They ignore the extent to which these leaders represented the concerns of 
other members of their communities, including older generation leaders 
who had long been pressuring BCL about compensation issues. They also 
ignore the extent to which key motivating grievances arose from internal 
community conflicts only partially related to compensation-related issues, 
and significant linkages between young landowner leaders and the NSPG, 
the Bougainvillean MPs, and leaders of other Bougainvillean groups with 
a variety of grievances and objectives, only some of which were related 
to the mine.
Mine Lease Landowners: ‘Young’ and ‘Older’ 
Generations
As we have seen, Ona and Serero had a particular grievance originating 
in family disputes from long before mining started, whose significance 
is widely recognised in SML communities but otherwise little known. 
In 2014, a relative of Ona published an account of the issues involved 
(Roka 2014: 23–6), describing how Ona and his family (siblings and 
maternal first cousins) resented the unfair distribution of compensation 
by their uncle, Matthew Kove, a key landowner leader from Guava 
village. The source of the conflict was the control of land belonging to the 
lineage of Ona’s grandfather’s wife, Hali. Control of this land had passed 
through the matrilineal line to Hali’s daughter from a relationship prior 
to her marriage to the grandfather. That daughter was Kove’s mother. 
The result was that most of the descendants of Hali’s marriage to the 
grandfather were largely excluded from decisions about their lineage land. 
They believed that this had enabled Kove to be designated as ‘customary 
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head’ for five blocks, including one of the largest, in the SML.17 Roka 
describes how Kove and his immediate family became wealthy through 
the distribution of compensation at his discretion, ignoring Ona and his 
relatives. The latter pursued:
their education with what little they earned from the sale of vegetables. 
When they asked Matthew Kove for financial help, he was known to burn 
banknotes before their eyes (Roka 2014: 24–5).
Kove had influential roles in the PLA and RMTLTF, contributing to 
Ona’s negative views of other leaders involved in control of those bodies. 
Roka describes how:
Serero, Ona and some other younger people began political sabotage to 
topple Matthew Kove and his cronies, who they claimed were corrupt 
and not landowner-oriented. Nearly all executives in the PLA had become 
rich men with high standards of living whilst the landowners felt they 
were in a backwater subjected to environmental pollution from the mine 
and harassment and exploitation by the rising population of Papua New 
Guineans brought to Bougainville as mine-workers. The Ona-Serero 
group’s call for change around 1986–87 did not produce any results and 
its members rebelled … in 1987 (Roka 2014: 25).
At the same time, Kove was a respected landowner leader and a signatory 
to the 1980 and 1986 compensation agreements between BCL and the 
PLA. His views on mining impacts and compensation—similar to those 
of the young generation leaders—were expressed to BCL in his capacity 
as a PLA executive member throughout the 1980s (Auna 1989: 10). 
In May 1987, together with other PLA leaders, including Ona (Griffin 
and Togolo 1997: 377), Kove attended a meeting with BCL’s managing 
director at which he supported the ‘Bougainville Initiative’ adopted by 
John Momis. The speeches made at this meeting ‘were very heated and 
contained threats to the effect that BCL could not expect to continue 
to conduct enormously profitable mining operations without a major 
redistribution of wealth amongst local … landowners’ (Auna 1989: 17).
Even in late 1988, well after the emergence of the NPLA, Kove appeared 
to support preparations for action against BCL when he attended 
a customary ceremony conducted by senior Nasioi men from the SML area 
to ‘spiritually’ prepare the small group that Ona was organising to begin 
such action (personal communication, Albert Magoi, July 2011). Feelings 
17  I am grateful to Greg McNee for identifying the blocks in question.
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against Kove amongst his young relatives were so strong, however, that 
his was probably the first death arising from the conflict. He was killed by 
Ona’s close relatives, in what was described as a ‘traditional’ manner, in 
January 1989 (Oliver 1991: 210).
The roles of Ona and Serero in the origins of the conflict have been variously 
characterised, but the most remarkable—and deeply misleading—
depiction is that of ‘young activists at the vanguard of … [an] anti-capitalist 
movement’ challenging the ‘old’ PLA, and doing so ‘to operationalise their 
[radical] social agenda’ (Lasslett 2014: 49). There is in fact little credible 
evidence of their being so motivated, and much indicating that, in their 
cases, the impacts of common landowner grievances were dramatically 
intensified by personal grievances.
Ona certainly played a key leadership role in mobilising pressure against 
BCL, the PNG Government and the NSPG, being well equipped to do 
so because of the force of his personality and his own certainty about 
the rightness of whatever he did. Many close to him say that he was also 
remarkably stubborn and often closed to alternative views. When faced 
with criticism, he tended to blame others. He also drew inspiration from 
Catholicism. From at least late November 1988, when he took to the 
bush with a small support group to avoid capture by police mobile squads 
deployed in response to the damage then being done to BCL facilities, 
Ona focused heavily on prayer. His associates were required to join him, 
whether they were Catholic or not. He had a particular devotion to 
the Blessed Virgin Mary (Hermkens 2007), and told associates that he 
received guidance from both Mary and God.
The Ona–Serero group rebellion must also be seen in the context of an 
earlier and wider mobilisation of young landowners, which is evident 
in Joseph Kabui’s early career. A young generation landowner from the 
upper part of the tailings lease, Kabui returned to Bougainville from the 
‘senior’ Catholic seminary in Port Moresby in the late 1970s, and became 
an organiser of the Bougainville Mine Workers Union (BMWU). His 
relative, Michael Pariu, who played key roles in establishing and then 
leading both the PLA and the RMTLTF, was elected to the NSPG 
assembly in 1980 to represent the Ioro constituency, which included both 
SML and tailings lease areas. Growing dissatisfaction with the PLA and 
RMTLTF leadership on the part of young generation landowners led 
Kabui to campaign on their behalf and defeat Pariu in the 1984 election 
(personal communication, Joseph Kabui, October 1998).
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Kabui then supported Ona, Serero and others who (unsuccessfully) sought 
to extract more benefits for the younger generation from the PLA and the 
RMTLTF (Auna 1989: 18). Both Kabui and Momis supported them in 
the August 1987 PLA special general meeting of about 100 landowners 
that ousted the older leaders and elected a new executive, with Serero 
as chair and Ona as secretary. Members of the old executive rejected 
the outcome, insisting that they remained in control. To the frustration 
of the young leaders, BCL continued to recognise the old executive. 
Communication between the NPLA and BCL was initially limited to 
letters seeking company recognition, but in March 1988 it shifted to 
increasingly strident demands against BCL.
Despite the predominance of younger landowners, the NPLA did work 
closely with some key older generation leaders from both mine lease 
and adjacent areas. One of the most significant, Damien Dameng, was 
considerably older than most of the older PLA leaders. Though he came 
from an area just outside the mine lease boundaries, he had a significant 
following, held strong views on mining, and participated actively in most 
of the NPLA’s written communications with BCL and actions against the 
company.
The concerns and demands of the NPLA were expressed from March 
to November 1988 in a variety of ways—through speeches made and 
a petition handed to BCL at a demonstration on 11 March 1988, through 
a series of letters to BCL, the NSPG and the PNG Government, and 
through demands made in at least nine meetings between those various 
entities. Copies of the petition and letters, and of minutes from several 
of the meetings, still exist, but difficulties arise in their selective use. 
First, NPLA demands varied over time, reflecting the concerns and 
goals of associated groups, not just those of young landowners. Second, 
‘outrageous demands are part and parcel of the Melanesian Way of doing 
politics’ (Filer 1992: 441). Finally, many of Ona’s letters were prepared by 
others whose particular concerns and personal styles could influence the 
content—a factor contributing to some of Ona’s more radical assertions 
(personal communications, Lawrence Uakai and James Tanis, 2013).
As for their concerns, a useful summary appears in the minutes of 
a  26  May  1988 meeting between NSPG and PNG Government 
officials and NPLA representatives (NSPG 1988b; AGA 1989; Connell 
1991). Six  main categories were identified. Significantly, the first was 
‘environmental’, involving loss of the previously ‘happy life’ of the 
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people due to the destruction of land and environment. The second was 
‘relocation’, involving inadequacy and lack of maintenance of the houses, 
which were by now becoming health risks, lack of housing for newly 
married couples, lack of garden land for relocated villages, inadequate 
septic tanks and water supplies, and lack of electric power. The third 
was ‘business opportunities’, involving BCL’s use of mainly foreign 
contractors, and its involvement in non-mining businesses that unfairly 
competed with local businesses. The fourth was ‘compensation’, relating 
to outstanding payments for a particular village. The fifth was ‘services’, 
involving poor and unsafe roads for village access, and poor standards 
of health and education facilities in mine lease areas. And the sixth was 
‘inconvenience’, involving the presence of squatter settlements in mine 
lease areas.
The demands made in this document included:
• dramatic increases in both compensation to mine lease landowners 
and mine revenue shares of landowners and NSPG;
• reimbursement to the NSPG of 50 per cent of mine revenue generated 
since mining began in 1972;
• priority in mine-related employment and contracts for landowners;
• much improved roads and services for landowners from both BCL 
and NSPG;
• much improved village relocation arrangements; and
• replacement of RMTLTF by NPLA as recipient of BCL SIC payments.
Both the concerns and the demands were broadly consistent with issues 
that had been raised by older generation PLA leaders in their 1980s 
engagement with BCL, including the demands made when Momis 
presented his Bougainville Initiative to BCL May 1987.
An earlier petition dated 11 March 1988, signed by Ona, Serero and 
Damien Damen (Dameng), included a demand for mine closure within 
28  days (PLA 1988). It was in a letter to BCL dated 5 April 1988, 
signed by Ona and Serero, that a demand for payment of K10 billion 
(then equivalent to far more than US$10 billion) was first made. In that 
letter, Ona and Serero stated that mining could continue if this demand 
were met, and if BCL:
• paid 50 per cent of its profits to landowners and NSPG;
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• consulted the NPLA before any mine expansion; and
• became a company owned by landowners and other Bougainvilleans 
within five years.
Informants close to Ona at the time advise that demands for mine closure 
were intended to pressure the PNG Government and BCL to negotiate 
new terms for mining. Permanent mine closure could not have been 
a serious demand when claims for additional payments, employment and 
contract preferences could only be met if mining continued. Nor can the 
K10 billion demand be seen as an indirect demand for mine closure. Then 
NSPG premier, Joseph Kabui, described this and related demands as ‘ways 
my people are trying to express their fear and the feeling of total loss of 
their environment and lifestyle’ (Kabui 1988, cited in Oliver 1998: 462–3). 
Moreover, by the time Ona started to demand secession from PNG, as in 
some of his statements in November 1988, he clearly envisaged the mine 
becoming independent Bougainville’s main revenue source (Oliver 1991: 
208)—a position he advanced in statements to BRA leaders as late as 1993 
(personal communication, Eddie Mohin, July 2014).
Furthermore, the demands made by young landowners did not involve the 
repudiation of deals made previously by the older generation, as argued 
by Filer (1990). Rather, they involved a rejection of the unfair revenue 
distribution under the Bougainville Copper Agreement (BCA) and the 
1980 and 1986 compensation agreements, and of the extent to which 
a small fraction of the older generation seemed to benefit from those 
arrangements. Although the old PLA leaders agreed that the arrangements 
were unfair, the NPLA leaders blamed the old leaders for both enriching 
themselves under these arrangements and failing to be sufficiently active 
in pursuit of change.
Even when Ona and his small support group went into the bush in late 
1988, he remained open to negotiation.18 Early in December 1988, Momis 
and Kabui met Ona in his ‘bush camp’ on several occasions, seeking to 
persuade him to meet a new national government ministerial committee 
dealing with the emerging crisis. Ona agreed to a meeting in Guava on 
8 December. At this stage, the mine had closed due to the destruction of 
a power supply pylon on 5 December. The tense meeting was attended by 
18  This account draws on personal communications from Joseph Kabui (1998–2005) and John 
Momis (2014–15), copies of minutes and reports of the meeting held in my files, and a national 
newspaper article (Anon. 1988).
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four national government ministers, including Momis and Deputy Prime 
Minister Akoka Doi, representatives of the NSPG, including Kabui, and 
numerous landowners. Ona spoke of landowner concerns, insisting on 
renegotiation of the BCA and the withdrawal of police mobile squads. 
When the deputy prime minister agreed to both demands, Ona agreed to 
the mine reopening. Ona and other key figures proceeded to a hotel on the 
small island of Arovo, near Kieta, to sign the new agreement. On leaving 
that event, however, and contrary to the directions of the deputy prime 
minister, police arrested key landowner representatives. Ona felt betrayed 
by the national government, violent conflict intensified and negotiations 
ceased for some months.
In summary, there is no clear evidence that Ona was committed to either 
permanent mine closure or secession just before, or in the early stages of, 
the violence. Rather, the evidence suggests that he was mainly seeking to 
renegotiate the terms and conditions of mining.19 More generally, there is 
no evidence that Ona planned the violent conflict that actually occurred.
Young Mineworkers
The key roles of young Bougainvillean mineworkers (generally under thirty 
years of age) in the origins of the conflict have drawn little attention from 
commentators, but have long been acknowledged by other Bougainvillean 
actors. BRA leader Sam Kauona has described how Ona ‘organised a core 
group comprising concerned Bougainvilleans  …  working in the mine 
with him’ (NZine 2000a). James Tanis, briefly employed by BCL during 
the university holidays in late 2008, reports that young mineworkers from 
all over Bougainville made ‘bitter complaints that BCL was favouring the 
non-Bougainvilleans and giving limited opportunities to Bougainvilleans’ 
(Tanis 2005: 467). Many of those involved later reported concerns that 
BCL unfairly ignored unemployed age-mates in their home areas.
The BMWU represented all of BCL’s PNG citizen employees (Hess and 
Maidment 2014; Hess et al. 2016). As the majority were from elsewhere 
in PNG, young Bougainvillean mineworkers felt that the union could not 
19  Writing early in 1990, anthropologist Gene Ogan reports the receipt of a letter from Bishop 
Singkai saying that Ona’s main aim, even after the conflict developed, was ‘to keep the Mine closed, 
thus punishing the Papua New Guinea Government that has taken so much from the landowners and 
the Province without putting anything back in return’ (Ogan 1990: 39).
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represent their particular concerns, and they had little in common with 
most of the older Bougainvillean employees who accepted the company’s 
policies too readily.
About 50 young men from all over Bougainville met irregularly for 
18 months before the conflict began to discuss their grievances. A core 
group of seven or eight, led by Ona and later known as the BRA ‘founders’, 
met more regularly, gradually taking on planning and organisational roles. 
Members of the larger group made contributions to a fund intended to 
support action against BCL. Early in 1988, one was sent to Honiara with 
several thousand kina to buy weapons for use in a proposed rampage 
through the mine. Both he and the funds disappeared. Subsequently, 
a group of workers and landowners waited some days at Marau, on 
Bougainville’s southwest coast. A submarine supposedly organised by 
a relative of Ona’s, then studying overseas, was expected to deliver weapons 
and ammunition, but they never arrived. In both instances, the aim was 
to force negotiations with BCL and the government.
When these efforts failed, a core group of young landowners joined 
the ‘founders’ in organising the theft of BCL explosives. Power pylons 
were targeted because they were not protected by BCL security guards, 
and serious damage to even one of them would cause temporary mine 
closure. A series of joint operations destroyed a succession of pylons over 
several months from early December 1988. To plan and support those 
operations, and to avoid suspicion of their involvement, most of the 
‘founders’ continued in employment with BCL until the mine closed in 
May 1989.
The young mineworkers sought temporary mine closure to force 
negotiations on new mining conditions that would be far more beneficial 
to Bougainvillean interests, including those of BCL employees. They 
saw no need to make public their particular concerns as they assumed 
that, once negotiations began, interests such as theirs could be joined 
with those of the young landowners at the negotiating table. Initially, 
they sought neither secession nor permanent mine closure. It was police 
mobile squad violence (from December 1988), followed by that of the 
PNG Defence Force (from April 1989), which provided the basis for 




The Arawa Mungkas Association
Although Ona was on the executive of this important Arawa-based 
organisation, its major focus was on the impacts of the influx into 
Bougainville of people from elsewhere in PNG and the limited mine-
related opportunities for Bougainvilleans in general. The name, 
Mungkas Association, originated with Bougainvillean students at the 
University of PNG who met to discuss Bougainville’s political future 
in the late 1960s (Griffin et al. 1979: 210–12). Various manifestations 
subsequently emerged, in Port Moresby and other urban centres, as well 
as in Bougainville, to address specific problems. The Arawa Mungkas 
Association, set up in 1987, comprised representatives of communities 
from many parts of Bougainville then resident in mine-related urban areas. 
During 1988, its members held public meetings and demonstrations to 
express grievances about squatter settlements.
The minutes of an executive meeting in held in Arawa on 24 March 
1988, with Ona and Serero in attendance, provide insights into their 
concerns and demands. Squatters from elsewhere in PNG were said to be 
committing crimes, taking over customary land, running small businesses 
and taking jobs and business opportunities that should have been reserved 
for Bougainvilleans. The NSPG administrator, Peter Tsiamalili, reported 
on the Operation Mekim Save taskforce that had just been set up to 
respond to such problems. He counselled moderation and collaboration 
with the NSPG.
Some members wanted ‘to take violent action now’ (Mungkas 1988: 2), 
while others spoke of the need to save Bougainville from crime, or called 
for an end to the PNG plantation labour scheme, under which labourers 
were recruited from elsewhere in PNG, because ‘it is the vehicle of death’ 
(ibid.: 6). As an indication of the broad but unfocused sympathy amongst 
Bougainvilleans for secession from PNG, the minutes record unanimous 
agreement on two points: ‘in view [of ] all the suffering, misery and lose 
facing [sic] we have been made to bear’, to ‘put it in strongest terms 
to the Prov. [Provincial] and Nat. [National] Governments that North 
Solomons DEMANDS SUCCESSION [sic]’; but ‘if they object to this 
demand’, then the two governments must ‘act immediately to remove all 
unemployed squatters from the whole of North Solomons’, and the PNG 
Constitution must be amended to require employers to return workers to 
their place of origin at the end of their contracts. Furthermore:
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This meeting strongly felt that our inclusion with PNG is a direct route 
to Bville neutralisation. This is starting. This plan is not because of BCL, 
but for our own safety and wellbeing. (ibid.: 3)
Additional calls were made for BCL and the NSPG to remove outsiders; 
for 80  per cent of BCL employees to be Bougainvilleans; for BCL to 
terminate non-Bougainvillean contractors undertaking jobs that could 
be handled by Bougainvilleans; and for ‘all tradestores [to] be returned 
to landowners’.20 The minutes also record the presentation of a plan by 
‘landowners’ (presumably the NPLA) that included ‘mine shutdown’, 
secession, and ‘BCL demanded to pay K10  billion for the damage’. 
However, it is most unlikely that permanent closure was envisaged here, 
or that the Mungkas executive would have supported such a proposal, for 
the minutes also advocated pressure on BCL to preference Bougainvillean 
employees and contractors.
‘Pressure Groups’ in Southwest Bougainville
The Mungkas leaders had close links with the Bana Pressure Group,21 the 
Siwai Pressure Group and similar, though less well organised, groups from 
the Buin area. Bana and Siwai were relatively densely populated areas, with 
intensive cultivation of cash crops and associated land shortages, close to 
the mine, and hence experiencing some of its impacts. Little has ever been 
written about these groups and their roles in the conflict (but see Tanis 
2005: 453–4, 463). Francis Ona received strong support from them, both 
before and after the conflict started.
These groups were mostly led by older men. Some held land adjacent to 
the tailings lease, receiving little or no compensation despite the impacts, 
leading to particular resentment of BCL. They were also concerned 
about the broader problem of environmental degradation, the lack of 
employment and business opportunities with the mine, and the number 
of non-Bougainvilleans now settling on their land or running small 
businesses nearby (Tanis 2005). Pressure group leaders thought that 
independence was the most realistic way of getting a fairer deal from BCL. 
They rejected the earlier generation of ‘nationalist’ Bougainville leadership 
20  The mid-1988 NSPG report on law and order later assessed such proposals as ‘impractical’ 
(NSPG 1988a), only adding to Mungkas leadership frustration.
21  Bana is a term applied to the combined areas occupied by speakers of the Banoni, Baitsi and 
Nagovisi languages, being derived from the first two letters of the names of these languages.
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that had abandoned the secessionist cause in 1976. Their position was also 
a reaction to PNG’s failure to agree to 1981 NSPG proposals for changing 
the BCA (Wesley-Smith 1992a).
As Bana Pressure Group chairman from mid-1988, James Singko 
expressed its position in ever more radical terms. From late 1988, he 
assisted Ona with funds raised from the sale of bananas and other crops 
from his plantation. He accompanied Ona into the bush in late 1988, 
bringing young men from his group, and soon becoming Ona’s deputy in 
the BRA. He is also regarded as being the strongest proponent of secession, 
and central to that cause being agreed as a core goal of the rebellion at 
a major meeting at Sipuru, in central Bougainville, in late February 1989. 
In later tensions with Ona over the direction of the rebellion, Singko 
claimed the right to negotiate with the PNG Government on the issue 
since he was the sponsor of that particular aspect of their agenda (personal 
communication, James Tanis, July 2015).
Marginalised Youth and Raskol Gangs
Initial damage to BCL offices and power pylons in November 1988 led 
to indiscriminate violence by PNG police mobile squads against mine 
lease landowners. Young mineworker leaders then recruited disaffected 
agemates—many involved in criminal (raskol ) gangs—to join what was 
soon being called the BRA,22 in the expectation that gang members would 
be more ready than others to meet the unexpected police violence with 
a violent response. This recruitment campaign helps to explain both the 
rapid expansion of Ona’s support from early 1989, and some of the BRA’s 
subsequent indiscipline.
Because the marginalised youth recruited in this way came from all over 
Bougainville, it is difficult to be specific about their goals. Information 
from some who undertook the recruiting indicates that few had political 
goals. Many were undisciplined and continued with their criminal 
activities (Oliver 1991: 214). Moreover, many were later involved in 
the chaotic situation that followed an agreement made on 2 March 
22  In 1989, they were more frequently known as militants or ‘Rambos’. Rambo was a character 
played by actor Sylvester Stallone in a popular 1982 movie, First Blood, which was very popular in 
Bougainville before and during the conflict.
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1990, under which PNG security forces withdrew from Bougainville 
by 16 March. On 8 March, Bishop Singkai expressed concern that the 
proposed withdrawal meant:
a power vacuum is being created which invites misguided youth to 
terrorise innocent persons. We believe that the BRA will influence the 
so-called ‘Rambo Gangs’ not to steal or destroy private property (Singkai 
1990).
His hopes were not realised. Ona was concerned about the damage to 
BCL  facilities and equipment because he envisaged an intact mine 
reopening as the main source of revenue for an independent Bougainville 
(personal communications, Joseph Kabui 2003, James Tanis 2005, Eddie 
Mohin 2015). In a radio broadcast on 18 March, he talked of receiving 
many complaints: ‘Those you fought to protect now regard you as 
worse than the security forces … a lot of you I don’t consider as BRA’. 
He directed the return of vehicles and goods stolen ‘against BRA law’ and 
threatened that he could ‘surrender now and everything will fall apart’ 
(Oliver 1991: 237).
In a 2000 interview, former BRA leader Sam Kauona described the 
situation as follows:
Another problem arose from Bougainvilleans making claims to a lot 
of materials, including hundreds of vehicles abandoned by the mining 
company … The soldiers in the BRA refused to listen to Sam. ‘It was 
madness’ said Sam. ‘They didn’t know how to drive the vehicles but they 
went from one to another—there were so many. There was virtually no 
control. They took all the money that was left in the drawers. Because of 
all the material goods Bougainvilleans started fighting against each other 
…  The problem became so complicated that it became impossible to 
address this internal instability’ (NZine 2000b).
Indigenous Political-Religious Movements
The leaders of several highly autonomous local movements strongly 
supported the NPLA. Once regarded as ‘cargo cults’, they have more 
recently been described in Bougainville as ‘indigenous political-religious 
movements’ (BCC 2004: 32–3). The most significant was Me’ekamui 
Pontoku Onoring, led from the early 1960s by Damien Dameng, a man 
from Irang village, just a few kilometres southwest of Panguna (Oliver 
1991: 180–1; Regan 2002; Tanis 2005: 461).
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Dameng sought the autonomy necessary for Bougainvillean communities 
to pursue their own ‘development’ paths based on their own choice to 
accept or reject elements of custom, Christianity, and other ‘modern’ 
institutions. He opposed mining as an uncontrollable force damaging 
culture and autonomy, and supported permanent mine closure. He had 
links with, and some influence over, similar movements elsewhere 
(BCC 2004: 32–3), most of which had supported secession in 1975, and 
did so again from early 1989.
Dameng associated closely with the NPLA. In March 1988, he signed 
the initial petition presented to BCL, along with Ona and Serero, being 
described in the document as ‘Chairman of the Demonstration’ (PLA 1988). 
He attended most of the meetings between the NPLA and representatives 
of BCL and the national and provincial governments between March and 
October 1988. He was the only person recorded as speaking for landowners 
at the 26 May meeting between NSPG and PNG Government officials 
(NSPG 1988b). And some of his supporters were amongst the young men 
who accompanied Ona into the bush late in 1988.
When police mobile squads began their active pursuit of Ona and his 
band, the latter moved southeast to the rugged and largely trackless 
Kongara Mountains. Most of the inhabitants were followers of the 
Methodist (now Uniting) church, but many also followed Dameng. Once 
in the area, Ona secured support from local clan leaders to recruit more 
young men to their group, and similar approaches were soon made to clan 
leaders and chiefs in other areas.23 This form of recruitment is the basis for 
recent assertions by some former combatant leaders of customary rights 
(to compensation) to be taken into account if the mine ever reopens.
Church Blessings
From an early stage there was a strong sense that the Catholic Church, 
in  particular, supported the NPLA and, by extension, the BRA. From 
before the conflict, religious beliefs provided a source of inspiration to 
many of those involved. Church social justice teachings influenced many 
with Catholic seminary training, while other Catholics, including Ona, 
drew inspiration from a range of more basic Catholic teachings and 
practices.
23  In February 2016, families from the Mangkaa area in Kongara asked the Bougainville authorities 
for a goodwill payment for having provided food and shelter to Ona from August 1989.
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As violence spread from late 1988, Bishop Singkai and the Justice and 
Peace Committee of the Bougainville Diocese spoke publicly against 
PNG security force violence (Oliver 1991: 216, 219, 232–4; see also 
Griffin 1995). Singkai maintained close communication with Ona in 
his bush hide-out, amongst other things sending rosary beads to Ona 
and other members of his core group (personal communication, James 
Tanis, February 2016). Father Bob Wiley, a critic of the mine in 1966, 
was parish priest at Panguna in 1988, and was known as a BRA supporter 
(see Wiley 1992).24 Perceptions of church support were reinforced 
from mid-1990 when Bishop John Zale, head of the Uniting Church 
in Bougainville, joined Bishop Singkai as a member of the Bougainville 
Interim Government established by the BRA.25
Some Pentecostal Protestants also had their own biblical explanations 
for Bougainville’s special place in God’s plans. Such views were prevalent 
in the 1980s and continue to be widely discussed amongst Pentecostal 
Bougainvilleans in 2016.26 A variety of religious beliefs therefore 
contributed to the ideological emphasis on the primacy of Bougainvillean 
rights that emerged after 1989.
Mainstream Politics
While both the NSPG and the Bougainvillean representatives in PNG’s 
national parliament were generally critical of BCL in the 1980s, they 
tended to support revision of the BCA rather than mine closure. John 
Momis attacked the unfairness of the BCA in a five-page letter known 
as ‘The Bougainville Initiative’ while he was campaigning in the 1987 
national elections. When he presented it to BCL’s managing director in 
May 1987, he was accompanied by Kove, Ona, and others who were later 
members of the NPLA (Auna 1989; Griffin and Togolo 1997: 377).
24  Early in 1989, he blessed BRA members before they went into operation and remonstrated 
strongly with one of Ona’s local supporters who questioned whether this was appropriate priestly 
behaviour (personal communications, John Amuna and Wendelinus Bitanuma, 2015).
25  Both were members of the Bougainvillean delegation that negotiated a ceasefire with PNG 
Government representatives on the New Zealand naval ship Endeavour from 29 July 1990 (Oliver 
1991: 248–53).
26  They were central to an ‘awareness’ package, regularly delivered from about 2010 by former 
BRA leader Sam Kauona, that concerned the ‘stolen rights’ to the gold of Bougainville. The theft was 
said to have begun with gold taken by the ships of the biblical King Solomon for the construction 
of the temple in Jerusalem. A 2010 paper by a former bible college lecturer close to the Me’ekamui 
leadership sets out similar views (Taruna 2010).
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This document (soon rejected by BCL) has been dismissed as an effort 
to prevent a reduction in the MA party’s vote in the impending election 
(Griffin 1995: 16; Griffin and Togolo 1997: 377). BCL’s former managing 
director later labelled it the ‘major catalyst’ of the conflict (Quodling 
1991: 51–2), but Momis was acting in a way that more likely ‘reflected 
rather than provoked the impatience of his electorate’ (Filer 1992: 441). 
After all, he was close to the leaders of the groups discussed here, and 
his demands were similar to the 1981 NSPG proposals to the national 
government, made in advance of the failed review of the BCA, to increase 
royalties from 1.25 to 5 per cent (Wesley-Smith 1992b: 100), as well as to 
later positions taken by both the PLA and the NPLA.
Any confidence Ona and his supporters might have had in the NSPG 
and the MA members of parliament to advance NPLA concerns was 
undermined by internal MA conflict in 1988. Alexis Sarei, elected premier 
in 1984, unexpectedly resigned in 1987 (Oliver 1991: 194–5). The 
NSPG constitution required a province-wide ‘presidential’ by-election, 
but the MA-dominated NSPG assembly amended the constitution to 
enable election of a caretaker premier from among the sitting members. 
Joseph Kabui was the MA nominee who was elected. His NPLA associates 
saw this as a major advance for their cause, but the party’s plan was that 
Kabui, who was seen as young and inexperienced, should merely ‘keep 
the seat warm’ for a more senior MA figure to be elected as premier in 
the 1988 provincial elections. To the anger of Momis, Kabui decided to 
run as a  pro-MA candidate without MA endorsement. In a three-way 
contest he defeated both the former premier, Leo Hannett, and the MA 
candidate, Anthony Anugu. Momis and his party allies could not forgive 
Kabui, who in turn resented MA election campaign attacks on himself.
An unfortunate consequence of this was the much-reduced capacity 
of Bougainville’s mainstream political leadership to cooperate as crisis 
became conflict. The standing of MA, and of Momis as the previously 
dominant figure in Bougainvillean politics, were both damaged: ‘it was 
clear that people were no longer following party politics’ (Tanis 2005: 
469). The failure of the NSPG’s 1988 Operation Mekim Save was also 
a grave disappointment to many people, and contributed to loss of faith 
in the NSPG’s ability to protect Bougainvillean rights and interests 
as opposed to the constitutional rights of all PNG citizens (Tanis 2005: 
466–7). That was undoubtedly a factor in the push for radical action 
amongst the coalition of groups identified here in the period from late 
October 1988 to February 1989.
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Kabui had a long history of links to Ona and his cause, and maintained 
these links after Ona went into the bush, but references to Kabui in Ona’s 
frequent public statements in 1989 were increasingly dismissive. Other 
members of Kabui’s government, while sympathetic to Ona, were soon 
deeply concerned about the escalating violence. They sought moderate 
solutions at the same time as Ona and the BRA became more radical 
in their demands. By the time of the March 1990 withdrawal of PNG 
security forces, the BRA felt that much of the NSPG had opposed them, 
and had little interest in sharing power with it.
Linkages and Networks
Extensive linkages existed between the leaders of most community groups 
involved in the origins of the conflict origins, and also between them, the 
state and the company. But, by late 1988, most of these groups were to 
varying degrees opposing both the national government and the NSPG, 
despite their links to individual MA members. Intergroup linkages meant 
that the NPLA, the Mungkas Association, the young mineworkers, the 
Bana and Siwai pressure groups, and Me’ekamui Pontoku Onoring 
operated as a loose coalition.
Bishop Singkai and several of his priests, notably Bob Wiley and Mark 
Roberts, also had close links with the NPLA and pressure group leaders. 
A significant proportion of the leaders of all groups came from the Catholic 
educated elite and so shared less formal links. Church support legitimised 
increasingly radical actions as being in the interests of Bougainville as 
a whole.
The core leadership of each group was small, and there were overlaps 
between them. Most of the key leaders were active MA members, 
which provided another set of linkages, yet each key one influenced and 
mobilised significant and to some extent distinct communities. Their 
influence was concentrated in central and southwest Bougainville, but 
for some it extended much further. Those stretching to almost all parts 
of Bougainville included the overarching church (especially Catholic) 
and MA networks, the Mungkas network (through Arawa-based 
communities from all over Bougainville), the ‘indigenous political-
religious movements’, the disaffected young males, and the young men 
recruited through clan leaders. Hence, during 1988 and into 1989, the 
leadership reflected the concerns of, spoke to, and mobilised support 
from, a significant proportion of the whole population. Once violence 
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on the part of (mostly non-Bougainvillean) police mobile squad members 
began in December 1988, it was a small step to build wider and more 
committed support networks, largely by mobilising people around ethnic 
divisions. Community concerns and demands rapidly moved beyond 
mine-related impacts, temporary mine closure, and the renegotiation of 
mining agreements. Support for secession was consolidated, and mining 
issues became secondary.
The groups increasingly worked together from late 1987 onwards. They 
played different roles, however, in the origins of the conflict. The NPLA, 
young landowners (some NPLA activists and others not) and young 
mineworkers initially took the lead. A few key members of Mungkas, the 
pressure groups and Me’ekamui Pontoku Onoring worked closely with 
the NPLA in the lead-up to the first violence against BCL in November 
1988, and then actively supported Ona as the conflict developed. Others 
only became actively engaged once police mobile squad violence started. 
Some marginalised youth and raskol gang members gravitated to Ona 
soon after the violence began, while others were actively recruited by 
young mineworkers from early 1989. As violence emerged, Mungkas and 
pressure group leaders mobilised support for Ona, some later becoming 
key BRA or Bougainville Interim Government leaders.
The group leaders had a range of attitudes to mining. Dameng wanted 
mining ended—a view attracting some, though not all, of his NPLA 
associates. Most of the young mineworkers, pressure group and Mungkas 
members sought much fairer conditions for mining. While almost all 
soon favoured secession, the pressure groups were initially most strongly 
committed to combining secession with continued mining, thus providing 
the revenue needed for independence.
From at least late 1987, Ona was a key link between the different groups. 
His own attitudes to future mining were ambivalent—sometimes probably 
for permanent mine closure, and sometimes more supportive of mining 
provided it was under radical new conditions. Undoubtedly, though, 
continued mining was key to the agenda of many in the wider coalition, 
and often for Ona’s agenda as well. Needing to keep that coalition together, 
Ona could neither ignore the positions of other groups nor dominate their 
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leaders, many of whom had the strength of personality to match him. 
Indeed, there were always some strong tensions in relationships between 
Ona and both Dameng and Singko.27
Of course, this coalition did not reflect the views of all Bougainvilleans. 
Other groups and leaders held different views on Panguna, and on 
Bougainville’s future relations with PNG. However, part of the loose 
coalition’s strength was that virtually all Bougainvilleans had sympathy 
for at least some aspects of their key concerns and demands.
It is most unlikely that any of the leaders of the various groups involved 
envisaged anything like the violent conflict that actually developed in 
1989. Each wanted negotiations on a variety of related issues. Strong 
demands were initially directed towards negotiations over mining. 
Damage to BCL property occurred when frustration levels became high, 
and was intended to demonstrate the degree of frustration. The dangers of 
escalating violence involved in these actions were recognised by Ona and 
Singko when they took to the bush. But even when they had done so, in 
the early stages they were still prepared to negotiate. Undoubtedly, it was 
the deployment of the police riot squads, followed by the PNG Defence 
Force, and their often random and extreme violence, that transformed the 
issues and tactics, and led to active recruitment of young men willing to 
fight violence with violence.
An Emergent Ideology28
The shared discussion of problems amongst the groups discussed here 
contributed to the beginnings of a shared ideology about the primacy 
of the rights of Bougainvilleans over those of outsiders. These were 
rights to mineral revenues and mine-related employment, contracts and 
businesses. Central was the idea that Bougainville’s land, so central to 
clan identities, needed special protection from both mining and from 
people from elsewhere in PNG. Bougainvilleans deserved respect from 
outsiders, just as a Bougainvillean clan regarded as original to a particular 
area should be accorded respect by other clans, even those with some land 
rights in the area.
27  Some key figures found Ona frustrating to deal with, and one described it as like dealing with 
a maleo (an eel) (personal communication, Theodore Miriung, 1995).
28  The following analysis summarises information from personal communications by Theodore 
Miriung (1995–96), James Tanis (1998–2016), and Damien Dameng (2002).
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Emerging in the mid to late 1980s, these ideas were elaborated between 
1990 and 1991. James Singko, by now Ona’s deputy, took a lead role. 
Articulated in the Nasioi and Nagovisi languages, the ideas were seen 
as derived from both Bougainvillean culture and Christianity. Church 
support for Ona and the BRA added to their legitimacy. The emphasis 
was on the sacred nature of Bougainville and the traditions of its true 
people, and their concern about damage to both their land and traditions 
wrought by outsiders. The corollary was the duty of true Bougainvilleans 
to assert control over, or perhaps oust, outsiders causing harm, and to 
establish an original Bougainvillean government to protect the land, 
its people and their traditions.
The key principles were encapsulated in Nasioi words me’ekamui, sipungeta 
and osikaing. Me’ekamui means something akin to ‘sacred land’. Just as the 
land of any particular Bougainvillean group is sacred to it, so the whole 
of Bougainville is sacred to all Bougainvilleans. Sipungeta literally means 
‘hearth’. In this context it meant something that was both ‘original’ and 
‘inventive’, as well as being strengthened by fire, and therefore suggested 
the idea of control from a strong base. A government for the sacred 
land needed similar qualities, involving reliance on traditional strengths 
to respond to new challenges.
Osikaing means ‘original inhabitants’. The original inhabitants of the 
sacred land had special duties towards that land, as well as corresponding 
rights. To be original, they must control what is theirs, especially their 
land. Outsiders entering it should respect osikaing ways. Osikaing 
contrasts with taboranku, meaning ‘strangers’ or ‘aliens’. A stranger does 
not have the same rights as the original inhabitants. BCL, the national 
government and people from elsewhere in PNG were all strangers who 
had turned Bougainvillean osikaing into taboranku in their own land. 
Ousting outsiders and reasserting osikaing control would substitute social 
harmony for discord.
This ideology, emerging from debates preceding the conflict, and forged 
by the early heat of violence, continues to resonate in post-conflict debates 
about the future of LSM.
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The Rectangular Model
Discussion so far has focused mainly on the local community ‘corner’ in 
the rectangular model of stakeholder relationships (see Chapter 1, this 
volume), highlighting the complexity of these relationships. Though the 
‘fourth estate’ was almost completely absent in 1988, brief comments can 
be made about the state and company ‘corners’ and the complex links 
between them and the community ‘corner’.
The state ‘corner’ involved both the PNG Government and the NSPG. 
While the latter had no formal powers over mining, it was a significant 
factor in the local politics of LSM, with close links to the community 
sector. Although the national government was the regulator, it was largely 
seen as a remote presence, focused on exploiting Bougainville’s mineral 
wealth to benefit the rest of PNG, and so mainly interested in the collection 
of mining revenues through dividends and taxation. As a result, state and 
company interests coincided. But key national government actors had 
deep links with the Bougainvillean community sector, especially John 
Momis and the MA’s other Bougainvillean MPs.
As the only LSM entity in the province, BCL dominated the company 
‘corner’, largely because of an official ‘moratorium’ on mining exploration 
or development in other parts of Bougainville that had been in place under 
PNG law from 1971. There were, however, many other mining-related 
companies providing services to BCL. The mining giant also had close 
links with local corporate entities that had close community links, as well 
as significant Bougainvillean entities like BDC and the RMTLTF. Some 
Bougainvilleans, like Severinus Ampaoi, were senior BCL employees, yet 
some employees of both BCL and its suppliers had close links to elements 
in the community ‘corner’. In particular, several such employees provided 
active support to mine lease landowner groups during the critical period 
from 1987 to 1989.
Current Views on Resumption of Large-Scale 
Mining
The current (2016) relationship between local-level politics and large-scale 
mining in Bougainville has both similarities and differences to that which 
existed between 1987 and 1989, especially with respect to the extent of 
community opposition to LSM. The current situation has of course been 
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deeply influenced by dramatic changes arising from the conflict itself. 
Although the Panguna mine has been closed since 1989, the possibility of 
reopening it ensures that LSM is a factor in political relationships between 
PNG and Bougainville, and also within Bougainville.
The differences between the two situations include a major shift in the 
state’s ‘corner’, largely resulting from the 2001 BPA, which made legislative 
authority over mining available to the ABG. There is also much greater 
complexity in each of the company, state and community ‘corners’ and in 
their mutual relationship, along with emergence of a new, multifaceted 
‘fourth estate’ corner. Major differences arising from the complex post-
conflict situation include: the national government’s much-reduced role in 
Bougainville as compared to 1988; the ABG’s limited capacity and reach 
in a situation where several parallel ‘governments’ claim ‘sovereignty’ over 
all or part of the autonomous region; armed groups remaining a factor 
to contend with; and numerous fringe foreign mining interests seeking 
to play significant roles in alliance with different local factions. A major 
similarity is that multiple Bougainvillean groups with considerable 
autonomy from one another, aware that important decisions on the future 
of mining may be made in the foreseeable future, all seek to ensure that 
their voices are heard.
There is some continuity, too, in aspects of the issues being dealt with, 
and even in the identity of some key individuals involved in debate. ABG 
President John Momis, always a strident critic of BCL, who supported 
Francis Ona in 1987 and 1988, now supports the reopening of Panguna 
or possible development of a maximum of two other large-scale mines—
that limit being set by the ABG’s Bougainville Mining Act 2015. This 
does not involve a change in the president’s long-term position, since he 
demands entirely new and fair mining conditions.
New actors in the political process include some of the leaders of nine 
new mine lease landowner associations established since 2011 to 
replace the PLA and NPLA, and others associated with the Me’ekamui 
Government of Unity. More familiar actors include figures formerly 
associated with both the PLA (Michael Pariu and Lawrence Daveona) 
and the NPLA (Wendelinus Bitanuma, John Amuna, Philip Miriori and 
Philip Takaung). For the most part, their positions are similar to that of 
Momis and the ABG. Nevertheless, the very different social, economic 
and political context of Bougainville in 2016 has resulted in dramatic 
changes in debates on the future of mining.
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The State ‘Corner’
The state ‘corner’ now involves both the PNG Government and the 
ABG. Although the ABG became the sole regulator from 2014 under its 
own mining legislation, national government roles continue. Amongst 
other things, the PNG Government is the second largest shareholder in 
BCL, and its legislation continues to cover some mining-related subjects, 
including occupational health and safety, land and environment. Tension 
between the two governments centres on the national government’s efforts 
to remain involved in Bougainville mining matters by taking over Rio 
Tinto’s equity in BCL.
Soon after it was established in mid-2005, the ABG began considering 
the possible resumption of LSM, which represented a significant shift 
from the positions of most Bougainvilleans early in the peace process, 
when resumption seemed unlikely (Regan 2014: 78). Concern about 
the revenue needed for either autonomy or independence led the first 
ABG president, Joseph Kabui, to examine this possibility from mid-2005, 
as did both his successors—James Tanis (2009–10) and John Momis 
(from 2010). The two main options under consideration have been the 
reopening of Panguna or the lifting of the 1971 ‘moratorium’ on mineral 
exploration (preserved under the ABG’s mining laws) with a view to 
possible developments elsewhere in Bougainville.
Kabui initially considered the first option, favouring potential developers 
other than BCL —initially a small Australian company called Ord River 
Resources Ltd. But intense pressure from former BRA commander Sam 
Kauona shifted Kabui and his cabinet to a second option, favouring 
a small Canadian company called Invincible Resources Ltd (IRL), which 
was established by Kauona’s close associate Lindsay Semple, a dual 
Australian-Canadian citizen, solely for the purpose of mining investment 
in Bougainville. Semple raised funds from a number of high-risk investors 
and used the money for a number of ‘development’ projects directed 
towards gaining ABG support for IRL to establish several new mines, 
smaller than Panguna, each in partnership with local landowners. The 
irresistible lure of significant revenue flows, ending the ABG’s reliance 
on PNG Government grants, seemed to be underwritten by IRL’s 2006 
advance of a K20 million loan to the ABG to support ‘capacity building’. 
In 2008, the ABG signed an agreement with IRL whereby the latter 
would hold a 70 per cent stake in an entity called Bogenvil Resources 
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Development Corporation (BRDC), supposedly established to implement 
a multisectoral Bougainville development plan using revenues generated 
by a virtual monopoly of mining activity beyond Panguna.
Controversies about IRL and BRDC centred on details of the K20 million 
loan repayment agreement, the failure of the ‘development’ projects, the 
opacity of the 30 per cent minority shareholding in BRDC,29 the near 
monopoly vested in IRL and the extent of indirect IRL control of the ABG. 
After Kabui died unexpectedly in June 2008, IRL and its ABG backers 
strove to ensure continued implementation of the development plan, but 
these efforts ended when Tanis became president in January 2009.
From early 2010, the ABG again examined the possibility of reopening 
Panguna. High commodity prices, proven reserves, and some existing 
mine-related infrastructure sustained optimism that reopening could 
occur within perhaps six years of negotiations commencing. By contrast, 
experience elsewhere in PNG showed that new mines take more than 
15 years to get from exploration to operation. So, while open to other 
possibilities, the ABG under Tanis and Momis decided that Panguna 
offered the best prospect of significant revenues around the time of the 
referendum on independence that is due to be held in 2019. Paradoxically, 
reopening Panguna also offered the best prospect for meeting the expected 
high costs of remediating mine-related environmental damage and 
negative social impacts, such as those experienced by the relocated villages.
After Momis took office in June 2010, initial uncertainty about BCL 
as  the preferred operator of a reopened Panguna mine was resolved in 
part because mine lease landowner community leaders argued in favour 
of BCL, preferring the ‘devil they knew’ to a ‘new devil’, mainly because 
BCL accepted some responsibility for the legacy issues. Uncertainty 
was also reduced as the result of a three-day ABG workshop on mining 
policy options, held in March 2011, that clarified the choice between the 
option of BCL reopening Panguna, an alternative developer doing so, and 
consideration of alternative prospects.
The ABG has consistently emphasised that no LSM will be permitted 
without landowner consent. Over three years from mid-2011, the ABG 
supported the establishment of nine independent associations to represent 
29  Fifteen per cent was to be held by the ABG, 9 per cent by an ‘ex-combatant’s’ company and 
6 per cent by a company representing un-named Bougainvillean ‘pioneer politicians’. The shareholders 
in these two companies have never been revealed.
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landowner communities impacted by the Panguna mine communities 
in considering possible resumption. Over 3,000 landowners voted for 
association executives at nine separate general meetings.30 The ABG has 
consulted the associations but has not sought to influence their positions 
on mining issues—indeed, there have been occasional tensions between 
the ABG and some association leaders. Five years on, in 2016, no decision 
had been made to even initiate negotiations with BCL or any other mining 
company about reopening Panguna.
Engagement with BCL has mainly been about steps preparatory to possible 
negotiation, inclusive of arrangements needed for a reconciliation process 
proposed by more than 50 mine lease landowner leaders who attended 
the first formal post-conflict meeting with the ABG and a senior BCL 
representative in July 2012. Extensive discussions have occurred within 
and between associations, and between them and the ABG, about possible 
conditions for reopening the mine, which reflects ideas about the primacy 
of Bougainvillean rights.
The ABG also undertook extensive public consultations about the future 
of mining, which included consultations about its mining policy in 
2010–11, about the future of Panguna and other possible LSM activities 
in 2013–14,31 and about its draft mining legislation in 2014–15. In the 
absence of opinion polling, it is difficult to be certain as to whether there 
has been a preponderance of views one way or another. Nevertheless, 
those involved in organising the consultation reported broad community 
support for resumption of mining. That is consistent with regular feedback 
to the ABG from the nine Panguna landowner association executives, as 
well as from the elected ABG members from their own constituencies, 
including the mine lease areas.
From about 2014, the ABG began seriously examining options other than 
reopening Panguna. The reasons for this included:
• falling commodity prices, which made it less likely that the reopening 
could be financed (at an estimated cost of US$6–8 billion);
• growing realisation of the extent to which negative sovereign risk 
assessment could make financing even more difficult;
30  This contrasts with roughly 100 attending the 1987 meeting that elected the NPLA executive.




• the high expectations of mine lease landowners, former combatants, 
and others about compensation, not just for mining impacts but also 
a range of conflict impacts; and
• the increasingly disruptive activities of small foreign companies linked 
to different Bougainville factions.
In taking over full regulatory responsibility for mining, the ABG 
established its own mining department in 2007, negotiated transfer of 
national government powers (2006–08) and developed its own mining 
policy (2009–14). It developed its own mining law in two main stages. 
The first was the Bougainville Mining (Transitional Arrangements) Act, 
proposed in 2012 and enacted in 2014 (Regan 2014: 87–91). This first 
law was based on PNG’s existing Mining Act, but with significant changes 
to meet Bougainville’s needs. These included:
• vesting both the ownership of minerals and powerful veto rights over 
exploration in the owners of customary land;
• divesting BCL of its mining tenements, leaving only an exploration 
licence over the former SML; and
• imposing a strict prohibition on the operation of more than two very 
large mines (like Panguna) at one time.
The second stage involved passage of the Bougainville Mining Act 
in March 2015. It was the product of the policy development process 
initiated in 2009, incorporated many of the initiatives included in the 
2014 Act, and extended landowner rights to include the power of veto 
over mining development tenements, as well as exploration licences.
While reluctantly accepting the validity of this ABG legislation, the 
national government was attempting (from 2013) to purchase Rio Tinto’s 
53.8 per cent equity in BCL, thus raising its own stake in the company to 
72.8 per cent. Opposing this move, the ABG argued that:
• PNG majority ownership of the mine at the heart of the conflict was 
unacceptable in Bougainville;
• the PNG Government was seeking to control Panguna despite the 
transfer of mining powers to the ABG; and
• PNG would gain significant control of the Bougainville economy, 
which would be a sensitive issue in the lead-up to the referendum.
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The ABG demanded that, if Rio Tinto divested, then its equity should 
be ‘gifted’ to the ABG and the landowners, and it should provide 
significant additional funding to meet corporate responsibilities for 
mine legacy issues, including extensive environmental, social and human 
rights impacts, especially for the thousands of relocated people who were 
now living in appalling conditions (Momis 2015). These issues remain 
unresolved at the time of writing.
The Community ‘Corner’
Just as in 1988–89, this part of the matrix of stakeholder relationships 
extends well beyond the immediate vicinity of Panguna. Since the 1960s, 
the significant social and economic impacts of the mine have ensured that 
most Bougainvilleans have felt that they have some stake in Panguna’s 
mineral resources. These feelings grew far stronger after the conflict, in 
which all communities shed blood, many at Ona’s explicit request. Under 
customary principles applicable in most Bougainvillean cultures, if blood 
is shed when supporting landowners in land-related conflict, the clan 
whose blood is shed gains some rights over the land in question. Such 
principles are referred to widely in public discussions about Panguna.
The three main groups of former combatants are a significant new 
addition to the ‘community corner’.32 Theirs have become increasingly 
prominent voices in public debates since Momis was elected as ABG 
president in 2010, partly because of suspicions of his PNG Government 
links. Two of the most significant voices are those of the former BRA 
leaders Sam Kauona and Ishmael Toroama. Kauona presents as a strident 
critic of BCL, opposed to the reopening of Panguna and the ABG’s 
mining policies, despite his own close association since 2004 with foreign 
corporate mining interests, most notably IRL. For Toroama, a key issue in 
Panguna-related debate is recognition of the rights of former combatants 
on the basis of blood shed during the conflict.
Despite the major logistical and financial difficulties involved, the 
ABG has made extensive efforts to consult widely about the future of 
LSM, not just with mine lease landowner communities, but amongst 
Bougainvilleans more generally. Elected executives of the nine landowner 
32  The three groups are the original BRA, the Bougainville Resistance Forces that opposed them, 
and the Me’ekamui Defence Force, most of whose members defected from the BRA to remain with 
Ona when he refused to support the peace process in 1998.
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associations, representing what could now be as many as 15,000 people in 
the mine lease areas, have consulted widely with their own communities 
as well as with the ABG. Consistent with the outcomes of the ABG’s 
wider process of community consultation, they report broad community 
support for mining resumption, but only under fair conditions, including 
redress for past injustices.
The Company ‘Corner’
In June 2016, Rio Tinto announced a plan to transfer its 53.8 per cent 
stake in BCL to an ‘independent trustee’ that would be jointly owned by 
the PNG Government and the ABG. Under the terms of this arrangement, 
Rio aimed to transfer 36.4 per cent of its equity in BCL to the ABG, 
and 17.4 per cent to the PNG Government. This meant that both would 
hold an equal proportion (36.4  per cent) of the shares in BCL, since 
the PNG Government already held 19  per cent. This announcement 
aroused a storm of protest from nearly all of the Bougainvillean actors 
mentioned in this chapter, most of whom demanded that the PNG 
Government should transfer the 17.4  per cent to the ABG so that it 
would become the majority shareholder (Anon. 2016a). This move was 
opposed by PNG Prime Minister Peter O’Neill, who announced instead 
that the 17.4 per cent would be transferred to a trust for the benefit of 
all Bougainvilleans, including the Panguna landowners (Anon. 2016b, 
2016c). This left the PNG Government with its original 19 per cent stake, 
the ABG with 36.4  per cent, the trust with 17.4  per cent and several 
thousand small shareholders with a little over 27 per cent.
An account of the details and ramifications of these developments, and 
the new political process engendered by this turn of events, is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, but it has not so far led to any significant change in 
the prospects of reopening the Panguna mine. What it might have done is 
to limit the scope for continued interference by other foreign companies 
in the prospective development of LSM projects in Bougainville.
In 1988 there was a small local corporate sector linked to the mine, notably 
the BDC and the RMTLTF, but both of these entities ceased to operate 
soon after the conflict began, and it is still unclear what happened to their 
funds and some of their other assets. By 2016, however, several other 
sets of corporate interests had emerged, with strong linkages to different 
Bougainvillean groups.
Large-Scale Mines and Local-Level Politics
398
As previously mentioned, former BRA leader Sam Kauona, supported 
by a small group of other former combatants, has had close links to dual 
Australian-Canadian citizen Lindsay Semple since 2004–05. Semple 
and Kauona have been financially supported by a series of at least three 
main external investors: the Canadian company IRL from 2004 to 
2010; another Canadian company, Morumbi Resources, from 2010 to 
2013 (Regan 2014: 86–9); and from 2015, New York investment firm 
Kuhns Brothers. They lost most of their influence over the ABG when 
Joseph Kabui died in 2008, and their cause then seemed to be lost in 
2010 when the investors in IRL lost faith in Semple. However, they soon 
re-entered the field with Morumbi, seeking exclusive rights to exploration 
and development in prospective areas through agreements made between 
Morumbi subsidiaries and small groups of landowners, which they 
unsuccessfully sought to persuade the ABG to recognise. After Canadian 
police visited Bougainville in late 2013 to investigate the activities of both 
IRL and Morumbi, the latter cut its ties to Semple. Since Kuhns Brothers 
became involved, their activities have included the establishment of a small 
gold-buying and refining operation, the creation of an investment fund 
called Bougainville Fund Management LLC,33 and various proposals for 
funding development projects outside the mining sector in what appears 
to be an approach similar to that attempted by IRL.
Since Ona’s death in July 2005, one of the two main sets of self-proclaimed 
successors to his leadership of the ‘Me’ekamui’ groups claiming to be the 
legitimate Bougainville government (as alternatives to the ABG) has been 
the Panguna-based Me’ekamui Government of Unity (MGU). The MGU 
has also had extensive involvement with a succession of small foreign 
companies. The first was Australian registered company Tall J Foundation 
Pty Ltd, involving a group of American citizens who attempted mechanised 
extraction of gold from the Panguna riverine tailings in 2008. It was 
followed by Cefeida SA, a company established in 2009 by former Tall J 
investors, Stewart Sytner and Thomas Megas, to attract investment funds 
by claiming ‘that they possessed exclusive rights to develop and mine in 
[Bougainville] … and that such rights “were extremely valuable and rare 
for outsiders”’.34 Next was a Canadian company, Transpacific Ventures 
Ltd, also linked to Sytner. It produced an information memorandum for 
prospective investors in July 2013, claiming an agreement with the MGU 
33  See www.secinfo.com/d1yT3c.we.htm (viewed 24 April 2016).
34  Amiron Development Corporation v Sytner [2013] E.D. New York 12-CV-3036, 29 March.
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‘on an exclusive basis for 20  years renewable, to advise the customary 
landowners (the Me’ekamui) in developing their natural resources sector’ 
under a new mining law ‘expected to transfer all land and mineral rights 
on the island of Bougainville and its territorial waters to the Sovereign 
Me’ekamui Tribal Government (the Me’ekamui)’ (Transpacific Ventures 
2013: 2). In 2014, Transpacific was succeeded by Australian company, 
United Resources Management Pacific, which was succeeded in 2016 by 
another Australian company, Central Exploration, both of which were 
introduced to the MGU by an Australian, Ian Renzie Duncan, who was 
previously involved in Transpacific Ventures. The companies involved, 
from about 2012 until at least the end of 2015, paid monthly ‘salaries’ to 
senior MGU members.
These are just a few of the small corporate entities that have sought access 
to Bougainville’s mineral resources since the ABG began considering the 
possibility of renewed LSM. Many have sought to advance their interests 
with no reference to the ABG. Rather, they have used links with the 
leaders of local factions (some armed) or have engaged in direct dealings 
with small landowner groups from prospective areas. The need to control 
such entities provided a major impetus for the ABG to develop its initial 
mining legislation in 2012.
The ‘Fourth Estate’
From 1989, the Bougainville conflict attracted considerable international 
attention, particularly in Australia. Several NGOs and other groups 
supported the BRA, or Bougainvilleans suffering the impacts of the 
PNG Government’s air and sea blockade of Bougainville imposed from 
mid-1990. These supporters included existing organisations and new 
ones established for the purpose, such as the Independent Bougainville 
Information Service, Australian Humanitarian Aid for Bougainville and 
Bougainville Freedom Movement (BFM).
Since the conflict ended, a few additional groups and some individuals 
have become involved, particularly with the emergence of debate on the 
future of LSM. They have included ‘mediators’ offering services to the 
ABG, as well as some journalists, lawyers, advisers or consultants mainly 
seeking to advise or influence various Bougainvillean groups—especially 
Panguna lease landowner associations.
Large-Scale Mines and Local-Level Politics
400
Since the ABG began developing its mining legislation in mid-2012, 
a  concerted campaign against its mining policy has been mounted by 
a  network of fourth estate actors whose central point appears to be 
Australian ‘activist’ academic, Kristian Lasslett. He is involved with the 
International State Crime Initiative, whose website includes material 
purporting to document the responsibility of Rio Tinto and BCL for the 
conflict and its impacts, and demanding that they be brought to account.35 
This view is advanced in Lasslett’s own publications (e.g. Lasslett 2014) 
and in other publications in which he acknowledges a  central role 
(e.g. Jubilee 2014).
The main PNG node in this network is the Bismarck Ramu Group, which 
operates two blogs that feature stories about mining on Bougainville—
‘PNGexposed’,36 which is intended to expose political corruption, and 
‘Papua New Guinea Mine Watch’, which was established to campaign 
against environmental damage by the Ramu nickel mine in PNG’s Madang 
Province, but has since expanded its remit to other mining projects.37 
Both blogs regularly publish strong attacks on the ABG, some under 
Lasslett’s name, but many anonymous, though very much in Lasslett’s 
style. According to Lasslett, the Bismarck Ramu Group is ‘one of Papua 
New Guinea’s unsung treasures, and their support over the years has been 
truly amazing’ (Lasslett 2014: x).
The Australian branch of the network includes Jubilee Australia, an NGO 
that has published two reports highly critical of the ABG’s mining policy 
and legislation (Jubilee 2014, 2015). The research for its 2014 report 
was overseen by Lasslett, who has had close links with Jubilee since his 
student days. The two Bougainvilleans who undertook the research were 
close associates of Lasslett, and are known to share his views on BCL and 
Rio Tinto.
The Australian branch also includes a few MPs from the Greens and 
Labour parties. Greens Party senator Lee Rhiannon has spoken at the 
launches of the Jubilee reports, and has regularly asked questions of the 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Senate Estimates 
Hearings about alleged Australian Government influence on ABG mining 
policy. Antony Loewenstein, an Australian activist journalist and author, 
35  See: www.statecrime.org/testimonyproject/bougainville.
36  For stories about Bougainville, see: pngexposed.wordpress.com/tag/bougainville/.
37  For stories about Bougainville, see: ramumine.wordpress.com/tag/bougainville/.
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has written articles critical of ABG mining policy, and covers such issues 
in his book on ‘vulture capitalism’ (Loewenstein 2013). Loewenstein 
acknowledges the support and assistance of Lasslett in his writings on 
Bougainville.
Finally, the Australian node includes the BFM, the last of the ‘support 
groups’ from the 1990s that still has a public voice. It regularly attacks 
the ABG on the PNG Mine Watch blog, as well as in other outlets such 
as ‘New Dawn on Bougainville’, in pieces by written by Vikki John. 
Lasslett acknowledges the ‘encouragement and guidance from activists 
and advocates involved in the Bougainville anti-war and independence 
movements’ that he received while doing his PhD research on ‘state-
corporate decisions and motivations that underpinned the crimes on 
Bougainville’ (from 1988–89), including support from key BFM figures, 
Vikki John amongst them (Lasslett 2014: ix).
This ‘fourth estate’ network does have some links in Bougainvillean 
communities, but mainly with a few people who share the views of 
other network members. Curiously, Lasslett’s connections include a key 
personal staff member of Jimmy Miringtoro, one of Bougainville’s MPs 
in PNG’s national parliament, who, despite being a strident critic of the 
ABG’s mining policies, has his own interests in the selection of companies 
that might redevelop the Panguna mine.
All the members of this network advance strident claims about what 
they believe to be the general opposition to mining on the part of either 
the people of Bougainville in general, or of mine lease communities in 
particular. The evidence offered in support of these claims is weak or 
flawed. For example, the basis for Jubilee’s 2014 claims that ‘the mine 
affected communities’ are ‘opposed to any discussion of the mine’s 
reopening’ (Jubilee 2014:  46) was a set of ‘semi-structured’ interviews 
with just 65 individuals selected by a ‘snowballing’ technique, plus a 
single focus group discussion with 17 males in a village just outside the 
mine lease area who ‘refused to be interviewed separately, instead stating 
that they preferred to reach a consensus … and then present one common 
position for each question’ (ibid.:  49). In a situation where there are 
perhaps 15,000 people in former mine lease area communities, where 
it is well established that a large (but unknown) proportion support 
the resumption of mining, subject to strict conditions, the most likely 
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explanation for the unanimous opposition reported from this supposed 
‘sample’ is the so-called ‘snowballing’ technique adopted and supervised 
by persons who are themselves deeply opposed to resumption.
None of the members of this supposed ‘civil society’ network has ever 
communicated with the ABG or the landowner associations about the 
issues on which they so regularly make public comment. They do not 
countenance the possibility that, in considering resumption, the ABG 
and the landowner associations find themselves with very limited options 
as they seek realistic means of not only providing a secure basis for 
Bougainville’s autonomy or possible independence, but also creating new 
livelihoods for the former mine lease communities.
The sustained attacks by members of the network on President Momis, 
the ABG, advisers to the ABG38 and the Australian Government 
(for funding such advice) are based on the assumption, unsupported by 
credible evidence, of a strong consensus against the reopening of Panguna 
or any other form of LSM. They make such assumptions in the process 
of projecting their own theories, ideologies or needs onto Bougainville, 
convinced that they are finding or providing the supporting evidence. 
None has the motivation to understand the facts and the complexity 
of Bougainville, either in 2016 or in the period from 1987 to 1989.
Their activities have had little impact in Bougainville or on Bougainvilleans, 
other than providing support to groups seeking control over the region’s 
mineral resources in partnership with foreign investors other than Rio 
Tinto. Their analysis has, however, influenced the positions of some 
donor countries, and those of some international NGOs involved in 
Bougainville. In these ways, they contribute to tensions, divisions and 
conflicts of which they have little understanding.
Conclusion
Returning to the central issues identified in the introduction to this 
chapter, I address four main questions:
• Are the origins of the conflict to be found primarily in the concerns of 
young mine lease landowners committed to permanent mine closure?
38  As an adviser to the ABG, funded by Australia at the ABG’s request, I have been the subject 
of sustained criticism and attack from these quarters.
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• What was the relationship between Francis Ona, or the NPLA, and 
the other Bougainvillean groups involved in the origins of the conflict?
• Was there generalised opposition to mining amongst these other 
groups in the period 1987–89?
• Is there generalised Bougainvillean opposition to the resumption 
of LSM in 2016?
Having addressed the questions, I shall consider the whether the rectangular 
model of stakeholder relationships advocated in the introduction to this 
book effectively captures the complexity of stakeholder relationships in 
the Bougainville case.
The evidence presented here establishes that the conflict did not originate 
mainly in the concerns of young mine lease landowners to put an end to 
LSM. The dominant public voices of Ona and the NPLA have confused 
the picture, especially where there has been selective reading of their 
public statements. The local-level politics of LSM was never confined to 
the mine leases or adjacent areas directly affected by mining. The peculiar 
features of its island geography, history and political economy mean that 
Bougainville constitutes a quite distinct political arena within PNG. It is 
an arena within which LSM is regarded as having had various impacts 
on all Bougainvilleans, not just mine lease landowners, generating 
a range of different concerns and demands. There is no evidence of either 
generalised resistance to LSM per se, by either Bougainvilleans in general 
or local landowner communities in particular, or of general support for 
permanent mine closure from either group. Indeed, it is not possible to 
find a consistent position on the future of mining even in the various 
documents stating the concerns and demands of the NPLA. There is 
clear evidence, however, of general (and resounding) rejection by both 
landowners and the other groups discussed here of the unfairness of the 
BCA as the basis for mining.
Francis Ona was not a class hero in the vanguard of an anti-capitalist 
movement. Rather, he was a key actor whose own interests, concerns 
and networks placed him at a critically important intersection of wider 
interests, concerns and influences that included Christian and customary 
values. He arrived at that intersection, and was inspired to take on 
a leadership role, not only because of the unfairness of his own situation 
as a young adult landowner, gravely exacerbated by a bitter family dispute, 
but also because of his own personality. What evidence we have of his 
motivations and roles points to the importance of individual agency in 
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the relationship between LSM and local-level politics, while the evidence 
of the roles of other key figures in the various groups considered here 
indicates the difficulties of mapping the influence of multiple individual 
motivations.
The linkages between the various groups involved in the origins of the 
conflict were developing from at least as early as 1987 and, as a result, by 
early 1988 Ona increasingly saw himself, and was seen by the leaders of 
other groups, as the key spokesperson for a coalition of interests. While 
some of his statements could be interpreted as expressions of a desire for 
permanent mine closure, many were clearly more directed to pressuring 
BCL to meet specific demands for a fairer mining dispensation which 
could only be met if mining continued. Those demands reflected the 
views of the loose coalition with which Ona and the NPLA were working.
The existence of that coalition in 1988 helps to explain some key aspects 
of the early stages of the conflict that have not previously been well 
understood. One is the rapid mobilisation of mainly young men in all 
parts of Bougainville from early 1989. Another is the fact that violence 
was not directed only against BCL and the PNG security forces, but 
also against other Bougainvilleans—some wealthy, or educated, or in 
middle-ranking to senior government or company jobs. The generalised 
resentment of marginalised young males was the key here. Further, the 
chaotic situation that emerged after the PNG security forces withdrew in 
March 1990 was largely due to the BRA’s recruitment of criminal gang 
members and disaffected youth.
With a few notable exceptions, such as Damien Dameng’s group, there is 
no evidence that the other Bougainvillean groups involved in the origins 
of the conflict were seeking permanent mine closure. In this respect, there 
are similarities between the situation that existed in 1987–89 and that 
which exists in 2016. Undoubtedly, in 2016 some people oppose the 
resumption of LSM under any circumstances. But many other opinions 
on mining also exist. In the absence of either representative opinion 
polling or rigorous research, it is difficult for even the ABG, despite its 
extensive public consultation, to be certain about the preponderance of 
views on the future of LSM, either on the part of mine lease landowners 
or Bougainvilleans more generally. It is clearly a mistake to take ‘noise’ 
created by fourth estate actors, especially those in the ‘Lasslett network’, 
as in any way accurately representing a majority position.
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Just as in 1988, there is a multiplicity of positions on this issue. That 
should be no surprise, given the history of mining, the expectations 
of mine lease landowners, the ABG’s revenue needs, the referendum 
timetable, and the multiple agendas of foreign actors who have developed 
links with Bougainvillean groups in the hope of economic advantage from 
either the reopening of Panguna or the exploration of other prospects.
Again, as in 1988, some Bougainvilleans oppose any form of LSM, 
including some in the former BCL lease areas strongly opposed to 
Panguna reopening. However, there is certainly some evidence that major 
voices in the debate are more concerned with the conditions under which 
a limited resumption of mining might be permitted—a situation that is 
also similar to 1988. Many groups and leaders, sometimes claimed by 
outside commentators to be ‘anti-mining’ (Anon. 2015), are in fact strong 
supporters of mining but have their own reasons for attacking the ABG 
on the issues involved (Regan 2014: 85–93).
To some extent, what appears to be happening in the ‘community corner’ 
involves multiple interest groups staking out positions in advance of any 
decision on the future of mining. Without the existence of political parties 
conducting policy debate, Bougainvilleans generally expect decisions 
on major issues to be made by some form of consensus. To influence 
such decisions, voices in favour of particular positions jostle to be heard. 
The situation points to difficulties in the operation of systems of elected 
representative government in a cultural context such as that found in 
Bougainville.
The ideology of primacy of Bougainvillean rights remains a lasting legacy 
of the Bougainville conflict, heavily influencing much of the Bougainville 
Mining Act 2015, including provisions on the ownership of minerals by 
owners of customary land, the distribution of preferences for employment 
and business opportunities, and the resettlement of communities impacted 
by mining. These provisions are remarkably similar to the NPLA demands 
of 1988.
The same principles are also brought to the fore in ABG discussions with 
the nine landowner associations about the possible future of Panguna. 
The kinds of landowner benefit packages negotiated for mining projects 
elsewhere in PNG are unlikely to be sufficient to gain landowner 
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community support for future LSM in Bougainville. Whether any 
responsible investor will be able to envisage a profitable enterprise in such 
circumstances has yet to be tested.
As to the reasons for the hitherto very incomplete understanding of the 
origins of the conflict, analysis of the composition and roles of the network 
of Bougainvillean groups that were involved underlines the complexity of 
the ‘community corner’ in 1988. It also illuminates some of the main 
reasons for the difficulties involved in gaining accurate understandings 
of the groups involved and their relationships one with another. These 
relationships were opaque even to most Bougainvilleans at the time. 
In large part this was because just one group—the NPLA—was making 
most or the public statements. Most of the others had no reason to draw 
attention to themselves. Indeed, some had good reason to avoid scrutiny.
The mainly oral traditions of Bougainvillean communities are also a factor 
here, because they help to explain why so few of those involved produced 
written records of what they were doing. After 1988, the situation changed 
very quickly, as the key issues no longer involved the future of mining. 
Even so, few—if any—of those previously involved now had any reason 
to record what they had done or why. Furthermore, there was a long 
period from the early 1990s when many had good reasons not to discuss 
their involvement—at least until immunity from prosecution for ‘crisis-
related’ offences was provided under the 2001 BPA.
As to whether the rectangular model of stakeholder relationships 
effectively captures the complexity of the relationships on Bougainville, 
evidence from 1988–89 emphasises the danger in seeing one or more 
communities or voices as constituting a single community ‘stakeholder’. 
The many groups then involved had multiple, and often quite distinct, 
concerns and agendas, and complex relationships one with another, as 
well as with actors in the state and company ‘corners’ at that time. The 
image of a  rectangle, with distinct sets of stakeholders in their separate 
‘corners’, may well be useful as a classificatory device, but, in itself, it 
does not help us to understand the complexities of relationships within or 
between the actors in each category. Those relationships are perhaps more 
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13. Between New Caledonia 
and Papua New Guinea
COLIN FILER AND PIERRE-YVES LE MEUR
In this concluding chapter, we return to the question posed in the 
introduction—the question of how to explain the similarities and 
differences in the relationship between large-scale mines and local-level 
politics in New Caledonia (NC) and Papua New Guinea (PNG), or 
in different parts of these two countries. The subtitle of this book (and 
the title of this chapter) could be read as a sign of our belief that the 
relationship between large-scale mines and local-level politics is one whose 
form and content mainly varies between countries or jurisdictions, largely 
as a result of differences in their political history and the current legal and 
policy frameworks in which the relationship is embedded. However, while 
there clearly are some points to be made on this score, the contributions 
to this volume also show that the relationship varies between projects and 
places as much as it does between countries, so there is no reason to assign 
a special kind of power to what we described (in Chapter 1) as the ‘state 
corner’ in our rectangular model of stakeholder relationships. Instead, we 
may conceive of the space ‘between’ NC and PNG as one that contains 
a number of different relationships between large-scale mines and local-
level politics whose variation can partly be understood in terms of the 
‘balance of power’ between the four corners in that model, but partly also 
in terms of other dimensions of difference. 
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Between Version One
Although the contributors to this volume have a good deal to say about 
political conflict, they have eschewed the well-worn concept of the 
‘resource curse’ (Ross 2003) and the related question of whether political 
actors in mine-affected communities are motivated by ‘greed or grievance’ 
(Collier and Hoeffler  2004). Anthony Regan’s review of the history of 
political conflict around the Panguna mine (Chapter 12) does not lead us 
to conclude that local political reactions to large-scale mining projects are 
generally more intense or more violent in PNG than they are in NC, and 
even if we had evidence to this effect, we could not readily link it to the 
extent of each country’s economic dependence on the mining industry, 
nor to the motivations of political actors who belong to mine-affected 
communities. If it barely makes sense to say that large-scale mines are 
‘more political’ in one country than in the other, then it might make more 
sense to argue that large-scale mining operations are not so much causes of 
political conflict as things or spaces that attract it, in which case the form 
and extent of conflict in each country needs to be considered as a sort of 
independent variable (Banks 2008).
We are also reluctant to conclude that variations in the relationship 
between large-scale mines and local-level politics can simply be explained 
by reference to the fact that PNG and NC represent or possess two different 
kinds of ‘society’—say a ‘post-colonial’ one as opposed to a ‘late colonial’ 
or ‘semi-colonial’ one. In this respect, we agree with actor-network 
theorists who would say that this does not count as an explanation so 
much as a summary of what it is we are trying to explain (Latour 2005). 
To emphasise this point, we have used the noun ‘society’ in a very different 
way, to designate a recently and somewhat poorly assembled group of 
‘stakeholders’ in our model of political relationships. The question then is 
whether the four groups of stakeholders in our model have been assembled 
in different ways in the two countries under discussion. On this score, it 
could be argued that the rectangular model is better ‘fitted’ to the politics 
of the large-scale mining industry in PNG than to its counterpart in NC 
because there is more power, or a group of more powerful actors, located 
in PNG’s ‘social corner’, and less power, or a group of less powerful actors, 
located in PNG’s ‘state corner’ (Chapter 9).
Of course, there is no escaping the significance of what Le Meur 
(Chapter 5) calls the ‘meta-conflict’ of settler colonialism in any account 
of what sets the two countries apart. All five of our chapters on NC deal 
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with mine-affected communities that are primarily Kanak communities 
in a country (or territory) where Kanaks still account for a minority of 
the total population. In some respects, the political complexion of the 
mining industry in NC is more like that found in other countries where 
indigenous people are still subordinate to people of European descent 
than like that which obtains in the independent and ‘indigenous’ state 
of PNG. Even so, the fact that Kanaks account for roughly 40 per cent 
of NC’s population explains why their leaders have been able to pursue 
the path of decolonisation and independence, rather than simply seek to 
advocate their rights as an indigenous minority.
Although PNG has its own colonial legacy, the Autonomous Region of 
Bougainville is the only part of the country where this legacy continues 
to cast a shadow across the politics of the mining industry, and that is 
because the Panguna mine was conceived and built as an Australian 
colonial enterprise. Even in nine decades of colonial rule, PNG never 
witnessed the wholesale expropriation of the native population, nor 
the creation of ‘tribal reserves’ of the kind established in NC, nor even 
the establishment of an effective system of indirect rule on the part of 
the colonial administration. And while PNG’s achievement of national 
independence took place at the same time that Kanaks began to demand 
the right of self-determination, the slow process of decolonisation in NC 
has resulted in a form of local-level politics that is dominated by a deepening 
division between French and Kanak political institutions. Furthermore, 
this division has been complicated by a further split between those Kanak 
political institutions that were part of the colonial system of indirect rule 
and those that have since been created in response to the demand for 
self-determination (Chapters 4 and 6). The only parallel to be found in 
PNG’s post-colonial form of local-level politics is the one between the 
laws inherited from Australia and those created to accommodate what the 
National Constitution nominates as ‘Papua New Guinean forms of social, 
political and economic organisation’.
The key point about the power of the state in NC is that local (Caledonian) 
institutions are opposed to metropolitan (French) institutions at the same 
time that ‘neotraditional’ (Kanak) institutions are opposed to ‘modern’ 
(European) institutions (Demmer and Salomon 2017). This is less a form 
of ‘hybridity’ (Clements et al. 2007) than a sort of double duality that 
diminishes the power of ‘the state as such’ at the same time that it makes 
more space for the practice of local-level politics in the suspended moment 
of the Nouméa Agreement preceding the referendum on independence 
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to be held in 2018 (Le Meur 2017). This should not lead us to think 
that there is any significant difference between the two countries in the 
number of roles (per capita or per project) that make up the political 
structure of the mining industry, but it does lead us to wonder if the 
practice of politics has escaped, avoided or even subverted the practice of 
government—or governmentality—in PNG’s version of this structure to 
an extent that is not so evident in NC.
If this means that community actors in PNG now wield more power 
than their (indigenous) counterparts in NC, it also seems to be consistent 
with the observation that this power is exercised within a neotraditional 
political order that is rather more chaotic and contestable, mainly because 
the institution of chieftainship is less significant. However, it is hard to tell 
how much of this difference in the form of local-level politics is due to the 
impressions left by the colonial legacy, to the relative strength or weakness 
of contemporary state institutions, or to differences in pre-colonial 
‘political cultures’ (Chapters 4, 8 and 9).
When it comes to the politics of the large-scale mining industry, what 
clearly does matter is that all large-scale mining operations in PNG have 
required the state’s acquisition of large areas of customary land, whereas 
those in NC tend to exclude customary claims to the state land on 
which they are almost invariably located (Chapters 3 and 4). While this 
explains the difference in the power that community actors can exercise 
over the mining industry in their capacity as ‘customary landowners’, it 
also explains why community actors in both countries have been slow 
to represent themselves as ‘indigenous peoples’ whose land rights need 
to be reinforced by appeals to international norms. In the PNG case, 
political actors in all corners of our rectangular model seem to believe that 
the ‘customary landowner’ is already a more powerful character than any 
kind of indigenous person (Chapter 9). In the NC case, by contrast, the 
limits previously imposed on the extent of customary land rights seem 
to have discouraged Kanak political leaders from using such rights as 
the basis of their demand to exert greater control over the operation of 
the mining industry (Chapter 6), even though mining agreements have 
included a recognition that the original occupants of any land should take 
precedence over those who followed (and sometimes dispossessed) them 
(Chapters 3 and 4).
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If the ‘ideology of landownership’ therefore has much greater political 
weight in PNG than it has in NC, there is also a notable difference in 
the qualities and quantities of the ‘benefit streams’ that flow to mine-
affected communities. This is not just a difference in the extent to which 
communities are entitled to compensation for the use of their customary 
land, but also a function of the fact that NC lacks any counterpart to 
the institutional machinery through which PNG’s national government 
collects an output-based royalty from each large-scale mining project 
and then redistributes the whole of this income to different groups of 
political actors (including groups of customary landowners) within the 
province where the project is located. Furthermore, NC lacks any obvious 
counterpart to the policy by which PNG’s national government obliges 
mining companies to make special efforts to train and employ the members 
of mine-affected communities. As a result, Kanak political leaders have 
laid a greater emphasis on what PNG’s policy regime designates as 
‘equity benefits’ and ‘business development opportunities’, which means 
that the distribution of shares in mining companies and their suppliers 
becomes a matter of paramount concern (Chapters 2 and 6). This type of 
benefit is also a matter of great concern in PNG, but the wider range and 
volume of ‘landowner benefits’ or ‘community benefits’ in PNG seems 
to have created more of a stimulus for the process that Glenn Banks and 
colleagues (in Chapter 7) call ‘immanent development’, and more of an 
incentive for the local beneficiaries to exclude ‘outsiders’ from their realm 
of entitlement (Chapter 11).
In one sense, this would suggest that PNG has a more intense form of 
identity politics, if the key political question is who counts as a landowner 
or community member in respect of any particular mining project. 
However, that question is clearly related to the intensity of local-level 
political contests over the distribution of material costs and benefits, and 
it could be argued that this type of contest is less intense in NC because 
there is less at stake. In that case, it would seem to follow that NC does 
not have a less intense form of identity politics, but a different form of 
identity politics—one that is more concerned with what we have called 
(in Chapter 1) the representational issue than the distributional issue, and 
more concerned with the establishment of a Kanak identity than a strictly 
local identity (Chapters 4 and 5).
These considerations lead us to wonder whether and how it makes sense to 
regard PNG and NC as countries located at different points along one or 
more historical trajectories, and if so, how it makes sense to regard PNG 
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as a country that is more ‘advanced’ in the political construction of its 
mining industry, despite the enduring paradox of human poverty in the 
midst of mineral wealth (Filer et al. 2016). If PNG is more advanced in 
the process of decolonisation, and also more advanced in the double-sided 
process of modernisation and globalisation, how does the relationship 
between these different trajectories produce a national contrast in the 
relationship between large-scale mines and local-level politics?
Although we have postulated a general process of modernisation and 
globalisation within the large-scale mining industry, this should not be 
taken to mean that we subscribe to a version of ‘modernisation theory’ 
(or ‘dependency theory’) that would allow us to arrange our two countries 
or their component parts, including their mining enclaves, along a single 
path that leads to a single goal, whether that goal be conceived as 
a condition of ‘modernity’, ‘development’ or ‘neoliberal governmentality’. 
As we pointed out in the introduction to this volume, the process has 
several different aspects that are not invariably found in combination with 
each other, and each of these has different political effects. We have not 
suggested that this process is one variant of an even more general process 
that has taken the same form over the same period of time in all other 
branches of the global capitalist economy. We have not even suggested 
that the process is permanent and irreversible in those places where its 
effects can be observed, since the mining industry is notorious for its 
booms and slumps, and one feature of the process we have described is 
that the mining industry now moves more rapidly from one location to 
another, often leaving desolation in its wake.
When we say that PNG contains a more ‘advanced’ form of the process, 
we partly refer to the extent of the gulf between multinational mining 
companies and mine-affected communities (Chapter  7), to the way in 
which representations of this gulf contributed to the ‘enlightenment’ of 
the global mining industry in the 1990s (Chapter  9), and to the role 
of international actors like the World Bank in attempting to repatriate 
the lessons of this enlightenment to the country from which they had 
been drawn (Filer et al. 2008). In all such respects, it could be said that 
NC was left behind for a while, even if it is now catching up with some 
of the trends, as new ‘social’ actors and political narratives have entered 
the mineral policy domain. The discourse of environmental protection, 
supported by non-governmental and community-based organisations, is 
an obvious case in point (Chapters 5 and 6), but this is only one part 
of the broader discourse of corporate social responsibility.
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We might also be tempted to argue that PNG’s large-scale mining 
industry is also very modern because ‘society’ has as much weight as 
the state in building the metaphorical roads or bridges that connect 
big mining companies with groups of indigenous people or customary 
landowners. If we take that path, we might then say that mine-affected 
communities in NC are also ‘state-affected communities’ to an extent 
that is not true of PNG because the PNG Government is well known 
for its habit of disappearing from mine-affected areas once development 
agreements have been signed (Chapters 8 and 9). In that case, the political 
complexion of PNG’s mining industry appears to possess a ‘neoliberal’ 
character that is not (yet) evident in NC, since the ‘selective absence of 
the state’ (Szablowski 2007) appears to have been the result of an ongoing 
transfer of power from state actors to both corporate and social actors. 
However, we also need to bear in mind that NC’s oldest mining company 
(SLN) already held quasi-governmental powers before the emergence of 
neoliberal forms of governance or governmentality in the period since 
1980 (Chapter 5).
If PNG and NC are still to be conceived as jurisdictions located at 
different points along a single historical trajectory, then this path may also 
be construed in terms of a shift from the social relations of employment 
to the social relations of compensation, so long as ‘compensation’ is 
understood to be something broader than compensation for the loss 
of customary land. The broader concept belongs to the general model 
of reflexive modernisation (Beck  1992), characterised by the double 
internalisation of risk as a social construct and a way of ordering material 
reality (Dean  2010). This form of ‘risk society’ is obviously connected 
with the practice of environmental (and social) impact and risk assessment 
and with norms of environmental (and social) justice (Dupuy  2002; 
Walker 2012). From this point of view, we may then proceed to ask whether 
the transformation of social relations as the subject of political action has 
still had somewhat different political effects in each of our two countries 
because of the manner in which the social relations of compensation have 
come to encompass the mining industry.
On this score, we would say that PNG acquired a resource-dependent 
economy in the process of dispensing with the legacy of colonial rule 
and, for this reason, the modernisation of the mining industry was 
encompassed by a national ideology—the ideology of landownership—
that served to intensify the social relations of compensation and extend 
their reach to parts of the country that were not directly affected by 
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any large-scale mining operations (Filer  1997). In NC, by contrast, 
a ‘traditional’ large-scale mining industry already dominated the colonial 
economy at the time when PNG achieved its independence in 1975, and 
the process of modernisation did not begin to have political effects until 
PNG had already acquired its new national ideology. What happened 
instead is that the exercise of political control over the mining industry 
became the means by which representatives of the Kanak population 
have sought compensation, not for the loss of specific areas of customary 
land, but for the broader historical experience of dispossession and 
subordination under the French colonial regime. As a result, the political 
relationship between ideas of indigenous identity and environmental 
justice seems to have a very different complexion (Ali and Grewal 2006; 
Le Meur 2010). In this respect, the ‘half-way house’ would be the case of 
Bougainville, where a modern mine was established before PNG became 
an independent country, but then became a symbol of neocolonial 
dispossession for a  new generation of secessionists whose actions were 
triggered by demands for environmental (and social) justice (Chapter 12).
Between Version Two
Once we think of Bougainville as a ‘mineral province’ that lies between 
PNG and NC in both a political and a geographical sense, we can 
immediately see that a comparison between two national jurisdictions is 
only one type of comparison that can be made when we seek to understand 
variations in the relationship between large-scale mines and local-level 
politics. In one political respect, Bougainville and NC have more in 
common with each other than either has with (the rest of ) PNG, since 
both are ‘partial countries’ confronting the prospect of a referendum on 
independence, and Bougainvillean nationalism bears some comparison 
with Kanak nationalism as an ideology that plays out in the politics of the 
mining industry. But if we go one step further and think of Bougainville 
as one of several ‘mineral provinces’ in PNG, then the questions previously 
posed about the difference between two national jurisdictions, two sets 
of political institutions, or two historical trajectories, can be turned into 
questions about the difference between a larger number of smaller political 
entities and the mining operations that they have hosted.
As noted in the introduction to this volume, PNG is a much bigger 
country  than NC, both in terms of the scales used by cartographers 
to measure surface areas and in terms of the size of their respective 
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populations. The whole of the resident population of NC is of a similar 
order of magnitude to that of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville 
and to each of PNG’s five provinces that currently host at least one 
large-scale mining project. While NC has been divided into three 
provinces, two of which can be counted as ‘mineral provinces’, one of 
them (North Province) has a much smaller population than the other one 
(South Province), comparable to the population of what officially counts 
as a ‘district’ in PNG. Yet there is no simple correlation between the size of 
a mineral province and the size or shape or scale of the mining operations 
located within it. In both of NC’s mineral provinces, large-scale processing 
plants derive their raw material from mining operations that vary a good 
deal in their scale and location. This type of variation is not found in 
PNG’s five mineral provinces, where each big mining project consists of 
a single processing plant that derives its raw material from a single mining 
operation. Yet these projects also vary in scale and location and impact, 
and this variation in the ‘forces of production’ is related to variations in 
way that ‘mine-affected communities’ are constructed as political entities 
in their own right and the way that ‘localities’ are to be defined in any 
assessment of local-level politics.
The entire population of Bougainville has come to be constructed as 
a single ‘mine-affected community’ because of the conflict that initially 
led to the closure of the Panguna mine and then escalated in the wake 
of that event, even if the customary owners of the mine lease areas still 
count as a more specific collection of political actors with a greater sense 
of grievance and entitlement (Chapter 12). Two-thirds of the population 
of PNG’s Western Province has been officially recognised as a community 
or collection of communities affected by the operation of the Ok Tedi 
mine because of the scale of the environmental damage it has caused 
(Chapter 8). In contrast, the community affected by the Lihir project in 
New Ireland Province is generally defined—and certainly defines itself—
as a much smaller collection of people with customary rights to land in 
the offshore group of islands where the mine is located (Chapters 10 
and 11). And the communities affected by some of the mining projects 
in NC may be smaller still, comprising the resident populations of single 
communes or municipalities (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). But then again, as in 
the case of Bougainville, it could be argued that the whole of the Kanak 
population counts as one ‘mine-affected community’ because of the way 
that control of the mining industry has come to be defined as a focal point 
in their struggles for autonomy and independence. Furthermore, NC has 
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the hallmarks of a single mining enclave or mineral province because of 
the density of the physical and social networks linking all of the actors 
in the local nickel industry, despite the segmentary form of local politics.
In our previous comparison between national jurisdictions, we were 
mainly concerned with the difference between (national-level) political 
institutions that have influenced or constrained the relationship between 
large-scale mines and local-level politics. This type of comparison bestows 
a measure of primacy on the ‘state corner’ in our rectangular model of 
stakeholder relationships, even when the relative ‘power of the state’ 
is understood to be something that varies from one jurisdiction to 
another. We are now moving in a rather different direction, where each 
mineral province is not only conceived as a sub-national level of political 
organisation, but also as a geographical space within which state actors 
have developed a distinctive set of political relationships with actors in the 
corporate, social and community corners. And at this juncture, we need 
to be wary of an ambiguity commonly found in academic discussion of 
the ‘politics of scale’, whereby scales and levels of political (or economic) 
organisation are not clearly differentiated because both are treated as 
artefacts of political (or economic) activity (Leitner et al. 2008; Huber 
and Emel 2009; Allen 2017).
Once this ambiguity is resolved, two additional dimensions can be added 
to the institutional dimension of difference in the politics of the mining 
industry. On one hand, there is a vertical or organisational dimension in 
which all four corners of our rectangular model, including the community 
corner, are internally stratified into levels or layers, so that some positions 
or roles are notionally ‘higher up’ than others. On the other hand, there 
is a horizontal or spatial dimension in which the four corners are also 
internally divided by the relative geographical proximity of different 
positions or roles to the project that constitutes the focal point of political 
activity. In both dimensions, there is room for variation in the number 
of political roles, and hence the number of political actors, in each of the 
four corners, including the number that belong to the ‘local’ level in an 
organisational hierarchy or the ‘central’ zone in a sort of spatial hierarchy. 
The point of making this distinction is to understand the powers exercised 
by actors who occupy one position in the organisational dimension and 
another position in the spatial dimension. If we look at the corporate 
corner, for example, we commonly find that a multinational mining 
company’s ‘country manager’, operating at the national level, typically has 
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less power than the mine manager who operates at the local level. Both are 
separately accountable to the company’s global or regional headquarters, 
but the country manager is typically responsible for the management of 
relationships with state actors who also operate at the national level, in the 
national capital, whereas the mine manager is responsible for the actual 
operation of the mine, as well as the management of relationships with 
mine-affected communities.
Even in the state corner, where the powers formally exercised by 
politicians and public servants commonly seem to be a function of their 
level of election or appointment, the powers that they actually exercise at 
a local level often turn out to be a function of their political and social 
connections to the place where a mining project is located. What this 
means is that the distance between the project and the capital of the 
mineral province in which it is located, let alone the national capital, 
generally turns out to be a critical variable in the exercise of state power. 
And in the community corner itself, where the emergence or elaboration 
of an organisational hierarchy often counts as one of the effects of a large-
scale mining project, there is no reason to assume that the actors who 
occupy the most senior positions will be those who occupy the innermost 
zone of maximal environmental impact. In other words, the practice of 
local-level politics may be partly motivated by a mismatch between the 
internal organisation of ‘the community’—or its form of representation—
and the relative proximity of different groups of people to the site of the 
mining operation, or the degree of ‘impact’ that they experience as a result 
of it, or the types and amounts of benefits (or costs) that they derive 
from it.
The exercise of power in the practice of local-level politics is not simply 
a function of the position that an actor happens to occupy in one of 
the four corners of our rectangular model, or in one of the levels in an 
organisational hierarchy, or one of the concentric zones of impact or 
benefit, grievance or entitlement, that surround a specific mining project. 
As stated in the introduction to this volume, it is primarily revealed 
in the capacity of actors to engage in specific forms of action: to move 
from one corner to another, from one level to another, from one zone 
to another; to control, support or attack the movements of other actors 
between different positions; and to challenge or defend the legitimacy 
of the positions themselves, as well as the manner of their occupation.
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The history of mine-related political action in Bougainville (Chapter 12) 
presents us with an extreme case of the fluidity and complexity that can 
result from this exercise of power. The closure of the Panguna mine was 
not only accompanied by the evacuation of the corporate corner and the 
collapse of the organisational hierarchy of the provincial government, 
but also by the emergence of new (contested) hierarchies along the axis 
linking the community and social corners within the province. This in 
turn entailed the emergence of new (contested) distinctions between 
these two corners, and hence in the definition of who has how much of 
a claim to be part of the community affected either by the mine or by 
the conflict that engulfed it. While Anthony Regan argues that the social 
corner was barely occupied until foreign activists began to campaign 
against the reopening of the mine, it is clear from his own account that it 
was already occupied by the Christian churches and other organisations 
during the original campaign over the distributional issue. More recently, 
the state and corporate corners have been repopulated in new forms, but 
the distributional and representational issues are still deeply contentious.
The Ok Tedi mine was the second of PNG’s mining projects to be 
designated as a project of ‘national significance’, but despite its size and 
the physical extent of its impact, this mine has acquired a form of local-
level politics that is quite unlike its counterpart in Bougainville. For one 
thing, there has been much greater interference by national-level state 
actors, partly to offset or reinforce the marginal role of the Fly River 
Provincial Government. Although this aspect of the balance of power 
within the state corner has not prevented the mining company or its 
corporate shareholders from performing a quasi-governmental role, the 
recent nationalisation of the mine has only served to make the company 
seem even more like a branch of the national government (Chapter 8). 
The consolidation of a multifunctional organisational hierarchy along this 
axis has been accompanied by a division of the mine-affected area into zones 
whose boundaries have been largely uncontested, and the communities 
contained within these zones are notable for the absence of organisational 
hierarchies in which positions of leadership or seniority are the subject of 
alternative forms of political contest. As a result, the organisational (and 
institutional) complexity that surrounds the operation of the mine and the 
management of ‘community affairs’ has no counterpart in a community 
corner that seems to be as ‘flat’ as it is ‘wide’ (Burton 1997). And despite 
the activation of the social corner during the (relatively brief ) period when 
some community members were engaged in litigation against the mining 
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company, this is a case that shows the absence of any correlation between 
the scale of a mining project and the amount of local-level politics that it 
generates. It is more like an extreme case of a mine that functions as an 
‘anti-politics machine’ (Ferguson 1990).
The Koniambo project is the closest approximation to a project of 
national  significance in NC, even if the nation in question is the one 
imagined by the Kanak nationalist movement. Its scale relative to the size 
and population of North Province is comparable to that of the Panguna 
and Ok Tedi mines in their respective provinces, but because it has only 
been developed over the course of the past decade, there remains a good 
deal of uncertainty about the direction in which the practice of local-
level politics is moving. In the planning and construction of the main 
processing plant, provincial state actors have played a mediating role 
between the corporate and community corners (Chapter 2), which is not 
unlike the role played by some national state actors in the original planning 
and construction of the Panguna and Ok Tedi projects during the 1960s 
and 1970s. This means that the risk of ‘social disintegration’ within the 
community corner has been addressed by the application of ‘normative 
frameworks’ generated at the provincial (state) level (Chapters 2 and 3). 
Nevertheless, these efforts have not been sufficient to conceal horizontal 
lines of political cleavage between zones of engagement (or entitlement) 
in the ‘logic of proximity’ to the processing plant, since community actors 
at the centre of the action appear to be less satisfied with the provincial 
solution to the distributional issue, and more inclined to support or 
oppose the project on the grounds of their ‘traditional’ political divisions 
(Chapter 3).
As previously noted, the factor that complicates the mediating role of 
(provincial) state actors in this context is the dual form of organisational 
hierarchy in which some of these actors occupy positions in the 
neotraditional political system as well as the formal system of electoral 
politics and bureaucratic administration. The split between chieftaincies 
and municipalities in the practice of local-level politics seems to have been 
less significant in the recent history of the Koniambo project than in the 
contest surrounding the closure and possible reopening of the Boakaine 
mine in the same province (Chapter 4). If this mine were to reopen, then 
it would be part of the network of relatively small mining operations that 
supply additional raw material to the Gwangyang plant in South Korea 
(Chapter 3), but its continued closure signals the presence of a barrier 
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between the contested politics of the local community—the municipality 
and chieftaincies of Canala—and the entanglements of corporate and 
state actors operating at the level of North Province (Chapter 2). 
If this form of political disengagement has been a function of the physical 
distance between the mine-affected community and the provincial capital, 
the same point would seem to apply to the neighbouring community of 
Thio in South Province (Chapter 5). In this case also, mining operations 
were disrupted by an episode of political conflict, yet the causes and 
consequences of that conflict were different because the practice of local-
level politics in this community has reflected the relative subordination 
and marginalisation of Kanak political actors in a different provincial 
context. In this case, the French company that ‘traditionally’ dominated 
the whole of the mining industry in NC was unable to maintain its 
customary practice of dealing privately with community protest, while 
community leaders deliberately made the conflict public as part of their 
demand for state actors to take more responsibility for validating their 
new deal with the company. However, this process itself has resulted in 
new forms of community engagement with actors operating in the social 
corner, whose actions tend now to be justified by reference to global, 
rather than provincial or national, normative frameworks.
These new forms of engagement are even more prominent in the politics 
of the Goro project, which is the second of the truly modern large-scale 
projects in NC, albeit one whose ‘mine-affected community’ is no larger 
than those attached to the medium-scale mining operations in Canala 
and Thio (Chapter 6). Here the social corner has been occupied by 
international and Caledonian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
concerned with environmental protection, operating in an unstable 
(and sometimes ruptured) alliance with community organisations and 
‘customary authorities’ (Horowitz 2012). These actors have combined 
different forms of expression, protest and action, from the mobilisation 
of legal competencies and scientific counter-expertise to demonstration, 
blockage and a limited use of violence. While the NGOs have taken on 
some aspects of the mediating role played by provincial (state) actors in 
the organisation of the Koniambo project, their involvement has also 
created the opportunity for community actors to adopt a wider range 
of strategies and tactics in their own attempts to extract a ‘sustainable 
development agreement’ from the mining company (even if the company 
has since failed to uphold its own side of that bargain).
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On most counts, the Lihir project in PNG is bigger than both the 
Goro and Koniambo projects, but has never been officially designated 
as a project of national significance, and is isolated from the capital 
of  its mineral province, not only in terms of physical distance but also 
by virtue of its location on a small island. The insularity of the mine-
affected community has exercised a profound influence on the practice 
of local-level politics, in a manner that would no doubt be replicated if 
a large-scale mine were to be developed on one of the islands in NC’s 
Loyalty Islands Province. While this community is internally divided by 
the strength of claims to ownership of the customary land leased to the 
mining company, and hence by a ‘logic of proximity’, it is also united by 
an ideology of landownership that denies membership of the community 
to anyone who lacks customary land rights in any part of the Lihir island 
group. While the status of the ‘immigrant outsider’ has become a political 
issue in the vicinity of other mining projects (Chapters 2 and 5), and was 
indeed one of the issues behind the eruption of the conflict that closed 
the Panguna mine (Chapter 12), this issue has taken on a peculiar form 
in the Lihirian context because of the way that such people have become 
the clients of ‘landowner patrons’ competing with each other for positions 
of seniority in the community’s ‘socioeconomic hierarchy’ (Chapter 11). 
In effect, community leaders have reconstructed the social corner in our 
rectangular model to be one that is not occupied by ‘civil society’, but by 
members of a national society who have no formal rights to occupy any 
of the other three corners, and therefore constitute a rather different kind 
of nuisance.
The community–society axis has another kind of significance in 
this context, because of the way that the PNG Government has been 
persuaded (primarily by actors from the World Bank Group) to adopt 
the principle of ‘gender mainstreaming’ or ‘gender equity’ as a feature of 
its own mineral policy regime. This has created a space or corridor within 
the social corner through which a few Lihirian women have departed 
the shores of their island community in order to participate in national 
and global debates about the implementation of this policy. However, as 
Susan Hemer explains (in Chapter 10), this opportunity has been taken at 
the cost of their status and influence within a community in which men 
seek to maintain a ‘customary’ monopoly over the practice of local-level 
politics, and women can only be granted a form of authority if it is not 
‘political’.
Large-Scale Mines and Local-Level Politics
430
Four-Wheel Drive?
While a case can be made for limiting the definition of ‘local-level politics’ 
to the political practice that takes place within mine-affected communities 
and along the three channels of communication between community 
actors and actors in the other three corners of our rectangular model, the 
internal constitution of the other three corners, and the three distinctive 
channels of communication between them, can also have local dimensions 
and effects (Chapter  9). If the roles or positions assembled in each of 
these four corners constitute the political structure of the mining industry 
in a formal sense, the manner in which they are created and occupied 
is closely related to what we have called the representational issue, which 
is one of the two big issues on which our political actors act (Chapter 1). 
However, we can now see why the representational issue is somewhat 
less significant than the distributional issue, since the positions that our 
actors occupy can mostly be assigned to the organisational dimension of 
difference between the sites of their political activity. The distributional 
issue, by contrast, is a matter of substance with which they engage from 
positions in all three of the dimensions of difference that we have so far 
identified—not just the organisational dimension, but also the spatial and 
institutional dimensions.
This leads us to wonder whether there is a fourth dimension of difference 
or variation in the relationship between large-scale mines and local-level 
politics that could be just as significant. One obvious candidate would 
be the gender dimension, since it is widely recognised that big mining 
projects normally have a significant impact on gender relations in mine-
affected communities (Lahiri-Dutt  2011). There is clearly a good deal 
of scope for variation between different projects, not only in the extent 
to which this impact has become a political issue for different groups 
of actors, but also in the consequences of the policies or activities by 
which it is addressed. The main reason that we have not treated this as 
the fourth dimension of difference in this volume is that only one of our 
contributors has dealt with the gendered nature of local-level politics in 
any detail (Chapter 10), so we do not have much additional light to cast 
on the difference between NC and PNG, or the variation between mining 
projects or mineral provinces, in this particular respect.
The second obvious candidate for recognition as a fourth dimension is the 
temporal dimension inherent in the concept of the mining ‘project cycle’ 
that leads from exploration to closure. The addition of this dimension 
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is certainly consistent with our argument that what really counts in any 
analysis of local-level politics is the way that actors shift themselves and 
others from one position to another, since these forms of mobility have 
their own particular time scales. It might also be argued that the balance 
of power between different groups of actors—and especially between the 
four corners of our rectangular model—tends to change over the different 
phases of the mining project cycle in ways that are independent of any 
particular institutional context (Chapter 2). This type of systematic shift 
has been ascribed to a form of ‘capital logic’ that applies to the relationship 
between large-scale mines and local-level politics in many different 
countries (Gerritsen and Macintyre 1991), and could therefore be seen as 
one aspect of the general process of modernisation and globalisation. The 
logic in question is one that operates around changes in the relationship 
between the costs borne or felt by mine-affected communities and the 
financial capacity of mining companies to compensate them in different 
phases of the project cycle (Howitt 2001). However, we would argue that 
the existence of three other dimensions of variation is precisely what makes 
it difficult for any group of actors to predict—and hence to manage—
the temporal transformations of power. Indeed, this is one of the main 
reasons why large-scale mining projects are subject to moments of rupture 
that come as a surprise to most of the actors who think they understand 
the local political trajectory. The forced closure of the Panguna mine is 
an obvious case in point (Chapter 12), but other contributions to this 
volume provide examples of ‘nasty surprises’ that disrupted the smooth 
passage of the mining project cycle (Chapters 4, 5 and 8). Whether or 
not these moment of rupture count as episodes of political conflict, the 
complexity of structural transformation is what enables actors to have the 
kind of agency that defies the power of management, and often leads to 
unintended and unwelcome outcomes.
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